Com. v. Turpin, N. ( 2019 )


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  • J-A16021-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    NORMAN SHAHEE TURPIN                    :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 1871 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 25, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
    CP-67-CR-0003242-2017
    BEFORE:    LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                             FILED JUNE 17, 2019
    Norman Shahee Turpin (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
    sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of criminal conspiracy to deliver
    heroin, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1). After careful review, we affirm.
    On April 5, 2017, Detective Russell Schauer, a team leader in the York
    County Drug Task Force unit, directed a controlled purchase of narcotics.
    Detective Schauer testified:
    [T]he [confidential] informant . . . debriefed me [about] what was
    going to happen or what they expected to happen. We then put
    a plan in place to watch what was predicted to happen, and that
    is the informant was to purchase 3 grams of heroin for $320
    through a middleman. This we were able to identify as Sean
    Thomas. Sean Thomas would take them to a location in York City
    where they would purchase the heroin [from] another individual
    and they would travel back to a hotel.
    N.T., 5/8/18, at 85. Detective Schauer explained that the CI and Thomas
    agreed to meet at the Econo Lodge Motel on Route 30. Detective Schauer
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A16021-19
    provided the CI with official funds1 to make the drug purchase. Id. at 87.
    Detective Schauer observed Thomas exit the motel and enter the CI’s vehicle.
    The CI drove the vehicle into the city, and parked on South Queen Street and
    East Cottage. Id. at 89. Thomas then exited the vehicle and began to walk
    south towards East Cottage, where he met Appellant. Id. at 90. Appellant
    and Thomas engaged in a hand-to-hand transaction and then separated.
    Thomas returned to the vehicle and gave the heroin to the CI; the CI then
    proceeded to drive the two men back to the Econo Lodge. Id. at 93. Detective
    Schauer directed police in a marked patrol car to follow the vehicle and arrest
    Thomas and the CI (the latter being arrested as a ruse), and the police
    recovered heroin from the CI. Id. at 92-93.
    Following his arrest, Thomas identified his supplier as Appellant and
    agreed to participate in a controlled purchase.    Id. at 97.   Thomas called
    Appellant to set up a meeting for Thomas to purchase 5 grams of heroin for
    $425 from Appellant. Thomas and Appellant agreed to meet at East Cottage.
    Upon observing Appellant arrive at the location, Detective Schauer authorized
    Appellant’s arrest. A search of Appellant revealed an iPhone, wallet, and three
    $20 bills, but no drugs. Id. at 102. However, Detective Schauer testified that
    ____________________________________________
    1Official funds are money provided by the police department; the currency is
    photographed or photocopied to record the serial number and track the
    money.
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    J-A16021-19
    the three $20 bills recovered from Appellant matched the same official funds
    provided to the CI during the initial controlled purchase. Id. at 111.
    The Commonwealth charged Appellant with possession with intent to
    deliver drugs, criminal conspiracy, and possession with intent to deliver a non-
    controlled substance.2 A jury trial was held on May 8, 2018 and May 9, 2018,
    during which the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Detective
    Schauer, Officer Adam Bruckhart and Sean Thomas to describe the
    transactions they witnessed. No defense witnesses took the stand. At the
    conclusion of trial, the jury acquitted Appellant of both possession charges,
    but convicted him of criminal conspiracy. On June 25, 2018, the trial court
    sentenced Appellant to 21 to 42 months of incarceration. Appellant filed a
    timely post-sentence motion, which was denied following a hearing on October
    30, 2018.
    This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied with the trial court’s
    directive to supply a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained
    of on appeal. The trial court has filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
    Appellant presents a single issue for our review: “[Did t]he Commonwealth
    present[ ] insufficient evidence in order to sustain a conviction for conspiracy
    to deliver heroin since there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of an
    ____________________________________________
    235 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1), and 35 P.S. § 780-
    113(a)(35).
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    agreement between Appellant and Sean Thomas for Thomas to deliver drugs
    to a third party.” Appellant’s Brief at 4.3
    Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled:
    As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims
    requires that we evaluate the record “in the light most favorable
    to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
    reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”
    Commonwealth v. Widmer, [ ] 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751 ([Pa.] 2000).
    “Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
    establishes each material element of the crime charged and the
    commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    Commonwealth v. Brewer, 
    876 A.2d 1029
    , 1032 (Pa. Super.
    2005).
    Nevertheless, “the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
    mathematical certainty.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v.
    Aguado, 
    760 A.2d 1181
    , 1185 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“[T]he facts
    and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not be
    absolutely incompatible with the defendant’s innocence”). Any
    doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact
    finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a
    matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
    combined circumstances. See Commonwealth v. DiStefano,
    
    782 A.2d 574
    , 582 (Pa. Super. 2001).
    The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly
    circumstantial evidence. See Brewer, 
    876 A.2d at 1032
    .
    Accordingly, “[t]he fact that the evidence establishing a
    ____________________________________________
    3 Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement of errors contains issues that Appellant
    failed to address in his statement of questions involved or in the body of his
    brief, including a challenge to the admissibility of testimony and a weight of
    the evidence claim. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/6/18. Because
    Appellant has abandoned these issues on appeal, we will not address them.
    See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in
    the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”); see also
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119; Gurley v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
    113 A.3d 283
    ,
    288 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2015) (issue is waived for purposes of appellate review
    when an appellant does not develop it in brief).
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    defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial does not
    preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the
    reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the
    presumption of innocence.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Murphy, 
    795 A.2d 1025
    , 1038–39 (Pa. Super. 2002)).
    Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the
    fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the
    light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the
    respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable
    doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be upheld. See Brewer,
    
    876 A.2d at 1032
    .
    Commonwealth v. Franklin, 
    69 A.3d 719
    , 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Pettyjohn, 
    64 A.3d 1072
    , 2013 49 (Pa. Super.
    2013)).
    The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines conspiracy as follows:
    § 903. Criminal conspiracy
    (a) Definition of conspiracy. -- A person is guilty of conspiracy
    with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent
    of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
    (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they
    or one or more of them will engage in conduct which
    constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to
    commit such crime; or
    (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the
    planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt
    or solicitation to commit such crime.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
    In other words, the Commonwealth must prove:
    (1) the defendant intended to commit or aid in the commission of
    the criminal act; (2) the defendant entered into an agreement with
    another (a ‘co-conspirator’) to engage in the crime; and (3) the
    defendant or one or more of the other co-conspirators committed
    an overt act in furtherance of the agreed upon crime. The essence
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    of a criminal conspiracy, which is what distinguishes this crime
    from accomplice liability, is the agreement made between the co-
    conspirators.
    Commonwealth v. Murphy, 
    844 A.2d 1228
    , 1238 (Pa. 2004) (internal
    quotation marks and citations omitted).
    This Court has held that “[t]he essence of a criminal conspiracy is the
    common understanding that a particular criminal objective is to be
    accomplished.”   Commonwealth v. Lambert, 
    795 A.2d 1010
    , 1016 (Pa.
    Super. 2002). Mere presence at the scene of a crime or association with the
    perpetrators is not sufficient. 
    Id.
     “Rather, the Commonwealth must prove
    that the defendant shared the criminal intent, i.e., that the Appellant was “an
    active participant in the criminal enterprise and that he had knowledge of the
    conspiratorial agreement.” 
    Id.
     Proof of a conspiracy is nearly always based
    on circumstantial evidence.     
    Id.
       “The conduct of the parties and the
    circumstances surrounding their conduct may create ‘a web of evidence’
    linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    719 A.2d 778
    , 784 (Pa. Super. 1998
    (en banc)).   “The evidence must, however, ‘rise above mere suspicion or
    possibility of guilty collusion.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Commonwealth v. Swerdlow,
    
    636 A.2d 1173
     (Pa. Super. 1994)).
    The following four factors are relevant in discerning the existence of a
    criminal conspiracy:
    Among the circumstances which are relevant, but not sufficient by
    themselves, to prove a corrupt confederation are:         (1) an
    association between alleged conspirators; (2) knowledge of the
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    J-A16021-19
    commission of the crime; (3) presence at the scene of the crime;
    and (4) in some situations, participation in the object of the
    conspiracy. The presence of such circumstances may furnish a
    web of evidence linking an accused to an alleged conspiracy
    beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed in conjunction with each
    other and in the context in which they occurred.
    
    Id.
     (quoting Commonwealth v. Olds, 
    469 A.2d 1072
    , 1075 (Pa. Super.
    1983).
    Appellant argues that the record does not contain sufficient evidence of
    an agreement between Appellant and Thomas to commit a criminal act. In
    particular, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
    existence of an agreement between Appellant and Thomas that Thomas would
    sell the heroin that he purchased from Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 11-15.
    This argument is not supported by prevailing law.
    As noted above, our Courts have found evidence of an agreement to be
    lacking where the evidence reflected nothing more than a mere association
    among the alleged co-conspirators.     For example, in Commonwealth v.
    Kennedy, 
    453 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1982), the appellant and his co-defendant got
    into a spontaneous argument with the appellant’s landlord and beat him
    severely. Id. at 929. The Supreme Court reasoned that the simultaneous
    participation in an assault that “erupted from an argument” was not “indicative
    of there having been an agreement, explicit or implicit, as to commission of
    the assault.” Id. at 930. The Court concluded that the incident was “perfectly
    consistent with the presumption that [the co-defendant] acted independently
    and spontaneously,” and that the record contained “no evidence upon which
    existence of the common understanding or agreement requisite to the charge
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    of conspiracy might properly be inferred[.]” Id. Thus, the Supreme Court
    affirmed this Court’s order vacating the conspiracy conviction. Id.
    In Commonwealth v. McCall, 
    911 A.2d 992
     (Pa. Super. 2006), officers
    observed the defendant looking up and down a street on which his cohorts
    were selling narcotics.   After several transactions, the defendant received
    some cash from his cohorts. The police apprehended the defendant and a
    search revealed $1,508.00 in cash.       This Court concluded that sufficient
    evidence of a conspiracy existed, reasoning “[e]ven though [the defendant]
    did not physically handle the drugs transacted, he clearly took an active role
    in the illicit enterprise” by acting as a lookout and receiving proceeds from
    sales. 
    Id. at 997
    .
    Here, the evidence shows that Appellant coordinated with Thomas to
    possess and deliver controlled substances.        Detective Schauer observed
    Appellant deliver heroin to Thomas in exchange for money, and later observed
    Appellant return to the same location to conduct another transaction. At the
    time of Appellant’s arrest, the police confiscated funds that were later
    identified as the same official funds used in the initial controlled purchase.
    As in McCall, the evidence presented supports a finding that Appellant
    took an active role in a drug-selling enterprise with Thomas, i.e., intended and
    agreed with Thomas to commit a criminal act, and committed an overt act by
    providing Thomas with heroin in exchange for cash.          For instance, police
    observed Appellant return to the location of the controlled purchase, where he
    possessed the same official funds used during the initial exchange with
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    Thomas. Therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
    as the verdict winner, the evidence sufficed to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt the existence of an agreement between Appellant and Thomas to deliver
    heroin.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 06/17/2019
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