Com. v. Nguyen, T. ( 2016 )

J-S66043-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
THUONG M. NGUYEN
Appellant No. 1849 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 8, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000080-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 13, 2016
Thuong M. Nguyen (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas following his
bench trial convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”) 1 and his
summary offense of disregarding a traffic lane.2 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
On January 4, 2015, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Pennsylvania State Police
Trooper Elizabeth Rita Clatch was operating her marked police vehicle when
she observed Appellant’s vehicle cross over the double yellow lines twice.
She activated her video recorder and followed Appellant, who varied his
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1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) and (b).
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 3309.
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speed between 35 and 45 miles per hour and partially crossed over the
yellow lines on three more occasions. Based on her experience with DUI
offenses and the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Clatch believed
Appellant was DUI and pulled over his vehicle. She proceeded to give
Appellant a breathalyzer test.
Appellant was arrested and charged with DUI (general impairment),
DUI (high rate of alcohol, Bac. 0.10-0.16), disregarding a traffic lane, and
careless driving.3 On April 2, 2015, Appellant entered into a guilty plea,
which he subsequently withdrew. On August 6, 2015, Appellant filed a
motion to suppress evidence, alleging Trooper Clatch did not have probable
cause to justify her stop, and requesting the trial court to suppress all
evidence obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. On August 18,
2015, the court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress. The
court denied Appellant’s suppression motion, conducted a bench trial,
convicted Appellant of the aforementioned convictions, and acquitted him of
careless driving.
On October 8, 2015, the court sentenced Appellant to fifteen (15) days
to six (6) months of incarceration, plus fines and costs. On October 23,
2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.4
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3
75 Pa.C.S. § 3714(a).
4
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN
DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE?
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
In his combined issues, Appellant argues that, because Trooper Clatch
did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle, the trial court
erred by denying his suppression motion. We disagree.
When addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression
motion, our standard of review is “whether the factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from these
facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 45 A.3d 1123, 1126
(Pa.Super.2012), appeal denied, 53 A.3d 756 (Pa.2012) (internal citation
omitted). Further:
[w]hen reviewing the rulings of a suppression court, we
must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so
much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are
in error.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, when
reviewing the suppression court’s rulings, we consider only the suppression
record. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa.2013) (“it is inappropriate to
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consider trial evidence as a matter of course, because it is simply not part of
the suppression record, absent a finding that such evidence was unavailable
during the suppression hearing.”).
Pennsylvania recognizes three types of interactions between police
officers and citizens. Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123,
1126-27, (Pa.Super.2003). “Interaction between citizens and police officers,
under search and seizure law, is varied and requires different levels of
justification depending upon the nature of the interaction and whether or not
the citizen is detained.” Id.The first category, a mere encounter or request for
information, does not need to be supported by any level of
suspicion, and does not carry any official compulsion to
stop or respond. The second category, an investigative
detention, derives from [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8, 88
S. Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)] and its
progeny: such a detention is lawful if supported by
reasonable suspicion because, although it subjects a
suspect to a stop and a period of detention, it does not
involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the
functional equivalent of an arrest. The final category, the
arrest or custodial detention, must be supported by
probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 884 (Pa.Super.2009) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Moyer, 954 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa.Super.2008) (en banc)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 836 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa.2003))).
“Police must have reasonable suspicion that a person seized is
engaged in unlawful activity before subjecting that person to an investigative
detention.” Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 306
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(Pa.Super.2011), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 442 (Pa.2012) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Cottman, 764 A.2d 595 (Pa.Super.2000)).
Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able
to articulate specific observations which, in conjunction
with reasonable inferences derived from those
observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of
his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that
the person he stopped was involved in that activity.
Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court
must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts
available to the officer at the moment of intrusion warrant
a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the
action taken was appropriate.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116
(Pa.Super.2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
At the suppression hearing, the court made the following findings of
fact before denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence:
The trooper was trained in DUI detection…. She has
experience in DUI investigation and stops…. [S]he was
traveling north on State Route 550 when she observed
[Appellant’s] vehicle prior to activating her camera…. She
witnessed [Appellant’s] driver’s side go over the double
yellow line twice, driver’s side wheels at least. Once she
activated the video, the [c]ourt observed the vehicle go
over the yellow lines three times from my observations.
The trooper testified [that Appellant varied his] speed….
She also followed [Appellant] for several miles.
She pulled [Appellant] over [based] on the totality of the
circumstances for a DUI investigation. It was a Saturday
night going into early Sunday morning, [and Appellant
was] crossing over the double yellow lines[,] hitting the
double lines[,] and [varying his] speed…. The [c]ourt finds
that the trooper did have probable cause for count 3,
disregard to traffic lanes, to pull over [Appellant] and also
had reasonable suspicion to pull [Appellant] over for
possible [DUI].
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N.T., 8/18/2015, at 25-26.
The suppression court found that Trooper Clatch had reasonable
suspicion that Appellant was DUI and probable cause that Appellant
disregarded traffic lanes to subject Appellant to an investigative detention.
The court’s findings are supported by the record, and its legal conclusions
drawn therefrom are not in error.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/13/2016
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