Com. v. Rivera, C. ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • J-S66040-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    CARLOS M. RIVERA
    Appellant                  No. 2109 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order November 12, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003202-2012
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:                         FILED SEPTEMBER 13, 2016
    Carlos Rivera appeals from an order dismissing his petition for habeas
    corpus, which the lower court properly treated as a petition for relief under
    the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
    On January 31, 2013, Rivera pled guilty to simple assault 2 and was
    sentenced to 6-24 months’ imprisonment. Rivera did not file a direct appeal.
    On September 11, 2015, Rivera filed what he claimed was a habeas
    corpus petition claiming that the court improperly computed his offense
    gravity score at the time of sentencing. The court appointed PCRA counsel.
    On November 6, 2015, counsel filed a “no merit” letter pursuant to
    ____________________________________________
    1
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq.
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2701.
    1
    J-S66040-16
    Commonwealth       v.   Finley,   
    550 A.2d 214
       (Pa.Super.1988),     and
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa.1988), and requested leave
    to withdraw from the case.
    On November 12, 2015, the court granted counsel leave to withdraw
    and entered a notice of intent to dismiss without a hearing. On November
    23, 2015, Rivera filed a pro se “amended PCRA petition” which repeated his
    original claims and also stated that his petition fell within the “newly
    discovered evidence” exception to the PCRA’s statute of limitations.      On
    December 10, 2015, the court dismissed Rivera’s petition.
    One week earlier, on December 3, 2015, Rivera filed a notice of
    appeal. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5), we treat the appeal as timely filed
    on December 10, 2015.        See 
    id.
     (“a notice of appeal filed after the
    announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable
    order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof”).
    Both Rivera and the court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Rivera alleged the following in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement:
    1. Defendant’s gravity score was calculated erroneously by court
    officials; the court completely disregarded ‘Court Procedure Rule
    152,’ relating to the amendment of rules, they ‘altered’ the
    gravity score from a 3 to a 5 thus sentencing the defendant to
    an excessive sentence, due to the court’s negligence.
    a. Defendant points out to the court that how is it possible
    for the court to state that in 1-31-13 sentencing
    defendants (PSI) were a 5 and this present day a (PSI)
    shows that defendant score is a 5? Clearly both erroneous.
    How is that possible? It’s not.
    -2-
    J-S66040-16
    2. The court purported to sentence defendant using the
    guidelines, but applied them erroneously; making the sentence
    illegal and excessive.
    3. Defendant’s constitutional rights were violated; as well as his
    due process in the court proceedings.
    4. Defendant states that there was a ‘conflict of interest’ by
    A.D.A. Dugan prosecuting this case due to the fact that her
    husband a Reading Police Officer was on the scene, having his
    fellow officer been assaulted, causing a very personal vendetta
    against the defendant.
    
    Id.
    Before proceeding to Rivera’s claims, “we must determine if counsel
    has satisfied the requirements to be permitted to withdraw from further
    representation.”     Commonwealth v. Freeland, 
    106 A.3d 768
    , 774
    (Pa.Super.2014).    Competent PCRA counsel must conduct an independent
    review of the record before we can authorize counsel’s withdrawal. 
    Id.
     The
    independent review
    requires counsel to file a ‘no-merit’ letter detailing the nature
    and extent of his review and list[ing] each issue the petitioner
    wishes to have examined, explaining why those issues are
    meritless. The PCRA court, or an appellate court if the no-merit
    letter is filed before it, then must conduct its own independent
    evaluation of the record and agree with counsel that the petition
    is without merit.
    
    Id.
     (internal citation omitted).
    PCRA counsel must also “serve a copy on the petitioner of counsel’s
    application to withdraw as counsel, and must supply to the petitioner both a
    copy of the ‘no-merit’ letter and a statement advising the petitioner that . . .
    he or she has the right to proceed pro se or with the assistance of privately
    -3-
    J-S66040-16
    retained counsel.”        Commonwealth v. Widgins, 
    29 A.3d 816
    , 818
    (Pa.Super.2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Friend, 
    896 A.2d 607
    (Pa.Super.2006), abrogated in part by Commonwealth v. Pitts, 
    981 A.2d 875
    , 876 (Pa.2009)).
    Counsel substantially complied with the dictates of Turner/Finley. In
    her no-merit letter, counsel provided a summary of the facts and procedural
    history of the case with citations to the record, provided citations to relevant
    case law, and concluded that the appeal was wholly frivolous.          Counsel
    asserted in her motion to withdraw that she made a careful and
    conscientious review of the record, researched the issues and potential
    issues for appeal, and determined that Rivera’s appeal was without merit.
    Further, counsel notified Rivera of her withdrawal request and sent him a
    letter explaining his right to proceed pro se or with new, privately-retained
    counsel to raise any additional points or arguments that he believed had
    merit.
    Next, we must determine whether Rivera’s PCRA petition 3 was timely.
    The timeliness of a PCRA petition implicates the jurisdiction of both this
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Although Rivera entitled his original petition as a petition for habeas
    corpus, the lower court properly treated it as a PCRA petition, because it
    challenges the legality of his sentence, an issue squarely within the confines
    of the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vii) (relief available under PCRA
    for “the imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum”); see
    also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (PCRA subsumes writ of habeas corpus unless PCRA
    does not provide potential remedy).
    -4-
    J-S66040-16
    Court and the PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    35 A.3d 44
    , 52
    (Pa.Super.2011), appeal denied, 
    50 A.3d 121
     (Pa.2012). “Pennsylvania law
    makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA
    petition.”   
    Id.
       To “accord finality to the collateral review process[,]” the
    PCRA “confers no authority upon [appellate courts] to fashion ad hoc
    equitable exceptions to the PCRA timebar[.]”      Commonwealth v. Watts,
    
    23 A.3d 980
    , 983 (Pa.2011). With respect to jurisdiction under the PCRA,
    this Court has further explained:
    The most recent amendments to the PCRA...provide a
    PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition,
    shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying
    judgment becomes final. A judgment is deemed final at
    the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
    review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
    time for seeking the review.
    Commonwealth v. Monaco, 
    996 A.2d 1076
    , 1079 (Pa.Super.2010)
    (citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 
    20 A.3d 1210
     (Pa.2011);
    see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). This Court may review a PCRA petition filed
    more than one year after the judgment of sentence becomes final only if the
    claim falls within one of the following three statutory exceptions, which the
    petitioner must plead and prove:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim was the result of
    interference    by   government      officials with    the
    presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
    or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
    laws of the United States;
    -5-
    J-S66040-16
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
    unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
    ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
    the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
    provided in this section and has been held by that court
    to apply retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).            Further, if a petition pleads one of these
    exceptions, the petition will not be considered unless it is “filed within 60
    days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
    9545(b)(2).
    Here, Rivera’s judgment of sentence became final on Monday, March
    4, 2013,4 his deadline for taking a direct appeal to this Court.            See 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).        Accordingly, he had until March 4, 2014 to file a
    timely PCRA petition.       See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).    He filed the present
    PCRA petition on September 11, 2015.             Thus, his petition is patently
    untimely, and we must determine whether he has pled and proved any of
    the exceptions to the PCRA time limitation. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-
    (iii).
    Rivera fails to satisfy any of these exceptions.       Contrary to his
    amended PCRA petition, his claim of an improper offense gravity score does
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The thirtieth day after sentencing, March 2, 2013, fell on a Saturday, thus
    extending the time for appealing to this Court to Monday, March 4, 2013.
    See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908.
    -6-
    J-S66040-16
    not constitute newly discovered evidence (section 9545(b)(1)(ii)), because
    all   information     relating    to   his     sentence   was   publically   available.
    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    67 A.3d 1245
    , 1248-49 (Pa.2013) (matters of
    public record are not unknown for purposes of newly discovered evidence
    exception to PCRA). Nor does Rivera contend that his sentence implicated
    governmental interference or violated a constitutional right that the United
    States Supreme Court or Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held to apply
    retroactively (sections 9545(b)(1)(1) and (iii)).5
    Because Rivera failed to plead and prove any of the statutory
    exceptions to the PCRA time limitation, the PCRA court correctly determined
    that it lacked jurisdiction to hear this petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/13/2016
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Although petitioners cannot waive illegal sentence claims, they must still
    raise such claims in a timely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    5 A.3d 462
    , 465 (Pa.Super.2013). Rivera failed to do so here.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2109 MDA 2015

Filed Date: 9/13/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024