Com. v. Williams, T. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
TYRONE LAMONT WILLIAMS :
:
APPELLANT : No. 249 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004623-2010
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016
Appellant, Tyrone Lamont Williams, appeals from the January 12, 2016
Order dismissing his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, challenging the effectiveness of trial
counsel. After careful review, we affirm.
The detailed facts of the underlying murder conviction are set forth in
our disposition on direct appeal, and we need not restate them in their
entirety. See Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1682 MDA 2012 (Pa.
Super. filed August 12, 2014) (unpublished memorandum).
On January 27, 2012, Appellant was convicted by a jury of First-
Degree Murder1 and related offenses in connection with his participation in
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
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the shooting death of Brandon Granthon after a drug dispute. The trial court
sentenced him to a term of life in prison. Appellant timely appealed and this
Court affirmed his Judgment of Sentence on August 12, 2014.
On March 10, 2015, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA Petition. On
the same day, the PCRA court appointed counsel and ordered counsel to file
a supplemental PCRA Petition. On November 24, 2015, appointed counsel
filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing under the PCRA. On January 6, 2016,
the court held a PCRA hearing, and on January 12, 2016, the PCRA court
dismissed Appellant’s PCRA Petition. Appellant timely appealed and both
parties complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: “Was Appellant’s trial
counsel ineffective as a matter of law for his failure to call desired witness?”
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
When reviewing the denial of PCRA Petition, “we examine whether the
PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “The scope of review is limited to the
findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.” Commonwealth
v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
As an initial matter, we presume that trial counsel was effective unless
the PCRA petitioner proves otherwise. Fears, supra at 804. To establish
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ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must plead and prove (1) the
underlying claim has arguable merit, (2) counsel's actions lacked any
reasonable basis, and (3) counsel's actions prejudiced the petitioner.
Commonwealth v. Miner, 44 A.3d 684, 687 (Pa. Super. 2012). “Counsel's
actions will not be found to have lacked a reasonable basis unless the
petitioner establishes that an alternative not chosen by counsel offered a
potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.”
Id. (citation omitted). To establish prejudice, Appellant must prove that
“absent counsel's conduct, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of
the proceedings would have been different.” Id. (citation omitted).
Appellant bears the burden of proving each of these elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, and his “failure to satisfy any prong of the
ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.”
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 2009) (citation
omitted).
To prove counsel had been ineffective for failing to call a witness, the
PCRA petitioner must show that:
(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available; (3)
counsel knew of, or should have known of the existence of the
witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense;
and (5) the absence of the testimony was so prejudicial to
petitioner to have denied him or her a fair trial.
Commonwealth v. Clark, 961 A.2d 80, 90 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).
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Here, Appellant avers that his trial counsel, Michael Rentschler,
Esquire, was ineffective because he failed to call an alibi witness, Quanisha
Williams. Ms. Williams is Appellant’s niece, and she claims that she was with
Appellant at the time of the crime. Appellant alleges that Attorney
Rentschler knew about Ms. Williams and his failure to investigate her
potential testimony “makes it impossible for a claim that there was a
reasonable basis for not calling her at trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 8.
Appellant further alleges that the failure to call Ms. Williams as a witness
resulted in prejudice to him because, had she been called to testify, the
outcome of the trial would have been different. See id.At the PCRA hearing, Ms. Williams testified that she was with Appellant
at the time of the murder, that she was available and willing to testify at
Appellant’s trial, and that she had contacted Attorney Rentschler several
times prior to trial but never spoke to him and never specified why she
wanted to speak to him. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1/6/16, at 4-9, 16-18. Ms.
Williams’ testified further that she finally spoke with Attorney Rentschler
after the first day of the trial and he told her that she could not be a witness
because she was not sequestered on the first day of trial. Id. at 11-14. Ms.
Williams also testified that she never provided a statement to the police and
that she never told anyone else that she was with Appellant at the time of
the murder. Id. at 14-16
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Appellant testified that he told Attorney Rentschler about Ms. Williams
several times and that Attorney Rentschler attempted to get into contact
with Ms. Williams but they kept missing each other. Id. at 53-54.
In contrast, Attorney Rentschler testified that he did not recall
speaking to Ms. Williams prior to trial, but if he had spoken to her, he would
have advised her to give a statement to the police. Id. at 19. Attorney
Rentschler stated that he reviewed his own files, and they did not indicate
that he spoke to Appellant about Ms. Williams and did not include any
contact information for her. Id. at 25. He further stated that when he took
over the case from another attorney prior to trial, “I went through
everything, and no other prior information was anywhere to be found about
[Ms. Williams].” Id. at 25-26. Attorney Rentschler had copies of all of the
police reports and there was no mention of Ms. Williams in any of them. Id.
at 50. Attorney Rentschler recalled meeting and speaking with Ms. Williams
after the first day of trial and telling her that she could not testify because
she had not been sequestered and she was not previously disclosed as an
alibi witness. Id. at 32-33. Finally, Attorney Rentschler indicated that even
if he had known about Ms. Williams as a potential alibi witness prior to trial,
which he had not, he would not have called her to testify because it would
have been inconsistent with the two different statements that Appellant had
given to police, and, thus, would have presented a third version of events.
Id. at 48-50.
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In denying relief, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant had not met
his burden of proving that Attorney Rentschler should have known about Ms.
Williams, stating that “[t]here is some serious doubt as to whether Attorney
Rentschler knew of [or] should have known about Ms. William[s’] identity.
The testimony at the evidentiary hearing was flatly contradictory[.]” PCRA
Court Order, dated 1/12/16, at 3 (unpaginated). Because Appellant failed to
convince the PCRA court that Attorney Rentschler even knew about Ms.
Williams’ existence prior to trial, Appellant has failed to prove an element
essential to his ineffectiveness claim. The record supports the PCRA court’s
determination and we find no error.
Moreover, even if counsel had been aware of Ms. Williams prior to
trial, Appellant would be unable to prove that he suffered prejudice as a
result of Ms. Williams’ missing alibi testimony. As the PCRA court concluded,
Appellant presented “nothing to indicate that including a third alibi in the
defense would have changed the outcome of the proceeding.” PCRA Court
Order, dated 1/12/16, at 3 (unpaginated). We agree. In light of the trial
evidence, including Appellant’s own conflicting statements made to
detectives, a third version of events put forth by Appellant’s niece would not
have resulted in a different verdict.
After reviewing the evidence with all inferences in favor of the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, we conclude that the record supports the
PCRA court’s determination, which is free of legal error.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2016
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