Gordon, M. v. Gordon, M. ( 2016 )

J-A22026-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MELANIE D. GORDON IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MATTHEW B. GORDON
Appellant No. 2190 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree January 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-951
MELANIE D. GORDON IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MATTHEW B. GORDON
Appellant No. 290 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree January 22, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-951
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2016
Appellant, Matthew B. Gordon (“Husband”), appeals from the decree in
divorce ending his marriage to Appellee, Melanie D. Gordon (“Wife”). On
appeal, Husband raises seven challenges to the trial court’s equitable
distribution order, which after amendment, acted as the final divorce
J-A22026-16
decree.1 After careful review, we conclude that Husband is due no relief, and
therefore affirm.
Husband and Wife had been married for 24 years when Wife filed for
divorce in 2013. On July 15, 2014, the first equitable distribution hearing
was held before a master. Only one witness testified at the hearing, Wife’s
pension valuation expert. That master subsequently recused himself from
the case.
After the appointment of a substitute master, a second hearing was
held on November 10, 2014. At this hearing, Wife presented her own
testimony, as well as further testimony from her pension expert and the
testimony of an expert in home valuation. The next hearing date was set for
January 26, 2015.
Shortly before the scheduled hearing, Wife filed a petition for special
relief seeking access to money in marital accounts. Husband requested a
continuance of the equitable distribution hearing, which was granted. A
hearing on Wife’s petition was subsequently held February 13, 2015, and
testimony was limited to the issue of whether Wife was entitled to access to
a marital stock account prior to a final resolution of the equitable distribution
claims. The master ultimately concluded that no relief was due to Wife, but
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1
Husband’s appeal from the equitable distribution order was premature. See
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). However, we may treat his premature appeal as a
timely appeal of the subsequently entered amendment. See Pa.R.A.P.
905(a)(5).
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ruled that Husband would not be allowed another continuance of the
hearing.
The third hearing was held on March 23, 2015. Husband and Wife
testified and both parties rested. The master issued a report and
recommendation on May 20, 2015, awarding Wife 50.5% of the marital
estate. Husband’s pension from his service as a Pennsylvania State Police
officer, valued at $1,180,097, from which Husband was currently drawing a
monthly income, was by far the largest asset in the marital estate. The
master determined that there were insufficient assets to permit an “in-kind”
distribution to offset Wife’s claim on the pension, and therefore
recommended that the pension be split by a qualified domestic relations
order (“QDRO”), providing that Wife would receive 47.4%2 of Husband’s
monthly payment from the pension.
Husband subsequently filed thirty exceptions to the master’s report,
while Wife filed five. After receiving argument from the parties, the trial
court issued an order adopting the master’s report in whole, with minor
exceptions regarding certain payments made by Wife during the pendency of
this matter, as well as requiring Wife’s pension expert to update the present
value of Husband’s pension.
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2
The master determined that the marital portion of Husband’s pension
constituted 93.92% of the value of the pension.
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Husband filed a notice of appeal from this order. Pursuant to a rule to
show cause issued by this Court, Husband filed a motion for clarification
from the trial court, seeking the inclusion of a divorce decree in the equitable
distribution order. On January 20, 2016, the trial court issued an amended
order of court finalizing the decree in divorce.
On appeal, Husband seeks to raise seven challenges to the trial court’s
equitable distribution award. Initially, we note that the substantive portion of
Husband’s brief on appeal is 45 pages. Therefore, Husband was required to
certify that his brief did not exceed 14,000 words. See Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1).
No such certification is present in his brief.
Furthermore, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 124(a)(4), Husband’s brief was
required to be typed in a font no smaller than 14 point in the body. An
examination of Husband’s brief reveals that the body is typed in 12 point.
Briefs … shall conform in all material respects with the [Rules of
Appellate Procedure] as nearly as the circumstances of the
particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed,
and if the defects … in the brief … of the appellant … are
substantial, the appeal … may be quashed or dismissed.
Pa.R.A.P. 2101. A party wishing to exceed the length limits set forth in the
Rules of Appellate Procedure must request leave of court prior to the
submission of the non-conforming brief. See DeMasi v. DeMasi, 530 A.2d
871, 874 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1987).
Husband’s intentional violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure do
not hamper our ability to dispose of the matters on appeal, and we therefore
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will not quash or dismiss the appeal. However, we cannot condone such
conduct, especially when it is detrimental to an opposing party who
endeavors to remain compliant with the Rules. We therefore conclude that
all content of Husband’s brief beyond page 30 (as numbered) is waived for
failure to abide by the Rules.
Turning to the merits of Husband’s arguments, we note that his
challenges all concern the award of equitable distribution. Our standard of
review in equitable distribution matters is as follows.
A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an
award of equitable distribution. Our standard of review
when assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the
equitable distribution of marital property is whether the
trial court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the
law or failure to follow proper legal procedure. We do not
lightly find an abuse of discretion, which requires a
showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court will
not find an abuse of discretion unless the law has was
been overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised
was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the
certified record. In determining the propriety of an
equitable distribution award, courts must consider the
distribution scheme as a whole. We measure the
circumstances of the case against the objective of
effectuating economic justice between the parties and
achieving a just determination of their property rights.
Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to
weigh the evidence and decide credibility and this Court
will not reverse those determinations so long as they are
supported by the evidence. We are also aware that a
master’s report and recommendation, although only
advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration,
particularly on the question of witnesses, because the
master has the opportunity to observe and assess the
behavior and demeanor of the parties.
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Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
There is no simple formula by which to divide marital property; the
method of distribution derives from the facts of the individual case. See
Gaydos v. Gaydos, 693 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Pa. Super. 1997). In fashioning
an equitable distribution award, the trial court must consider, at a minimum,
the eleven factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502, Equitable division of
marital property, (a) General rule. “The courts attempt to split property
equitably, instead of equally, taking into consideration such factors as length
of marriage, the contributions of both spouses, ages and health of each
spouse.” Taper v. Taper, 939 A.2d 969, 974 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted).
Husband’s first challenge concerns the transcripts of the February 13,
2015 hearing on Wife’s petition for special relief. Husband contends that the
master did not have access to this transcript, and as a result, she did not
consider all the circumstances of the case when she issued her report and
recommendation. He contends that the master’s failure to review the
February 13 transcript deprived the master of important evidence regarding
a stock account owned by Mother.
We need not reach the procedural issue raised by Husband, as we
conclude that any possible error arising from the master not having the
transcript to review was utterly harmless. The petition for special relief dealt
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with Wife’s Edward Jones account, which was an investment and retirement
account. See N.T., Hearing, 2/13/15, at 6. The history of this account was
the subject of extensive questioning during the equitable distribution
hearings. See, e.g., N.T., Hearing, 11/10/14, 220-233; N.T., Hearing,
3/23/15, 22-24, 29-33, 39-41, 177-179, 213-220. Husband does not
identify any crucial evidence that was presented at the special relief hearing
that was not presented during the equitable relief hearing. We thus conclude
that Husband’s first issue on appeal merits no relief.
In any event, we note that the substitute master heard the petition for
special relief on February 13, 2015. She also heard the second equitable
distribution hearing on March 23, 2015. Finally, she issued her report and
recommendation on May 20, 2015, slightly more than three months after the
hearing on the petition for special relief. There is no indication in the record,
nor does Husband cogently argue, that the master had forgotten the
testimony that she heard on February 13, 2015, in three months’ time. The
trial court did not err or commit an abuse of discretion in concluding that the
substitute master “was well aware of the testimony from the special relief
hearing held on February 13, 2015.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/15, at 18.
In his second issue on appeal, Husband contends that the trial court
erred in handling his pension. The crux of Husband’s argument concerns the
present valuation of Wife’s share of his pension. Important to this question is
the fact that, during the marriage, and with Wife’s signed consent, Husband
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chose to have his pension paid out only for the remainder of his life. Should
Husband predecease Wife, the pension payments to both parties would end.
Husband’s argument focuses on the converse scenario where Husband
outlives his actuarially determined life expectancy under the pension plan. If
that happens, Husband argues, Wife would receive a “windfall” of pension
payments over and above the present value assigned to her share of the
pension by the master. However, Husband’s argument fails to acknowledge
that, under the circumstances set forth by Husband, Wife would not receive
a “windfall” at Husband’s expense. Rather, Wife would receive a share of the
“windfall” Husband received from his pension plan. As the pension is
primarily marital property, Wife is entitled to an appropriate share of any
“windfall” derived from the pension. Thus, Husband’s second argument on
appeal merits no relief.
As noted above, we find the remaining five arguments raised by
Husband waived due to Husband’s failure to abide by the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. However, even if we were to reach these issues, we conclude
that none would entitle Husband to relief.
Husband’s third issue amounts to a challenge of the master’s
credibility determinations regarding the use of marital funds for marital
purposes. The trial court gave proper deference to these credibility
determinations, and therefore we would find that the trial court did not err.
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Husband’s fourth issue attacks an error made by the master in
describing certain accounts that were at issue. The trial court reviewed the
record and concluded that the error was merely clerical in nature, and that
the master’s report indicated that the master was aware of the different
accounts at issue. Our review of the record and the master’s report
comports with the trial court’s, and therefore, had we reached this issue, we
would have concluded that the trial court did not err.
In his fifth issue, Husband argues that the master’s finding of a
disparity in non-marital assets was not supported by the record. However,
our review of the record comports with the trial court’s, and we find ample
support for the master’s recommended findings.
Next, Husband asserts that the trial court did not properly weigh the
evidence concerning the tax consequences that apply to his deferred
compensation program. Once again, the trial court was entitled to rely upon
the credibility determinations recommended by the master. Husband’s sixth
argument would merit no relief.
Finally, Husband argues that the trial court erred when it amended the
equitable distribution order pursuant to Husband’s request for clarification.
As noted above, this Court observed that a final decree in divorce had not
been entered when Husband filed this appeal. In response to our rule to
show cause, Husband moved for the trial court to amend its order to include
entry of a decree of divorce. Wife responded by noting that she had no
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objection to the entry of the decree, so long as alimony pendente lite (“APL”)
was continued pending resolution of the appeal.
The trial court amended the equitable distribution order to include the
entry of a divorce decree, but also included a requirement that APL continue
during the appeal. Husband contends that the trial court erred by including
the provision of APL in the amended order. However, Husband’s motion for
clarification noted that Wife concurred with “the filing of this Motion provided
that [Wife’s] award of APL remains in place pending the appeal in this
matter.” Motion for Clarification, 1/19/16, at ¶ 12. Husband’s motion does
not assert any objection to the continuance of APL. This argument would
therefore have been waived on appeal.
Decree affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/23/2016
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