Commonwealth v. Neal , 2016 Pa. Super. 270 ( 2016 )

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2016 PA Super 270COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VAUGHN NEAL,
Appellant No. 2656 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 1, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Municipal Court - Traffic Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0040246-2014
BEFORE: OTT, J., SOLANO, J. AND JENKINS, J.
OPINION BY JENKINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016
Vaughn Neal appeals from an order entered in the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his petition for writ of certiorari. Neal
argued in his certiorari petition that the Philadelphia Municipal Court
erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his person
at the time of his arrest. We remand for further proceedings, including entry
of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Municipal Court.
On November 28, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint
in the Municipal Court charging Neal with knowing and intentional possession
of a controlled substance (“simple possession”).1 On April 10, 2015, Neal
presented a motion to suppress in the Municipal Court, claiming that the
police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain, frisk or search him and lacked
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1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
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probable cause to seize a Bic lighter from his person or open the lighter to
search its interior.2 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Honorable
Jacqueline Frazier-Lyde denied the motion to suppress without entering
findings of fact or conclusions of law. Judge Frazier-Lyde simply announced:
“Motion to suppress denied.” N.T., 4/10/15, at 14-15.
On May 1, 2015, Neal proceeded to trial before another Municipal
Court judge, who found him guilty of simple possession and sentenced him
to six months’ probation.
On May 29, 2015, Neal filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, arguing that the Municipal Court
erroneously decided the motion to suppress. Initially, the Court of Common
Pleas granted Neal’s petition, but the Commonwealth moved for
reconsideration. On July 31, 2015, the Court of Common Pleas granted the
Commonwealth’s motion for reconsideration and denied Neal’s petition. Neal
filed a timely appeal to this Court, and both Neal and the Court of Common
Pleas complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Neal raises two issues in this appeal:
1. Did not the courts below err in denying [] Neal’s motion to
suppress physical evidence, where a police officer stopped []
Neal simply because he had exited a car that the police officer
knew had been involved with drug activity in the past?
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2
The parties allege that the arresting officer found packets of crack cocaine
stored inside the lighter.
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2. Did not the courts below err in denying [] Neal’s motion to
suppress physical evidence, where a police officer searched []
Neal’s cigarette lighter, a closed container without a warrant, or
warrant exception?
Brief For Appellant, at 3.
Because Judge Frazier-Lyde failed to enter findings of fact or
conclusions of law, we remand the case with instructions for Judge Frazier-
Lyde to enter these findings and conclusions. We explain our decision as
follows.
A suppression hearing is an evidentiary proceeding in which “the
Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence
and of establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in
violation of the defendant’s rights. The defendant may testify at such
hearing …” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). At the conclusion of the suppression
hearing, “the judge shall enter on the record a statement of findings of fact
and conclusions of law as to whether the evidence was obtained in violation
of the defendant’s rights, or in violation of these rules or any statute, and
shall make an order granting or denying the relief sought.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
581(I).
When the Municipal Court (1) denies a motion to suppress, (2) finds
the defendant guilty of a crime, and (3) imposes sentence, the defendant
has the right either to request a trial de novo or to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Pa.R.Crim.P.
1006(1)(a). If the defendant files a certiorari petition challenging the denial
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of a suppression motion, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
sits as an appellate court and reviews the record of the suppression hearing
in the Municipal Court. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1118–
19 (Pa.Super.2011); Commonwealth v. Menezes, 871 A.2d 204, 207 n. 2
(Pa.Super.2005). Importantly, when performing this appellate review, the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County applies precisely the same
standard that the Superior Court applies in appeals from common pleas
court orders denying motions to suppress. Specifically,
[the court of common pleas] is limited to determining whether
the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the
record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts
are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
suppression court, [the court of common pleas] may consider
only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the
evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in
the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression
court’s factual findings are supported by the record, [the court of
common pleas is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse
only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the
appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal
conclusions are not binding on the court [of common pleas],
whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly
applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the
court[] below are subject to [ ] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010). The scope of
review from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record created
at the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa.2013).
In prior decisions, when courts of common pleas have denied
suppression motions without entering findings of fact and conclusions of law,
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we have vacated the order denying suppression and remanded with
instructions for the suppression judge to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 703
(Pa.Super.2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 66, 68
(Pa.Super.2003)). The same remedy should apply when the Municipal Court
denies a suppression motion and the defendant subsequently files a petition
for writ of certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
Just as this Court cannot perform appellate review of a common pleas order
denying a suppression motion until the common pleas court enters findings
of fact and conclusions of law, Landis, Menezes, supra, neither can the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County perform appellate review of a
Municipal Court order denying a suppression motion until the Municipal Court
enters findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Because the Municipal Court failed to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law into this record, we order the following:
(1) The order denying Neal’s petition for writ of certiorari is vacated;
(2) This case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County with instructions to remand the case to the Municipal
Court with instructions that Judge Frazier-Lyde enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law;
(3) Following entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County shall reconsider Neal’s
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petition for writ of certiorari by reviewing the evidentiary record in
accordance with the standards articulated in Jones and L.J.;3 and
(4) We relinquish jurisdiction. Landis, 89 A.3d at 704 n. 10 (“given
our disposition of this appeal, we decline to retain jurisdiction for the
purposes of the filing of a statement of the court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect to the suppression issue”).
Order denying Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari vacated. Case
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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3
In Landis, we took the additional steps of vacating the common pleas
court’s order denying the motion to suppress and the defendant’s judgment
of sentence. These steps are not necessary in the present case.
In Landis, the court of common pleas did not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but it subsequently filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that
applied the wrong standard (reasonable suspicion instead of probable
cause). Therefore, we “vacate[d] the order denying Appellant's motion to
suppress for reconsideration of the evidence in light of the probable cause
standard and the filing of a statement of its findings of fact and conclusions
of law.” Id., 89 A.3d at 703.
Here, unlike Landis, there is no indication that Judge Frazier-Lyde applied
the wrong standard to Neal’s motion to suppress. She simply neglected to
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. The entry of these findings and
conclusions is the only step that is necessary to complete the record for
appellate review by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/2/2016
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