Com. v. Tyler, C. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
COPELAND TYLER
Appellant No. 257 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 3, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0015854-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 2, 2016
Copeland Tyler appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on
September 3, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.
After careful review, we affirm.
On October 4, 2014, Officer Matthew Schwartzmiller responded to a
shooting that occurred at the New Pennley Apartments located at 5601 Penn
Avenue in East Liberty. When he arrived at the scene, Officer
Schwartzmiller found the victim, Reginald Turner, lying in a stairwell, with
fatal gunshot wounds. Officer Schwartzmiller also found Tyler with a
gunshot wound to his right forearm. Detective John Hamilton of the City of
Pittsburgh Police Department’s Mobile Crime Scene Unit photographed the
crime scene and collected five .380 caliber shell casings and three .45 caliber
shell casings.
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Detective Robert Shaw of the City of Pittsburgh Police Department’s
Homicide Division was also on the scene and testified that although more
than one firearm was fired, no firearms were recovered on the night of
October 4, 2014. Tyler told the officers on the scene that he was shot and
gave his name, but did not provide the officers with any additional
information about what had occurred in the stairwell that evening. Tyler
testified that he was carrying a firearm on the night in question because he
was involved in a shooting a few weeks prior, explaining “I just got shot, and
I was scared. I didn’t want to get shot again. I thought I was going to die
that day.” N.T. Trial, 6/10/15, at 104. Deputy Medical Examiner Dr.
Abdulrezak Shakir testified that Turner was shot three times. One bullet
entered the back of Turner’s head, and the other two bullets passed through
Turner’s back.
On October 28, 2014, detectives visited Tyler’s home. After a brief
interview, Tyler admitted to shooting Turner. The detectives transported
Tyler to police headquarters and read him his Miranda1 Rights. During the
interview at police headquarters, Tyler told the detectives that he was in fear
for his life that night.2 After encountering Turner and a third, unidentified
man in the stairwell of the New Pennley Apartments, Tyler grabbed Turner
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1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
During the trial, the Honorable Phillip A. Ignelzi viewed a tape of the
interview that took place at police headquarters. N.T. Trial, 6/9/15, at 77.
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and held a gun to his head, “hoping that [the third man] was going to leave
me alone so I could leave and get out of the hallway.” N.T. Trial, 6/9/15, at
108. Tyler indicated that the third, unidentified man shot first, and Tyler
returned fire and fell down the steps with Turner. Tyler then testified that
when he regained consciousness, he proceeded to shoot Turner two more
times because he believed Turner still posed a threat. The detectives asked
Tyler why he shot an unarmed man, and Tyler replied “He had to die. He
got to go. What am I supposed to do?” N.T. Trial, 6/9/15, at 127. The
Commonwealth also presented evidence that showed Tyler in an Instagram
video holding a .45 caliber firearm and firing it into the air on a residential
street. Tyler admitted that he was the individual in the video holding the
firearm and that the video was posted to his account.
On December 23, 2014, Tyler was charged with one count of criminal
homicide, one count of carrying a firearm without a license, and one count of
a person not to possess a firearm.3 On June 9, 2015, Tyler proceeded to a
non-jury trial before the Honorable Philip A. Ignelzi. The trial court found
Tyler guilty of one count of voluntary manslaughter, 4 one count of carrying a
firearm without a license, and one count of a person not to possess a
firearm. On September 3, 2015, Judge Ignelzi sentenced Tyler to an
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3
18 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106; and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1) and
(c), respectively.
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(a)(1).
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aggregate sentence of 12½ to 29 years’ incarceration on all 3 counts, to be
served consecutively.5 The trial court also ordered Tyler to pay $15,745 in
restitution.
On September 14, 2015, Tyler filed a timely post-sentence motion
seeking reconsideration of his sentence. On January 19, 2016, the trial
court filed an order denying Tyler’s post-sentence motion by operation of
law.6 Tyler filed a timely notice of appeal, and on February 29, 2016, the
trial court ordered Tyler to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion
on May 23, 2016.
Tyler raises the following issue for our review:
Was the sentence imposed by the court manifestly
excessive, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion
where the court focused on improper factors,
sentenced in the aggravated range of the guidelines
without providing reasons, failed to consider
rehabilitative needs and focused solely on the
seriousness of the offense to the exclusion of other
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5
Tyler’s sentence for each count was in the aggravated range under the
Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines. Tyler’s sentence was also within the
statutory limits for each offense. See Exhibit 1 to Commonwealth’s
Sentencing Memorandum, 8/26/15.
6
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(3)(a) (Except as provided
in paragraph (B)(3)(b), the judge shall decide the post-sentence motion,
including any supplemental motion, within 120 days of the filing of the
motion. If the judge fails to decide the motion within 120 days, or to grant
an extension as provided in paragraph (B)(3)(b), the motion shall be
deemed denied by operation of law.).
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factors despite the mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. §
9721(b)?
Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
Tyler’s claim implicates the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 7 When
the discretionary aspects of a sentence are questioned, an appeal is not
guaranteed as of right. Commonwealth v. Moore, 617 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa.
Super. 1992). Before this Court can address such a discretionary challenge, an
appellant must comply with the following requirements:
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of
his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by
satisfying a four-part test: (1) whether appellant has
filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and
903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P 720; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 2011).
An appellate court will find a “substantial question” and review the
decision of the trial court only where an aggrieved party can articulate clear
reasons why the sentence imposed by the trial court compromises the
sentencing scheme as a whole. Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522 A.2d 17____________________________________________
7
Tyler filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his claim in a post-
sentence motion. Tyler also included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his
appellate brief. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.
Super. 2006); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 720.
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(Pa. 1987). See also Commonwealth v. Jones, 613 A.2d 587, 590 (Pa.
Super. 1992) (Superior Court will grant an appeal only when appellant shows
that trial judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with specific provision of
Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to fundamental norms which underlie
sentencing process).
“A substantial question is raised when an appellant alleges that the
sentencing court erred by imposing an aggravated range sentence without
consideration of mitigating factors.” Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d
1175, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d
1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“It is well-established that a sentencing courts
failure to consider mitigating factors raises a substantial question.”). Our
Supreme Court has held that where “[p]re-sentence reports exist, we shall
continue to presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant
information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.
Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988). Additionally,
[A] sentencing judge may consider any legal factor
in deciding whether a defendant should be sentenced
within the aggravated range. Second, in order to be
adequate, the sentencing judge's reasons for
sentencing within the aggravated range must reflect
this consideration. Finally, the sentencing judge's
decision regarding the aggravation of a sentence will
not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of
discretion.
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Commonwealth v. Duffy, 491 A.2d 230, 233 (Pa. Super.
1985).
The Superior Court’s standard of review when a defendant challenges the
discretionary aspects of his or her sentence is very narrow; we will reverse
only where appellant has demonstrated a manifest abuse of discretion by the
sentencing judge. Commonwealth v. Hermanson, 674 A.2d 281 (Pa. Super.
1996).
An abuse of discretion may not be found merely
because an appellate court might have reached a
different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or
ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
erroneous. The rationale behind such broad
discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard
of appellate review is that the sentencing court is in
the best position to determine the proper penalty for
a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
individual circumstances before it. Simply stated,
the sentencing court sentences flesh-and-blood
defendants and the nuances of sentencing decisions
are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript used
upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing
court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate
review, bringing to its decisions an expertise,
experience, and judgment that should not be lightly
disturbed.
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, “[a] sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy
discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the
statute in question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing
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court's consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.”
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2010). The trial
court should consider imposing a sentence “for confinement that is consistent
with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the
impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative
needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).
Tyler has raised a substantial question because he argues that the trial
court failed to consider mitigating factors and provide reasons supporting an
aggravated sentence in this case. See Hyland, supra.8 Tyler contends that
the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, unreasonable, and an abuse
of the trial court’s discretion. We disagree. The trial court carefully considered
Tyler’s age, the seriousness of the crime, and Tyler’s prior criminal record in
accordance with Section 9721(b) before rendering a sentence in the
aggravated range. See Walls, supra.
During the sentencing proceeding, Tyler’s counsel asked the trial court to
“look at his young age, look at the fact that he had graduated from the
Academy, that he was working at Wendy’s, that he had previously been
victimized, [and] that he was shot that night.” Appellant’s Brief, at 68. We
are confident that the trial court considered Tyler’s accomplishments in
addition to the seriousness of the crime and Tyler’s prior criminal convictions.
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8
Tyler properly preserved his claim on appeal. See Evans, supra.-8-
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The trial court heard extensive testimony from family members and friends of
the victim in addition to Tyler’s mother and father. The trial court was satisfied
that Tyler’s conviction did not “come out of left field,” as Tyler’s father
suggested to the court. See N.T. Sentencing, 9/3/16, at 59. (Judge Ignelzi
reviewed Tyler’s criminal history, explaining “at the age of 13 [Tyler] carried a
gun. At the age of 16 [Tyler] carried a gun. And at the age of 18 [Tyler]
carried a gun. And [Tyler] was shot months before this.”).
The trial court also reviewed the Commonwealth’s sentencing
memorandum and the pre-sentence report. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/16,
at 10 (“This Court reviewed the Commonwealth’s sentencing memorandum
and it agreed with the Commonwealth that there are aggravating factors in this
case. This Court was also deeply disheartened by the pre-sentence report it
received.”); see also Devers, supra. Additionally, the trial court considered
Tyler’s young age when it rendered a verdict for the lesser-included offense of
voluntary manslaughter rather than the original charge of criminal homicide.
Specifically, the trial court showed “. . . mercy with its verdict, and as a result,
Mr. Tyler will one day leave the walls of a state prison a free man. The
alternative would have resulted in Mr. Tyler leaving the confines of a state
prison only upon his death.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/16, at 9.
Furthermore, Tyler’s prior gun convictions deeply troubled the court and
influenced the court’s decision to render a sentence in the aggravated range.
N.T. Sentencing, 9/3/15, at 61 (“those choices were made to carry guns; and
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it’s the third time [Tyler] made his choice to carry a gun”); see also Crump,
supra. The trial court clearly stated that it considered both the evidence
presented at trial and the evidence presented during the sentencing proceeding
before determining an appropriate sentence. Id. at 71-72 (“[T]his sentence
will be a result of many factors and considerations that the Court has. I agree
with the Commonwealth that there are aggravating factors in this case.”).
Therefore, the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion when it
found that Tyler’s previous convictions for gun possession, the Instagram
photo showing Tyler shooting a firearm recklessly into the air, and Tyler’s
testimony stating that Turner “had to die” supported an aggravated sentence
in this case. Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/16, at 8-10. Furthermore, the trial
court determined that Tyler’s “best chance of rehabilitation [would] be
incarceration, as he is apparently not receptive to rehabilitation in public life,”
based on his prior criminal history. Id. at 10.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.9
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9
Carrie L. Allman, Esquire, Tyler’s appellate counsel, filed a petition for
leave to withdraw as counsel because she is leaving the Office of the Public
Defender of Allegheny County. The Office of the Public Defender will still
represent Tyler.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/2/2016
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