Com. v. Howard, T. ( 2014 )

J-S68019-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TRAMAINE HOWARD
Appellant No. 3322 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 8, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009245-2012
BEFORE: ALLEN, J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 01, 2014
Following a non-jury trial, the court found Tramaine Howard guilty of
receiving stolen property and sentenced him to two years’ probation.
Howard filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Howard and the trial court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The lone issue in this direct appeal is
whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Howard’s conviction for
receiving stolen property1. We affirm.
____________________________________________
1
Howard frames this issue as follows:
WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH SHOWED ONLY THAT
APPELLANT FELL ASLEEP FOR A BRIEF PERIOD IN A
PARKED CAR THAT HAD BEEN STOLEN MONTHS
BEFORE, WHERE THERE WAS NO PROOF THAT
APPELLANT EVER ATTEMPTED TO DRIVE, OPERATE,
OR OTHERWISE ASSERT DOMINION OR CONTROL
OVER THE VEHICLE, AND WHERE THERE WAS NO
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S68019-14
Our standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
is well-settled:
[W]hether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the
[Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not
weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts
and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility
of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a
matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1092 (Pa.Super.2003) (citations
omitted).
A person is guilty of receiving stolen property “if he intentionally
receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it
has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the
property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
SHOWING THAT APPELLANT KNEW OR SHOULD
HAVE KNOWN THE CAR WAS STOLEN, THE
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT HIS
CONVICTION FOR RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY.
Brief for Appellant, p. 10.
-2-
J-S68019-14
owner.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a). As used in this statute, “receiving” means
“acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the
property.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(b). The Commonwealth can prove the
element of intent
entirely through circumstantial evidence. While it is
clear that mere possession without more is
insufficient to show that the defendant knew or
should have known that the property was stolen,
other facts can make the inference of guilty
knowledge reasonable, even compelling. Such
circumstances include but are not limited to the
unexplained possession of recently stolen property,
flight from the police or other evidence indicating an
attempt to avoid capture and the condition of the
property indicating a theft.
Commonwealth v. Carson, 592 A.2d 1318, 1321 (Pa.Super.1991)
(footnote omitted).
Construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence is as follows: at 1:22 a.m. on November 5, 2011, Officer Marco
Padilla came across Howard asleep in the driver's seat of a car parked on the
4100 block of 8th Street in Philadelphia. N.T., 11/8/13 (“Tr.”), pp. 9-10.
The officer noticed that the car's ignition was broken, and its interior
appeared to have been ransacked. Tr., p. 10-11. There were numerous
scratches and dents to its exterior. Tr., p. 11. The officer checked the car's
status and determined that it had been stolen on August 17, 2011. Tr., p.
10. After feeling the engine and finding it cold, the officer knocked on the
-3-
J-S68019-14
car's window and woke up Howard. Tr., pp. 10-11. Howard told the officer
he was inside the car to sleep. Tr., p. 12.
The parties stipulated that (1) the car had been stolen from the house
of Nancy Fuhrmeister in Philadelphia on August 17, 2011; (2) she did not
know Howard; and (3) she did not give him permission to take her car. Tr.,
pp. 12-13. Howard testified that on the evening of November 5, 2011, he
got drunk with his friend on his friend's front porch on 8th Street. Tr., pp.
18-19. He stated that he got into the car at approximately 1:00 a.m.
because his friend's mother would not allow him to spend the night at his
house. Tr., p. 16. Howard claimed that he thought the car was abandoned,
and that he did not notice the broken ignition because he was too drunk.
Tr., p. 18.
Construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
circumstantial evidence establishes that Howard was guilty of receiving
stolen property. Howard did not have the owner's consent to be in the car,
which was stolen from her home in Philadelphia less than two months
before, yet he was sitting by himself in the driver’s seat of the car, and he
admitted entering the car in order to go to sleep. Commonwealth v.
Grabowski, 549 A.2d 145, 148 (Pa.Super.1987) (possession of stolen car
parts three months after theft contributes to reasonable inference of guilty
knowledge); Commonwealth v. Grabowski, 452 A.2d 827, 830
(Pa.Super.1982) (sufficient evidence of receiving stolen property where car
-4-
J-S68019-14
had been reported stolen eleven months prior). Howard could not have
missed unmistakable signs that the car was stolen. The car’s interior
appeared to be ransacked, its exterior had numerous scratches and dents,
and the ignition directly in front of the driver’s seat was broken. Carson,
supra, 592 A.2d at 1323 (broken steering column indication that car had
been stolen); In the Interest of Scott, 566 A.2d 266, 267 (Pa.Super.1989)
(same); Commonwealth v. Murray, 371 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa.Super.1977)
(ignition wires of the car pulled down). This evidence demonstrates that
Howard intentionally acquired possession of a car that he knew was stolen or
believed had probably been stolen.
Howard cites three decisions -- Commonwealth v. Scudder, 416
A.2d 1003 (Pa.1980), Commonwealth v. Henry, 875 A.2d 302
(Pa.Super.2005), and In the Interest of Scott, 566 A.2d 266
(Pa.Super.1989) -- for the proposition that he was not in possession of the
car at the time of his encounter with Officer Padilla. All three decisions are
distinguishable.
In Scudder, two patrol vehicles chased a van for three miles after the
officers received a report that it was stolen. The defendant was a passenger
in the van. Also inside the van were two stolen lawn mowers, a spray can of
blue paint that apparently had been used to paint the van's side windows
after it had been stolen from the owner. and a jumped ignition switch
hanging under the van's dashboard. Our Supreme Court held that there was
-5-
J-S68019-14
insufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for receiving
stolen property, because “as a passenger in the vehicle, there is no basis for
finding that appellant ‘received’ either the van or the mowers. There is no
showing that appellant exercised conscious control or dominion over these
goods.” Id., 416 A.2d at 1005. Furthermore, the spray can did not create
any inference that the defendant knew the van was stolen: “The fact that
the side windows had been recently painted and the paint and the gloves
used to do the painting [were] in the van do not help to support such an
inference. The painting of windows on such a vehicle is not so uncommon
an event as would arouse the suspicion of the reasonably prudent man.” Id.
at 1006. Nor did the jumped ignition switch create any inference that the
defendant knew the van was stolen:
The significance of this fact when offered against the
operator of a vehicle pales when it is offered to
establish the guilty knowledge of the passenger. The
Commonwealth relies upon the fact that the
condition was observable. Knowledge that the van
was started without a key is not the critical factor
pointing to guilt. The inference of guilt flows from the
fact that the operator would be aware of why he was
required to use this means to start the motor. Here,
there is no showing that appellant was privy to such
information.
-6-
J-S68019-14
Id.2 In this case, Howard was the only occupant of a stolen car and was
sitting in the driver’s seat in front of a broken ignition switch. Moreover, the
car had other visible signs of theft on its exterior. Thus, in contrast to the
passenger in Scudder, Howard had to have known that he was in
possession of a stolen car.
In Henry, police officers found a vehicle one day after it was stolen.
The side door lock was broken, and the defendant’s fingerprints were on a
placard inside the vehicle. The owner of the vehicle did not know the
defendant or give him permission to use the car. This Court held that there
was insufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for receiving
stolen property:
[Appellant’s] fingerprint on the placard reveals only
that at some point Appellant was present in the
vehicle and nothing more. Since the vehicle was
found more than a day after being reported stolen
with the driver's side door lock broken, Appellant
could have had access to the interior of the vehicle
after it was abandoned by the perpetrator who stole
the car. The fingerprint alone is insufficient to
establish operation, i.e., conscience control or
dominion over the vehicle, beyond a reasonable
doubt.
____________________________________________
2
The Court also refused to hold that the driver’s decision to flee indicated
that the defendant knew the van was stolen, because there was “[no]
showing that the passenger directed, encouraged or consented to the
actions of the operator in this regard. The inference of guilt arising from
flight may not be imputed to a passenger unless there is some evidence to
indicate that the passenger concurred in the judgment to flee.” Id.
Obviously, the evidence in the present case does not raise any issue of
flight.
-7-
J-S68019-14
Id., 875 A.2d at 306. Here, in contrast, when Officer Padilla encountered
Howard, he was sitting asleep in the driver’s seat of a stolen vehicle in front
of a broken ignition. This is much sturdier evidence of intent to exercise
possession over a stolen vehicle than the single fingerprint in Henry.
Finally, in Scott, the juvenile appellant was one of two people who
abandoned a stolen car and fled from police on foot, but police were unable
to specifically identify him as the driver. Nevertheless, this Court affirmed
his adjudication of delinquency, finding sufficient evidence of joint
possession by both occupants of the car based on the appellant’s flight from
the vehicle and his failure to provide any explanation for his flight. Id., 566
A.2d at 268-69. Scott does not help Howard’s cause. While Howard did not
attempt to flee from Officer Padilla, the other circumstances described above
provide proof of Howard’s intentional receipt of stolen property.
Howard’s testimony that he thought the car had been abandoned, and
that he only intended to sleep inside it temporarily, is irrelevant for purposes
of evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. Our standard of review
requires examination of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. Troy, supra. By focusing on his own self-serving
testimony, Howard asks us in so many words to construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to him instead of the Commonwealth.
For these reasons, the evidence of Howard’s receipt of stolen property
is sufficient to affirm his conviction.
-8-
J-S68019-14
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/1/2014
-9-