In the Interest of: J.W., a Minor ( 2016 )

J-S71032-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.W., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: E.B., FATHER
No. 830 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered March 2, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court
at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000433-2016
FID: 51-FN-393-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2016
E.B. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered on March 2, 2016, in
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Family Court, adjudicating
dependent his daughter J.W. (“Child”), born in May of 1998,1 and ordering
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
We note that J.W. turned eighteen years of age in May 2016 and, in
general, is not considered a “child” for purposes of dependency. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 6302. It is well settled that an actual claim must be present at all
stages of the judicial process for the case to be actionable, however an
exception can be made “where a party will suffer some detriment without
the court’s decision.” Pub. Defender’s Office of Venango Cnty. v.
Venango Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 893 A.2d 1275, 1279-80 (Pa. 2006)
(citation omitted). In this case, J.W.’s dependency could be extended to age
21, if she were adjudicated dependent by the trial court prior to age 18.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302; § 6351. Therefore, the instant case is not moot
because J.W. would suffer a detriment without the trial court’s adjudication
of dependency. See Pub. Defender’s Office of Venango Cnty., 837 A.2d
at 1279-80. Further, the mootness exception is also applicable because
E.B., as J.W.’s father, could suffer a detriment in any future proceedings
with DHS should J.W. be declared dependent. See In re D.A., 801 A.2d
614, 616-17 (Pa. Super. 2002).
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that she remain in the care and custody of Department of Human Services
(“DHS”). We affirm.
The trial court related the factual and procedural history as follows:
[The dependency] petition was filed pursuant to an Order
of Protective Custody (“OPC”) obtained by DHS on
February, 22, 2016.
The previous involvement of DHS stemmed from August 4,
2012, when it received a Child Protective Services Report
(“CPS”) report alleging that [Child] had been the victim of
sexual abuse by her former step-father, K.W., when she
was between the age of nine (9) and twelve (12) years
old. K.W. and J.W. (“Mother”) were the caregivers of
[Child] and her sibling. It was reported to DHS that
[Child] disclosed the sexual abuse to [Mother]. The report
further alleged that the abuse stopped after [Child]
watched an episode of Special Victim’s Unit, and informed
K.W. that if he did not stop abusing her, she would report
him to the police. Thereafter, K.W. stopped sexually
abusing [Child]. The report was indicated.
[Child] never received sexual abuse therapy.
In August 2012, [Child] went to live with her maternal
aunt, [T.W.].
From November 2012 to June 2013, [Child] lived with
[Father] in Harrisburg, Pa.
Prior to age fourteen (14), [Child] had never spoken to or
seen [Father].
While living with [Father], [Child] did not perform well
academically. [Child] was unable to participate in
extracurricular activities, because she had to care for her
nephew after school.
Subsequently, [Child] ran away from [Father]’s home and
walked to Hershey, [Pennsylvania], stating that she no
longer desired to live with [Father] and wanted to return to
[Mother]’s home.
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On January 28, 2016, while residing with [Mother], [Child]
voluntarily went to Pathways Youth Shelter (“PYS”), a
program for children experiencing conflict with their
parents, and [Child] was accepted into its twenty-one day
program.
Consequently, on February 18, 2016, DHS received a
General Protective Services Report (“GPS”) which alleged
that [Child] had been living at PYS for the last twenty-one
(21) days and had reached the final day and could no
longer remain at the shelter. It was alleged that [Mother]
refused to allow her to return home and that [Child] did
not initially want to return home. The report further
alleged that [Father] had been notified; that he was willing
to travel from Harrisburg to Philadelphia to pick up [Child],
but that [Child] did not want to go with him; that she was
on the honor roll at her high school and she wished to
remain in Philadelphia to complete her senior year.
Subsequently, on February 19, 2016, DHS met with [Child]
at PYS. [Child] expressed that she experienced a lot of
conflict in her interactions with [Mother]. [Child] also
reiterated to DHS that she did not want to go to Harrisburg
to live with her father. Furthermore, [Child] told DHS that
she did not want to return to [Mother]’s home. However,
[Child] later retracted her statement and agreed to return
home, if [Mother] decided to participate in therapy with
her.
On February 19, 2016, [Father] travelled to Philadelphia to
pick her up, but [Child] once again declined to go to
Harrisburg with her father and returned to PYS instead.
On February 19, 2016, PYS agreed to allow [Child] to
remain at the shelter until February 22, 2016.
Subsequently, on February 21, 2016, [F]ather visited
[Child] at PYS and attempted to convince [Child] to return
with him to Harrisburg, but [Child] still refused to go.
The following day, on February 22, 2016, DHS spoke with
[Mother] who stated that [Child]’s choices were to go with
[Father] to Harrisburg or to be placed in foster care.
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As a result, DHS obtained the aforementioned Order of
Protective Custody and placed [Child] in foster care
through Turning Points for Children.
On February 24, 2016, a shelter care hearing was held
before [the trial court] where [the trial court] ordered that
the OPC be lifted and the child be temporarily committed
to DHS.
Trial Ct. Op., 4/12/16, at 1-3 (unpaginated).
On March 2, 2016, a dependency hearing was held. At the hearing,
Ms. Tara Fisher (a caseworker from DHS), Child, Mother, and Father
testified. Following the hearing, the court adjudicated Child dependent and
committed Child to the care and custody of DHS.
On March 15, 2016, Father timely appealed and filed a statement of
errors complained of pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On
appeal, Father raises the following issues:
Whether there were grounds for the adjudication of
[dependency] of [] Child, as to the evidence having been
sufficient to establish [Father] as unwilling or unable to
care for [] Child?
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
placement of [] Child into [DHS’s] [c]ustody?
Father’s Brief at 5.
Our Supreme Court set forth our standard of review for dependency
cases as follows.
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported by
the record, but does not require the appellate court to
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accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law.
Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).
Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child” as a child
who:
(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
education as required by law, or other care or control
necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or
morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper
parental care or control may be based upon evidence
of conduct by the parent, guardian or other
custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of
the child at risk, including evidence of the parent’s,
guardian’s or other custodian’s use of alcohol or a
controlled substance that places the health, safety or
welfare of the child at risk[.]
42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1) (emphasis added).
In In re G., T., 845 A.2d 870 (Pa. Super. 2004), this Court clarified
the definition of “dependent child” further.
The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental
care or control so as to be a dependent child encompasses
two discrete questions: whether the child presently is
without proper parental care and control, and if so,
whether such care and control are immediately available.
Id. at 872 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re J.C., 5
A.3d 284, 289 (Pa. Super. 2010). “This Court has defined ‘proper parental
care’ as ‘that care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of the child
and (2) at a minimum, is likely to prevent serious injury to the child.’” In re
A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Additionally,
the “burden of proof in a dependency proceeding is on the petitioner to
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demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a child meets that
statutory definition of dependency.” In re G., T., 845 A.2d at 872 (citation
omitted).
With regard to a dependent child, in In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (en banc), this Court explained:
[A] court is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c) to
make a finding that a child is dependent if the child meets
the statutory definition by clear and convincing evidence.
If the court finds that the child is dependent, then the
court may make an appropriate disposition of the child to
protect the child’s physical, mental and moral welfare,
including allowing the child to remain with the parents
subject to supervision, transferring temporary legal
custody to a relative or a private or public agency, or
transferring custody to the juvenile court of another state.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a).
Id. at 617 (alteration in original and citation omitted).
Regarding the placement of a child who has been adjudicated
dependent, this Court has explained:
When a child is adjudicated dependent, the child’s proper
placement turns on what is in the child’s best interest, not
on what the parent wants or which goals the parent has
achieved. See In re Sweeney, 393 Pa. Super. 437, 574
A.2d 690, 691 (1990) (noting that “[o]nce a child is
adjudicated dependent . . . the issues of custody and
continuation of foster care are determined by the child’s
best interests”). Moreover, although preserving the unity
of the family is a purpose of the Act, another purpose is to
“provide for the care, protection, safety, and wholesome
mental and physical development of children coming within
the provisions of this chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1.1).
Indeed, “[t]he relationship of parent and child is a status
and not a property right, and one in which the state has an
interest to protect the best interest of the child.” In re
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E.F.V., 315 Pa. Super. 246, 461 A.2d 1263, 1267 (1983)
(citation omitted).
In re K.C., 903 A.2d 12, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Instantly, after careful review of the parties’ briefs, the certified
record, and the trial court’s opinion, we are satisfied that the record
supports the trial court’s findings, the findings support the trial court’s
conclusion that Child is dependent based upon a lack of parental care and
control, and the placement of Child with DHS was necessary and appropriate
for Child’s well-being. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s
opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/18/2016
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