Sosa, R. v. Rodriguez, S. ( 2019 )

J-A16027-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RAYMOND SOSA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SEBASTIAN RODRIGUEZ & THE IBS : No. 3953 EDA 2017
GROUP, LLC :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): No. 151105717
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
CONCURRING STATEMENT BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2019
I join in the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s order denying
Raymond Sosa’s post-trial motion. I am constrained to do so, owing to the
failure of Sosa’s attorney to provide the trial court with any evidence of the
stipulation by and between counsel. I write separately to further explicate the
principles underpinning stipulations, define key terms, and underscore my
disappointment with the unartful practice of law in the court below.
I am obligated to affirm the result below, purely as result of Mark
Greenfield, Esquire, trial counsel for Sosa, failing to present the trial court with
any evidence whatsoever that he and Lauren Glynn, Esquire, trial counsel for
Sebastian Rodriguez and the IBS Group (“the Defendants”), entered into an
agreement stipulating to Rodriguez’s liability. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,
2/6/18, at 2 (“No written stipulation was presented to the court and no
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stipulation had been entered on the docket for court approval.”); see also
Eck v. Eck, 475 A.2d 825, 827 (Pa. Super. 1984) (“[A] trial court may not
consider facts of evidence dehors the record in making its determination.”)
(emphasis added). I, therefore, cannot consider it an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to fail to enforce an agreement for which no evidence was
presented. See N.T. Trial, 10/11/17, at 13 (ruling below based on
“conversation on the record” which does not reflect a “broad stipulation.”).
I write separately to make clear that had Attorney Greenfield merely
filed his stipulation with the court or presented evidence in the form of
correspondence between himself and Attorney Glynn, he would have been
able to enforce the agreement stipulating to liability. It has long been settled
law that “[a]ny matter which involves the individual rights or obligations of
the parties inter se may properly be made the subject of a stipulation between
them.” Foote v. Maryland Cas. Co., 186 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1962). Any
such agreement “will become the law of the case.” Muir v. Preferred Acc.
Ins. Co of New York, 53 A. 158, 160 (Pa. 1902) (emphasis added); see
also Tyler v. King, 496 A.2d 16, 21 (Pa. Super. 1985) (“[C]oncessions made
in stipulations are judicial admissions, and accordingly[,] may not later in the
proceeding be contradicted by the party who made them.”).
Nearly eight months before the case went to trial, Attorney Glynn agreed
“to stipulate to the following: 1. Liability is 100% on defendant, Sebastian
Rodriguez.” Glynn email, 2/27/17, at 1. The day of the trial, however,
Attorney Glynn stated “I’m not going to argue liability. In terms of causation
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of damages, I am contesting all of it.” N.T. Trial, 10/11/17, at 7. She further
explained “the stipulation to one hundred percent liability[,] as opposed to
one hundred percent negligence[,] assumes both negligence and factual
cause.” Id. at 7–8. These statements hint at one of two possibilities:
Attorney Glynn’s actions either expose a fundamental misunderstanding of
basic legal principles, implicating her duty to provide competent
representation, or they illustrate a form of legal practice so sharp, it
constitutes nothing less than a lack of candor toward the tribunal. See
Pa.R.P.C. 1.1, 3.3.
Negligence is a tort, requiring proof of duty, breach, proximate cause,
factual cause, and damages. See Straw v. Fair, 187 A.2d 966, 982 (Pa.
Super. 2018). Liability is “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being legally
obligated or accountable . . . enforceable by civil remedy[.]” Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), liability. Factual cause is “[t]he cause without
which the event could not have occurred.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019), but-for cause (defining cause in fact as synonymous with but-for
cause). Negligence, liability, and factual cause are plainly distinguishable
terms, all of which should be equal parts understandable and unambiguous to
a licensed attorney. One is liable for negligence when, inter alia, his actions
were the factual cause of another’s injuries. We are unclear as to whether
Attorney Glynn stipulated to liability being “100% on . . . Rodriguez” as an
inducement to persuade Attorney Greenfield to agree not to call Rodriguez at
trial, or if she genuinely believed being liable for negligence did not encompass
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factual cause. In any event, Attorney Glynn had a professional obligation to
understand these terms of art, and a concomitant duty to follow through on
the statements she made to opposing counsel. Unfortunately, Attorney
Greenfield also had an obligation to provide the trial court with a sufficient
basis to find the parties entered into a binding stipulation. As he did not do
so, I concur.
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