Com. v. Hyman,K. ( 2015 )

J. S03006/15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
KEVIN HYMAN, : No. 3066 EDA 2013
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, July 30, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0004610-2008
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA AND OTT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 10, 2015
Kevin Hyman appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on July
30, 2013 after he was found to be in direct violation of his parole and
probation. We affirm.
On October 7, 2008, appellant pled guilty to firearms not to be carried
without a license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106, and possession of a firearm, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 6105. On that same date, he was sentenced to serve a period of
incarceration of 11½ to 23 months’ and 4 years of probation. Appellant was
granted parole on September 25, 2009, but failed to report to his parole
officer; an “absconder warrant” was issued in December of 2009. On
June 3, 2010, appellant was arrested on drug possession charges which
were later withdrawn. On November 5, 2010, appellant appeared before the
Honorable Susan I. Schulman for a violation of probation/parole hearing
J. S03006/15
resulting from his absconding and other technical violations. Appellant was
found to be in technical violation for absconding from supervision; his parole
was suspended and he was re-sentenced to 11½ to 23 months’ incarceration
and three years of probation. (Notes of testimony, 7/30/13 at 4.)
Appellant was granted parole on May 18, 2011. On July 6, 2011,
appellant was arrested again and charged with murder, conspiracy, burglary,
and related offenses for an incident that occurred on November 14, 2009,
before his revocation hearing on November 5, 2010, but while he was
serving parole under the original sentence imposed on October 7, 2008.
During the next two years, appellant remained in jail throughout two jury
trials that both ended in a hung jury and one trial which resulted in an
acquittal on the murder charge. (Id. at 6, 8.) On July 18, 2013, appellant
entered into a negotiated plea before the Honorable Benjamin Lerner to one
count of burglary in exchange for a sentence of five years’ probation.
On July 30, 2013, appellant again appeared before Judge Schulman for
a probation violation hearing as the Commonwealth alleged he was in direct
violation of his parole and/or probation based on the new burglary
conviction. Defense counsel argued that there was no basis for a direct
violation because the incident, occurring in 2009, predated the imposition of
the current sentence imposed in 2010. (Id. at 17.) The court terminated
appellant’s parole, revoked probation, and resentenced appellant to 1½ to
5 years’ incarceration.
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Appellant filed a notice of appeal on August 29, 2013. Appellant
complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal within 21 days pursuant to Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1925(b),
42 Pa.C.S.A., and the trial court has filed an opinion.
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred “by finding
appellant in direct violation of his parole and probation as a result of criminal
behavior that occurred prior to imposition of the sentence he was currently
serving.” (Appellant’s brief at 9.) Appellant avers that at the time he pled
guilty for the 2009 burglary, his original sentence had already been revoked
for absconding. He claims that the burglary violated a sentence that had
already been revoked and his new sentence could not have been violated by
a burglary he committed before the new sentence was imposed. (Id. at 11.)
He claims that a “probation revocation based on ‘pre-probationary conduct’
is invalid and must be reversed.” (Id. at 13.) We disagree.
Again, after pleading guilty to multiple weapons offenses, appellant
was released on parole in September of 2009; he absconded two months
later. At the resulting VOP hearing, appellant pled for mercy and stated that
he absconded as he was being “blamed for a murder [he] didn’t commit.”
(Notes of testimony, 11/5/10 at 6-7.) Appellant stated he found out that he
was wanted merely for questioning and he realized that he made a
“big mistake” in absconding. (Id. at 6.) The VOP court revoked his parole
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and resentenced him to 11½ to 23 months of imprisonment followed by
three years of probation.
It is important to note that appellant actually committed a burglary on
November 14, 2009 (the burglary to which he most recently pled guilty) nine
days before he absconded and while he was on parole. The burglary was
clearly committed while appellant was on parole, in violation of the terms of
parole. Appellant had never suffered any consequence for this direct
violation. We agree with the VOP court that appellant’s criminal conduct
that occurred before his VOP hearing on November 5, 2010 -- for which he
was later convicted -- was “a proper basis to adjust [his] existing VOP
sentence on July 30, 2013.” (Trial court opinion, 4/9/14 at 7.)
We find the trial court has thoroughly and adequately addressed these
issues, citing relevant authority, and we affirm on the basis of the trial
court’s opinion, which we adopt as our own.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/10/2015
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL TRlAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-51-CR-0004610-2008
vs.
3066 EDA 2013
KEVIN HYMAN
OPINION
SCHULMAN, SJ., J.
Appellant appea]s this Court's Order of July 30, 2013, which terminated Appellant's
parole, revoked his probation, and re-sentenced him to one and a half (1 1/2) to five (5) years'
incarceration. This Court submits the following Opinion in accordance with Pa. R.A.P. No.
1925, and for the reasons set forth herein, recommends that its Order be affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL IDSTORY
~: ,·
On October 7, 2008, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to charges of violating
Sections 6105 and 6106 of the Uniform Firearms Act (18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 6106).1 On the
charge of violating 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6106, this Court sentenced Appellant to eleven and a half (11
1/2) to twenty-three (23) months' incarceration, followed by four (4) years' probation. This
Court imposed no penalty on the charge of violating 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105. (See N.T. 10/7/08).
This Court granted Appellant parole on September 25, 2009, but he failed to report to his
parole officer and an "absconder warrant" was issued in December of 2009. On or about June 3,
1
These charges stem from Appellant's arrest on April 3, 2008. At approximately 11 :50 p.m. that
evening, Philadelphia Police officers pulled over a Lincoln Town Car that "swerve[d] and almost
hit" the officers' vehicle. Defendant was a backseat passenger in the vehicle and was asked by
the officers to exit the vehicle while they "were dealing with the driver].]" As Appellant exited
the vehicle, an officer observed "a brown handle of a shotgun sticking out of [Appellant's]
pants." The officer immediately performed a pat down of Appellant and recovered the unloaded
shotgun. While conducting a search incident to arrest, the officer also recovered ten (10) bags of
marijuana from Appellant. (See N.T., 10/7/08, pp. 20-23).
Exhibit "B"
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2010, Appellant was arrested on drug possession charges that later were withdrawn. On
November 5, 2010, Appellant appeared before this Court for a violation of parole/probation
(''VOP11) hearing, resulting from his absconsion and other technical violations. This Court
terminated Appellant's parole, revoked his probation, and re-sentenced him to eleven and a half
(11 1/2) to twenty-three (23) months' incarceration followed by three (3) years' probation. (See
N.T., 11/5/10, pp. 10-11).
Appellant was granted parole on May 18, 2011, but he again was arrested on Julyo, 2011
on charges of burglary and murder. Appellant committed the burglary on or about November
14, 2009 -- before his revocation hearing on November 5, 2010, but while he was serving parole
under this Court's original sentence imposed on October 7, 2008. After two hung juries on the
burglary charge, and one hung jury and eventual acquittal on the murder charge, Appellant
pleaded guilty to burglary on July 18, 2013. (See N.T., 7/30/13).
On July 30, 2013, Appellant appeared before this Court for another VOP hearing, this
one resulting from his direct parole/probation violation -- i.e., the burglary conviction. This
Court terminated Appellant's parole, revoked his probation, and re-sentenced him under 18 Pa.
C.S.A. § 6106 to a term of one and a half (1112) to five (5) years' incarceration. (See N.T.,
7/30/13, p. 23).
DISCUSSION
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
a. "Whether the Court erred in finding appellant to be in direct violation of his
parole and probation as a result of criminal behavior which occurred prior
to imposition of that sentence of parole and probation."
b. "Whether appellant was denied due process of law when parole and
probation violation proceedings were not initiated until over two years after
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the alleged violation was known to the Commonwealth and where appellant
suffered prejudice as a result of that delay."
This Court will address Appellant's claims in the order that they are raised.
a. Whether this Court "erred in finding appellant to be in direct violation of his
parole and probation as a result of criminal behavior which occurred prior to imposition of
that sentence of parole and probation."
11 [T]he scope of review in an appeal following a sentence imposed after a probation
revocation is limited to the validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the sentence
imposed following revocation." See Commonwealth v. Infante, 585 Pa. 408, 419 (Pa. 2005)
(citations omitted here). "The reason for revocation of probation need not necessarily be the
commission of or conviction for subsequent criminal conduct." See Commonwealth v. Ortega,
955 A.2d 879, 886 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted here). Rather, 11[a] probation violation is
established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the probationer indicates the probation has
proven to have been an ineffective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to deter
against future antisocial conduct.11 Id.Furthermore, "[ujnder Pennsylvania law, an order of probation can be changed or
revoked if, at any time before he has begun service of his probation the defendant commits
offenses or otherwise demonstrates he is unworthy of probation." See Commonwealth v.
Mitchell, 955 A.2d 433, 435 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the fact that an appellant "had not
commenced serving probation when the new offense occurred [does] not prevent the court from
revoking its prior order placing [the] appellant on probation." See Commonwealth v. Dickens,
475 A.2d 141, 144 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citing Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 420 A.2d 628(1980)).
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Appellant claims this Court cannot terminate his parole or revoke his probation based on
criminal conduct that occurred before his revocation hearing on November 5, 2010, during
which this Court terminated Appellant's previously-imposed parole, revoked his previously-
imposed probation, and re-sentenced Appellant for violating 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6106. According to
Appellant, only conduct that occurred after his November 5, 2010 VOP hearing can justify this
Court's revocation order at the January 30, 2013 VOP hearing.
The Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Infante addresses a similar sequential
scenario and is instructive in this case. On December 10, 1999, the defendant in Infante pleaded
guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (11PWID11) and was sentenced to
"one year of Intermediate Punishment to be followed by two years of probation].]" See Infante,
585 Pa. 408, 411-412. On June 5, 2001, the defendant appeared before the trial court for a VOP
hearing resulting from a new arrest on charges of simple possession and PWID. Id. The trial
court modified the defendant's initial sentence oflntermediate Punishment to include ninety days
of house arrest. Id.On October 29, 2002, the defendant appeared before the trial court for a second VOP
hearing, this one resulting from new criminal charges as well as technical violations involving
his failure to report or maintain employment. Id. at 412-414. The criminal charges stemmed
from the defendant's arrest in July of2002; trial on these new charges was scheduled for
November 26, 2002. Id. "During the [VOP] hearing, neither the parties nor [the defendant's]
probation officer explained the nature or extent of the new charges." Id. The trial court revoked
the defendant's probation based solely on his technical violations, and resentenced him to a
county sentence ~f 11 1/2 to 23 months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation. Id. The
trial court explained that it would "await the outcome of [the defendant's] trial on the new
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charges before determining if a further response was necessary.11 Id. The court specifically
warned that if the defendant was found guilty of the pending criminal charges, the court would
terminate his parole, revoke his probation, and "send [him] to state prison." Id. at 414.
The defendant ultimately was found guilty ofrobbery, intimidating a witness, and
possessing an instrument of a crime. Id. at 414-415. He appeared for his third VOP hearing on
January 27, 2003, and because of his new convictions, the VOP court terminated the defendant's
parole, revoked his probation, and re-sentenced him to three (3) to six (6) years' imprisonment.
On appeal to the Superior Court, the defendant argued that the trial court "erred in finding
him to be in violation of probation as a result of criminal behavior that occurred prior to the
imposition of such probation." Id.2 The Superior Court agreed and reversed the trial court's
revocation order, holding that it was the "October 2002 imposed probation that was revoked in
January 200311 -- not the original probation imposed in December of 1999. Therefore,the
probationimposed in Octoberof 2002 could not be revoked in Januaryof 2003 "basedon
2
In its "slip opinion" to the Superior Court, the trial court held in part:
In the present case, the January 27, 2003 violation hearing was prompted by a
'subsequent arrest' from when [the defendant] had commenced being under this Court's
supervision in December 1999. His criminal conduct (of June 19, 2002, and July 22,
2002) which led to the probation revocation in this case occurred during that supervision.
[The defendant] had never suffered any consequences for these direct violations and
therefore this Court's revocation of his probation and imposition of a new sentence was
proper. In this Court's view, so long as [the defendant] has not already had a
transgression punished by this Court, the Court is not precluded from punishing him for
said transgression (timeliness issues aside).
Id. at 415 (quoting trial court's slip opinion).
In his appeals to the Superior Court and Supreme Court, the defendant argued in part that "each
parole/probationary term is forever extinguished upon its revocation and is then replaced by the
succeeding VOP sentencing order." Id. at 418.
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criminal conduct that occurred prior to imposition of that [October 2002] probation." Id.
at 416 (emphasis added).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently granted allocatur "in order to review the
authority of the sentencing judge to terminate parole and revoke probation in the face of a
succeeding conviction for criminal conduct, where the underlying conduct, but not the
conviction, existed at the time of the prior VOP hearing." Id. at 417 (emphasis added). In
reversing the Superior Court and reinstating the sentence of the trial court, the Supreme Court
noted that when "the basis for revocation arises from the advent of intervening criminal conduct,
a VOP hearing may be held prior to any trial arising from such criminal conduct." Id. at 421-
422. However, a court may postpone a VOP hearing "pending adjudication of criminal charges
which are the basis for the revocation." Id. When a court learns that a defendant incurs a
criminal conviction for an offense committed while on probation, the court must find a probation
violation "as a matter of law." Id. (citations omitted here). According to the Supreme Court,
"the salient point is that the ultimate disposition of outstanding criminal charges, which
would require revocation if a conviction occurs, is a proper basis to adjust an existing VOP
sentence -- to the defendant's ultimate benefit or to his detriment." Id. at 425-426 (emphasis
added). Therefore, the VOP court "did not lack authority on January 27, 2003 when it
considered [the defendant's] November 26, 2002 convictions in terminating his parole, revoking
his probation, and imposing the mandatory minimum sentence that the General Assembly has
fixed for his crimes." Id.Similar to Infante, the issue in this appeal is whether, on July 30, 2013, this Court could
"terminate parole and revoke [Appellant's] probation in the face of a succeeding conviction for
criminal conduct, where the underlying conduct ... but not the conviction ... existed at the time of
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the prior VOP hearing" on November 5, 2010. Quoting Infante, 585 Pa. 408, 417. Although
Appellant had not been charged with burglary at the time of his VOP hearing on November 5,
2010 (in contrast to the circumstances in Infante), Appellant committed the criminal conduct
while serving parole on this Court's original sentence imposed on October 7, 2008 (similar to
Infante). Like the VOP court in Infante, this Court never addressed Appellant's criminal conduct
at the prior VOP hearing (on November 5, 20 I 0), when it sentenced Appellant only for his
technical violations. Therefore, in accord with Infante, Appellant's criminal conduct as a parolee
that occurred before his VOP hearing on November 5, 2010 -- for which he later was convicted -
- was "a proper basis to adjust [his] existing VOP sentence" on July 30, 2013. See Infante, 585
Pa. 408, 425-426.3
Accordingly, consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Infante, this Court
properly considered Appellant's guilty plea when terminating his parole and revoking his
probation, and Appellant's appeal on this ground should be denied. See Infante, 585 Pa. 408,
425-426.4
3
Even if the Commonwealth had charged Appellant with burglary by the time of his VOP
hearing on November 5, 2010, this Court would have been under no obligation to address
Appellant's potential parole/probation violations at that time, and could have waited until the
disposition of Appellant's new criminal case. See Infante, supra; Commonwealth v. Burrell, 497
Pa. 367, 371 (Pa. 1982) ("[I]t is not unreasonable for a probation revocation hearing to be
postponed pending adjudication of criminal charges which are the basis for the revocation, even
if that postponement results ... in a revocation hearing held after the expiration of the
probationary sentence.... "Although it is constitutionally permissible for a probation revocation
hearing to be held after arrest but before determination of a criminal charge ... it has been
recognized that it may in many cases be preferable to defer that hearing until after the trial, thus
avoiding the possibly unjust result ofrevoking probation, only to find later that the probationer
has been acquitted of the charges that prompted the revocation hearing").
4
This case is distinguishable from cases where a VOP court impermissibly revokes a defendant's
probation for criminal conduct occurring before the court imposed any sentence of probation.
See~. Commonwealth v. Carver, 923 A.2d 495 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that a court may
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b. Whether Appellant "was denied due process of law when parole and
probation violation proceedings were not initiated until over two years after the alleged
violation was known to the Commonwealth and where [A]ppellant suffered prejudice as a
result of that delay."
"When the alleged probation violation is the commission of another crime during the
probationary period, the relevant period is the delay between the date of conviction for such
crime and the date of the revocation hearing." See Commonwealth v. Smith, 403 A.2d 1326,
1327-1328 (Pa. Super. 1979) (citations omitted here); Commonwealth v. Reed, 419 A.2d 677,
680 (Pa. Super. 1980). 11In evaluating the reasonableness of such period, [courts] use a tripartite
test, focusing upon three factors: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; and the
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay." See Smith, 403 A.2d 1326, 1328. 11[IJt is
not unreasonable for a probation revocation hearing to be postponed pending adjudication of
criminal charges which are the basis for the revocation, even if that postponement results ... in a
revocation hearing held after the expiration of the probationary sentence." See Commonwealth
v. Burrell, 497 Pa. 367, 371 (Pa. 1982). "Although it is constitutionally permissible for a
probation revocation hearing to be held after arrest but before determination of a criminal charge
... it has been recognized that it may in many cases be preferable to defer that hearing until after
not consider "facts occurring prior to the imposition of probation when revoking probation").
Unlike the defendant in Carver, Appellant committed his criminal conduct after this Court
already sentenced him to probation as part of his original sentence, and while he was serving
parole on that sentence. In fact, because he absconded in November of2009 and was arrested on
burglary and murder charges in July of 2011, Appellant never reached the probation stage of
either his original sentence or his re-sentence in November of 2010. Accordingly, in terminating
Appellant's parole and revoking his probation, this Court considered conduct that occurred while
Appellant already was serving parole on this Court's original sentence imposed on October 7,
2008. This Court did not consider conduct that occurred before this Court ever sentenced
Appellant to parole and probation. Therefore, the circumstances of this case resemble those
presented in Infante.
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the trial, thus avoiding the possibly unjust result of revoking probation, only to find later that the
probationer has been acquitted of the charges that prompted the revocation hearing." Id.Furthermore, 11 a probationer awaiting his probation violation hearing while being imprisoned for
another offense does not suffer much if there is a delay in holding the revocation hearing, for he
is already imprisoned." See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 392 A.2d 827, 829 (Pa. Super. 1978);
Commonwealth v. Clark, 847 A.2d 122, 125 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In this case, the relevant period of "delay" comprises the time between Appellant's guilty
plea on the burglary charge and his revocation hearing. See Smith, supra. Appellant pleaded
guilty on July 18, 2013, and his revocation hearing was held merely two weeks later, on July 30,
2013. Thus, there was no unreasonable delay in the twelve (12) days between Appellant's
conviction and his revocation hearing. Moreover, Appellant argues that he suffered "prejudice"
because his revocation proceedings were not initiated until over two years after his arrest on the
burglary charge. However, Appellant was incarcerated during this interim period because of his
burglary and murder charges, and thus any purported delay in conducting his revocation hearing
had caused him minimal, if any, prejudice, since he would have been confined in any event. See
Diaz, supra. Because there was no unreasonable delay in conducting Appellant's revocation
hearing, and because Appellant suffered no prejudice by whatever delay he claims to have
occurred, his appeal on this ground should be denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing Opinion, Appellant's convictions of robbery and
attempted theft.
BY THE COURT:
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