Com. v. Homan, C. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
CHRISTY MARIE HOMAN, :
:
Appellee : No. 1009 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered June 4, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-21-CR-0003113-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JUNE 10, 2015
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“Commonwealth”),
appeals from the order of the trial court dated June 4, 2014 granting a
motion for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 704 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure and ordering a new trial. For the reasons that
follow, we vacate the trial court’s order, affirm the jury’s verdict, and
remand the case for resentencing.
In its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the trial court provided the following brief summary of
the evidence presented at the trial of Appellee, Christy Marie Homan
(“Homan”), on the charges of simple assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2701, and
summary harassment, id. § 2709.
The simple assault alleged in this case arose out of
events which occurred on August 3, 2013. Around
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midday on that date, [Homan] commenced a period
of partial custody or visitation with her two children,
[H.B. (age 12)] and [N.B. (age 5)]. The visit was
supervised by [Homan’s] brother, Aaron.2 [Homan]
and her brother attempted to initiate a conversation
concerning whether the group should go for lunch.
According to the Commonwealth’s testimony, the
children, however, decided to give their mother and
her brother something of the “silent treatment.”
This clearly angered [Homan]. When the car came
to a stop in front of Rita’s (an Italian ice parlor),
[Homan] expressed her extreme anger at the
children and used extensive profanity in admonishing
them for not only treating her but, more importantly,
their uncle with disrespect. [H.B.] sat in the
backseat of the car and continued to refuse to
respond to her mother. At that point, [Homan]
forcefully removed [H.B] from the car grabbing her
violently by the neck and arms. In the meantime, a
witness had called the police and the incident came
to an end.
2
The fact that the visitation was supervised
conveyed to the [c]ourt, and no doubt to the jury,
that [Homan] has anger issues.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/2014, at 3-4.
The jury found Homan guilty of simple assault and the trial court then
found her guilty of summary harassment and set a date for sentencing.
Homan then filed a written “PA CRIM P. 704(B) PRE-SENTENCE MOTION FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF,” alleging that the guilty verdict was against the
weight of the evidence and not supported by sufficient evidence. On June 4,
2014, the trial court granted the motion and ordered a new trial. The
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Commonwealth has appealed this ruling, presenting the following issue for
our consideration and determination:
Did the trial court err in ruling there was insufficient
evidence to disprove parental justification when
[Homan] directed a profanity laden, public tirade
against her 12 year old daughter before finally choke
slamming her up against a car – erroneously
believing that section 509 ‘harkens’ back to a time
when such behavior was legally permissible?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 1.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court admits that it made two
errors in its ruling. First, it should not have considered Homan’s written Rule
704 motion for extraordinary relief because such motions must be made
orally. Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B)(1) (“Under extraordinary circumstances, when
the interests of justice require, the trial judge may, before sentencing, hear
an oral motion in arrest of judgment, for a judgment of acquittal, or for a
new trial.”); Commonwealth. v. Howe, 842 A.2d 436, 441 (Pa. Super.
2004) (“The plain terms of Rule 704(B) does not permit the filing of a
written motion for extraordinary relief prior to sentencing.”). Second, the
trial court admits that it granted the motion principally upon Homan’s weight
of the evidence arguments, although upon reflection it should have focused
on the sufficiency of the evidence. Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/2014, at 2-3.
The trial court now concedes that Homan’s weight of the evidence argument
was clearly just “boilerplate” and inadequate to preserve the issue for
appellate consideration. Id. at 3.
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On appeal, however, at the Commonwealth’s request and for the sake
of judicial economy, we will address Homan’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence. We note that the trial court addressed Homan’s sufficiency of
the evidence argument in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and thus there is no
impediment to this panel addressing it substantively in this appeal.
We begin with our scope and standard of review for a sufficiency
claim:
In conducting a sufficiency of the evidence review,
we view all of the evidence admitted, even
improperly-admitted evidence. We consider such
evidence in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, drawing all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
the Commonwealth. When evidence exists to allow
the fact-finder to determine beyond a reasonable
doubt each element of the crimes charged, the
sufficiency claim will fail.
The evidence “need not preclude every possibility of
innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence presented.” In
addition, the Commonwealth can prove its case by
circumstantial evidence. Where “the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no
probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
circumstances[,]” a defendant is entitled to relief.
This Court is not permitted “to re-weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
finder.”
Commonwealth v. Haynes, 2015 WL 1814017, at 15* (Pa. Super. April
22, 2015).
In its written decision, the trial court ruled that the Commonwealth did
not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
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Homan’s actions were not justifiable pursuant to section 509(1) of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code, which provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 509. Use of force by persons with special
responsibility for care, discipline or safety of
others
The use of force upon or toward the person of
another is justifiable if:
(1) The actor is the parent or guardian or other
person similarly responsible for the general care
and supervision of a minor or a person acting at
the request of such parent, guardian or other
responsible person and:
(i) the force is used for the purpose of
safeguarding or promoting the welfare of
the minor, including the preventing or
punishment of his misconduct; and
(ii) the force used is not designed to
cause or known to create a substantial
risk of causing death, serious bodily
injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or
mental distress or gross degradation.
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 509(1). The trial court found that the Commonwealth’s
evidence was insufficient to prove either subsection of section 509(1)
beyond a reasonable doubt, including that Homan’s use of force against H.B.
was not intended for proper punishment and was not designed to cause or
known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury,
disfigurement, extreme pain, mental distress, or gross degradation. Trial
Court Opinion, 9/3/2014, at 5-6. In so ruling, the trial court indicated that
section 509 “harkens back to a time when the striking of children at home or
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at school was completely acceptable and it mattered not whether it occurred
in front of others or left a mark.” Id. at 5.
In Commonwealth v. Ogin, 540 A.2d 549 (Pa. Super. 1988), this
Court made clear that our legislature’s adoption (in 1972) of section 509 was
a compromise between a parent’s continuing right to use corporal
punishment and the need for “limits regarding the type and severity of the
corporal punishment which a parent may impose.” Id. at 554. Put another
way, we recognized that while we must “ensure that the state through its
criminal justice system does not unduly interfere with the private realm of
family life,” it is also the case that the law “long ago abandoned the view
that children are essentially chattels of their parents without independent
legal rights.” Id.
The language of section 509(1) plainly signals that the requirements of
subsections 509(1)(i) and 509(1)(ii) are independent conditions, such that
the parent/defendant is not entitled to the benefit of a justification defense
unless the obligations under both subsections are satisfied. Id. Because
criminal charges are involved, however, the Commonwealth bears the
burden of proof to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is
not entitled to a justification defense.1 Commonwealth v. Douglass, 588
1
The trial court indicated that while it instructed the jury on the justification
defense in section 509(1), it may not have indicated that the burden of proof
on its elements was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial Court Opinion,
9/3/2014, at 5. This issue is not presently before this Court.
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A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. Super. 1991). Accordingly, the Commonwealth must
introduce evidence at trial to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
elements of either subsection 509(1)(i) or 509(1)(ii) are not present in the
case at issue.
In the current case, the Commonwealth argues that it presented
sufficient evidence to disprove both subsections 509(1)(i) and 509(1)(ii).
Based upon our review of the certified record and applying our standard of
review for sufficiency challenges, we agree. With respect to subsection
509(1)(i), the Commonwealth insists that sufficient evidence was admitted
to permit the jury to find that Homan’s violent acts were not undertaken for
the purpose of “safeguarding or promoting the welfare” of H.B., but rather
were the product of her extreme anger. Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. In
Commonwealth v. Kramer, 371 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 1978), this Court
recognized that it is “absolutely crucial to establish [] the particular state of
mind of the parent when administering the punishment,” and thus we posed
the question in this way: “Was it accomplished with an attitude of proper
parental responsibility for teaching the child right from wrong; was the
offending conduct justification for the severity of the punishment, or was the
parent acting with a malicious intent and thereby abusing the privilege or his
relationship with the child?” Id. at 1011; see also Boland v. Leska, 454
A.2d 75, 78 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“[P]ermissible corporal punishment …
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becomes malicious abuse … [when the] point is reached when the parent or
guardian acts with malicious intent in so punishing the child.”).
In the above-quoted portion of its written decision (supra pages 1-2),
the trial court determined that H.B.’s refusal to talk to her mother and uncle
“clearly angered [Homan],” and that Homan “expressed her extreme anger”
when the car stopped and she removed H.B. from the vehicle, yelling
profanity at her and grabbing her violently by the arms and neck. Trial
Court Opinion, 9/3/2014, at 3.
The record on appeal supports the trial court’s factual findings. Traci
Bouder, an employee at Rita’s who witnessed the events at issue, testified at
trial that she observed Homan and her brother screaming at H.B. and N.B.
while the children were still in the back seat of the car. N.T., 5/13/2014, at
10-11. Bouder then saw Homan grab H.B. in the neck area, pull her out of
the car, and then, while holding H.B. by the hands and wrists, put her face
very close to H.B.’s and started “spit screaming” expletives at her,
repeatedly telling her to “shut the fuck up,” and shaking her. Id. at 11-13.
Bouder called the police because “I felt it was all wrong.” Id. at 12. H.B.
described Homan’s actions similarly, testifying that Homan repeatedly yelled
“F-you” at her in an “outside voice,” and then, while “jacking me up against
the car,” began to choke her, not stopping until the police arrived. Id. at
23-26.
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Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, the jury could have
reasonably found that Homan’s actions were the result of extreme anger,
rather than for the purpose of “safeguarding or promoting the welfare” of
H.B, as required by subsection 509(1)(i). In the context of a sufficiency of
the evidence challenge, it is not this Court (or the trial court) to weigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Haynes,
2015 WL 1814017, at 15*.
Likewise, the Commonwealth contends that pursuant to subsection
509(1)(ii), it introduced sufficient evidence to prove that Homan’s actions,
including yelling profanities at H.B. and the grabbing her by the arms and
neck, were “designed (or intended) to cause extreme pain, or mental
distress, or gross degradation.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. Regarding
“extreme pain,” H.B. testified that getting pinned against the car was
“painful” and that the grabbing of her wrists was “kind of” painful. N.T.,
5/13/2014, at 23-26. H.B.’s body later showed bruising. Id. at 69-50. We
note that in Douglass, however, this Court held that subsection 509(1)(ii)’s
reference to “extreme pain” placed a high burden on the Commonwealth,
requiring proof of a level of pain beyond mere “substantial pain.” Douglass,
588 A.2d at 56.
We need not decide whether the pain Homan inflicted on H.B. here
qualified as “extreme pain” as required by Douglass, however, since there
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was clearly sufficient evidence to establish that Homan’s actions resulted in
mental distress and gross degradation to H.B. The Commonwealth argues,
persuasively we think, that “there can be no other plausible explanation for
screaming ‘fuck you’ and choking a 12 year old girl in public, but to degrade
her and cause her mental anguish.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. Bouder
testified that the events she observed were severe enough to make her cry,
and that when the police arrived, N.B. was “in trauma” and “ran to the cop
like it was her savior” and “climbed up on her like a cat.” N.T., 5/13/2014,
at 14. H.B. testified that when the police arrived, she jumped into the police
car on “the other side, to get as far away as I could get away from her.” Id.
at 26. Officer Briana Gaumer, the first police officer to arrive at the scene,
testified that H.B. “looked terrified ... and confused” and “crawled over her
mother and ran to me and began clawing at me and screaming please help
me, and trying to climb me.” Id. at 31. According to Officer Gaumer, both
girls were “hysterical” and got into the back seat of her patrol car so they
could stay together and hold on to each other. Id. at 31-32. H.B. and N.B.
were so scared of their mother at that point that when Officer Gaumer
offered to crack the car window for them, H.B. said, “no, no, no, I don’t want
her to come in here.” Id. at 32.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as our standard of review requires, the jury could
reasonably have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Homan’s actions
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resulted in mental distress and gross degradation to H.B. The jury, as the
fact-finder, was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.
Haynes, 2015 WL 1814017, at 15*. Based upon our review of the evidence
in the certified record on appeal, we conclude that the Commonwealth
introduced sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding Homan
guilty of simple assault and rejecting the defense of parental justification
under section 509(1).
The trial court’s order dated June 4, 2014 is hereby vacated and the
jury’s verdict is reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court for
resentencing in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/10/2015
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