Morris, M. v. Martin, D. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MALCOLM S. MORRIS, D.M.D. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
2031 Perry Highway : PENNSYLVANIA
Wexford, PA 15090, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
DAVID C. MARTIN, JR., ESQUIRE, AND :
PATTI LERDA, ESQUIRE, Individually :
and t/d/b/a MARTIN & LERDA, :
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, :
:
Appellees : No. 1868 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Order entered on November 4, 2013
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Civil Division, No. GD-13-011433
BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2014
Malcolm S. Morris, D.M.D. (“Morris”) appeals from the Order sustaining
the preliminary objections filed by David C. Martin, Jr., Esquire, Patti Lerda,
Esquire, individually (“Lerda”) and t/d/b/a Martin & Lerda, Attorneys at Law
(collectively, “the Appellees”), and dismissing Morris’s Second Amended
Complaint with prejudice. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The Appellees hired Morris as an expert witness in a dental malpractice
case. After the case settled, Morris filed a Complaint against the Appellees
for failure to pay his expert witness fees, amounting to $345,100.00. The
Appellees filed Preliminary Objections, arguing that the Complaint did not
contain any allegation of agreed-upon contractual terms or a clear
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accounting of the expert witness fees sought by Morris. On August 21,
2013, the trial court granted the Appellees’ Preliminary Objections and
ordered Morris to “amend his pleading and attach the required
documentation …” within twenty days of the entry of the Order.
On September 6, 2013, Morris filed an Amended Complaint, arguing
that the Appellees had breached an oral contract to pay Morris’s expert
witness fees. Morris attached to the Amended Complaint emails between
Morris and Lerda regarding the fees in question. Morris also attached a
check from the Appellees for $10,000.00, which they purported was
payment in full for Morris’s services. Morris filed a Second Amended
Complaint on September 13, 2013, to correct a typographical error.1
The Appellees filed Preliminary Objections, arguing that Morris failed to
specify the agreed-upon contractual terms, and Morris failed to support his
claim for $345,100.00 in expert fees. The trial court granted the Appellees’
Preliminary Objections and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint with
prejudice. The trial court specifically found that Morris failed to sufficiently
plead the existence of a contract based upon course of conduct; Morris did
not attach any bills; and Morris’s claim for $345,100.00 in expert fees was
1
In the Second Amended Complaint, Morris adopted the averments made in
the Amended Complaint. In addressing Morris’s claims on appeal, we will
cite to the Amended Complaint, which sets forth, in detail, Morris’s relevant
averments.
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unreasonable on its face, as there was no itemization of work done. Morris
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,2 which the trial court denied.
Morris filed a timely Notice of Appeal. The trial court ordered Morris to
file a Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) concise statement.
Morris filed a timely Concise Statement, and the trial court issued an
Opinion.
On appeal, Morris raises the following questions for our review:
1. [Whether t]he trial court erred in dismissing [Morris’s] Second
Amended Complaint with prejudice and without leave to
amend, as the Second Amended Complaint complied with
Pa.R.C.P. 2128[?]
2. [Whether t]he trial court erred in dismissing [Morris’s] breach
of oral contract claim with prejudice, as the Second Amended
Complaint sufficiently states a claim for damages arising out
of [the Appellees’] breach of a binding oral contract[?]
3. [Whether t]he trial court erred in dismissing [Morris’s] claim
for breach of a contract implied in law with prejudice, as the
Second Amended Complaint sufficiently states a claim for
damages arising from [the Appellees’] breach of a binding
contract implied from the conduct of the parties in light of the
surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ course of
dealing[?]
4. [Whether t]he trial court erred in dismissing all claims stated
in [Morris’s Second] Amended Complaint with prejudice, to
the extent [that] such dismissal was based on the trial court’s
insistence upon greater specificity in pleading[?] Claims and
damages are properly pleaded generally, and no greater
specificity is required by the [Pennsylvania] Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2
Morris attached a detailed description of his work on the underlying
malpractice claim to the Motion for Reconsideration. See Motion for
Reconsideration, 11/15/13, at 1-2 (unnumbered), Exhibit A.
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Brief for Appellant at 3-4 (emphasis omitted).
Our standard of review of an order of the trial court
overruling or granting preliminary objections is to determine
whether the trial court committed an error of law. When
considering the appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary
objections, the appellate court must apply the same standard as
the trial court.
Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the
legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering preliminary
objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings
are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the
dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases
in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be
unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to
relief. If any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be
sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the
preliminary objections.
Joyce v. Erie Ins. Exch., 74 A.3d 157, 162 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted).
We will address Morris’s claims together, as he has only set forth a
single claim in his Argument section. Morris contends that the trial court’s
dismissal of his Second Amended Complaint with prejudice denied him the
right to collect his expert witness fees on a breach of contract claim. Brief
for Appellant at 7. Morris asserts that preliminary objections are
inappropriate to challenge the damages sought in a complaint. Id. Morris
argues that a trial judge or a jury should have determined the amount of
fees owed to him. Id.
A breach of contract action involves (1) the existence of a
contract, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract, and (3)
damages. While every element must be pled specifically, it is
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axiomatic that a contract may be manifest orally, in writing, or
as an inference from the acts and conduct of the parties.
Sullivan v. Chartwell Inv. Partners, LP, 873 A.2d 710, 716 (Pa. Super.
2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Pennsy Supply, Inc. v.
Am. Ash Recycling Corp. of Pennsylvania, 895 A.2d 595, 600 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (stating that “[w]hile not every term of a contract must be
stated in complete detail, every element must be specifically pleaded.
Clarity is particularly important where an oral contract is alleged.”) (citation
omitted).
Instantly, Morris averred that he entered into an oral agreement with
the Appellees to be a key expert witness in a lawsuit involving dental
malpractice. Amended Complaint, 9/6/13, at 2. Morris stated that the
Appellees had previously retained him as an expert witness, each pursuant
to oral agreements, wherein the Appellees would pay him after the case
concluded. Id. Morris stated that his usual billing rate is $350.00 per hour
and that the Appellees were aware of this rate based upon their prior
dealings with Morris. Id. Morris stated that he worked on the underlying
dental malpractice case for a total of 986 hours over a five-year period. Id.
Morris sought payment of expert fees totaling $345,100.00. Id. at 3.
Morris averred that the Appellees refused to pay him the $345,100.00, and
instead gave him a $10,000.00 check as payment for his expert fees. Id.;
see also id., Exhibit 3 (wherein the Appellees sent Morris a letter stating
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that they were enclosing a $10,000.00 check as payment in full for his
services).
In light of the facts alleged in Morris’s Second Amended Complaint,
which are assumed to be true, and the inferences reasonably deducible
therefrom, we conclude that Morris’s Second Amended Complaint was
adequate to survive the Appellees’ preliminary objections. Indeed, Morris
pled the existence of an oral contract, the Appellees’ failure to pay under the
contract, and damages. See Sullivan, 873 A.2d at 716-17 (concluding that
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were improperly granted
on a breach of contract claim where appellant averred the existence of a
contract, the appellee’s breach of the contract, and damages); see also id.
at 716 (stating that while the “[a]ppellant will carry the burden of proving
the oral agreement’s existence at trial, for purposes of this appeal we are
constrained to accept [a]ppellant’s averments as true.”); Gaston v.
Diocese of Allentown, 712 A.2d 757, 758 (Pa. Super. 1998) (stating “[i]f
the facts pleaded state a claim for which relief may be granted under any
theory of law, then there is sufficient doubt to require rejection of the
demurrer.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice and remand
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the case for further proceedings.3
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/31/2014
3
This Court, like the trial court, is skeptical of the amount claimed by Morris
for expert witness fees. However, because of the relevant standard of
review, we are constrained to reverse the Order sustaining Preliminary
Objections.
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