In Re: P.R.M., Appeal of: J.M. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
IN RE: P.R.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.M., A/K/A J.M., FATHER : No. 601 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order dated March 21, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 158 of 2013
IN RE: L.M.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.M., A/K/A J.M., FATHER : No. 602 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order dated March 21, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 160 of 2013
IN RE: A.L.M., MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.M., A/K/A J.M., FATHER : No. 603 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order dated March 21, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 159 of 2013
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IN RE: P.R.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: L.C.S., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 638 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order March 21, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 158 of 2013
IN RE: A.L.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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:
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APPEAL OF: L.C.S., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 639 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order March 21, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 159 of 2013
IN RE: L.M.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: L.C.S., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 640 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order March 21, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 160 of 2013
BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2014
Appellants, J.M. (“Father”) and C.L.S. (“Mother”), appeal from the
orders dated March 21, 2014, granting the petitions of Appellee, Allegheny
County Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) to terminate their parental
rights to PRM (born June 2007), ALM (born July 2010), and LMM (born
March 2013). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s orders.
On July 15, 2012, CYF took custody of PRM and ALM after receiving a
report that the two children were found walking by railroad tracks. Mother
and Father each pled guilty to one count of endangering the welfare of a
child, and on August 6, 2012, PRM and ALM were adjudicated dependent. At
the time of LMM’s birth in March 2013, CYF immediately obtained an
emergency custody authorization. LMM was adjudicated dependent on
March 27, 2013.
CYF established the following Family Service Plan (FSP) goals for
Mother and Father: learn and use non-violent means of discipline, eliminate
verbal and physical family abuse, maintain contact and cooperation with
agency and service providers, address mental health issues, maintain safe
and stable housing, address developmental delays and physical disabilities of
the children, and maintain regular visits. CYF referred Mother and Father to
several service providers, including Achieva and Project Star, both of which
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have expertise in helping parents and children with disabilities.1 Mother and
Father made substantial progress with respect to certain of the FSP goals.
Father completed anger management classes and showed a marked
improvement in managing his anger. N.T., 3/21/2014, at 141. An
extermination service assisted with the housing issues. Id. at 142. Both
Mother and Father achieved all of their visitation goals with the children and
were extremely cooperative with both CYF and the assigned service
providers. Id. A CYF caseworker testified that he had never met parents
that were more cooperative and that their level of communication
throughout the process was “unheard of.” Id. at 141.
Nevertheless, after an evidentiary hearing on March 21, 2014, on
March 31, 2014 the trial court issued orders terminating the parental rights
of Mother and Father to the three children. In its written opinion in support
of the orders, the trial court emphasized that for Mother and Father, “[i]t is a
matter of ‘cannot,’ as opposed to ‘will not,’” noting that “the issue is that the
parents are intellectually impaired to such a degree that they are unable to
provide care for the three children, all of whom have significant health
concerns and special needs.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/2014, at 4.
1
PRM has a disorder on the autism spectrum reflecting pervasive
developmental delays. N.T., 3/21/2014, at 33. ALM has muscular
dystrophy and Charcot Marie Tooth Syndrome, both of which are
degenerative disorders. Id. at 19, 199. LMM may also have muscular
dystrophy and Charcot Marie Tooth Syndrome. Id. at 197-98. Mother has
mild to moderate mental retardation. Id. at 7. Father has expressive
language disorder and articulation disorder. Id. at 10.
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On appeal, Father raises the following four issues for our consideration
and determination:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred
as a matter of law in finding that [CYF] proved by
clear and convincing evidence that they provided
reasonable services to Father to reunify [him] with
his children?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred
as a matter of law in finding that the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by Father?
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred
as a matter of law in finding that Father was not
likely to remedy the conditions which led to the
removal of the children within a reasonable period of
time?
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred
as a matter of law in finding that termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, emotional needs and welfare of the
children?
Father’s Brief at 1-2. Mother raises a single issue on appeal:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Mother’s parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the children pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
Mother’s Brief at 9.
When considering an appeal from a trial court’s termination of parental
rights, our standard of review is as follows:
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[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s
determination of a petition for termination of
parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. As
has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does
not result merely because the reviewing court might
have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion
only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.
… [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on
a cold record, where the trial judges are observing
the parties during the relevant hearing and often
presiding over numerous other hearings regarding
the child and parents. Therefore, even where the
facts could support an opposite result, as is often the
case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess
the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer
to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
supported by the record and the court’s legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an
abuse of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–27 (Pa. 2012) (citations
omitted).
We begin with Father’s first issue on appeal, in which he argues that
CYF failed to provide “reasonable services” to reunify him with his children.
Father’s Brief at 6. Father does not contend that CYF failed to provide any
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services to him, but rather that the services provided “were not specific
enough to be meaningful to this family and in particular to Father,” and that
instead of helping, the services provided “were frustrating and confusing to
the family.” Id. at 6, 10. Father alleges that when he complained about his
frustration with the services being provided, his concerns were not taken
seriously and that he was accused of being belligerent and rude. Id. at 10.
Father did not preserve this issue for appeal, as it was not included in
his statement of issues complained of on appeal filed pursuant to Rule
1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, it is
waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Cobbs v. SEPTA, 985 A.2d 249, 256
(Pa. Super. 2009); Southcentral Employment Corp. v. Birmingham Fire
Ins. Co. of Pa., 926 A.2d 977, 983 n. 5 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that
issue not raised in statement of matters complained of on appeal is waived
for purposes of appeal).
Even if not waived, however, we would not grant relief on this basis.
This Court recently reiterated a petitioner must make reasonable efforts to
reunify a parent with his child prior to seeking to terminate a parent's rights.
In re D.C.D., 91 A.3d 173, 179 (Pa. Super.), appeal granted, 93 A.3d 802
(Pa. 2014); see also In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (“Before filing a petition for termination of parental rights, the
Commonwealth is required to make reasonable efforts to promote
reunification of parent and child.”); Fallaro v. Yeager, 528 A.2d 222, 229
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(Pa. Super. 1987) (“Ultimately, the goal is to rehabilitate the family, reunite
the child with his family or, after reasonable efforts over an appropriate
period of time have failed, to terminate parental rights and free the child for
adoption[.]”).
Based upon our review of the certified record, CYF met its obligation to
provide reasonable efforts to reunify Father with his children. During
permanency reviews in the dependency proceedings, the trial court
repeatedly ruled that “[r]easonable efforts have been made by [CYS] to
finalize this child’s permanency plan.”2 Moreover, the record reflects that
CYF made referrals for multiple service providers, including Family Resources
and the East Allegheny Family Support Center, which provided parenting
services to both Mother and Father. N.T., 3/21/2014, at 132. With respect
to Father’s contention that the services provided to him were not specific
enough to be meaningful to this family, the trial court found that the
services provided by Achieva and Project Star are the best available in
Allegheny County for the types of needs of the parents and children in this
case. Id. at 222. Dr. Angela Pepe (“Dr. Pepe”), a licensed clinical
psychologist who evaluated and worked with both the parents and the
2
For ALM, the certified record contains four such Permanency Review
Orders, dated November 21, 2012, February 21, 2013, June 10, 2013, and
September 20, 2013. For PRM, the certified record contains three such
orders (for reasons unclear, the docket does not contain a February 2013
Permanency Review Order for PRM). Due to her later birth, for LMM the
certified record contains two such orders, dated June 10, 2013 and
September 20, 2013.
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children, testified that she recommended Achieva for Father because it
provided interactive therapy services to help Father develop the ability to
address his own, and his children’s, special needs. Id. at 34. Colleen Sokira
(“Sokira”), a parenting educational specialist at Achieva, testified that
Achieva evaluated PRM’s behaviors and provided Mother and Father with
recommendations on how to best respond to them, establishing a clear
routine for the parents to follow when working with him. Id. at 99-100.
Finally, while Mother and Father initially voiced some frustration with what
they considered to be conflicting advice from Achieva and Project Star
(which was working with PRM), Sokira testified that the two agencies came
together and concluded that while their advice was essentially the same,
they were using different words to express the same recommendations. Id.
at 107. After the two agencies came together and agreed on common
verbiage, Mother and Father stopped expressing confusion, and in fact
seemed to be more comfortable after seeing representatives from the two
agencies communicating with each other before the beginning of visits with
them. Id.
For his second issue on appeal, Father contends that CYF did not
produce sufficient evidence to permit termination of his parental rights under
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs the
termination of parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. CYF bears the
burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the asserted
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grounds for termination are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.
Super. 2009). “[C]lear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that
is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to
come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise
facts in issue.” Id.
In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights based
upon section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), which state the following:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard
to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for
a period of at least six months
immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled
purpose of relinquishing parental claim to
a child or has refused or failed to
perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of
the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control
or subsistence necessary for his physical
or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
***
(5) The child has been removed from the
care of the parent by the court or under
a voluntary agreement with an agency
for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or
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placement of the child continue to exist,
the parent cannot or will not remedy
those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance
reasonably available to the parent are
not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the
child within a reasonable period of time
and termination of the parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare
of the child.
(8) The child has been removed from the
care of the parent by the court or under
a voluntary agreement with an agency,
12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
***
(b) Other considerations. The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are first initiated
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
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Father contends that the trial court erred in finding that CYF had
produced clear and convincing evidence to satisfy subsection 2511(a)(2).3
Parental rights may be terminated under subsection 2511(a)(2) if three
conditions are met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied. In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing In re
Geiger, 331 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa. 1975)).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under section
2511(a)(2) are “not limited to affirmative misconduct.” In re A.L.D., 797
A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). Unlike subsection 2511(a)(1), subsection
2511(a)(2) does not emphasize a parent's refusal or failure to perform
parental duties, but instead focuses on the child's present and future need
for essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical
or mental well-being. In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d at 82. Thus, while “sincere
efforts to perform parental duties” can preserve parental rights under
subsection 2511(a)(1), those same efforts may be insufficient to remedy
3
Satisfaction of any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with
consideration of section 2511(b), will suffice for the involuntary termination
of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). Because we conclude infra that CYF established sufficient grounds
for termination of parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(2), we need not
address Father’s third issue on appeal, which challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence under subsections 2511(a)(5) and 2511(a)(8).
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parental incapacity under subsection 2511(a)(2). In re Z.P., 994 A.2d
1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010); see also Matter of Adoption of C.A.W.,
683 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. Super. 1996); In re Adoption of M.J.H., 501 A.2d
648 (Pa. Super. 1985).
In this case, the trial court, after an extensive review of the evidence
presented at the March 21, 2014 evidentiary hearing, found that Father,
despite genuine and diligent efforts to do so, could not obtain the necessary
parenting skills to allow for reunification with the children.
One of the driving concerns which led to the
children’s removal was the parents’ inability to
properly supervise their children. [N.T., 3/21/2014],
at 145. Even before the incident leading to the
children’s removal, there were previous reports
made to the police concerning the lack of
supervision. Id. at 156. ‘Parenting’ is a general
term, as the caseworker suggested. Id. at 144. In
this context, the ‘parenting’ goal, and consequently
the crux of the case, revolved around the [parents’]
abilities to address their own impairments while
simultaneously addressing the rather extraordinary
needs of their children. This Court agrees with CYF
that this goal has not and cannot be met by the
parents. Id.
CYF recruited the assistance of Achieva, which is a
large, private non-profit organization whose mission
is to work with individuals with disabilities from birth
to death. Id. at 70. Specifically, Achieva, and its
service worker [Sokira], were asked to assess the
parents’ independent living and parenting skills and
to supervise the children’s visits at the Children’s
Institute. Id. Achieva attempted to provide the
parents with additional parenting skills. The services
began in May 2013. Id. at 71. But despite these
services, the concerns about the parties’ ability to
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parent remained. [Sokira] testified that the primary
and overarching issue during supervised visits is the
parent’s ability to identify what each and all of their
children are doing at any given time. Id. at 74.
After this initial identification, the question then
becomes whether the respective child’s activity is a
health, safety or welfare concern. Id. Sokira
testified that the parents could not make these
diagnoses without a cue from the supporting staff.
Id. That is, the parents were unable to identify
dangerous situations. By way of example, Sokira
testified that, during a visit, [PRM] started playing
with the cords of a CD player that sat on a table. Id.
at 75. The cord was wrapped around the child’s
neck, and the CD player was poised to fall on the
child’s head. Id. Achieva or Project Star staff would
point out that [PRM] was playing with the CD player,
but the parents lacked the ability to recognize the
situation for what it was. Id. Not only do the
parents have difficulty recognizing situations as
hazardous, but they also lack the necessary skills to
rectify the situation. Id. at 76.
Achieva sought to address this problem by helping
the parents create a routine. Id. at 77. The routine
was created with the hope that if the parents and the
children knew what was supposed to be next, it
would decrease the stress of the visit. Id. at 79.
And if the children experienced less stress, then
hopefully there would be less behavioral problems
for the parents to have to address. Id. Sokira
testified that, at the time of the hearing, there are
less behavioral problems coming from the children,
but that there are also more services being provided.
Id. For example, [PRM] had his own behavior
specialist consultant [Project Star]. Id. Still, both
parents struggled throughout the visits directing the
children what to do. Id. at 82. They would rather
let the children be and then only engage with the
children if the kids were having difficulty or if the
staff prompted them to partake. Id. at 82-83. The
problem with this approach is that if they cannot
direct the children, the children will be harder for the
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parents to supervise. Id. at 83-84. If the [parents’]
cannot supervise, they cannot ensure that the
children are safe. Id. at 103. Again, parental
supervision was a primary concern if not the primary
concern behind the removal of the children. Amanda
Frey of Project Star, who also observed the visits,
noted that the parents are often unaware when
[ALM] would run off. Id. at 195. Sokira testified
that on many visits, Father scrolled through his
phone, not talking or paying attention to the
children. Id. at 84-85. During other visits, Father
wanted to discuss the court case with the staffers.
The staff attempts to redirect Father were often
fruitless. Id. at 85. Another reason the parents had
trouble engaging with the children is because
engagement requires verbal interaction and both
parents have difficulty communicating. Id. at 87.
When Achieva became involved with the parents.
Father’s verbal interactions consisted of repeating
the child’s name. Id. at 96, At the time of the
[termination of parental rights] hearing, Father was
able to give two and three word phrases to direct the
children. Id. Given Father’s inabilities, Sokira
considered this development to be “significant
progress. Id. at 97.
Though the parents communication, and thus their
skillset has advanced somewhat, Sokira testified that
it was still Achieva’s conclusion that the parents do
not have the ability to be aware of what all the
children are doing at the same time. Id. at 87. This
failure impedes the parents’ ability to recognize
danger or assess whether an activity is hazardous for
the children. Even when the parents are cued in,
they do not possess the ability to intervene. Id. at
88. The parents struggled to understand how to
properly discipline the children. Id. at 119. They
had difficulty understanding how to provide the
children with the proper [instruction]. Id. at 118.
Indeed there were still other concerns about the
parties’ ability to live independently. …
Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/2014, at 5-7.
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The certified record on appeal supports the trial court’s analysis, and
thus we must conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred with respect to
the trial court’s finding that Father cannot remedy the conditions that led to
the removal of the children from the home. CYF produced sufficient
evidence to permit the termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to
subsection 2511(a)(2).
For Father’s fourth issue and Mother’s only issue on appeal, both
contest the trial court’s finding that CYF met its evidentiary burden pursuant
to section 2511(b), which requires consideration of whether the child's needs
and welfare will best be met by termination of parental rights. In re Z.P.,
994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). This Court has described the
nature of the analysis under section 2511(b) as follows:
Before granting a petition to terminate parental
rights, it is imperative that a trial court carefully
consider the intangible dimension of the needs and
welfare of a child—the love, comfort, security, and
closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship, as
well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of
relationships is also important to a child, for whom
severance of close parental ties is usually extremely
painful. The trial court, in considering what situation
would best serve the child[ren]'s needs and welfare,
must examine the status of the natural parental
bond to consider whether terminating the natural
parents' rights would destroy something in existence
that is necessary and beneficial.
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). A parent's own feelings of love and
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affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. In
re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Both parents insist that termination of their parental rights is not in
the best interests of the children. They argue that they have established
(or, with respect to LMM, are establishing) strong bonds with the children,
and that termination would unnecessarily result in a permanent loss of these
bonds. Mother’s Brief at 21; Father’s Brief at 20. They insist that continued
visitation with the children is the best course for all concerned, and thus the
trial court, rather than terminating their parental rights, should have
considered less drastic alternatives. Mother’s Brief at 21; Father’s Brief at
22. Father contends that the trial court should have placed the children in a
permanent legal custodianship (“PLC”), which would have permitted the
parents to retain their rights to continued visitation without requiring them
to resume custody. Father’s Brief at 22.
As indicated hereinabove, when contemplating the termination of
parental rights, a trial court must consider whether terminating the natural
parents' bond with their children “would destroy something in existence that
is necessary and beneficial.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. The mere
existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent, however, is not
outcome determinative and is instead just one of many factors that must be
considered. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). One of these
additional factors is whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and
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whether they have an emotional bond with their foster parents. Id. (citing
In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012)).
In this case, Dr. Pepe testified that the children’s primary attachment
is with their foster parents, and that while with their foster parents, they
have all made “tremendous progress” in dealing with their special needs. As
a result, Dr. Pepe testified that given their ages, primary attachments to the
foster parents, and developmental needs, termination of Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights best serves the children’s needs and welfare. N.T.,
3/21/2014, at 29. Moreover, Dr. Pepe indicated that while a bond does exist
between the children and their biological parents, if the children would never
see them again they would likely only be “sad” for a period of time but it
would not seriously impact their psychological functioning. Id. at 27, 56-57.
Accordingly, the certified record supports the trial court’s determination that
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children,
particularly given the unique facts presented here.
We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not
to place the children in a PLC. Based upon our review of the certified record,
the trial court thoroughly reviewed the case, heard expert witnesses, and
considered permanent legal custody as an option, but concluded that
adoption best suits the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the
children. To this end, the trial court specifically referenced the testimony of
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Dr. Pepe regarding the children’s need for the stability and permanency that
only adoption can provide them.
It [adoption] provides the children with a level of
stability that they need of knowing what to anticipate
in the future. For example, what school they are
going to go to, who their friends are going to be,
what they can expect in their future. It is very
important as opposed to being in limbo and not
knowing how long is this going to last. … They have
just a very high degree of insecurity without the
level of permanency that I believe adoption offers
them after a period of time. … Now, while a legal
arrangement, for example, could occur until the
children are 18, it doesn’t have the same level of
emotional reinforcement for the children. If they are
able to comprehend that these are now my parents
versus these are now my caregivers. … There is
just a difference in their perception regarding the
degree of stability that adoption provides.
N.T., 3/21/2014, at 54-55; Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/2014, at 10. The special
needs of the children take on added significance in the present
circumstances, as they will likely continue to require parental assistance
beyond the age of 18. N.T., 3/21/2014, at 19.
Finally, the trial court was influenced by Dr. Pepe’s testimony that a
refusal to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father would actually
have a negative effect on the children’s long-term well-being, as the foster
parents are more capable of meeting the unique challenges presented here
and providing the necessary care for special needs children. Trial Court
Opinion, 6/6/2014, at 10 (citing N.T., 3/21/2014, at 38).
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J-A29014-14
J-A29015-14
For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
decision to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. This was an
extremely difficult case fraught with the reality that the love and affection
Mother and Father have for their children cannot overcome the stark fact
that they are incapable of parenting their children, who have extraordinary
needs. We commend the trial court for its thorough and thoughtful analysis
of the situation and the needs and welfare of the children.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/7/2014
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