Com. v. Blankenship, V. ( 2017 )

J-S80028-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VANDY BLANKENSHIP
Appellant No. 301 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 19, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No: CP-36-CR-0004698-2014
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and RANSOM, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2017
Appellant Vandy Blankenship appeals from the January 19, 2016
judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster
County (“trial court”) following a jury trial where Appellant was found guilty
of first degree murder.1 Appellant challenges the denial of his omnibus
motion to suppress. Upon review, we affirm.
The matter stems from a homicide that occurred on or around
September 3, 2014. On March 16, 2015, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial
motion, including a motion to suppress. The trial court held a suppression
hearing on May 12, 2015. On December 9, 2015, the trial court issued an
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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opinion and order denying Appellant’s suppression motion. The trial court
made the following factual findings.
On September 3, 2014[,] at approximately 2:09 A.M.
[Appellant] called Lancaster 911[FN1] stating that he
wanted to report a murder. Officers Hatfield and Hanby
arrived at the scene an[d] met Lieutenant Laser and
Sergeant Stoltfus. Laser was in the residence and Stoltfus
was on the front porch talking with [Appellant]. Officer
Hatfield at the instruction of Lieutenant Laser began
talking to [Appellant].
[Appellant] acknowledged that he made the 911 call
after he arrived home and found the victim in a pool of
blood. Hatfield checked with Countywide Communications
and was informed of a York County warrant, however
[Appellant] was not arrested. Hatfield asked if he would
accompany them to the police station to talk about the
incident and he agreed. [Appellant] also agreed to be
searched for the safety of the police and no weapons were
found. [Appellant] voluntarily entered the car, he was not
handcuffed, and they drove to the police station.
Upon arrival they entered the station and went to the
media room. Officer Hatfield left to obtain a guest
information sheet, and [Appellant] and another police
officer, Sergeant Mummau remained. Officer Hatfield
returned and the guest information sheet was filled out.
[Appellant] was talking to the officers for about 30 minute
to 1 hour. He was not given any Miranda warnings and
the interview was basically an information gathering
section[(sic)].
....
After the first interview [Appellant] was questioned
by Det. Mackley.[2] Detective Mackley arrived and
introduced himself to [Appellant] in the media room.
Detective Mackley then left for about 40 minutes to take
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2
Detective Mackley was also joined by Detective Zook.
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care of some other matters. He returned and asked
[Appellant] if he would come upstairs to the detective
division on the third floor. [Appellant] did and when they
arrived [Appellant] agreed to be interviewed. [Appellant]
was offered food and drink but declined. The interview
started at 4:00 A.M. and continued to 8:30 A.M.
[Appellant] had not been formally arrested no[r] were any
Miranda warnings given.
....
At 8:30 A.M. the two detectives concluded the
general interview and began a formal question and answer
interview with [Appellant]. This consisted of 10 pages
containing 92 questions and answers. This interview
commenced at 8:40 A.M. and concluded at 12:30 P.M.
This was simply a continuation of the interview between
[Appellant] and [Detective] Zook. [Appellant] was not
given any Miranda warnings because he was not under
arrest. He was fully cooperative with the police, never
requesting an attorney, and never asked to end the
interview or leave.
At the conclusion of the interview [Appellant] was
asked to provide a buccal sample and agreed to do so.
Prior to giving the swab [Appellant] signed a Lancaster
Bureau Police Consent agreeing to it.
At 12:45 P.M. [Appellant] was officially arrested on
the outstanding York County warrant. He was given his
Miranda warnings at 12:51 P.M. Detective Mackley
testified that [Appellant] understood his Miranda rights
and then when asked at the hearing whether [Appellant]
indicated that he wanted to proceed with continuing with
the interview Detective Mackley answered “Yes, Sir. He
was eager.”
This continued until 4:58 P.M. when Detective
Winters entered the room and Detective Mackley left.
Detective Winters continued questioning until
approximately 7:00 P.M. when he terminated the
interview.
[FN1] He used the victim’s cell phone.
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Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/2015, at 1-5 (footnotes 2 and 3 omitted).
After a jury trial that occurred from January 11 through January 19,
2016, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life.
Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions; however, Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal on February 18, 2016. After directing Appellant to
comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and ordering the Commonwealth to respond,
the trial court entered an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on April 14,
2016.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal.
I. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
suppress, where police did not have probable cause to
arrest [Appellant] at 4:10 a.m. after approximately an
hour of initial questioning when he was placed in a secure
room, and therefore, any evidence taken from or
statements made by [Appellant] should have been
suppressed as fruit of the illegal arrest?
II. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
suppress where police subjected [Appellant] to a custodial
interrogation on September 3, 2014[,] at 4:10 a.m.
without advising [Appellant] of his Miranda rights, and
therefore, any statements made by [Appellant] should
have been suppressed?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant’s arguments are practically identical; essentially, Appellant
argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because
Appellant was in custody and subjected to a custodial interrogation at 4:10
a.m. without being advised of his Miranda rights.
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Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress is
limited to determining whether the suppression court’s
factual findings are supported by the record and whether
the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of
the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression
court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are
bound by these findings and may reverse only if the
court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression
court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate
court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus the
conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our
plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Ransom, 103 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010), cert denied 131
S. Ct. 110 (2010) (citations, quotations, and ellipses omitted)). Appellant is
not challenging the factual findings made by the trial court. Thus, the only
issue is whether the Appellant was subject to a custodial interrogation at
4:10 a.m.
It is clear from the record that Appellant was subject to interrogation;
therefore, the paramount question is whether Appellant was in custody at
the time of questioning. “A person is in custody for Miranda purposes only
when he is ‘denied his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in
a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or
movement is restricted by the interrogation.” Commonwealth v.
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Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75, 90 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 727 A.2d 1089, 1100 (Pa. 1999)).
[I]n determining whether an individual was in custody, the
‘ultimate inquiry is … whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree
associated with a formal arrest. The question of custody is
an objective one, focusing on the totality of the
circumstance, with due consideration given to the
reasonable impression conveyed upon the person being
questioned.
Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, factors to determine whether an
individual has been in custody include: “the basis for detention; its length;
its location; whether the suspect was transported against his or her will;
how far, and why; whether restraints were used; whether the law
enforcement officer showed, threatened, or used force; and the investigative
methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.” Commonwealth v.
Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citing Commonwealth v.
Busch, 713 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. Super. 1998)).
In the matter sub judice after officers responded to the scene following
Appellant’s 911 call, Appellant was asked to accompany Officer Hatfield to
the police station for an interview. Prior to entering the vehicle, he was
searched solely for officer safety purposes. Appellant was not handcuffed or
restrained in any manner. Upon entering the police station he was led to an
unsecured portion of the police station while Officer Hatfield filled out a
guest information sheet. After his initial interview, Appellant was questioned
by Detective Mackley, who introduced himself to Appellant in the media
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room. Detective Mackley left Appellant for about 40 minutes to take care of
some other matters. Appellant is not asserting that he was in custody at
that time.3
Appellant’s challenge flows from the interrogation after Detective
Mackley returned. At approximately 4:10 a.m., Detective Mackle returned
and asked Appellant if he would come upstairs to the detective division on
the third floor. Appellant consented and agreed to be interviewed.
Appellant was not in restraints at this time. Appellant was offered food and
drink. Furthermore, Appellant was fully cooperative with the police, never
requested an attorney, to leave, or to end the interview. While Appellant’s
interview lasted for an extended period of time, that alone is not
determinative. Upon review of the totality of the circumstances, Appellant
was not in custody at 4:10 a.m. on September 3, 2014. As Appellant was
not in custody, he was not subject to a custodial interrogation and the
officers were not required to advise him of his Miranda rights. Therefore,
the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s
claim fails.
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3
Appellant is arguing that there was no probable cause to arrest Appellant
at this point; however, Appellant was not arrested at that time.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/9/2017
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