Com. v. Smith, E. ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • J-S67009-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,              : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :      PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    ERIC WAYNE SMITH,                          :
    :
    Appellant               : No. 42 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 6, 2013,
    Court of Common Pleas, Washington County,
    Criminal Division at No. CP-63-CR-0000054-2013
    BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.:                      FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2014
    Eric Wayne Smith (“Smith”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered on December 6, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington
    County, Criminal Division, following his convictions for indecent assault,1
    false imprisonment,2 corruption of minors,3 and terroristic threats.4 For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    The trial court accurately summarized the facts of this case as follows:
    In the late summer/early fall of 2012, [R.M.] (age
    15), [K.C.] (age 12), and [S.D.] (no age of record)
    were ‘ding dong ditching’ in Lawrence, Washington
    County. When [R.M.] approached 20 Third Street to
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(8).
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2903(a).
    3
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
    4
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1).
    *Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S67009-14
    ring the doorbell, [Smith] approached the three
    juveniles from the side of the house and asked them
    what they were doing. After [R.M.] explained the
    prank, [Smith] offered to share some of his
    marijuana with the juveniles. [R.M.] called his
    girlfriend, [J.C.] (age 15), to bring a pipe for
    smoking the marijuana.
    When [J.C.] arrived, the four juveniles proceeded to
    a nearby park with [Smith] to smoke the marijuana.
    While smoking together, [Smith] told [R.M.] that he
    was gay, and wondered if [R.M.] knew anyone
    around [R.M.]’s age that was also gay. When the
    juveniles asked [Smith] about his age, [Smith]
    initially stated that he was 27, then changed it twice
    more during the conversation. Prior to leaving the
    park, [Smith] provided his cell phone number to
    [J.C.] and [R.M.].
    Over the next month, [J.C.] texted [Smith]
    frequently to obtain marijuana. On occasion, [J.C.]
    would bring her brother [K.C.] with her to pick up
    the marijuana at [Smith]’s residence or smoke it
    there with [him]. [Smith] lived a short walking
    distance from [J.C. and K.C.’s residence]. [K.C.]
    began to stop by [Smith]’s house alone to smoke
    marijuana. [Smith] never charged the juveniles for
    the marijuana. On those occasions where [Smith]
    would smoke with [J.C. and K.C.], it would always be
    outside his house.
    One evening in the fall of 2012[,] [K.C.] stopped at
    [Smith]’s residence to smoke marijuana. [Smith]
    invited him inside, and [K.C.] and [Smith] smoked
    marijuana in [Smith]’s living room. [K.C.] asked
    [Smith] how he knew he was gay. [Smith] asked
    [K.C.] if he was gay, to which [he] responded he was
    bisexual. [Smith] asked [K.C.] if he wanted to
    engage in sexual activity, and [K.C.] said no. Despite
    this refusal, [Smith] fondled [K.C.]’s genitalia over
    his clothes. [K.C.] immediately stood up to leave,
    but [Smith] grabbed his pant leg, causing [K.C.] to
    fall to the ground. [Smith] threatened [K.C.], and
    -2-
    J-S67009-14
    told him that if he told anyone what happened he
    would kill him.
    In December 2012, while admitted at Southwood
    Psychiatric Hospital, [K.C.] disclosed the incident to
    his therapists. Following a forensic interview and
    notification of law enforcement, [Smith] was charged
    [with several offenses].
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/9/14, at 4-6 (footnotes and record citations omitted).
    On August 23, 2013, the trial court held a nonjury trial after which it
    found Smith guilty of the above-reference crimes. On December 6, 2013,
    the trial court sentenced Smith to a total of six to twelve years of
    incarceration. Smith did not file any post-sentence motions in this case. On
    January 3, 2014, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal.      On January 23,
    2014, the trial court ordered Smith to file a concise statement of the errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules
    of Appellate Procedure.   On February 6, 2014, Smith filed a timely Rule
    1925(b) statement.
    On appeal, Smith raises the following issues for our review:
    DID THE COMMONWEALTH PRESENT SUFFICIENT
    EVIDENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, OF EACH OF THE
    COUNTS:
    A.    FALSE IMPRISONMENT;
    B.    CORRUPTION        OF    MINORS      (TWO
    COUNTS);
    C.    TERRORISTIC THREATS; AND
    -3-
    J-S67009-14
    D.    INDECENT    ASSAULT,     PERSON    LESS
    THAN 16.
    In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our
    standard of review is as follows:
    As a general matter, our standard of review of
    sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the
    record ‘in the light most favorable to the verdict
    winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
    reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
    evidence.’ Commonwealth v. Widmer, 
    560 Pa. 308
    , 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751 (2000). ‘Evidence will be
    deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
    establishes each material element of the crime
    charged and the commission thereof by the accused,
    beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Commonwealth v.
    Brewer, 
    876 A.2d 1029
    , 1032 (Pa. Super. 2005).
    Nevertheless, ‘the Commonwealth need not establish
    guilt to a mathematical certainty.’ Id.; see also
    Commonwealth v. Aguado, 
    760 A.2d 1181
    , 1185
    (Pa. Super. 2000) (‘[T]he facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not be
    absolutely incompatible with the defendant’s
    innocence’). Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is
    to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence
    is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law,
    no probability of fact can be drawn from the
    combined circumstances. See Commonwealth v.
    DiStefano, 
    782 A.2d 574
    , 582 (Pa. Super. 2001).
    The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by
    means of wholly circumstantial evidence. See
    Brewer, 
    876 A.2d at 1032
    . Accordingly, ‘[t]he fact
    that the evidence establishing a defendant’s
    participation in a crime is circumstantial does not
    preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled
    with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
    overcomes the presumption of innocence.’ 
    Id.
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Murphy, 
    795 A.2d 1025
    , 1038–39 (Pa. Super. 2002)). Significantly, we
    may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact
    -4-
    J-S67009-14
    finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced,
    accepted in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth,      demonstrates     the    respective
    elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a
    reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be
    upheld. See Brewer, 
    876 A.2d at 1032
    .
    Commonwealth v. Franklin, 
    69 A.3d 719
    , 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Pettyjohn, 
    64 A.3d 1072
    , 1074-75 (Pa.
    Super. 2013)).
    The argument section of Smith’s appellate brief consists of four
    sections. See Smith’s Brief at 8-10. Each section addresses the four crimes
    (false imprisonment, corruption of minors, terroristic threats, and indecent
    assault) for which Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. See 
    id.
    In each section, Smith quotes the statutory provision that defines each of
    the four crimes. See 
    id.
     Following each statutory provision, Smith provides
    approximately four to seven lines of argument in which he claims that the
    witness testimony supporting his convictions for each crime is incredible,
    unreliable, and contradictory. See 
    id.
    This Court has consistently held that “credibility determinations are
    made by the fact finder and that challenges thereto go to the weight, and
    not the sufficiency, of the evidence.”    Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 
    692 A.2d 224
    , 227 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 
    981 A.2d 274
    , 281-82 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“An argument that the finder of fact
    should have credited one witness’ testimony over that of another witness
    -5-
    J-S67009-14
    goes to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the evidence.”).
    Our Supreme Court has held that an “appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency
    of the evidence must fail[,]” where an appellant phrases an issue as a
    challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but the argument that appellant
    provides goes to the weight of the evidence.       Commonwealth v. Small,
    
    741 A.2d 666
    , 672 (Pa. 1999); see also Gibbs, 
    981 A.2d at 281-82
     (finding
    that a sufficiency claim raising weight of the evidence arguments would be
    dismissed).
    Smith clearly confuses a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
    with a challenge to the weight of the evidence. In his appellate brief, Smith
    cites the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims, challenges
    the sufficiency of the evidence in the statement of questions involved, and
    refers to the evidence in this case as “insufficient as a matter of law” in his
    summary of the argument.       See Smith’s Brief at 2, 4, 7.      However, the
    arguments that Smith makes throughout the rest of his brief pertaining to
    witness credibility and reliability challenge the weight of the evidence, not its
    sufficiency.   Because Smith has raised sufficiency claims in which he
    presents weight of the evidence arguments, his sufficiency claims must fail.5
    See Small, 741 A.2d at 672.
    5
    We note that our rationale in reaching this conclusion differs from that of
    the trial court. However, “[w]e can affirm the [trial] court’s decision if there
    is any basis to support it, even if we rely on different grounds to affirm.”
    -6-
    J-S67009-14
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Mundy, J. joins the Memorandum.
    Fitzgerald, J. concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/17/2014
    Commonwealth v. McLaurin, 
    45 A.3d 1131
    , 1138 (Pa. Super. 2012),
    appeal denied, 
    65 A.3d 413
     (Pa. 2013).
    -7-