In Re: Adoption of: A.D.M. Appeal of: J.D.M. ( 2015 )

J-S28002-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.D.M. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.D.M.
Appellant No. 94 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 41-Adopt-2014
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: L.B.M. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.D.M.
No. 95 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 42-Adopt-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.B.M. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.D.M.
Appellant No. 96 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-28-DP-0000050-2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D.M. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.D.M.
Appellant No. 97 MDA 2015
J-S28002-15
Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-28-DP-0000051-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and LAZARUS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 15, 2015
J.D.M. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered on November 25,
2014, wherein the trial court terminated his parental rights to his minor
children, A.D.M. and L.B.M., and changed the children’s permanency goals
from reunification to adoption. We affirm.1
Franklin County Children and Youth Service2 (“CYS”) became involved
with this family on July 3, 2013, in response to a referral alleging that then-
six-year-old A.D.M. and L.B.M., his two-year-old brother, were without
parental care and control. J.P. (“Mother”) had issues with substance abuse,
lacked housing, and did not have the resources to care for her sons. As
Father was incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill for a variety of offenses including
theft, criminal trespass, and DUI 4th or subsequent offense, he was unable to
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1
The trial court declined to terminate the parental rights of the children’s
mother, J.P., and the boys’ permanency goals remain reunification as it
relates to that parent.
2
We note with disapproval that Franklin County Children and Youth Service
failed to file a brief in this matter.
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provide parental care. The children were placed in temporary shelter care,
and on July 11, 2013, they were adjudicated dependent. The children
currently reside together in a pre-adoptive foster home. Father remained
incarcerated at either SCI Camp Hill or SCI Rockview throughout the
children’s placement and was released immediately before the second day of
the two-day termination proceedings.
The initial permanency goal for both children was reunification with
birth parents. The juvenile court directed Father to participate in
psychological evaluations, follow treatment recommendations, achieve
financial stability, obtain adequate housing, maintain consistent supervised
visitation with the children, and comply with the terms of his criminal
sentences and probation. Father’s compliance with these expectations was
minimal.
While the reality of incarceration made it difficult to achieve some of
the FSP goals, Father claimed to have enrolled in substance abuse, violence
prevention, money management, and parenting programs at SCI Rockview.
However, Father failed to document any of the foregoing achievements.
Likewise, he refused to submit a release so that CYS could verify his
participation in any of the programs or obtain the results of a purported
psychological assessment.
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On May 17, 2014, Father participated in one visitation with the
children at SCI Rockview, but in doing so, he violated the terms of the
interaction by permitting a person without ChildLine clearance to change
L.B.M.’s diaper without supervision.3 Father’s only other contact with his
sons was two or three letters that misled the children to believe reunification
was imminent.4 Beyond that correspondence, Father failed to send the
children birthday cards or presents while he was incarcerated. Indeed,
Father declined to participate during the first day of the evidentiary hearing
by video conference, and even though he had been released prior to the
second day of testimony, he also declined to participate in that day of the
hearing.
On August 6, 2014, CYS filed petitions to terminate Mother and
Father’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a) and (b) of the Adoption Act.
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3
ChildLine is a statewide system administered by the Department of Public
Welfare that maintains records regarding reports of suspected child abuse.
See C.K. v. Department of Public Welfare, 869 A.2d 48, 50 n.1 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2005) (citing 55 Pa.Code § 3490.4; 23 Pa.C.S. § 6332).
4
During August and September 2013, Father mailed then-six-year-old
A.D.M. two letters that misinformed the child that Father would be
discharged within one or two months and indicated that, after his discharge
from prison, A.D.M. and B.L.M. would be released to his care. See N.T.,
10/3/14, at 60. When Father mailed the letters, he had more than one year
remaining to serve on his minimum sentence of imprisonment and no plan to
care for the children following his discharge.
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Following two days of evidence, the trial court terminated Father’s parental
rights, and by separate orders entered the same day under the Juvenile Act,
it changed the relevant aspects of the children’s permanency goals relating
to Father from reunification to adoption. As noted in footnote one, the court
denied CYS’s petitions as they relate to Mother. These timely appeals
followed.5
Father filed a Rule 1925(b) statement asserting three issues that he
reiterates on appeal as follows:
I. The trial court erred in determining that Franklin County
Children and Youth Services (FCCYS) met its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that J.D.M. . . .
cannot or will not remedy the conditions that caused the
child to be without parental care in that the evidence
showed that Father was only recently released from
incarceration and therefore not given the opportunity to
demonstrate his ability to care for the child.
II. The trial court erred in determining that FCCYS met its
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
Father will not be able to remedy the condition which led
to the removal of the child within a reasonable time. . . .
III. The trial court erred in terminating Father’s rights when
Mother’s rights were not terminated.
Father’s brief at 4.
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5
Although Father appealed the trial court’s separate goal change orders, he
does not level any legal challenge to either of those orders in his brief.
Accordingly, we affirm the orders without discussion.
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We apply the following standard of review of an order terminating
parental rights:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental
rights, our review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. Adoption of B.D.S., 494 Pa. 171, 431 A.2d 203, 207
(1981). The party petitioning for termination “must prove the
statutory criteria for that termination by at least clear and
convincing evidence.” In re T.R., 502 Pa. 165, 465 A.2d 642,
644 (1983). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as
“testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Matter of
Sylvester, 521 Pa. 300, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203–04 (1989).
In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098, 1107 (Pa. 2011). As the ultimate
trier of fact, the trial court is empowered to make all determinations of
credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and believe all, part, or none of
the evidence presented. In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 477 (Pa.Super. 2010).
“If competent evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm even
if the record could also support the opposite result.” Id.
Requests to involuntarily terminate a biological parent’s parental rights
are governed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
....
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the
parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable
period of time and termination of the parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
....
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date
of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
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described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
The test for terminating parental rights consists of two parts. In In re
L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007), we explained:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
We need only agree with the trial court’s analysis as to one subsection of 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and subsection (b) in order to affirm the termination of
parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc). Herein, the certified record supports the trial court’s determination
that CYS established the statutory grounds to terminate Father’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). Hence, we do not
address the remaining statutory grounds.
We have explained our review of the evidence pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(8), as follows:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
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§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1)
The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or
more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa.Super. 2003).
Thus, in order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8) in the case
at bar, CYS was required to produce clear and convincing evidence that: (1)
A.D.M. and L.B.M. have been removed from Father for at least twelve
months; (2) the conditions which led to the children’s removal continue to
exist; and (3) involuntary termination of parental rights would best serve the
children’s needs and welfare. See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not
require an evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the
conditions that led to placement of [the] children.” Id. at 511 (emphasis in
original).
First, we observe that A.D.M. and L.B.M. have been in CYS’s care since
July 3, 2013, due to the complete lack of parenting by either parent. As CYS
did not file its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights until August 6,
2014, approximately thirteen months later, CYS satisfied the threshold
requirement of § 2511(a)(8) requiring that the children be removed from
Father for at least twelve months. Next, the certified record reveals that the
condition that led to A.D.M. and L.B.M.’s placement in July 2013, Mother and
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Father’s inability to perform their parental duties, continued to exist and that
terminating Father’s parental rights would best serve A.D.M. and L.B.M.’s
needs and welfare.
The crux of Father’s argument is that he could not achieve any of the
enumerated FSP goals while he was incarcerated. He continues that, since
he was not released from imprisonment until after CYS filed its petitions to
terminate his parental rights, the trial court erred in terminating his parental
rights without affording him additional time to comply with the FSP. For the
following reasons, we disagree.
In In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa.Super. 2003), we explained,
“A parent is required to exert a sincere and genuine effort to maintain a
parent-child relationship; the parent must use all available resources to
preserve the parental relationship and must exercise ‘reasonable firmness’ in
resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child
relationship.” As it relates to incarcerated parents, our Supreme Court
reiterated in In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012), that the
primary focus of the § 2511(a)(1) analysis is whether an incarcerated parent
exercised reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles created by
imprisonment and employed available resources to maintain a relationship
with his or her child. The High Court explained, “pursuant to an
abandonment analysis [an incarcerated parent has] a duty to utilize
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available resources to continue a relationship with his or her child.” Id.
While the trial court did not invoke § 2511(a)(1) as a basis to
terminate Father’s parental rights in this case, the court’s rationale relating
to § 2511(a)(5) and (8) was founded squarely upon Father’s continued
unavailability to perform parental duties as evidence that Father failed to
remedy the conditions that led to the children’s placement. The court
reasoned, “Based on the fact that Father’s incarceration had rendered the
children without essential parental care and that he has made no attempts
to remedy this or even maintain a relationship with A.D.M. and L.B.M., the
Court finds that the Agency has easily established grounds for termination
for Father pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2),(5) and (8).” Termination Decree,
11/25/14, at 12-13. Hence, Father’s failure to exercise reasonable firmness
in attempting to overcome the obstacles presented by his incarceration is
particularly relevant in this case. As the certified record sustains the trial
court’s characterization of Father’s efforts, we will not disturb it.
During the evidentiary hearing, Nicole Weller, the CYS case worker
assigned to the family, testified about the circumstances that led to the
boys’ placement, including Father’s unavailability as a parental resource.
N.T., 10/3/14, at 9-10. She also outlined Father’s FSP goals and
expectations following the children’s adjudication of dependency. Id. at 11.
As noted, supra, Father was directed to, inter alia, participate in
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psychological evaluations, comply with recommendations, maintain
consistent visitation, and comply with the terms of incarceration and
probation. Id. Father’s efforts were minimal. Since the agency does not
believe that it can provide any additional services that would assist Father in
his ability to care for A.D.M. and L.B.M., it recommended terminating
Father’s parental rights. Id. at 32.
As it relates to Father’s efforts to comply with the FSP goals, Ms.
Weller testified as follows. Father completed a psychological assessment
while incarcerated, but he refused to execute a consent to release
confidential information and the prison would not permit CYS to review the
evaluation. Id. at 20, 49. She explained that the prison assessment was
not a complete psychological evaluation and that, to the extent that the
assessment generated any treatment recommendations, that information
was not provided to the agency. Id. at 65. In light of the agency’s inability
to review the relevant information, the fact that Father submitted to a
psychological assessment was of no benefit to the children in determining
the effect of Father’s mental health on their welfare. Therefore, CYS
considered that goal unsatisfied. Id. at 20.
Similarly, while Father’s incarceration limited his ability to establish
financial security or obtain stable housing, he did not provide CYS any
information concerning prospective employment or outline his intentions to
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satisfy those components upon his release. Id. at 22, 65. Father informed
CYS of an expected release date, October 26, 2014; however, he failed to
present a proposed home plan for the children upon his anticipated
discharge. Id. at 22, 65. Father claimed to have completed several
programs while incarcerated. However, he failed to document any of those
achievements and the value of some of the programs is unclear because the
FSP did not identify concerns with issues like violence or anger management
as problems that Father needed to address in order to reunite with A.D.M.
and L.B.M.
Concerning Father’s visitation, Ms. Weller testified that Father
participated in only one visitation with the children while he was
incarcerated. Id. at 22. Unfortunately, the family members whom Father
selected to facilitate the visitation violated CYS’s transportation policies by
smoking in the automobile and permitting a person without the Childline
clearances to have unsupervised access to L.B.M., and the visitations were
thereafter discontinued upon the recommendation of the guardian ad litem.
Id. at 23. Father failed to identify any alternative resources to transport his
sons to the prison for additional visitations. Id. at 24.
The foregoing testimony supports the trial court’s finding that Father
failed to remedy his unavailability as a parent or make a significant effort to
maintain a place of importance in their lives. Father was either
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noncompliant with the FSP goals that he could have achieved in prison or
simply neglected to document those achievements. He failed to send his
children gifts or attempt to contact them by telephone. In sum, Father
participated in one visitation, presumably attended prison programs of
unknown value, and mailed his sons a few letters. Tellingly, although given
the opportunity to appear virtually the first day and physically the second
day of the two-day hearing, Father declined to participate in the termination
proceedings. As Father failed to demonstrate any resolve in attempting to
overcome the obstacles of his incarceration, we reject his claim that CYS did
not satisfy its burden of proving that the conditions which led to the removal
of A.D.M. and B.L.M. continue to exist.
Next, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in
finding that CYS presented clear and convincing evidence that terminating
Father’s parental rights and permanently severing the existing bond between
him and his sons would best serve the children’s needs and welfare pursuant
to § 2511(b). While the Adoption Act does not mandate that the trial court
consider the effect of permanently severing parental bonds, our case law
requires it where a bond exists to some extent. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d
481, 485 (Pa. 1993).
The extent of the trial court’s bond-effect analysis depends upon the
circumstances of a particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763
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(Pa.Super. 2008). We have emphasized that while a parent’s emotional
bond with his child is a major aspect of the § 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the trial court
when determining what is in the best interest of the child. In re K.K.R.-S.,
958 A.2d 529, 535-536 (Pa.Super. 2008). Indeed, the mere existence of an
emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental rights. See In
re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate
parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond
against parents’ inability to serve needs of child).
As we explained in In re K.Z.S., supra at 763 (emphasis omitted),
In addition to a bond examination, the court may equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child under subsection (b),
particularly in cases involving physical or sexual abuse, severe
child neglect or abandonment, or children with special needs.
The trial court should also examine the intangibles such as the
love, comfort, security and stability the child might have with the
foster parent. Another consideration is the importance of
continuity of relationships to the child and whether the parent
child bond, if it exists, can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child. All of these factors can contribute to the
inquiry about the needs and welfare of the child.
See also In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010) (orphans’ court
can emphasize safety needs, consider intangibles, such as love, comfort,
security, and stability child might have with the foster parent, and
importance of continuity of existing relationships).
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Herein, the trial court concluded that severing the parental bond with
Father was in the children’s best interest. Our review of the certified record
confirms the trial court’s conclusion, albeit based on an alternative rationale.
A.D.M. and L.B.M. have continued to reside together in a pre-adoptive foster
home since April 2014. N.T., 10/3/14, at 29. The foster father is a licensed
social worker with a master’s degree. Id. at 61; N.T., 10/24/14, at 43. Ms.
Weller testified that A.D.M. admires Father and sometimes cries for him at
night. N.T., 10/3/14, at 74. However, both of the children are bonded with
their foster parents, and the agency does not have concerns about the level
of care that the foster parents provide. Id. at 29, 31. Ms. Weller described
the children’s bond with the pre-adoptive foster parents as a “loving
relationship [that is] continually growing to be more of a parent/child
relationship.” Id. at 30. L.B.M.’s primary bond is unquestionably with the
foster mother. She stated that L.B.M. is “very clingy to the foster mother”
and explained that during a prior visit to the home, L.B.M. hid from her and
a CYS colleague because the child feared that they would remove him from
the foster home. Id.
Ryan Kane, a permanency worker with Children’s Aid Society, testified
about his work with A.D.M. N.T., 10/24/14, at 32-33. Mr. Kane expounded
that permanency workers meet with children to clarify why they are in
placement and prepare them for either reunification or alternate outcomes
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depending on the facts of the case. Id. at 33. He did not work with L.B.M.
because that child was too young to understand the situation with Mother
and Father. Id. Mr. Kane conducts sessions with A.D.M. twice per month.
Id. at 37. The sessions can last up to two and one-half hours in duration.
Id. Beyond the one-on-one discussions with A.D.M., Mr. Kane maintains
regular contact with the foster parents and gets updates about A.D.M.’s
development and behavior between visits. Id.
In relation to A.D.M.’s bond with Father, Mr. Kane testified as follows.
The child knows his Father and enjoys his company. A.D.M. was happy to
visit Father in jail and mentioned a desire to visit with him more often. Id.
at 46. However, A.D.M. has also articulated that if he cannot return home to
Mother, who remains his primary attachment, “he absolutely wants to be
with his foster family[.]” Id. at 40. Similar to Ms. Wellers, Mr. Kane
testified that A.D.M. and L.B.M. have become very bonded to their foster
family. “[O]ver the course of the last several months, [A.D.M.] will tell his
foster parents he loves them. So I mean, I think that they are very adapted
to the home at this point. [I] [v]ery much think that could be a family for
them if need be.” Id. at 40.
While Mr. Kane did not proffer a position on which home would satisfy
A.D.M.’s needs and welfare, he opined that finality in and of itself is in that
child’s best interest regardless of whether he returns to Mother or remains
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with his foster parents. Id. at 42. Mr. Kane did not doubt A.D.M.’s ability to
thrive emotionally in either situation. Id. Moreover, he confirmed that
A.D.M. has appropriate services available to him should the trial court decide
to terminate either or both parents’ parental rights. Id. at 41-42.
Mindful of the additional factors that we stressed should be
emphasized during the needs-and-welfare analysis in In re K.Z.S., supra at
763, such as “the love, comfort, security and stability the child might have
with the foster parent” and the importance of continuing those beneficial
relationships, we find that the record confirms that terminating Father’s
parental rights best satisfies A.D.M.’s and L.B.M.’s developmental, physical,
and emotional needs and welfare. Despite the appearance of a bond
between Father and A.D.M., Father’s interactions with his sons were
infrequent. CYS intervened with the family due, in part, to Father’s
unavailability and during the course of A.D.M. and L.B.M.’s placement in
foster care, Father’s total contact with his children amounted to one
visitation and a few letters. As it relates to L.B.M, the evidence
demonstrates that he has no bond with Father, as he had little contact with
him over his brief life. Accordingly, the record sustains this aspect of the
trial court’s findings. Terminating Father’s parental rights best fulfills
L.B.M.’s emotional needs and welfare.
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A.D.M’s situation is more nuanced. While A.D.M. has not had
consistent contact with his Father since before his placement in CYS’s care,
the facts adduced at trial do not sustain the court’s finding that any bond
between the seven-year old and Father is minimal. To the contrary, it is
obvious from the certified record that A.D.M. admires Father even though
there was no significant contact.
Despite A.D.M.’s affection for Father, the certified record reveals that
A.D.M. does not look to Father to provide comfort, support, or security.
While A.D.M. enjoyed interacting with Father during the prison visitation,
there is no evidence of a shared emotional attachment that reveals the
hallmarks of a healthy parent-child relationship. Father communicated with
A.D.M. sparingly for an entire year, and on the few occasions that Father
reached out to his impressionable son, he knowingly misled him to believe
that the family would reunite within one or two months. Thus, while some
emotional bond exists between Father and A.D.M., it is marked by
uncertainty rather than comfort and security. Accordingly, we find that
sufficient evidence exists in this case to sustain the trial court’s
determination. Stated simply, A.D.M.’s primary focus remained reunification
with Mother, whose parental rights have been preserved, and he is currently
thriving in the foster home. Terminating Father’s parental rights best fulfills
A.D.M.’s emotional needs and welfare.
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Finally, we address Father’s contention that it was improper to
terminate his parental rights when the court declined to terminate Mother’s
rights. In sum, Father posits that “it simply does not make sense to
terminate the parental rights of one natural parent and not the other.”
Father’s brief at 12. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court addressed this issue in In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535
(Pa. 1977), and rejected the assertion that the termination of parental rights
of only one parent was improper. The High Court reasoned that the parents’
respective rights to their children are not inextricably interwoven and when a
child service agency files a petition for the termination of parental rights, the
parents’ rights are decided separately. Specifically, the Burns Court
explained:
Nothing in the Adoption Act requires that an agency, which has
assumed custody of a child, must establish grounds for the
involuntary termination of both parents, before it can obtain
such a decree as to either. When an agency having custody of a
child petitions for termination of parental rights, the rights of the
respective natural parents must be determined independently.
Id. at 541.
Instantly, the trial court declined to terminate Mother’s parental rights
due to the significant parent-child bond that Mother shares with A.D.M. in
particular and also due to Mother’s commitment to rectifying the
circumstances that led to her sons’ placement. See Trial Court Decree,
11/25/14, at 18-19. However, unlike the facts relating to Mother, the
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evidence that CYS presented against Father during the hearings established
the statutory grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights by clear and
convincing evidence. Thus, consistent with our Supreme Court’s rationale in
Burns, we reject Father’s assertion that the trial court erred in terminating
his parental rights to A.D.M. and L.B.M. simply because the court declined to
also terminate Mother’s parental rights to the children.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court order
terminating Father’s parental rights to A.D.M. and L.B.M. pursuant to §
2511(a)(8) and (b) and changing to adoption the pertinent aspects of their
permanency goals under the Juvenile Act.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/15/2015
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