In the Interest of: E v. Appeal of E.V ( 2016 )

J. A15010/16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.V. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: E.V. : No. 1261 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Dispositional Order, April 7, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No. CP-51-JV-0000135-2015
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DUBOW AND JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2016
E.V. appeals from the juvenile dispositional order entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on April 7, 2015, adjudicating him
as a delinquent after the trial court found him guilty of possession of firearm
by minor and furnishing false identification to law enforcement authorities.1
We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual history:
On February 6, 2015, Philadelphia Police
Officer Matthew Blaszczyk Badge #6382, assigned to
the 25th Police District, was on vehicular patrol near
the 100 block of W. Gurney Street in Philadelphia
County. Officer Blaszczyk had been an officer in said
area for nine years. Officer Blaszczyk described the
area as a high-crime area and the busiest area in the
city, as far as narcotics and violent crimes.
Officer Blaszczyk had recovered at least one hundred
firearms, during the course of his career.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6110.1 and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914, respectively.
J. A15010/16
At approximately 12:30 [p.m.], Officer
Blaszczyk was partnered in a vehicle with
Officer Gorman, Badge # 4909. Officer Blaszczyk
observed a motor vehicle abruptly pull over without
signaling, which constituted a motor vehicle
violation. The vehicle then parked in front of a
hydrant and the two officers initiated a vehicle
investigation at said location. E.V. was seated in the
passenger seat of said vehicle.
Immediately after the vehicle pulled over, both
the operator and the passenger, E.V., exited the
vehicle and attempted to walk away. Both E.V. and
the driver, Luis Angala, began to walk south on Hope
Street. Officer Gorman, who was closer to the
driver, said “Hey. What are you guys doing? Stop.
Come back.” The driver turned around and started
arguing with Officer Gorman saying “What? What do
you want?” Officer Gorman replied “sit back down in
the car. You are not free to leave.”
Officer Blaszczyk exited the vehicle.
Officer Blaszczyk walked behind E.V. and said “Hey.
Where are you going?” Despite two or three
requests, E.V. refused to stop. As he pursued E.V.,
Officer Blaszczyk initially observed the protrusion,
which was being caused by a heavy object.
Eventually, Officer Blaszczyk was able to grab E.V.
and immediately felt the bulge in his right cargo
pants pocket. E.V.’s pants were tight, which had
made the bulge more visible. The bulge had been
weighing down his pants pocket.
Upon patting E.V. down, he immediately
identified the shape of a firearm. His immediate
recognition of the firearm was based on his vast
experience recovering firearms. Officer Gorman
assisted Officer Blaszczyk in handcuffing E.V. E.V.
identified himself as “Josh Ramos” several times to
Officer Blaszczyk. E.V. first identified himself as
“Josh Ramos” while sitting in the back of the police
vehicle. Officer Blaszczyk tried to do a criminal
background check for “Josh Ramos” and could not
find any information. Officer Blaszczyk placed the
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recovered firearm, a black Ruger, [.]380 caliber,
LCP model, bearing serial number 37630766, on
Property Receipt 3185925. E.V. denied having a
license to carry a firearm. Officer Blaszczyk believed
that E.V. appeared older than his stated age of
seventeen.
Upon being arrested, Officer Blaszczyk
transported E.V. to East Detectives for processing.
Officer Blaszczyk asked E.V. to sign a medical
checklist. Officer Blaszczyk observed E.V. sign the
checklist as “E****.” Then, E.V. crossed it out and
said that he made a mistake. Officer Blaszczyk
asked E.V. what was his name. E.V. responded
“Josh Ramos”[.] Officer Blaszczyk asked E.V. why
he signed “E****.” Officer Gorman asked “what is
your real name?” E.V. responded “I’m not giving
you my real name.” After several minutes, E.V.
provided his real name of E**** V*****.
When Officer Blaszczyk first began pursuing
E.V., he wanted to know E.V.’s identity, due to the
pending motor vehicle investigation.
Officer Blaszczyk wanted to check if E.V. had any
pending warrants. Officer Blaszczyk was concerned
for his safety due to the nature of the area.
Ultimately, Officer Blaszczyk asked E.V. his name on
several occasions, and had tried to figure out if his
name was Joshua versus Josh. E.V. had stated that
his name was “just Josh.” After crossing out
“E****”, E.V. could not even write “Josh.” The
Commonwealth presented a Certificate on
non-licensure, demonstrating that E.V. did not
possess a license to carry a firearm. The
Commonwealth also presented a ballistics report,
showing that the recovered firearm was operable.
Trial court opinion, 7/15/15 at unnumbered pages 2-4 (citations to notes of
testimony omitted).
The trial court set forth the following procedural history:
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On January 17, 2015, Philadelphia police
arrested [appellant], E.V., and charged him with
[possession of firearm by minor and furnishing false
identification to law enforcement authorities]. On
February 6, 2015, E.V. litigated a motion to suppress
before the Honorable Lori A. Dumas. After the denial
of the suppression motion, E.V. went to trial and was
found guilty of [both charges]. On said date, E.V.
was adjudged delinquent and placed on probation,
while the probation officer continued to plan for
placement. On April 7, 2015, E.V. was committed to
a Residential Treatment Facility at Pennsylvania
State Department of Public Welfare for Appropriate
Placement with a specific referral to YDC Cresson.
On April 21, 2015, E.V., through his attorney,
the Defender Association of Philadelphia filed this
appeal. . . .
Id. at unnumbered page 1 (citations to notes of testimony and footnote
omitted).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did not the lower court err by denying the
juvenile’s motion to suppress evidence where
the juvenile was first stopped and detained in
the absence of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, and then subjected to a frisk?
2. Was not the evidence insufficient to prove the
juvenile guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the crime of false identification to law
enforcement officer where the evidence failed
to show that the juvenile was informed that he
was the subject of an official investigation of a
violation of law before the juvenile was
asserted to have given a false name?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
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J. A15010/16
Having determined, after careful review, that the learned
Judge Dumas, in her June 15, 2015 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, ably and
comprehensively disposes of appellant’s issues on appeal, with appropriate
reference to the record and without legal error, we affirm on the basis of
that opinion.
Juvenile dispositional order affirmed.
Jenkins, J. joins this Memorandum.
Dubow, J. files a Concurring and Dissenting Statement.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/16/2016
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Circulated 09/14/2016 10:03 AM
IN THE INTEREST OF: COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
E.V. JUVENILE DMSION
APPEAL OF: SID# 403-94-17-6
E.V. Petition# CP-51-JV-0000135-2015
Type of Order:Opinion Superior Court# 1261 EDA 2015
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OPINION
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On January 17, 2015, Philadelphia police arrested the defendant, E.V., and charged him v?
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with VUFA-without license (18 Pa.C.S. §6106§§Al-F3), VUFA-public streets (18 Pa.C.S.
§6108-Ml), VUFA-possession by minor (18 Pa.C.S. §6110.l§§A-Ml), and False Identification
to Law Enforcement Officer (18 Pa.C.S. §4914§§A-M3). On February 6, 2015, E.V. litigated a
motion to suppress before the Honorable Lori A. Dumas. After the denial of the suppression
motion, E. V. went to trial and was found guilty of VUF A-possession by minor-M 1 and False
Identification to Law Enforcement Officer-Ml. On said date, E.V. was adjudged delinquent and
placed on probation, while the probation officer continued to plan for placement.1 On April 7,
2015, E.V. was committed to aResidential Treatment Facility at Pennsylvania State Department
of Public Welfare for Appropriate Placement with a specific referral to YDC Cresson.
On April 21, 2015, E.V., through his attorney, the Defender Association of Philadelphia,
filed this appeal. The appellant claims that the court erred by-denying the motion to suppress
evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict on the crime of false
identification to law enforcement officer.
1
A copy of the February 6, 2015 Notes of Testimony are hereto attached and incorporated as Exhibit A.
FACTS
On February 6, 2015, Philadelphia Police Officer Matthew Blaszczyk Badge# 6382,
assigned to the 25th Police District, was on vehicular patrol near the 100 block of W. Gurney
Street in Philadelphia County. (Notes of Testimony, February 6, 2015, pp. 4~5) Officer
Blaszczyk had been an officer in said area for nine years. (N.O.T., p. 9) Officer Blaszczyk
described the area as a high-crime area and the busiest area in the city, as far as narcotics and
violent crimes. (N.O.T., p. 9) Officer Blaszczyk had recovered at least one hundred firearms,
during the course of his career. (N .O.T., p. 9)
At approximately 12:30PM, Officer Blaszczyk was partnered in a vehicle with Officer
Gorman, Badge # 4909. Officer Blaszczyk observed a motor vehicle abruptly pull over without
signaling, which constituted a motor vehicle violation. (N.O.T., p. 7) The vehicle then parked in
front of a hydrant and the two officers initiated a vehicle investigation at said location. (N.O.T.,
p. 12) E.V. was seated in the passenger seat of said vehicle. (N.O.T., pp. 6 & 12)
Immediately after the vehicle pulled over, both the operator and the passenger, E.V .,
exited the vehicle and attempted to walk away. (N.O.T., pp. 6 & 8) Both E.V. and the driver,
Luis Angala, began to walk south on Hope Street. (N.O.T., pp. 6 & 9) Officer Gorman, who was
closer to the driver, said "Hey. What are you guys doing? Stop. Come back." The driver turned
around and started arguing with Officer Gorman, saying "What? What do you want?" (N.O.T., p.
8) Officer Gorman replied "sit back down in the car. You are not free to leave." (N.0.T., p. 8)
Officer Blaszczyk exited the vehicle. (N.O.T., p. 8) Officer Blaszczyk walked behind
E.V. and said "Hey. Where are you going?" (N.O.T., p. 6) Despite two or three requests, E.V.
refused to stop. (N.O.T., pp. 6 & 8) As he pursued E.V., Officer Blaszczyk initially observed the
protrusion, which was being caused by a heavy object. (N.O.T., pp. 10 & 13) Eventually,Officer
Blaszczyk was able to grab E.V. and immediatelyfelt the bulge in his right cargo pants pocket.
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(N.O.T., p. 6) E.V.'s pants were tight, which had made the bulge more visible. (N.O.T., p. 9)
The bulge had been weighing down his pants pocket. (N.O.T., p. 9)
Upon patting E.V. do'\VII, he immediately identified the shape of a firearm. (N.O.T., p. 6)
His immediate recognition of the firearm was based on his vast experience recovering firearms.
(N.0.T., p. 10) Officer Gorman assisted Officer Blaszczyk in handcuffing E.V. (N.O.T., p. 6)
E.V. identified himself as "Josh Ramos" several times to Officer Blaszczyk. (N.O.T., p. 7) E.V.
first identified himself as "Josh Ramos" while sitting in the back of the police vehicle. (N .O.T., p.
14) Officer Blaszczyk tried to do a criminal background check for "Josh Ramos" and could not
find any information. (N.O.T., p. 11) Officer Blaszczyk placed the recovered firearm, a black
Ruger, 3 80 caliber, LCP model, bearing serial number 37630766, on Property Receipt 3185925.
(N.O.T ., p. 6) E.V. denied having a license to carry a firearm. (N.O.T., p. 10) Officer Blaszczyk
believed that E.V. appeared older than his stated age of seventeen. (N.0.T., p. 10)
Upon being arrested, Officer Blaszczyk transported E.V. to East Detectives for
processing. (N.O.T., p. 6) Officer Blaszczyk asked E.V. to sign a medical checklist. (N.0.T., p.
7) Officer Blaszczyk observed E.V. sign the checklist as "E****." (N.O.T., p. 7) Then, E.V.
crossed it out and said that he made a mistake. (N.O.T., p. 7) Officer Blaszczyk asked E.V. what
was his name. (N.O.T., p. 7) E.V. responded "Josh Ramos" (N.O.T., p. 7) Officer Blaszczyk
asked E.V. why he signed "E****." (N.O.T., p. 7) Officer Gorman asked "what is your real
name?" (N.O.T., p. 7) E.V. responded "I'm not giving you my real name." (N.O.T., p. 7) After
several minutes, E.V. provided his real name ofE**** V*****. (N.O.T., p. 7)
When Officer Blaszczyk first began pursuing E.V., he wanted to know E.V.'s identity,
due to the pending motor vehicle investigation. (N.0.T., p. 13) Officer Blaszczyk wanted to
check if E.V. had any pending warrants. (N.O.T., p. 13) Officer Blaszczyk was concerned for his
safety due to the nature of the area. (N.O.T., p. 13) Ultimately, Officer Blaszczyk asked E.V. his
name on several occasions, and had tried to figure out if his name was Joshua versus Josh.
(N.O.T ., p. 13) E.V. had stated that his name was "just Josh." (N.O.T., p. 13) After crossing out
"E****", E.V. could not even write "Josh." (N.O.T., p. 15) The Commonwealth presented a
Certificate on non-licensure, demonstrating that E.V. did not possess a license to carry a firearm.
(N.O.T., p. 20) The Commonwealth also presented a ballistics report, showing that the recovered
firearm was operable. (N.O.T., p. 20)
LEGAL DISCUSSION
The Motion to Suppress was properly denied.
This court recognizes that the forcible stop of a motor vehicle by a police officer
constitutes a seizure of the driver and its occupants. However, the vehicle in this case pulled over
abruptly on its own, without any compulsion. The evidence did not demonstrate any show of
force on the part of the police. The vehicle's movement itself constituted a motor vehicle
violation, which then created probable cause for the police to lawfully detain the driver of the
vehicle. E.V. does not seem to be contesting the probable cause that existed with regard to the
driver of the motor vehicle.
Once the officers had probable cause toward the driver, the police had the right to
perform the traffic stop in a safe, efficient manner. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct.
882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) established:
In summary, danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be
greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the
stopped car. While there is not the same basis for ordering the
passengers out of the car as there-is for ordering the driver out, the
additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal. We therefore hold
that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of
the car pending completion of the stop.
In Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561 (Pa.Super. 2007), our Superior Court expanded
on the reasoning of Maryland v. Wilson, to find that an officer may similarly order a passenger of
a lawfully stopped vehicle to remain inside or get back into the vehicle. In doing so, the Superior
Court joined numerous other state and federal courts in this ruling. Pratt states:
We further recognize, as did the court in Williams, that traffic stops
today present the same, if not greater, safety concerns for police
officers than they did when Wilson was decided, and that the public
interest in promoting the safety of police officers outweighs the
marginal intrusion on personal liberty. We believe that allowing police
officers to control all movement in a traffic encounter, and, in
particular, eliminate the possibility of a passenger, who has an obvious
connection to the vehicle's driver, from distracting or otherwise
interfering with an officer engaged in a traffic stop, whether by exiting
the car and remaining at the scene, or attempting to leave the scene for
unknown reasons, is a reasonable and justifiable step towards
protecting their safety.
Pratt makes clear that the officers in this case had a right to control the movements of
E.V ., in order to ensure their safety. In both Pratt and in this case, the front passenger abruptly
exited the vehicle and began to walk away. In both Pratt and this case, the interaction took place
in an area known for high-crime and violence. In Pratt, the police officer had 7 ~ years of
experience. In this case, the officer had 9 years of experience. In Pratt, only the front passenger
exited the vehicle abruptly and there were two police officers in the patrol car. In this case, both
the front passenger and the driver simultaneously exited the vehicle abruptly. Clearly, the
potential for danger and chaos is greater when police have two people disobeying orders at the
same time. The fact that the driver, Luis Angala, began to engage in an argument with Officer
Gorman only further enhanced the urgency to control the actions ofE.V.
Still, Officer Blaszczyk's actions were measured. He first issued verbal commands to
E.V. Officer Blaszczyk requested two or three times for E.V. to stop. E.V. refused to stop.
Meanwhile, the driver continued to argue with his partner. With tensions rising, Officer
Blaszczyk had no choice but to stay close to E.V. and in doing so, he clearly observed a bulge in
E.V.' s pants pocket that appeared to be created by a heavy object. This observation now
necessitated a greater show of authority, a full investigative detention, and a pat down. The pat-
do'\VII was brief, minimal, and directly-targeted toward the suspicious bulge. Officer Blaszczyk
immediately detected the firearm during the brief and targeted pat-down. Officer Blaszczyk's
experience in recovering over one hundred firearms in said neighborhood immediately helped
form the basis to identify the presence of the firearm. Once the officer identified the firearm, he
was entitled to retrieve the firearm and subsequently arrest E.V.
The evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on the
charge of False Identification to Law Enforcement Officer.
The relevant statute is set forth below under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4914§§A in the Crimes Code
as:
§ 4914. False identification to law enforcement authorities.
(a) Offense defined.v-A person commits an offense ifhe furnishes
law enforcement authorities with false information about his identity
after being informed by a law enforcement officer who is in uniform or
who has identified himself as a law enforcement officer that the person
is the subject of an official investigation of a violation of law.
In order to satisfy the elements of this crime, there are two requirements. First, the
defendant must furnish law enforcement authorities with false information about his identity.
Second, the defendant must do so after being informed by a law enforcement officer that the
defendant was the subject of an official investigation of a violation of the law-. In Re D.S., 614
PA 650, 39 A.3d 968 (2012).
E.V. does not deny that he provided false information. The evidence clearly shows that
he provided the name of "Josh Ramos" and that he later provided the name of "E**** V*****,
after Officer Gorman requested that E.V. tell him his "real name". Prior to said admission, E.V.
also stated "I'm not giving you my real name." Therefore, it is. clear that "Josh Ramos" was a
fictitious name and that the first element of this charge is clearly met.
Instead, E.V. hereby claims that he was never notified by a law enforcement officer that
he was the subject of an official investigation of a violation of the law, prior to providing the
fictitious name. Because E.V. continued to provide the name of "Josh Ramos" throughout
various phases of the official investigation and post-arrest, this claim must clearly fail. This was
not a momentary lapse by E.V., as law enforcement gave him plenty of chances to tell them the
truth. E.V. chose to provide the false name for a period of time sufficient for this court to have
found him guilty.
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E.V. identified himself as "Josh Ramos" several times to Officer Blaszczyk. E.V. first
identified himself as "Josh Ramos" while sitting in the back of the police vehicle. This was after
Officer Blaszczyk had told E.V. numerous times to "stop." This was after Officer Blaszczyk had
recovered the gun from his pants pockets. This was after Officer Blaszczyk and his partner had
handcuffed E.V. For E.V. to claim that he was not aware that he was the subject of an official
investigation seems disingenuous. It should also be noted that E.V. was no stranger to law
enforcement arrest procedure, as his counsel noted after the trial that E.V. had a "lengthy
history." (N.O.T., p. 21)
This court believes that Officer Blaszczyk's calls to stop were sufficient indicators that an
official investigation was underway. This court does not believe that the Officer Blaszczyk had
to have uttered the words ''you are now the subject of an official investigation of a violation of the
law." If the calls to "stop" did not constitute sufficient notification, E.V. must have known that
Officer Blaszczyk's discovery of the gun on his person and Officer Blaszczyk's placement of
handcuffs on E.V. signified an official investigation. Certainly, when E.V. was sitting in the back
of the police car and the officer was filling out forms and typing into his computer, these must
have constituted signs of an official investigation.
This court recognizes that the holding in In Re D.S. specifically states "for purposes of
offense of providing false identification to law enforcement, information regarding .an officer's
identity and purpose in investigating a violation of the law must come from the officer, not from
the surrounding circumstances." In Re D.S., 614 PA at 660. This court believes that sufficient
notification was, in fact, delivered by Officer Blaszczyk. The facts in In Re D.S. are quite
different, in that it involved plainclothes officers who were traveling in an unmarked car who
approached juveniles with their guns drawn at some point after the crime had been committed.
This case involves uniformed police officers travelling in a police vehicle. The police officers
themselves witnessed the motor vehicle violation, watched the two vehicle occupants abruptly
exit the vehicle and walk away while disregarding orders, and recovered a gun from the
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individual's person. The initial false identification was provided in the back of a police vehicle, II -
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as opposed to inside of a park. More importantly, E.V. provided numerous other false
identifications, even while in police custody at the detective's division, while filling out a medical
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checklist. Still, E.V. seeks to take harbor in the fact that the magic words "you are now the
subject of an official investigation of a violation of the law" appear to have never been uttered.
·CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this court's Order should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT: