In Re: A.J.G.-B., Appeal of: J.S. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S42030-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: A.J.G.-B., A MINOR                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: J.S., FATHER                       No. 256 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order entered January 17, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Orphans’
    Court, at No(s): TPR 066 of 2013
    BEFORE:    PANELLA, J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:                    FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2014
    J.S. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered on January 17, 2014, in
    the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, terminating his parental
    rights to A.G.-B. (born in January of 2007) (“Child”), pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.1 We affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    This family became known to the Allegheny County Office of Children,
    Youth and Families (“CYF”) on March 16, 2011, after Mother was arrested in
    the home where she resided with Child in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. At the
    time of the removal, Father resided in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.     At the
    dependency hearing, Father testified that he was aware that Mother was
    using drugs, was unable to ensure Child’s safety, and testified to using
    marijuana. N.T., 1/8/14, at 14-15. Additionally at the dependency hearing,
    Father agreed that Child should be placed in maternal grandparent’s care.
    
    Id. at 14.
    On April 11, 2011, Child was adjudicated dependent. Two weeks
    1
    H.R.G.’s (“Mother”) parental rights were terminated on October 16, 2013.
    Mother is not a party to this appeal, nor did she file her own appeal.
    J-S42030-14
    later, Father moved to Florida. Father has not seen Child in the three years
    since. 
    Id. at 19.
    On April 13, 2011, CYF created Family Service Plan (“FSP”) goals for
    Father.      
    Id. at 18.
      Father’s FSP goals were: (1) to complete drug and
    alcohol assessment and make himself available for urine screening; (2) to
    contact and cooperate with CYF; (3) to arrange visits and maintain contact
    with Child; (4) to take part in a psychological examination. 
    Id. at 17-18.
    On April 8, 2013, CYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination of
    Father’s parental rights, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8)
    and (b). The trial court held a hearing on the petition on January 8, 2014.
    At the hearing, Latari Mitchell, a family service worker for CYF, and Father
    testified.
    On January 17, 2014, the trial court entered its order terminating
    Father’s parental rights to Child.       On February 13, 2014, Father filed his
    notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal,
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
    As     a   preliminary   matter,   Father’s   counsel   seeks   to   withdraw
    representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L. Ed. 2d 493
    (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    602 Pa. 159
    , 
    978 A.2d 349
    (2009).         Anders principles apply to appeals involving
    termination of parental rights.      See In re S.M.B., 
    856 A.2d 1235
    (Pa.
    Super. 2004).      Anders and Santiago require counsel to: 1) petition the
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    Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the
    record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; 2)
    file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support
    the appeal; and 3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise
    him or her of the right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise
    any additional points the appellant deems worthy of review. 
    Santiago, 602 Pa. at 173-79
    , 978 A.2d at 358-61; In re Adoption of V.G., 
    751 A.2d 1174
    , 1176 (Pa. Super. 2000).                Substantial compliance with these
    requirements is sufficient.      Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    934 A.2d 1287
    ,
    1290    (Pa.   Super.   2007).     “After     establishing   that   the   antecedent
    requirements have been met, this Court must then make an independent
    evaluation of the record to determine whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly
    frivolous.”    Commonwealth v. Palm, 
    903 A.2d 1244
    , 1246 (Pa. Super.
    2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Townsend, 
    693 A.2d 980
    , 982 (Pa.
    Super. 1997)).
    In Santiago, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing requirements
    where court-appointed counsel seeks to withdraw representation on appeal:
    Neither Anders nor [Commonwealth v.] McClendon[,
    
    495 Pa. 457
    , 
    434 A.2d 1185
    (1981)] requires that
    counsel’s brief provide an argument of any sort, let alone
    the type of argument that counsel develops in a merits
    brief.  To repeat, what the brief must provide under
    Anders are references to anything in the record that
    might arguably support the appeal.
    *    *     *
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    Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by
    counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and
    counsel’s references to anything in the record that
    arguably supports the appeal.
    
    Santiago, 602 Pa. at 176-177
    , 978 A.2d at 359-360. Thus, the Court held:
    [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
    counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a
    summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations
    to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
    counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set
    forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
    (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal
    is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
    record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
    have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    
    Id. at 178-79,
    978 A.2d at 361.
    Instantly, counsel filed a petition to withdraw representation.       The
    petition states that counsel conscientiously and thoroughly reviewed the
    record of the proceedings, and concluded that the appeal is frivolous. The
    petition also states that counsel informed Father by United States mail of his
    appellate rights.   Application/Petition for Leave to Withdraw Appearance,
    filed 4/22/14, at 1. The letter, attached to the petition, advises Father of his
    right to raise questions about the jurisdiction of the court and to question
    the legality of the trial court’s decision, and of his right to retain new
    counsel, proceed pro se, or to raise any additional points that he may deem
    worthy of consideration.
    In her Anders brief, counsel provides reasons for her conclusion that
    the appeal is wholly frivolous. Fathers’ Brief at 3-5. Counsel also refers to
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    items in the record that arguably support the appeal. Father’s Brief at 3-5.
    Additionally, counsel provides a well-written and detailed summary of the
    facts and procedural history of the case, with citation to the record and
    relevant law.    
    Id. Thus, counsel
    has substantially complied with the
    requirements of Anders and Santiago.      As Father has filed neither a pro
    se brief nor a counseled brief with new privately retained counsel, we review
    this appeal based on the issues raised in the Anders brief:
    1. Whether the trial court erred in determining [F]ather failed to
    parent [C]hild under section 2511(a)(1)?
    2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that terminating
    [F]ather’s rights would meet [C]hild’s needs and welfare?
    Father’s Brief at 1.
    Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is
    as follows:
    When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental
    rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the
    trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an
    abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary
    support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.
    Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily
    terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing
    judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a
    jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review
    of the record in order to determine whether the trial court’s
    decision is supported by competent evidence.
    In re S.H., 
    879 A.2d 802
    , 805 (Pa. Super. 2005). In termination cases, the
    burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
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    the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid.
    
    Id. at 806.
    We have previously stated:
    The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
    testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
    enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
    hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
    In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 
    837 A.2d 1247
    , 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
    presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
    resolve conflicts in the evidence.   In re M.G., 
    855 A.2d 68
    , 73-74 (Pa.
    Super. 2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we
    will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re
    Adoption of T.B.B., 
    835 A.2d 387
    , 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).         Additionally,
    this Court “need only agree with [the trial court’s] decision as to any one
    subsection in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.”     In re
    B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    581 Pa. 668
    , 
    863 A.2d 1141
    (2004). Accordingly, as the trial court focused on
    sections 2511(a)(1) and (5) in terminating Father’s parental rights, we will
    focus on that sections for our review.
    In terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court relied upon
    section 2511(a)(1) and (b) which provide:
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
    may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
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    (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
    least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
    petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
    relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
    failed to perform parental duties.
    * * *
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
    developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
    child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
    the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
    furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
    beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
    filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
    consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
    described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
    giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
    We have conducted a careful review of the briefs of the parties, the
    relevant law, the certified record, and the thorough opinion of the Honorable
    Kathryn Hens-Greco, dated April 19, 2014.        We conclude that competent
    evidence supports the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to
    Child under sections 2511(a)(1) and (b). We discern no abuse of discretion
    in the court’s termination of Father’s parental rights.    Accordingly, on the
    basis of the well-analyzed discussion in the trial court opinion dated March
    13, 2014, we affirm the order terminating Father’s parental rights to Child
    under sections 2511(a)(1), and (b), and adopt that opinion as this Court’s
    own. Additionally, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
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    Order affirmed; counsel’s petition to withdraw is granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/12/2014
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