Com. v. Henderson, W. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM R. HENDERSON,
Appellant No. 724 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-SA-0000417-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and ALLEN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 31, 2014
Appellant, William R. Henderson, appeals pro se from the judgment of
sentence of a $300.00 fine, imposed after he was convicted of one count of
public drunkenness, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5505. We affirm.
Appellant was initially convicted by a District Magistrate of two
summary offenses - one count of public drunkenness and one count of
disorderly conduct, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503. He filed a timely summary appeal
with the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. At a de novo hearing
conducted on April 7, 2014, the Commonwealth presented the following
evidence:
Officer Ralph Rush of the Borough of Pleasant Hills Police
Department[] testified that on November 2, 2013, a young
woman approached him while he was in his police vehicle, and
reported that an intoxicated male had entered her car for no
reason a short time earlier. She described the man and when
Officer Rush observed [Appellant] at the scene, the young
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woman identified [Appellant] as the man who had entered her
car without her permission.
When Officer Rush met with [Appellant], he observed an
odor of alcohol emanating from [Appellant’s] breath. He testified
that [Appellant’s] words were slurred, his eyes were glassy and
bloodshot and he had difficulty maintaining his balance.
[Appellant] admitted that he had a “few drinks earlier that
evening” but denied being intoxicated.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 5/29/14, at 1-2 (unnumbered).
Based on Officer Rush’s testimony, the court convicted Appellant of
public drunkenness, but acquitted him of disorderly conduct. The court
imposed a sentence of a $300.00 fine. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice
of appeal, as well as a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal.
Appellant subsequently filed an appellate brief with this Court that
wholly fails to comport with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Namely, Appellant does not include any of the sections required by Pa.R.A.P.
2111(a), with the exception of an argument section (although it is not
delineated as such). Because of the substantial defects in Appellant’s brief,
we could dismiss his appeal in its entirety. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
Nevertheless, because it is apparent from Appellant’s brief that he seeks to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his public drunkenness
conviction, and because we are able to meaningfully review this claim
despite the inadequacies of his brief, we decline to dismiss his appeal.
Appellant essentially argues that the testimony of Officer Rush was
inaccurate. Appellant states that he was sitting with several friends in the
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parking lot of a convenience store when two officers approached the group
and asked for Appellant’s driver’s license. Appellant’s Brief at 1
(unnumbered). Although Appellant complied “with all of the officer[s’]
requests,” one of the officers “singled [Appellant] out” and threatened “to
take [him] to jail.” Id. Appellant emphasizes that the officer “never gave
[him] a Breathalyzer test, field sobriety test, or a horizontal gaze nystagmus
test,” despite the officer’s testimony at the de novo hearing that Appellant
smelled of alcohol, was slurring his words, and was staggering. Id. While
Appellant admits he “had approximately four or five beers between about
11:00 p.m. and 12:30 a.m.,” he maintains that he was not intoxicated and
was not acting in a disruptive manner. Id. Thus, Appellant avers that his
public drunkenness conviction cannot stand.
In light of Officer Rush’s testimony at the hearing, Appellant’s
argument is meritless. In Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089 (Pa.
Super. 2003), we explained that:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all evidence admitted at trial in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
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by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is
free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Id. at 1092 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
Here, the trial court explicitly “found the testimony of Officer Rush
concerning [Appellant’s] condition at the relevant time to be clear, credible
and consistent. The [c]ourt did not find [Appellant’s] denial of the Officer’s
averments credible or persuasive. No other witnesses testified.” TCO at 2
(unnumbered). Because this Court is “bound by the trial court’s credibility
determinations,” Commonwealth v. A.W.C., 951 A.2d 1174, 1179 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (citation omitted), we may not overturn Appellant’s conviction
simply because he offers a different version of the events that preceded his
arrest. Additionally, we agree with the trial court that even though Officer
Rush did not administer a Breathalyzer, field sobriety, or horizontal gaze
nystagmus test, the officer’s testimony was sufficient to prove that Appellant
was “manifestly under the influence of alcohol” in a public place, and that he
was intoxicated “to the degree that he may [have] endanger[ed] himself or
other persons or property, or annoy[ed] persons in his vicinity.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 5505 (defining the offense of public drunkenness). See TCO at 2;
Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[A]
police officer may utilize both his experience and personal observations to
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render an opinion as to whether a person is intoxicated.”) (citations
omitted). Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s public drunkenness conviction.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/31/2014
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