Com. v. Payton, J. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S18007-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JARVIS PAYTON,
    Appellant                  No. 2583 EDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered August 9, 2013,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
    Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013450-2012
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, and MUNDY, JJ.
    CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.:FILED JUNE 17, 2015
    I join the Majority’s conclusion that sufficient evidence supports
    Appellant’s convictions. My review of the record, however, establishes that
    Appellant has not met his burden of establishing his after-discovered
    evidence claim.   I therefore dissent from the Majority’s decision to vacate
    Appellant’s sentence and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
    Our Supreme Court has summarized:
    The four-prong test for awarding a new trial because of
    after-discovered evidence is well settled. The evidence:
    (1) could not have been obtained prior to trial by
    exercising reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely
    corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to
    impeach a witness’s credibility; and 4) would likely result
    in a different verdict.
    Commonwealth v. Castro, 
    93 A.3d 818
    , 821 n.7 (Pa. 2014) (citation
    omitted). Additionally, “the proposed new evidence must be ‘producible and
    J-S18007-15
    admissible.’”   Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 
    30 A.3d 381
    , 414 (Pa.
    2011) (citation omitted). In order for a new trial to be granted, a defendant
    must establish at the evidentiary hearing, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, that each of the above factors has been met. Commonwealth v.
    Padillas, 
    997 A.2d 356
    , 363 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    My review of the record reveals that Appellant has failed to meet his
    burden. The fact that Officer O’Connor was twice found civilly responsible by
    a federal district court has little relevance to Appellant’s criminal conviction.
    See generally, Pa.R.E. 401. The same is true regarding statements made
    by Bell in his affidavit, in which he states in his case “officers O’Connor and
    Goshert fabricated a basis for the unlawful stop in their police reports,
    searched Bell’s person and vehicle without consent, and gave false
    testimony at trial.”    Majority, at 8.   In fact, the jury in Bell rejected the
    plaintiff’s claim of an illegal stop. See Bell, 
    2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163333
    .
    At best, this evidence could be used to impeach Officer O’Connor’s
    credibility. At Appellant’s trial, the trial court as fact-finder credited Officer
    O’Connor’s version of the incident, and expressly “discredited [Appellant’s]
    testimony based upon his demeanor, manner of testifying, as well as his
    prior conviction for a crimen falsi.” See Trial Court Opinion, 5/16/14, at 4.
    Clearly, under Castro and Chamberlain, Appellant’s after-discovered
    evidence claim fails.
    The Majority nevertheless accepts Appellant’s claim that his new
    evidence would provide a basis to pursue a suppression motion. Majority, at
    -2-
    J-S18007-15
    12.   My review of the record refutes Appellant’s claim.             At sentencing,
    Appellant asked the trial court to remove trial counsel because Appellant
    believed counsel to be ineffective. See N.T., 8/9/13, at 4. Appellant cited
    myriad reasons to support his assertion, including trial counsel’s failure to
    pursue a suppression motion.           Id., at 4-13.   According to Appellant, trial
    counsel informed him that because he was a backseat passenger in someone
    else’s vehicle, he lacked “standing” to pursue a suppression motion. 1 N.T.,
    8/9/13, at 7.      At sentencing, trial counsel likewise indicated that he had
    communicated        to   Appellant     that    a   suppression   motion   would    be
    unsuccessful.     Id. at 18.     Because Appellant was charged with possessory
    crimes, he would have had standing to file a suppression motion; there is no
    indication in the record, however, that Appellant would be able to establish
    that he had an expectation of privacy in the other person’s vehicle.              See
    generally, Commonwealth v. Powell, 
    994 A.2d 1096
     (Pa. Super. 2010),
    appeal denied, 
    13 A.3d 477
     (Pa. 2010).              Indeed, during his allocution at
    sentencing, Appellant informed the trial court that the vehicle in which he
    was a passenger “did not belong” to him. N.T., 8/9/13, at 34. Thus, the
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The certified record contains both an omnibus pre-trial motion filed by prior
    defense counsel, as well as a pro se suppression motion. Although the trial
    court denied one of these motions prior to Appellant’s waiver trial, see N.T.
    6/7/13, the motion was not specifically identified.
    -3-
    J-S18007-15
    record refutes Appellant’s claim that he could successfully pursue a
    suppression motion.
    In sum, because sufficient evidence supports Appellant’s convictions,
    and his after-discovered evidence claim lacks merit, I would affirm
    Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2583 EDA 2013

Filed Date: 6/17/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/17/2015