Com. v. Lenz, T. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
TERESA LENZ, : No. 326 WDA 2014
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, January 6, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0001704-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE AND ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 17, 2015
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered on January 6,
2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County following
Teresa Lenz’s conviction of obstructing the administration of law
(“obstruction”), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101. We reverse.
The facts, as summarized by the trial court, are as follows.
On December 24, 2012, Officer Warren Lillie of
the Ross Township Police Department responded to a
burglary call. Upon arriving at the residence where
the burglary occurred, he spoke with the victim. The
victim, Pastor Michael Guthrie, explained to
Officer Lillie that he believed his niece, Jessica Hirth
and her boyfriend, Jeremiah Kelly, were responsible
for the burglary. Pastor Guthrie further advised
Officer Lillie that Hirth and Kelly were staying at
Kelly’s parents’ house which was located a very short
distance from Pastor Guthrie’s residence.
Office[r] Lillie, accompanied by Pastor Guthrie, then
proceeded to Kelly’s residence.
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Upon arriving at Kelly’s residence, Officer Lillie
walked around the perimeter of the property to
determine if there were any security issues. All of
the windows and doors were closed. He then
approached the front door and knocked. At that
point, the defendant, who is Kelly’s mother, peeked
through the window. Several minutes elapsed before
she opened the front door. Officer Lillie observed
that the hallway light leading to the second floor of
the residence was on. Officer Lillie asked her if he
could search the residence for Hirth and Kelly. The
defendant was advised that Hirth and Kelly were
suspected of burglarizing Pastor Guthrie’s residence
and taking many things, including a loaded firearm.
The defendant advised Officer Lillie that she would
have to check with her husband. She closed the
door. Through a front window, Officer Lillie was able
to observe the defendant walk up the steps to the
second floor of the residence. A few minutes later,
the light in the second floor hallway went out and the
curtains were drawn on the windows that would have
enabled Officer Lillie to see into the living room and
that stairwell between the first and second floors.
About a minute later, the defendant opened the door
and welcomed Officer Lillie and Pastor Guthrie into
the residence. She led them both to the second floor
to a bedroom. She informed them that the bedroom
belonged to Kelly. Upon entering the bedroom,
Office Lillie observed a cloud of cigarette smoke
along with an ashtray that containing [sic] cigarette
butts. Also found in the room were a number [of]
items that were taken from Pastor Guthrie’s home.
At that point, Officer Lillie advised the
defendant that he believed she was deceiving him
and he explained that it was a criminal offense for
her to lie to him about the whereabouts of someone
being sought for committing a criminal act.
Officer Lillie advised Pastor Guthrie to go outside so
he could secure the residence. Shortly after Pastor
Guthrie left the residence, Officer Lillie heard him
scream, “Jessica, stop! Come back!” Officer Lillie
then went outside and both Hirth and Kelly were
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observed fleeing the residence, running from the
area of the garage door. As both of them were
fleeing, additional items from Pastor Guthrie’s
residence were dropped. While Officer Lillie was at
the residence, the defendant’s husband came
upstairs from the basement to inquire what was
happening.
After Hirth and Kelly fled, Officer Lillie returned
to the residence. The defendant apologized for her
actions, indicating that she didn’t realize how serious
the matter was. She indicated that she knew Kelly
was a fugitive. Days later, after the defendant was
taken into custody in this case, she again apologized
to Officer Lillie for helping Kelly escape the
residence.
Trial court opinion, 7/19/14 at 1-3.
Appellant was charged with two counts each of obstructing the
administration of law and hindering apprehension; however, prior to trial,
the Commonwealth withdrew one count under Section 5101 and both counts
under Section 5105. A bench trial was held before the Honorable
Anthony M. Mariani, and appellant was convicted of the remaining count. On
January 6, 2014, appellant was sentenced to one to two months’
incarceration to be followed by one year of probation. On January 15, 2014,
appellant filed a motion for reconsideration; and on January 31, 2014, an
order was issued for appellant to be paroled on February 5, 2014. This
timely appeal followed on February 27, 2014. (Docket #8.) The following
issue has been presented for our review:
I. WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE GUILTY VERDICT FOR THE CHARGE OF
OBSTRUCTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
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LAW, AS THE DEFENDANT HAD NO CRIMINAL
INTENT AND DID NOT COMMIT AN UNLAWFUL
ACT?
Appellant’s brief at 5.
Prior to addressing this issue, we will recite our standard of review:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact-finder to find every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above
test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we
note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the trier of
fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 947 A.2d 800, 805-806 (Pa.Super. 2008),
appeal denied, 980 A.2d 606 (Pa. 2009), quoting Commonwealth v.
Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Again, appellant was convicted of obstruction of justice pursuant to
Section 5010 of the Crimes Code. Section 5101 provides:
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5101. Obstructing administration of law or
other governmental function
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second
degree if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or
perverts the administration of law or other
governmental function by force, violence, physical
interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or
any other unlawful act, except that this section does
not apply to flight by a person charged with crime,
refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal
duty other than an official duty, or any other means
of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative
interference with governmental functions.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.
The Pennsylvania supreme court has instructed that to establish a
violation of Section 5101, the Commonwealth must prove that (1) the
defendant had the intent to obstruct the administration of law; and (2) the
defendant used force or violence, breached an official duty, or committed an
unlawful act. Commonwealth v. Goodman, 676 A.2d 234, 235 (Pa. 1996)
(citations omitted). Section 5010 was substantially based upon the Model
Penal Code Section 242.1. Commonwealth v. Neckerauer, 617 A.2d
1281, 1287 (Pa.Super. 1992). As stated in the comment to section 242.1 of
the Model Penal Code “[t]his provision is designed to cover a broad range of
behavior that impedes or defeats the operation of government.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 100 A.3d 207, 215 (Pa.Super. 2014), citing
Commonwealth v. Trolene, 397 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Pa.Super. 1979).
The trial court provides the following analysis in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion:
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The evidence in this case was sufficient to convict.
The defendant in this case created an opportunity for
Hirth and Kelly to flee the residence as Officer Lillie
was performing his official duties as a police officer
investigating a burglary. She intentionally
obstructed and impaired the administration of
Officer Lillie’s investigation by keeping Officer Lillie at
bay while she closed curtains on the windows that
would have provided an open view to the escape
path taken by Hirth and Kelly. Had the defendant
done nothing else, the result of this case may have
been different. Instead, the defendant further
enabled Hirth and Kelly to flee by leading
Officer Lillie to an empty bedroom on the second
floor of the residence while she knew that the two
burglars were downstairs readying themselves to flee
through the garage. The defendant did this despite
having been advised that Hirth and Kelly had stolen
a loaded firearm and that they were most likely in
possession of it when they fled. The gun was never
recovered. These actions physically interfered with
Officer Lillie’s functions and they certainly created an
obstacle to his ability to carry out those functions.
Trial court opinion, 7/17/14 at 5.
We disagree with the court’s rationale. The officer arrived at
appellant’s address on a hunch to investigate a reported burglary. Without a
warrant, the officer searched the outside of appellant’s home before
knocking on her door.1 The officer then knocked on appellant’s door and
1
Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless searches
and seizures in a private home violate both the Fourth Amendment and
Article 1 § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Lopez,
609 A.2d 177, 178-179 (Pa.Super. 1992). These constitutional protections
have been extended to the curtilage of a person’s home. Id. at n.1. The
officer stated he searched the perimeter of the house for any potential items
of the burglary and also checked to see if all the doors and windows were
closed and secured. (Notes of testimony, 10/7/13 at 12-13.)
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asked to search the residence for Hirth and Kelly.2 Appellant had no legal
duty to open her door or to speak with the officer. Thus, appellant cannot
be said to have impeded a law enforcement officer from administering the
law; appellant’s son had not even been charged with a crime when the
officer knocked on her door. See contra Johnson, 100 A.3d at 214-215
(court upheld a conviction after appellant intentionally delayed opening a
locked door after police announced they were serving a warrant so another
could avoid apprehension); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 60 A.3d 165(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 70 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2013) (evidence
sufficient to support the conviction where appellant went to the home of
another and informed that person police were intending to execute a search
warrant at the residence).
Appellant was well within her rights when she closed the curtain on her
window and such action cannot be said to have obstructed Officer Lillie’s
duties. Further, the facts of record do not demonstrate that appellant took
the officer to the room on the second floor, which she stated was Kelly’s
room, as an act of deception. Rather, appellant appeared to be following the
2
See Florida v. Jardines, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 1409 (U.S. 2013) (“A
police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home in hopes of
speaking to its occupants, because that is no more than any private citizen
might do.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 638 A.2d 203, 207 (Pa. 1994) (“the police
have the power to knock on the doors of the citizens of this Commonwealth
for investigatory purposes without probable cause”).
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officer’s directive by permitting him to search her son’s room. Perhaps
appellant was evasive but she did not commit an unlawful act.
We cannot agree that appellant obstructed the officer’s effectuation of
his duty by closing her living room curtain, seeking her husband’s permission
to allow the officer in the house, or by taking the officer to her son’s room.
Appellant cannot be guilty of thwarting the officer from effectuating an
arrest, and she bore no affirmative obligation to cooperate with the officer’s
investigation and desire to speak with her son, who had not yet been
charged with a crime. See Commonwealth v. Gettemy, 591 A.2d 320(Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, (Pa. 1992) (where defendant, when
questioned by police, denied knowledge of a missing woman and her motor
home, but was later found to have made untruthful statements to police,
defendant had not obstructed the administration of law by force, violence,
physical interference, or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other
unlawful act, and could not be found to have violated 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101).
Judgment of sentence reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/17/2015
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