Com. v. Blackwell, T. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TATIA LEA BLACKWELL
Appellant No. 1965 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 23, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000032-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 02, 2015
Tatia Blackwell files this direct appeal from a judgment of sentence of
90 days to 6 months’ imprisonment for driving under the influence (second
offense) (“DUI”).1 Blackwell’s principal argument is that the arresting officer
lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop her car on the
roadway, and therefore the trial court erred by refusing to suppress all
evidence arising from the traffic stop. The trial court properly held that
probable cause existed to stop Blackwell’s car for speeding. For this reason
and other reasons provided below, we affirm.
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).
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On December 1, 2012, following a traffic stop, Blackwell was charged
with DUI and other offenses.2 Blackwell filed an omnibus pretrial motion
requesting, inter alia, suppression of all evidence arising from the traffic
stop. On April 29, 2013, the trial court ordered Blackwell to file a
memorandum in advance of the hearing on her suppression motion. On May
16, 2013, Blackwell submitted her memorandum; the Commonwealth
submitted an opposing memorandum sixteen days later.
On August 29, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on Blackwell’s
motion to suppress. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the
motion.
On September 16, 2014, following a one-day trial, a jury found
Blackwell guilty of DUI. The jury specifically found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Blackwell was informed of her implied consent warnings but still
refused to submit a blood sample on the night in question. On October 23,
2014, the court imposed sentence. Blackwell filed a timely notice of appeal,
and both Blackwell and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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2
In addition to the DUI charge, Blackwell was charged with one felony
(aggravated assault), two misdemeanors (simple assault and resisting
arrest) based on her conduct at the scene of the traffic stop. She also was
charged with two summary offenses (failure to carry a driver’s license and
failure to exhibit driver’s license on demand). The jury acquitted Blackwell
of aggravated assault, simple assault and resisting arrest. The trial court
found Blackwell guilty of failure to carry a driver’s license and sentenced her
to a fine of $25.00, and Blackwell did not appeal this summary conviction.
None of these charges are at issue in this appeal.
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Blackwell raises three issues on appeal:
Whether the briefing schedule that was ordered by the
suppression court is violative of [Pa.R.Crim.P. 581] and the Due
Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution[,] since it improperly required
[Blackwell] to file a pre-hearing brief regarding the
unconstitutionality of the traffic stop[,] in that [] Blackwell had
already satisfied her initial and only burden by filing an omnibus
pre-trial motion after which time the Commonwealth had the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion at the
suppression hearing?
Whether the suppression court erred in refusing to declare the
traffic stop illegal under Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
suppress all fruit of the poisonous tree, which was derived from
the illegal traffic stop[,] since the ‘MVR’ [motor vehicle recording
device] irrefutably demonstrated that Trooper Barry Rowland did
not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to effectuate
the traffic stop?
Whether the evidence was insufficient to support [] Blackwell’s
conviction [under] 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1)(driving under the
influence – general impairment – incapable of safe driving -
refusal - second offense)(M1)?
Brief For Appellant, p. 8.
Blackwell’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court violated her
procedural and constitutional rights by ordering her to file a memorandum in
support of her motion to suppress in advance of both the Commonwealth’s
opposing memorandum and the suppression hearing. Blackwell contends
that the court’s order effectively shifted the burden of proof to her and gave
the Commonwealth unfair advantage by permitting it to preview Blackwell’s
defense theories and adjust its strategy accordingly.
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Blackwell waived this argument by failing to object to the April 29,
2013 order either in her memorandum in support of her motion to suppress
or during the suppression hearing. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“issues not raised in
the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal”); ABG Promotions v. Parkway Pub., Inc., 834 A.2d 613, 619
(Pa.Super.2003) (waiver applies even if issue raised for first time on appeal
is constitutional question).
Even if Blackwell preserved this issue for appeal, it is devoid of merit.
We see nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure that prohibits the trial
court from directing the defendant to file a memorandum in advance of a
suppression hearing or in advance of the Commonwealth’s opposing
memorandum. Nor do we consider such a directive to shift the burden of
proof to Blackwell in violation of her constitutional rights. The
Commonwealth bears the burden to prove at the suppression hearing that
the defendant’s rights were not infringed. Commonwealth v. Enimpah,
106 A.3d 695, 701 (Pa.2014). A pre-hearing memorandum merely educates
the trial court about the applicable law; it does not realign the burden of
proof in any way. Even assuming the order to file a pre-hearing
memorandum constituted a technical violation of Blackwell’s rights, she fails
to demonstrate that it caused actual prejudice, i.e., that the burden of proof
actually shifted. The trial court’s analysis at the conclusion of the
suppression hearing indicates that it applied the proper burden of proof and
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found that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving probable cause.
N.T., 8/29/13, at 54-56. Moreover, Blackwell’s claim that the
Commonwealth was able to change its strategy in response to the
memorandum is speculative, because she fails to identify the
Commonwealth’s strategy prior to her memorandum or how the
Commonwealth changed its strategy afterward.
In her second argument, Blackwell contends that the trial court erred
by denying her motion to suppress. In an appeal from the denial of
suppression, our standard of review
is whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings
and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from
error. Our scope of review is limited; we may consider only the
evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of
the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of
the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions
based upon the facts.
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 111 A.3d 747, 754 (Pa.Super.2015).
Moreover, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to
pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.
Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa.Super.2003).
During the suppression hearing, one of the arresting officers, State
Trooper Rowland, testified that he has received training in DUI enforcement
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and has been a patrol officer for 8½ years, during which time he has
encountered numerous individuals driving under the influence. N.T.,
8/29/13, at 9. In the early morning hours of December 1, 2012, Trooper
Rowland, accompanied by Trooper Buchheit, observed Blackwell’s car driving
northbound on Route 64 near its intersection with Route 445 in Centre
County. Id. at 11-12. Trooper Rowland followed Blackwell’s car in his patrol
vehicle, and he observed Blackwell’s car speeding and weaving across the
double yellow lines. Id. at 12-13. Trooper Rowland “paced” Blackwell’s car
for approximately one half mile, i.e., he “[got] behind the vehicle and
follow[ed] it at the speed or approximately the same speed as the vehicle is
going,” using a speedometer to calculate the vehicle’s speed.3 Id. at 14, 16.
The speedometer calculated Blackwell’s car as traveling 53 miles per hour in
a 45 mile per hour zone. Id. at 18. Trooper Rowland pulled over Blackwell’s
car on Washington Avenue slightly beyond the intersection of Washington
Avenue and Route 64, approximately one mile from where the trooper first
observed Blackwell’s car. Id. at 12, 23.
The Commonwealth introduced a Google map which illustrated Route
64’s northerly course between Route 445 and Washington Avenue.
Commonwealth Exhibit 1.
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3
On September 14, 2012, the Department of Transportation certified as
accurate the speedometer that Trooper Rowland used to pace Blackwell’s
car. Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2.
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Most of Trooper Rowland’s pursuit of Blackwell’s car was videotaped on
an MVR affixed to the rear view mirror in the trooper’s vehicle. The
Commonwealth introduced the MVR video during Trooper Rowland’s
testimony at the suppression hearing, but neither party moved for its
admission into evidence.
The trial court denied Blackwell’s motion to suppress. It ruled, on the
basis of the video, that reasonable suspicion existed to stop Blackwell’s car
for DUI:
And what I’m seeing on the video is a vehicle reacting to an
oncoming vehicle by crossing the fog line substantially. And
then on two other occasions from the [per]spective of the
videocamera it appears that the vehicle is riding the center line
[without] cross[ing]. And then at the very end before turning
onto Washington Avenue there is a substantial period of time
where the vehicle has again crossed the white fog line and then
pulled back onto the road …
N.T., 8/29/13, at 54-55.4 The trial court also found that Blackwell’s rate of
speed during the “pacing” period was 53 miles per hour, eight miles per hour
over the speed limit. Id. at 55. Thus, the court concluded, Trooper
Rowland had probable cause to pull over Blackwell’s car for speeding. Id.
Presently, Blackwell contends that the video demonstrates that her car
did not cross the fog lines or touch the center line during the pursuit. In
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4
As discussed below in footnote 6, we need not address whether reasonable
suspicion existed to stop Blackwell’s car for DUI. We only cite the trial
court’s ruling on this subject to demonstrate that the trial court based its
decision to deny Blackwell’s motion to suppress on the video.
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addition, Blackwell claims that the video shows that she was not speeding,
because (1) it is approximately one mile from Route 445 and the site of the
traffic stop on Washington Road, (2) the video shows that the pursuit lasted
one minute and sixteen seconds until Blackwell’s car stopped, and (3)
dividing the distance of one mile by the time of one minute and sixteen
seconds equals a speed of 42.6315 miles per hour, 2.3685 miles per hour
below the speed limit. Brief For Appellant, pp. 37-38.
Although the trial court never formally admitted the video into
evidence during the suppression hearing,5 the court regarded the video as
admissible for purposes of this hearing, because it based its denial of
Blackwell’s suppression motion on the video. Moreover, both parties
regarded the video as admissible for purposes of the suppression hearing,
because they both contend in this Court that the video supports their
respective positions on the suppression issue. Under these circumstances,
we will deem the video admitted as a suppression hearing exhibit so that we
can incorporate it into our review of Blackwell’s suppression argument. This
solution is consistent with Pa.R.A.P. 1926(b)(1)’s directive that “[i]f anything
material to a party is omitted from the record by error, breakdown in
processes of the court, or accident or is misstated therein, the omission or
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5
During trial, the video was formally admitted into the trial record as
Commonwealth exhibit 2. N.T., 9/16/14, p. 233.
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misstatement may be corrected … by the … appellate court … on its own
initiative at any time.”
We now examine the record to determine whether the trial court
properly held that the state troopers had probable cause to stop Blackwell’s
car for violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362 (Maximum Speed Limits). Section 3362
provides in relevant part:
Except when a special hazard exists that requires lower speed
for compliance with [75 Pa.C.S. §] 3361 (relating to driving
vehicle at safe speed), the limits specified in this section or
established under this subchapter shall be maximum lawful
speeds and no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed in excess
of the following maximum limits: … Any other maximum speed
limit established under this subchapter.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3362(a)(3). A vehicle’s rate of speed “may be timed on any
highway by a police officer using a motor vehicle equipped with a
speedometer. In ascertaining the speed of a vehicle by the use of a
speedometer, the speed shall be timed for a distance of not less than three-
tenths of a mile.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(a).
To justify the present stop, the trooper was required to possess
probable cause that Blackwell violated section 3362(a)(3). Commonwealth
v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super.2010) (“reasonable suspicion will
not justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an
investigatory purpose relevant to [a] suspected violation” of the Motor
Vehicle Code; instead, “[i]n such an instance, it is [incumbent] upon the
officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the
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questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the
vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the [Code]”).
The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Blackwell was
speeding. Comparison of the landmarks on the video with the map of Route
64 shows that Trooper Rowland “paced” Blackwell’s car (followed Blackwell’s
car at approximately the same speed) between Myers Street and Cherry Run
Road. Given that the distance between Route 445 and Washington Road is
approximately one mile, the map shows that the “pacing” distance between
Myers Street and Cherry Run Road was approximately four tenths of one
mile, more than enough within which to time Blackwell’s speed under section
3368(a), and the distance between Cherry Run Road and the site of the stop
on Washington Avenue was approximately three tenths of one mile. The
video shows that Trooper Rowland activated his emergency lights at Cherry
Run Road. In response, Blackwell’s car immediately slowed down and then
came to a stop on Washington Avenue. The video also demonstrates that
Trooper Rowland’s pursuit from Route 445 to the stop on Washington
Avenue took one minute and sixteen seconds.
Although Blackwell’s average speed during the pursuit was 42.6315
miles per hour (one mile in 76 seconds), the video demonstrates that her
speed during the “pacing” period between Myers Street and Cherry Run
Road was faster than her speed after Cherry Run Road. This higher speed
corroborates the speedometer’s report of Blackwell’s rate of speed during
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the “pacing” period as 53 miles per hour. And because the “pacing” period
was more than three tenths of a mile, Trooper Rowland had probable cause
to stop Blackwell’s car for speeding under 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3362(a)(3) and
3368(a).
Blackwell protests that probable cause did not exist to stop her for
speeding because she ultimately was not charged with speeding. We
disagree. Probable cause is an objective inquiry; probable cause to initiate a
traffic stop arises when “the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that
action.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). “[I]t is
irrelevant to the probable cause analysis what crime a suspect is eventually
charged with.” Sennett v. United States, 667 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir.
2012) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160
L. Ed. 2d 537 (2004)); see also Sennett, 667 F.3d at 537 (citing Michigan
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (“the fact that a suspect is never
charged with an offense does not conclusively establish that officers did not
have probable cause to arrest for the offense”). As illustrated above, the
evidence, viewed objectively, established probable cause to stop Blackwell
for speeding. The fact that she was not charged with speeding does not
show the lack of probable cause to stop her for this offense. Sennett, 667
F.3d at 535, 537.
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Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Blackwell’s motion to
suppress.6
In her third and final argument, Blackwell asserts that the evidence is
insufficient to support her conviction for DUI or the jury’s verdict that she
refused to submit to a blood test following her arrest.
Our standard of review for such challenges is well-settled:
[W]hether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the
light most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict
winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to
find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note
that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa.Super.2015).
The jury found Blackwell guilty under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), which
provides that “an individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of
alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving,
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6
Because the trial court properly determined that probable cause existed to
stop Blackwell’s car for speeding, we need not address the alternative
ground that the Commonwealth gave for denying Blackwell’s motion to
suppress, viz., reasonable suspicion existed to stop Blackwell for DUI.
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operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the
vehicle.”
The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may proffer in a
subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution
include but are not limited to, the following: the offender’s
actions and behavior, including manner of driving and ability to
pass field sobriety tests; demeanor, including toward the
investigating officer; physical appearance, particularly bloodshot
eyes and other physical signs of intoxication; odor of alcohol,
and slurred speech. Blood alcohol level may be added to this list,
although it is not necessary and the two hour time limit for
measuring blood alcohol level does not apply. Blood alcohol level
is admissible in a subsection [3802(a)(1)] case only insofar as it
is relevant to and probative of the accused’s ability to drive
safely at the time he or she was driving. The weight to be
assigned these various types of evidence presents a question for
the fact-finder, who may rely on his or her experience, common
sense, and/or expert testimony. Regardless of the type of
evidence that the Commonwealth proffers to support its case,
the focus of subsection 3802(a)(1) remains on the inability of
the individual to drive safely due to consumption of alcohol-not
on a particular blood alcohol level.
Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (Pa.2009).
In addition, “an individual who violates section 3802(a)(1) where the
individual refused testing of blood or breath … and who has one or more
prior offenses commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.”7 75 Pa.C.S. §
3803(b)(4). Such an individual is subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of ninety days’ imprisonment. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3803(c)(2)(i).
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7
Blackwell does not dispute that she has one or more prior DUI offenses.
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The following evidence was adduced during trial: while “pacing”
Blackwell’s car on Route 64, Trooper Rowland determined that she was
driving 53 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone. N.T., 9/16/14, at 58-
59. Trooper Rowland stopped Blackwell for speeding. There were two
individuals in the car: Blackwell was the driver, and she was not in
possession of her driver’s license. Id. at 65-66. While speaking with
Blackwell, Trooper Rowland detected an odor of alcohol and noticed that
Blackwell’s face was flushed, her eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and her
speech was slurred. Id. at 66, 136. Trooper Rowland asked Blackwell to
step out of the vehicle. When she did, she had difficulty with her balance.
Id. at 66-67. Trooper Rowland asked her to submit to field sobriety tests.
During the one-legged stand, she failed to follow instructions, swayed and
constantly put her foot down. Id. at 70-71; Commonwealth exhibit 2 (video
of traffic stop), time stamp 7:22-7:47. During the walk-and-turn, Blackwell
failed to walk in a straight line, missed several heal-to-toe connections, had
difficulty maintaining her balance, and quit the test after falling off the line,
stating “this is ridiculous.” N.T., 9/16/14, at 72-74; Commonwealth exhibit
2, time stamp 7:47-8:55. Trooper Rowland placed Blackwell under arrest
for DUI, but she resisted. She pulled away while being handcuffed, yelled at
her passenger, dragged her feet on the way to the police vehicle and
resisted Trooper Rowland’s attempts to place her in the back seat. N.T.,
9/16/14, at 76-78. Trooper Buchheit, who was accompanying Trooper
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Rowland, advised Blackwell that she would be tased if she did not cooperate.
Id. at 90, 188-89. Blackwell began kicking repeatedly at Trooper Buchheit,
who dry-stunned her in an attempt to induce her to cooperate. Id. at 80-
84. Blackwell continued to resist. As Trooper Buchheit tried to reconnect
the taser cartridge, the instrument was still arcing, and its prongs deployed
into his hand. Id. at 195-96.
After confining Blackwell inside the police car, the troopers transported
her to Mount Nittany Medical Center (“hospital”). N.T., 9/16/14, at 88.
Trooper Rowland read Blackwell her implied consent warnings 8 from a DL-26
form, but she refused to sign the form or submit to a blood test, stating:
“This is bullshit” and “hell no.” Id. at 97, 127-28, 138-40, 169-70, 213-16.
Trooper Rowland transported Blackwell to the county prison, which would
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8
The “implied consent” warnings
originate in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547[,] [which provides] that, in
Pennsylvania, drivers impliedly consent to a chemical test of ‘breath,
blood or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of
blood or the presence of a controlled substance if a police officer has
reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving ... a
vehicle’ under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a)(1). Where an officer requests that an individual
submit to chemical testing, Section 1547(b)(2) requires that the officer
warn the person: ‘the person’s operating privilege will be suspended
upon refusal to submit to chemical testing” and “if the person refuses
to submit to chemical testing, upon conviction or plea for violating [75
Pa.C.S.A. §] 3802(a)(1), the person will be subject to the penalties
provided in [75 Pa.C.S.A. §] 3804(c) (relating to penalties).’ 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(b).
Commonwealth v. Barr, 79 A.3d 668, 670 n. 3 (Pa.Super.2013).
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not process her because she claimed to be suffering from a diabetic episode.
Id. at 88. Trooper Rowland drove Blackwell back to the hospital, where a
physician examined her and determined that her blood sugar levels were in
the normal range, and that she was intoxicated. Id. at 226-30.
Construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this
evidence – in particular, her speeding, the odor of alcohol in her vehicle, her
flushed features, her glassy and bloodshot eyes, her slurred speech, her
demeanor during the traffic stop, her inability to perform field sobriety tests
satisfactorily, her combativeness at the time of arrest, her refusal to take a
blood draw while saying “this is bullshit”, and the physician’s conclusion that
she was intoxicated -- establishes Blackwell’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt for DUI under section 3802(a)(1). Cf. Commonwealth v. Graham,
81 A.3d 137, 146-47 (Pa.Super.2013) (evidence was sufficient to support
finding that defendant’s impairment which rendered her unable to drive
safely was caused by combined influence of alcohol and drug or combination
of drugs, as necessary to support DUI conviction without introduction of
expert testimony; police officer who had received extensive training with
respect to recognizing signs and behaviors of individuals driving under the
influence observed defendant’s erratic driving behavior, unsteadiness, and
inability to perform field sobriety tests, and defendant refused to submit to
chemical test of her blood).
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Furthermore, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the evidence supports the jury’s determination that Trooper
Rowland read Blackwell her implied consent warnings but that she refused to
submit to a blood test following her arrest. Therefore, the trial court
properly graded Blackwell’s offense as a first degree misdemeanor for
purposes of sentencing, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3803(b)(4), and properly sentenced
Blackwell to a mandatory minimum of 90 days’ imprisonment under 75
Pa.C.S. § 3803(c)(2)(i).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/2/2015
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