Com. v. Greenleaf, W. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A13028-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    WARREN GREENLEAF,
    Appellant               No. 1636 WDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 11, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0007051-2012
    BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and OTT, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                             FILED JUNE 18, 2015
    Appellant, Warren Greenleaf, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered following his convictions of violations of the Pennsylvania Uniform
    Firearms Act1 and defiant trespass. We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
    case as follows:
    On May 23, 2012 Zone 5, Pittsburgh Police Lieutenant,
    Reyne Kacsuta, was patrolling in the Garfield section of the
    [C]ity of Pittsburgh Allegheny County PA. As she drove past
    5402 Broad St., she saw a woman and three men on the front
    porch of an apartment building. The police had received an
    anonymous citizen’s complaint the day before of people
    trespassing on that property, gambling, and smoking marijuana.
    Lt. Kacsuta decided to stop and investigate after observing a
    police car drove [sic] past without stopping. As she exited the
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6101, et seq.
    J-A13028-15
    police car and approached the front of the apartment building
    the people on the porch jumped up and one said, “Okay we’re
    going”. Lt. Kacsuta testified that the actions of the people and
    their remark, “we’re going” gave her reasonable suspicion that
    the people were trespassing.
    When the Lieutenant asked the people to remain where
    they were, one person, later identified as Anthony Amato began
    talking and screaming.       [Appellant] began to bang on the
    apartment’s locked front door yelling for someone to let him
    inside the building, and a third individual started to run away.
    Fearing for her safety and because her backup had just begun to
    arrive, Lt. Kacsuta handcuffed [Appellant] and the remaining
    individuals until she finished her investigation. However, once
    she determined that [Appellant] and other individuals had no
    outstanding warrants, and would only be charged with a
    summary trespass, Lt. Kacsuta began to uncuff the detainees.
    [Appellant] had difficulty standing up and stated he had been
    shot.   When Lt. Kacsuta and Officer McGee went to assist
    [Appellant], they saw a gun, in plain view, protruding from his
    pants pocket. [Appellant] was placed under arrest and charged
    with Violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, Person Not to
    Possess, use etc. a Firearm[;] Violation of the Uniform Firearms
    Act, Carrying a Firearm Without a License[;] and Defiant
    Trespass.
    [Appellant’s] firearm was a .38 caliber Colt Special
    revolver, tested and found to be in good working condition[.]
    Furthermore, [Appellant] did not have a license to carry the gun,
    nor could he obtain a license because of prior convictions. All
    the testimony from the Suppression hearing was incorporated in
    [Appellant’s] non-jury trial.
    [Appellant] was found guilty on all three counts and
    sentenced on September 11, 2013 to 4 to 8 years.
    [Appellant] filed a timely appeal[.]
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/14, at 2-3 (internal citations and footnotes
    omitted).   Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b).
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    Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
    Did [the] trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
    suppress where police, acting on an anonymous tip, seized
    [Appellant] without the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe
    criminal activity was afoot?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    Appellant argues that Lieutenant Kacsuta violated his constitutional
    rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when she stopped
    him without the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe he was engaged in
    criminal activity.   Appellant’s Brief at 11.   Appellant contends that on the
    evening of the incident at issue, Lieutenant Kacsuta did not know whether
    the individuals encountered on the porch were the same individuals who
    were there the day before, when the anonymous complaint was made. 
    Id. at 16.
    Thus, Appellant asserts, the day-old anonymous tip, in conjunction
    with the officer’s observation that Appellant walked away from the porch
    when the officer approached, was insufficient to establish reasonable
    suspicion of criminal activity. 
    Id. at 11.
    Because the officers recovered a
    firearm from Appellant’s person pursuant to this alleged unlawful seizure,
    Appellant maintains that the firearm should have been suppressed. 
    Id. at 19.
    The standard of review an appellate court applies when considering an
    order denying a suppression motion is well established. An appellate court
    may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the
    evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
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    context of the record as a whole.     Commonwealth v. Russo, 
    934 A.2d 1199
    , 1203 (Pa. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 
    846 A.2d 75
    (Pa. 2004)). Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial
    court, the appellate court is bound by those facts and may reverse only if
    the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. 
    Id. However, it
    is also
    well settled that an appellate court is not bound by the suppression court’s
    conclusions of law. 
    Id. (citing Commonwealth
    v. Duncan, 
    817 A.2d 455
    (Pa. 2003)).
    With respect to factual findings, we are mindful that it is
    the sole province of the suppression court to weigh the credibility
    of the witnesses. Further, the suppression court judge is entitled
    to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented. However,
    where the factual determinations made by the suppression court
    are not supported by the evidence, we may reject those findings.
    Only factual findings which are supported by the record are
    binding upon this [C]ourt.
    Commonwealth v. Benton, 
    655 A.2d 1030
    , 1032 (Pa. Super. 1995)
    (citations omitted).   In addition, we are aware that questions of the
    admission and exclusion of evidence are within the sound discretion of the
    trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
    Commonwealth v. Freidl, 
    834 A.2d 638
    , 641 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    “‘Interaction’ between citizens and police officers, under search and
    seizure law, is varied and requires different levels of justification depending
    upon the nature of the interaction and whether or not the citizen is
    detained.”     Commonwealth v. DeHart, 
    745 A.2d 633
    , 636 (Pa. Super.
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    2000). The three levels of interaction are: mere encounter, investigative
    detention, and custodial detention. 
    Id. A mere
    encounter can be any formal or informal
    interaction between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be
    an inquiry by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this
    interaction is that it carries no official compulsion to stop or
    respond.
    In contrast, an investigative detention, by implication,
    carries an official compulsion to stop and respond, but the
    detention is temporary, unless it results in the formation of
    probable cause for arrest, and does not possess the coercive
    conditions consistent with a formal arrest. Since this interaction
    has elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable
    suspicion of unlawful activity. In further contrast, a custodial
    detention occurs when the nature, duration and conditions of an
    investigative detention become so coercive as to be, practically
    speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.
    
    Id. (internal citations
    and quotation marks omitted).
    Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to
    articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
    reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
    reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
    activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved
    in that activity. Therefore, this Court must make an objective
    inquiry, namely, whether the facts available to the officer at the
    moment of the [intrusion] warrant a man of reasonable caution
    in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.
    Commonwealth v. Plante, 
    914 A.2d 916
    , 922 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal
    citations and quotations omitted).
    “To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an
    investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as a matter of law, the
    police conducted a seizure of the person involved.”     Commonwealth v.
    Reppert, 
    814 A.2d 1196
    , 1201 (Pa. Super. 2002).
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    To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court must consider
    all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine
    whether the demeanor and conduct of the police would have
    communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not
    free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the
    encounter. Thus, the focal point of our inquiry must be whether,
    considering the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
    reasonable [person] innocent of any crime, would have thought
    he was being restrained had he been in the defendant’s shoes.
    
    Id. at 1201-1202
    (internal citations and quotations omitted).
    Lieutenant   Kacsuta   provided    the   following    relevant    testimony.
    Lieutenant Kacsuta was patrolling the area of Broad Street, in the Garfield
    area of the city on May 23, 2012.        N.T., 5/16/13, at 6, 11.       On May 22,
    2012, the night before the incident at issue, the Zone 5 police station had
    received an anonymous complaint regarding individuals at 5402 Broad
    Street, who were trespassing, smoking marijuana, and shooting dice. 
    Id. at 5-6.
      As a result, during her patrol on May 23, 2012, Lieutenant Kacsuta
    drove by 5402 Broad Street to observe the area.             
    Id. at 6.
       Lieutenant
    Kacsuta saw one woman and three or four men on the porch to the
    apartment building at 5402 Broad Street. 
    Id. She stated
    that as soon as
    she pulled up in a marked police car and started to get out, the individuals
    on the porch stood up and said “okay, we’re going.” 
    Id. Lieutenant Kacsuta
    testified that response indicated to her that they were in fact trespassing.
    
    Id. Lieutenant Kacsuta
    described the subsequent developments as follows:
    [Lieutenant Kacsuta]: [Appellant] reached towards the door
    knob [of the apartment building door] which was locked, and he
    started yelling let me in, let me in, let me in. A woman came
    out of the second or third floor window and she started yelling
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    and I said everybody just sit down.    I wanted everybody [to]
    just sit down on the porch.
    At that point there was one other individual who I later
    identified as Anthony Amato, he was a little to the side of the
    porch, he was kind of standing in the yard. And he just started
    talking and screaming, which was a diversion – I believe was a
    diversion, he was trying to divert my attention.
    ***
    And he just kept screaming. So, I’m telling everybody just sit
    down. And one of the men ran. He ran like off the porch
    towards me and then he turned to my left. I already had my
    taser out. I deployed my taser. He screamed, he fell on the
    ground. So now I have this guy who is diverting me, I have
    Anthony Amato who is diverting me, I have a woman and two
    other men on the porch.
    ***
    [Counsel]: At this time, lieutenant, do you have any backup or
    are you by yourself?
    [Lieutenant Kacsuta]:   I was by myself.
    [Counsel]: So with all this activity going on what do you do
    next?
    [Lieutenant Kacsuta]: I’m directing everybody to sit down
    which [Appellant], the other individual and the woman sat on the
    porch. Amato, I had him lay down on the ground, he eventually
    complied. The other guy got away, he ran. He – the taser hit
    him, he fell to the ground, he got back up and he ran.
    [Counsel]: Okay.
    [Lieutenant Kacsuta]: At this point my sense was that I was in
    sort of an ambush type situation with this individual who ran
    because now I don’t know where he went. So I have everybody
    sitting on the porch, and I had already radioed for backup when
    I was getting out of the car so other officers were coming.
    ***
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    When the first officer arrived on the scene, it was Officer Greg
    McGee, we just started handcuffing the people who were on the
    porch and I handcuffed [Appellant].
    [Counsel]: At that time what was the basis for your handcuffing
    [Appellant] along with the other individuals?
    [Lieutenant Kacsuta]: He was – my initial investigation was of
    the defiant trespass and because everybody got up to leave as
    soon as they saw a police car, I said okay, these individuals do
    not belong here so I’m going to investigate this as defiant
    trespass.
    When [Appellant] tried to get into the building and he
    could not access it, that led me further to believe that he was in
    fact trespassing on this porch because he couldn’t get in, and he
    was yelling to somebody to let him into the building. That’s the
    crime that I was investigating.
    Once all of this chaos happens with the running and I know
    that I am – that the initial complaint is drug dealing, trespass,
    gambling and I know that this area, this area -- this is in
    Garfield, it is a very violent high crime area. There is a lot of
    shootings, there is a lot of drug dealing, so that’s kind of what I
    figured I had there. And my initial charge for [Appellant] was
    that he was trespassing.
    [Counsel]: When all that activity was going on is it safe to say
    that you were in fear of your safety?
    [Lieutenant Kacsuta]:   Yes, I was.
    [Counsel]: So, once you place [Appellant] in handcuffs along
    with I believe two other individuals what happened next?
    [Lieutenant Kacsuta]: Other officers had arrived.          We got
    everybody handcuffed, got everybody’s name.               We ran
    everybody for warrants to see if there were warrants for
    anybody. I realized I had not patted anybody down because I
    just wanted to get them handcuffed so we could all be safe. So
    at that point I was about to let [Appellant] go, went to stand him
    up, Officer McGee and I went to get him to stand up –
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    [Counsel]: Was he in handcuffs?
    [Lieutenant Kacsuta]: He was handcuffed. We were going to
    stand him up, and I’m not sure at what point we were going to
    pat him down, if we were patting him down and letting him go,
    but the situation was calm, everything was in my mind at this
    point calm and somewhat resolved.
    As we went to get [Appellant] up, told him to stand, he
    leaned over to his right. He said I can’t stand up, I can’t stand
    up, I got shot. Well, I didn’t know when he got shot. I didn’t
    know if he had just gotten shot. He said I got shot, I got shot, I
    can’t stand up. And he very oddly leaned over to his right side.
    And so Officer McGee and I went to pick him up and he still kept
    leaning to his right, leaning to his right. As I stood him up I saw
    the handle of a gun sticking out of his pants pocket.
    
    Id. at 6-12.
    The record supports the conclusion that Lieutenant Kacsuta’s initial
    interaction with the individuals on the porch began as a mere encounter.
    She approached the individuals merely for purposes of making inquiry. The
    reactions of the individuals in response to her approach resulted in her
    developing reasonable suspicion that they were involved in criminal activity.
    Specifically, the individuals started to leave as she approached, indicating
    that “we’re leaving”.   Appellant was banging on the front door to the
    apartment building seeking access.     One of the men started yelling and
    screaming and another charged off of the porch towards Lieutenant Kacsuta.
    Additionally, the individuals were in the same location that was the subject
    of a complaint the night before involving individuals trespassing, smoking
    marijuana, and gambling. This address was located in a high crime area of
    the city, where drug dealing and shootings are common. Thus, the totality
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    of the circumstances reasonably led Lieutenant Kacsuta to believe that the
    individuals, including Appellant, were involved in criminal activity. 
    Plante, 914 A.2d at 922
    .        Accordingly, she was justified in detaining these
    individuals for purposes of investigating potential criminal activity.
    We further note that, despite Appellant’s claim, Lieutenant Kacsuta’s
    reasonable suspicion that the individuals were involved in criminal activity
    was not based solely on the anonymous tip received by officers the night
    before.   The previous complaint regarding criminal activity at this address
    was simply one factor in the totality of circumstances supporting her
    conclusion. Furthermore, it is of no relevance whether Appellant was one of
    the individuals trespassing at that address the night before. As noted, the
    totality of the circumstances reasonably led Lieutenant Kacsuta to believe
    that the individuals, including Appellant, were involved in criminal activity.
    
    Plante, 914 A.2d at 922
    . As such, reasonable suspicion justified her seizure
    of these individuals for purposes of investigating criminal activity.     The
    seizure of Appellant and the other individuals was lawful.
    Having determined that the seizure of Appellant’s person was lawful,
    we turn to consider the legality of the seizure of the gun on Appellant’s
    person.   The gun sticking out of Appellant’s pants pocket came into plain
    sight while the officers were attempting to stand Appellant upright after he
    stated that he could not stand because he had been shot.          We apply the
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    following test to determine whether a search falls within the plain view
    exception:
    For the exception to be present, initially, the officer must not
    have violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place
    from which the evidence could be plainly viewed. Moreover, two
    additional conditions must be satisfied to justify the warrantless
    seizure. First, the incriminating character of the item must be
    immediately apparent. Also, the officer must have a lawful right
    of access to the object itself.
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    982 A.2d 90
    , 92 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quotations
    and citations omitted).
    Here, the officers viewed the gun from a lawful vantage point.         As
    stated, the officers had lawfully seized Appellant. The gun became apparent
    as the officers were helping Appellant to stand after he asserted that he
    could not do so because he had been shot. Additionally, the incriminating
    nature of the object was immediately apparent to Lieutenant Kacsuta, and
    she had a lawful right to access the firearm. Thus, a warrantless seizure of
    the gun was justified.
    Accordingly, we conclude the suppression court did not err in finding
    Lieutenant Kacsuta had the necessary reasonable suspicion to detain
    Appellant.   Additionally, because the gun was viewed in plain sight during
    the lawful detention, the officers properly seized it. Thus, the trial court did
    not err in denying Appellant’s request to suppress this evidence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/18/2015
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