Com. v. Chambers, S. ( 2015 )

J-A15016-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHEKIANA CHAMBERS
Appellant No. 1739 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 15, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010468-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2015
Appellant, Shekiana Chambers, appeals from the May 15, 2014
aggregate judgment of sentence of three years’ probation, imposed after
pleading guilty to hindering apprehension or prosecution and false
identification to law enforcement authorities.1 After careful review, we
affirm.
The trial court has set forth the relevant factual and procedural
history, as follows.
On July 23, 2013, Philadelphia police officers
arrested [Appellant] for hindering apprehension and
related offenses stemming from an incident wherein
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5105(a)(1) and 4914(a), respectively.
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[Appellant] enabled another person to evade arrest
by posing as the other person and permitting officers
to arrest her under that person’s name. After
arraignment, court administrators scheduled the
matter for a waiver trial on December 6, 2013[,]
before the Honorable Rayford A. Means. On that
date, the [Appellant] requested a continuance.
Honoring this request, Judge Means rescheduled the
waiver trial for March 17, 2014[,] and transferred
the matter to th[e instant trial court].
On March 17[, 2014] [Appellant] recanted her
desire to proceed to a waiver trial and asserted her
right to a jury trial. Upon hearing [Appellant]’s new
demand for a jury trial and her corresponding
continuance request, th[e trial court] conducted a
colloquy with [Appellant] and scheduled a jury trial
on May 5, 2014. [Appellant] appeared on that date,
but th[e trial court] was in the midst of another trial,
so it could not proceed with [Appellant]’s jury trial.
[The trial c]ourt conducted another colloquy with
[Appellant] and rescheduled [Appellant]’s jury trial to
May 6, 2014.
On May 6[,2014] [Appellant] failed to appear,
and th[e trial c]ourt issued a bench warrant for her
arrest. Court administrators again rescheduled
[Appellant]’s jury trial to May 13, 2014. On that
date, [Appellant]’s attorney failed to appear. Yet
again, court administrators rescheduled [Appellant]’s
jury trial to May 15, 2014.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/14, at 1-2.
Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the aforementioned charges
on May 15, 2014. Appellant read, reviewed, and signed a written guilty plea
colloquy, wherein the trial court specifically guaranteed her a term of
probation. Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 5/15/14, at 1. At her hearing,
Appellant stated that no one threatened her to plead guilty, she was
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pleading guilty of her own free will, and she was pleading guilty because she
was guilty of the offenses charged. N.T., 5/15/14, at 5-7. That same day,
the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of three years’ probation. 2 No
post-sentence motions were filed. On June 10, 2014, Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal.3
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.
Was it reversible error for the trial judge to
repeatedly pressure … Appellant to enter into a guilty
plea when Appellant had indicated, numerous times,
that she wished to be tried by a jury, resulting in a
plea under duress?
Appellant’s Brief at 1.
In assessing challenges to the validity of a guilty plea, we are guided
by the following standard of review. “Settled Pennsylvania law makes clear
that by entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives his right to challenge on
direct appeal all nonjurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence
and the validity of the plea.” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606,
609 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 319 (Pa.
2014). “Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was
aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise.”
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2
Specifically, Appellant was sentenced to two years’ probation for hindering
apprehension or prosecution, and a consecutive one year term of probation
for false identification to law enforcement authority.
3
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted). “[A] defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea; rather, the decision to grant such a motion lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d
378, 382 (Pa. Super. 2002).
A defendant wishing to challenge the
voluntariness of a guilty plea on direct appeal must
either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion
to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to
employ either measure results in waiver.
Historically, Pennsylvania courts adhere to this
waiver principle because [i]t is for the court which
accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first
instance, any error which may have been committed.
Lincoln, supra at 609-610 (Internal quotation marks and some citations
omitted).
Instantly, our review of the record reveals that Appellant did not
object to her plea prior to or during the May 15, 2014 guilty plea and
sentencing hearing. Further, Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion
to withdraw her plea, despite being informed of her right to do so at said
hearing. N.T., 5/15/14, at 12-13. As noted above, in order to preserve an
issue related to the validity of a guilty plea, an appellant must either object
during the colloquy or otherwise raise the issue at the guilty plea hearing,
the sentencing hearing, or through a post-sentence motion. Lincoln, supra
; accord Commonwealth v. Tareila, 895 A.2d 1266, 1270 n.3 (Pa. Super.
2006); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating, “[i]ssues not raised in the lower
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court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[]”).
Accordingly, Appellant has waived any challenge to the validity of her guilty
plea.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s sole issue on appeal
is waived for lack of preservation. Accordingly, the trial court’s May 15,
2014 judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/23/2015
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