Matthews, J. v. Batroney, C. ( 2019 )

J-A22012-19
2019 PA Super 299JASON MATTHEWS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CYNTHIA BATRONEY : No. 483 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 12, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): July Term 2017 No. 1835
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., STRASSBURGER, J.*, and PELLEGRINI, J.*
OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 04, 2019
Jason Matthews (Appellant) appeals from the judgment entered in favor
of Cynthia Batroney (Appellee) following a jury trial. Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows:
The matter was tried before a jury on the issue of liability
only. It involved a September 18, 2015, intersection collision at
19th and Cherry Streets in Philadelphia between a bicycle ridden
by [Appellant] and a car driven by [Appellee]. [Appellant] was
traveling [southbound] on 19th Street which is one-way.
[Appellee] was driving eastbound on Cherry Street, also one-way.
[Appellee] testified that she stopped at the stop sign, or a little
after it and looked both ways, including up 19th Street, but did not
see [Appellant] before proceeding into the intersection.
[Appellant] admitted that he did not stop at the stop sign while
traveling south on 19th, but said that he had “made eye contact”
with [Appellee] before entering the intersection; [Appellee] denied
any eye contact. [Appellant] testified that [Appellee] did not stop
at her stop sign. [Eyewitness], Albert Eschert, was a pedestrian
at the intersection at the time of the incident. He testified that
[Appellee’s] car stopped before moving into the intersection. He
testified further that [Appellant] did not stop at the stop sign. The
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A22012-19
physical evidence is that the contact occurred between the mid-
section of the bike and the front corner of the car on the passenger
side.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/6/19, at 2 (footnote and citations to notes of testimony
omitted).
After deliberations, the jury rendered a verdict finding Appellee 30%
negligent, and Appellant 70% negligent. Id. at 4. Because the jury found
that Appellant was 70% negligent, the trial court entered judgment in
Appellee’s favor. Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102 (“In all actions brought
to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or
property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar recovery by the plaintiff . . . where such negligence
was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant[.]”).
Appellant filed a timely post-trial motion on September 14, 2018,
requesting that the trial court grant his motion for a new trial based upon the
trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on Section 3321 of the Motor Vehicle
Code. Appellant’s Post-Trial Motion, 9/14/18, at 4-5. After conducting a
argument, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion and entered judgment in
favor of Appellee on November 8, 2018.1 Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal. Both the trial court and Appellant have complied with Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
____________________________________________
1 While the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s post-trial motion and
entering judgment in favor of Appellee is dated November 8, 2018, the order
was docketed on November 12, 2018. See Trial Court Docket Entry,
11/12/18.
-2-
J-A22012-19
Appellant presents the following issues for review:
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in failing to give proper
jury instructions, and denying [Appellant’s] [m]otion for a new
trial, where doing so was contrary to the law and [a]ffected the
verdict?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to give proper
jury instructions, and denying [Appellant’s] [m]otion for a new
trial, where doing so affected the verdict?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in agreeing with counsel
to charge the jury with a certain instruction and then not
instructing the jury with charge?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
We address Appellant’s issues together because they all allege error by
the trial court in refusing to charge the jury on the section of the Motor Vehicle
Code pertaining to rights-of-way for vehicles approaching or entering an
intersection, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3321. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.
We review challenges to jury instructions as follows:
In examining these instructions, our scope of review is to
determine whether the trial court committed clear abuse of
discretion or error of law controlling the outcome of the case.
Error in a charge is sufficient ground for a new trial, if the charge
as a whole is inadequate or not clear or has a tendency to mislead
or confuse rather than clarify a material issue. A charge will be
found adequate unless the issues are not made clear to the jury
or the jury was palpably misled by what the trial judge said or
unless there is an omission in the charge which amounts to
fundamental error. A reviewing court will not grant a new trial on
the ground of inadequacy of the charge unless there is a
prejudicial omission of something basic or fundamental.
Stange v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 179 A.3d 45, 59 (Pa. Super.
2018) (citations omitted).
-3-
J-A22012-19
Further,
Trial courts have broad discretion to grant or deny a new trial.
The grant of a new trial is an effective instrumentality for seeking
and achieving justice in those instances where the original trial,
because of taint, unfairness or error, produces something other
than a just and fair result, which, after all, is the primary goal of
all legal proceedings.
There is a two-step process that a trial court must follow when
responding to a request for new trial. First, the trial court must
decide whether one or more mistakes occurred at trial. These
mistakes might involve factual, legal, or discretionary matters.
Second, if the trial court concludes that a mistake (or mistakes)
occurred, it must determine whether the mistake was a sufficient
basis for granting a new trial.
To review the two-step process of the trial court for granting or
denying a new trial, the appellate court must also undertake a
dual-pronged analysis[.] First, the appellate court must examine
the decision of the trial court that a mistake occurred[.] If the
mistake concerned an error of law, the court will scrutinize for
legal error.
If the appellate court agrees with the determination of the trial
court that a mistake occurred, it proceeds to the second level of
analysis. The appellate court must then determine whether the
trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the request for a new
trial.
Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 180 A.3d 386, 396-97 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citation omitted).
The essence of Appellant’s three issues is that the trial court abused its
discretion and/or committed an error of law by failing to charge the jury on
Section 3321 of the Motor Vehicle Code. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-27.
Appellant argues that the omission was so prejudicial to his case that it
-4-
J-A22012-19
affected the outcome of the jury trial, and therefore the court should have
granted his motion for a new trial. Id. We disagree.
Section 3321 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides:
(a) General rule.--When two vehicles approach or enter an
intersection from different highways at approximately the same
time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-
way to the vehicle on the right.
(b) Exception.--The right-of-way rule established in subsection
(a) is not applicable:
(1) on through highways, where the traffic on the highway shall
have the right-of-way;
(2) on limited-access highways, where the traffic on the limited-
access highway shall have the right-of-way;
(3) in traffic circles, where the traffic in the circle shall have the
right-of-way; and
(4) as otherwise provided in this part.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3321.
Prior to closing arguments, the trial court stated that as requested by
Appellant’s counsel, it would charge the jury with Section 3321. N.T., 9/6/18,
at 147. Appellee’s counsel, who had not previously seen the Section 3321
instruction, was granted the opportunity to review the statute overnight. Id.
at 148. The trial court noted that further discussion would take place the next
morning at the charging conference. Id. Both sides then proceeded to
present closing arguments, during which Appellant’s counsel chose to explain
Section 3321 to the jury. Id. at 153.
-5-
J-A22012-19
The next day, prior to charging the jury, the trial court informed the
parties that it would not be reading Section 3321 to the jury, “because it
doesn’t apply in this case where there’s a two-way stop and someone has not
stopped.” N.T., 9/7/18, at 4. Over the objection of Appellant’s counsel, the
trial court charged the jury only on Sections 3501 (applicability of traffic law
to pedalcycles) and 3323 (stop signs and yield signs) of the Motor Vehicle
Code. Id. at 14-15. Upon review, we agree that the trial court did not err by
failing to charge the jury as to Section 3321.
With regard to the operation of a bicycle on a roadway, the Motor
Vehicle Code states:
(a) General rule.--Every person riding a pedalcycle upon a
roadway shall be granted all of the rights and shall be subject
to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by
this title, except as to special provisions in this subchapter and
except as to those provisions of this title which by their nature can
have no application.
(b) Application of subchapter.--The provisions of this
subchapter apply whenever a pedalcycle is operated upon any
highway or upon any path set aside for the exclusive use of
pedalcycles subject to the exceptions stated in subsection (a).
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3501 (emphasis added).
Subsection (b) of Section 3323 of the Motor Vehicle Code outlines the
duties of vehicle operators at stop signs:
Except when directed to proceed by a police officer or
appropriately attired persons authorized to direct, control or
regulate traffic, every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop
sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line or, if no stop
line is present, before entering a crosswalk on the near side
of the intersection or, if no crosswalk is present, then at
-6-
J-A22012-19
the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the
driver has a clear view of approaching traffic on the
intersecting roadway before entering. If, after stopping at a
crosswalk or clearly marked stop line, a driver does not have a
clear view of approaching traffic, the driver shall after yielding the
right-of-way to any pedestrian in the crosswalk slowly pull forward
from the stopped position to a point where the driver has a clear
view of approaching traffic. The driver shall yield the right-of-way
to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another
roadway so closely as to constitute a hazard during the time when
the driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction
of roadways and enter the intersection when it is safe to do so.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(b) (emphasis added).
At trial, Appellant testified that on September 18, 2015, he was riding
his bicycle on his way to work when he and the vehicle driven by Appellee
collided at the intersection of 19th and Cherry Streets in Philadelphia. N.T.,
9/6/18, at 94-96. Appellant testified that he failed to bring his bicycle to a
stop at the intersection’s stop sign. Id. at 97, 103, 118. Also, a disinterested
eyewitness to the collision, Mr. Albert Eschert, corroborated Appellant’s
testimony that he failed to stop. Id. at 130, 136.
Because Appellant does not dispute that he failed to stop prior to
entering the intersection of 19th and Cherry Streets, the trial court did not err
by not charging the jury as to Section 3321. Compare McClintock v. Works,
716 A.2d 1262, 1264-65 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citations omitted) (“When the
facts are disputed, the trial court’s charge should address any theory or
defense that has support in the evidence.”). Although this Court has not
previously held in a published opinion that a violation of Section 3323(b)
forfeits the right-of-way created by Section 3321, we have held that other
-7-
J-A22012-19
violations of the Motor Vehicle Code have done so. See Schreckengost v.
Kraft, 204 A.2d 646 (Pa. Super. 1964) (forfeiture of statutory right-of-way
by speeding); and Williams v. Philadelphia Toilet & Laundry Co., 29 A.2d
336 (Pa. Super. 1942) (forfeiture of statutory right-of-way by travelling on
wrong side of roadway).
Appellant argues that his case was “hindered” and his counsel’s
credibility diminished because his counsel addressed Section 3321 in his
closing argument to the jury. See Appellant’s Brief at 18; see also N.T.,
9/6/18, at 153. We are not persuaded by this argument.
At the charging conference prior to the trial court charging the jury,
Appellant’s counsel admitted that during his closing argument he presented
Section 3321 to the jury, “at my own risk.” N.T., 9/7/18, at 4. Moreover,
Appellant’s counsel was present when the trial court indicated that it would
not decide whether to charge the jury regarding Section 3321 until the next
morning. N.T., 9/6/18, at 147-48. Appellant’s counsel could have asked the
trial court for a recess to resolve the matter prior to his closing argument.
However, Appellant’s counsel did not do so. See id. at 148. We therefore
agree with Appellant’s counsel that he presented Section 3321 to the jury at
his “own risk.”
Accordingly, we hold that Appellant’s admitted violation of Section
3323(b) forfeited his right-of-way proscribed by Section 3321. We therefore
agree with the trial court’s determination that Section 3321 was inapplicable
-8-
J-A22012-19
due to Appellant’s admitted violation of Section 3323(b) immediately
preceding his collision with Appellee, and thus the trial court did not abuse its
discretion or commit an error of law in refusing to charge the jury on Section
3321.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/4/19
-9-