Com. v. Ortiz-Cruz, L. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S47012-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    LUIS GILBERT ORTIZ-CRUZ                    :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1824 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 3, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-22-CR-0002213-2017
    BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                              FILED OCTOBER 23, 2019
    Appellant, Luis Gilbert Ortiz-Cruz, appeals from the Judgment of
    Sentence entered by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas following
    his convictions of Possession of Firearm Prohibited and Conspiracy to Commit
    Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver.1 He challenges
    the sufficiency of evidence, the denial of his Motion for a Mistrial, and the
    admission of prior bad acts evidence. After careful review, we affirm.
    We glean the relevant facts from the trial court’s Opinion. See Trial Ct.
    Op., filed 3/8/19, at 4-7. During the early morning hours of March 31, 2017,
    Pennsylvania State Trooper Jay Lownsbery and other members of the
    Pennsylvania State Police Special Emergency Team (“SERT”) executed a
    search warrant at the residence located at 3812 Crooked Hill Road in
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    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, respectively.
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    Susquehanna Township in connection with suspected narcotics trafficking.
    The SERT officers arrested eight individuals who had been asleep in various
    areas of the house: Appellant, Patrick McKenna, Jordy Melendez, Dennison
    Ortiz-Cruz, Charlie Vasquez, Trisha Santiago, Jonathan Samuel Pizarro-Diaz,
    and Elizabeth Grimwold.
    In the living room, where officers found Patrick McKenna asleep on a
    futon, officers recovered a loaded 38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver from
    an end table. They also recovered an unloaded H&R 32-caliber pistol from
    beneath a pile of clothing, an unboxed surveillance system, an open metal
    canister, and drug paraphernalia spread throughout the living room.
    Throughout the three bedrooms in the house, officers recovered numerous
    firearms—some loaded with multi-shot magazines, large quantities of
    ammunition, large quantities of cocaine, large quantities of U.S. currency,
    small amounts of marijuana and heroin, drug-packaging materials, a coffee
    grinder with white residue, drug transaction owe sheets, multiple cell phones,
    receipts reflecting money transfers to Puerto Rico, and body armor. In the
    bedroom where officers located Appellant and Dennison Ortiz-Cruz, officers
    discovered a loaded 12-gauge shotgun next to the bed.
    In the kitchen, officers found an electronic scale with white residue on
    it, a vacuum sealer, and a money counter.
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    The Commonwealth charged Appellant with numerous drug and firearm-
    related offenses. A joint jury trial commenced on August 13, 2018.2 After the
    court gave the jury preliminary instructions, co-defendant, Dennison Ortiz-
    Gomez, pleaded guilty outside the presence of the jury. Appellant then moved
    for a mistrial, arguing Ortiz-Gomez’s absence would prejudice the jury. The
    court denied Appellant’s motion and gave the jury the following cautionary
    instruction:
    You will notice that Mr. Ortiz-Gomez . . . is no longer here. So I
    am going to give you an instruction that I want you to follow. The
    fact that he is no longer here in the courtroom is not something
    that you [should] consider. His presence is no longer a concern
    for you, and I instruct you not to allow it to affect your decision or
    anything that you ultimately decide in this case.
    The remaining individuals are due and deserve your full attention
    and that you give them the right to be adjudged by you fairly and
    impartially considering only the evidence in this case and nothing
    outside of this courtroom when you assess their guilt or innocence
    in this matter.
    Likewise, I am going to address that you are about to hear
    evidence about other individuals who are not in the courtroom
    who were also charged in this matter. You are not to consider any
    of them in terms of your determination as to these individuals and
    their guilt and innocence. As I told you in the very beginning . . .
    you have to judge each and every individual separately.
    N.T. Trial, 8/15/18, at 66-67.
    ____________________________________________
    2Appellant was tried with Jordy Melendez, Dennison Ortiz-Cruz, and Jonathan
    Samuel Pizarro-Diaz.
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    Patrick McKenna, Officer Lownsbery, and Dauphin County Detective
    John Goshert, an expert in street-level narcotics, testified on behalf of the
    Commonwealth. Jordy Melendez testified for the defense.
    Patrick McKenna testified that “all the individuals within the Crooked Hill
    house, including [Appellant], had their hands on the operations of breaking
    down the cocaine[,] which involved using scales to weigh out the cocaine, a
    blender to grind the cocaine into powder form, and plastic one-ounce bags to
    package the cocaine for sale.” Trial Ct. Op. at 13-14.
    Goshen testified that evidence of narcotics trafficking included high
    quantities of narcotics, large amounts of cash, sale paraphernalia, and
    firearms indicating traffickers’ heightened security. 
    Id. at 8-9.
    Examples of
    sale paraphernalia included scales, blenders, and packaging materials. 
    Id. at 9.
    On August 18, 2018, a jury convicted Appellant of Possession of Firearm
    Prohibited and Conspiracy to Commit Possession of a Controlled Substance
    with Intent to Deliver. The trial court ordered a Pre-Sentence Investigation.
    On October 3, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
    term of seven to twenty years of incarceration. Appellant did not file a post-
    sentence motion.
    This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied
    with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises the following three issues on appeal:
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    1.       Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence     to
    allow a jury to return a verdict of guilty of the charges    of
    Possession of Firearm Prohibited and Criminal Conspiracy     to
    Commit Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession with Intent      to
    Manufacture or Deliver?
    2.       Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion for
    mistrial where the prosecutor presented prejudicial
    evidence, which manifested a necessity for mistrial?
    3.       Did the trial court err by allowing the introduction of
    improper Rule 404(b) evidence through the testimony of
    cooperating co-conspirators?
    Appellant’s Br. at 10.
    In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence
    supporting his Possession of Firearm Prohibited and Criminal Conspiracy to
    Commit Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver
    convictions.
    “A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.”
    Commonwealth v. Widmer, 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751 (Pa. 2000). “[O]ur standard
    of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
    Hutchinson, 
    164 A.3d 494
    , 497 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).              In
    reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we determine “whether the evidence at trial,
    and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to
    establish   all   elements   of   the   offense   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.”
    Commonwealth v. May, 
    887 A.2d 750
    , 753 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).
    “Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on circumstantial evidence,
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    and the trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”
    Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    172 A.3d 632
    , 640 (Pa. Super. 2017). “In
    conducting this review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and
    substitute its judgment for the fact-finder.” 
    Id. Appellant specifically
    challenges the evidence supporting the possession
    element of the Possession of Firearm Prohibited offense. Appellant’s Br. at 20-
    23. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
    evidence to establish that Appellant constructively possessed the firearm. 
    Id. Thus, we
    limit our analysis to this element only.3
    To sustain a conviction for the crime of Persons Not to Possess Firearms,
    the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant possessed a firearm and that
    he had been previously convicted of an enumerated offense that prohibits him
    or her from possessing, using, controlling, or transferring a firearm. 18
    Pa.C.S. § 6105.
    This Court has held that “[p]ossession can be found by proving actual
    possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession.”
    Commonwealth v. Heidler, 
    741 A.2d 213
    , 215 (Pa. Super. 1999). Where a
    defendant is not in actual possession of the recovered firearm, the
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    3 The parties stipulated that Appellant had been previously convicted of an
    enumerated offense that prohibits him or her from possessing, using,
    controlling, or transferring a firearm.
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    Commonwealth must establish that the defendant had constructive possession
    to support the conviction. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 
    67 A.3d 817
    , 820
    (Pa. Super. 2013).
    “We have defined constructive possession as conscious dominion.”
    
    Id. (citation and
    quotation omitted). “We subsequently defined conscious
    dominion as the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise
    that control.” 
    Id. (citation and
    quotation omitted). “To aid application, we
    have held that constructive possession may be established by the totality of
    the circumstances.” 
    Id. (citation and
    quotation omitted).
    It is well established that, “[a]s with any other element of a crime,
    constructive   possession   may   be   proven   by   circumstantial   evidence.”
    Commonwealth v. Haskins, 
    677 A.2d 328
    , 330 (Pa. Super. 1996). In other
    words, the Commonwealth must establish facts from which the trier of fact
    can reasonably infer that the defendant exercised dominion and control over
    the weapon. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 
    743 A.2d 946
    , 953-54
    (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding evidence was sufficient to prove constructive
    possession over drugs found in common areas of apartment where defendant
    entered apartment using his own key, possessed $800 in cash on his person,
    and police recovered defendant’s identification badge, size-appropriate
    clothing, and firearms from a bedroom).
    It is insufficient to infer “dominion and control” when the Commonwealth
    only provides evidence of the defendant’s presence. See Commonwealth v.
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    Valette, 
    613 A.2d 548
    , 551 (Pa. 1992) (holding mere presence at a place
    where contraband is found or secreted is insufficient standing alone to prove
    constructive possession). Moreover, if the only inference that the fact-finder
    can make from the facts is a suspicion of possession, the Commonwealth has
    failed to prove constructive possession. 
    Id. “It is
    well settled that facts giving
    rise to mere ‘association,’ ‘suspicion’ or ‘conjecture,’ will not make out a case
    of constructive possession.” 
    Id. The trial
    court addressed the sufficiency challenge as follows:
    Trooper Lownbery testified that upon entry into [Appellant]’s
    bedroom, a loaded 12-gauge shotgun was observed in plain view
    next to [Appellant]’s bed. In addition to the firearm found in
    [Appellant]’s bedroom, nine (9) other firearms were found
    throughout the Crooked Hill residence. [Patrick] McKenna testified
    that given the dangerous nature of narcotics trafficking,
    individuals within the Crooked Hill residence, including [Appellant]
    felt the need to carry firearms by their sides at all times.
    ***
    In viewing the testimony and evidence in its entirety, along with
    the stipulation that [he] was convicted of an offense which
    prohibited him from possession a firearm . . . , the evidence [was]
    sufficient to sustain [Appellant]’s conviction for [P]ossession of
    [F]irearm [P]rohibited.”
    Trial Ct. Op., dated 3/8/19, at 11-12.
    Considering the totality of the circumstances, and viewing the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree
    with the trial court’s conclusion that the Commonwealth proffered sufficient
    evidence from which the jury could draw a reasonable inference that Appellant
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    constructively possessed a firearm. Appellant is not, therefore, entitled to
    relief on this claim.
    Appellant also challenges the evidence supporting his Conspiracy to
    Commit Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver conviction.
    Appellant’s Br. at 23. He contends the Commonwealth failed to proffer
    evidence that he and co-defendants had entered into an agreement, and that
    he was connected to the drug paraphernalia or owe sheets found in the house.
    
    Id. at 24.
    To prove the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent
    to Deliver, the Commonwealth must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt
    that: (1) the accused possessed a controlled substance; and (2) the accused
    had the intent to deliver it to another. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    33 A.3d 1283
    , 1288 (Pa. Super. 2011). Where a defendant is not in actual possession
    of the recovered contraband, the Commonwealth must establish by the totality
    of the circumstances that the defendant had constructive possession to
    support the conviction. 
    Hopkins, 67 A.3d at 820
    . As discussed above,
    constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial evidence. 
    Haskins, 677 A.2d at 330
    . Additionally, the power to control the contraband “may be
    found in one or more actors where the item in issue is in an area of joint
    control and equal access.” 
    Valette, 613 A.2d at 550
    .
    To sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must
    demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant: (1) entered into
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    an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another; (2) with a
    shared criminal intent; and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy
    was done. Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 
    67 A.3d 19
    , 25–26 (Pa. Super.
    2013). The conduct of the parties and the totality of circumstances may create
    a web of evidence linking the defendant to the alleged conspiracy beyond a
    reasonable doubt. 
    Id. The conspiratorial
    agreement can be inferred from a
    variety of circumstances, including the relationship between the parties,
    knowledge of the crime, participation in the crime, and the circumstances and
    conduct of the parties. 
    Id. The trial
    court addressed the sufficiency challenge as follows:
    On March 31, 2017, [Appellant] was found inside the Crooked Hill
    residence during the SERT Team’s execution of the search
    warrant. Within the residence, officers seized roughly one (1)
    kilogram of cocaine, over $10,000 in U.S. currency, ten (1)
    firearms, a variety of ammunition, twenty-five (25) cellular
    phones, ballistic gear and sale paraphernalia, such as electronic
    scales, a blender, a money counter, and various packaging
    materials. [Patrick] McKenna testified that all the individuals
    within the Crooked Hill house, including [Appellant], had their
    hands on the operations of breaking down the cocaine. This
    process involved using scales to weigh out the cocaine, a blender
    to grind the cocaine into powder form, and plastic one-ounce bags
    to package the cocaine for sale. The testimony of [Patrick]
    McKenna regarding preparation of cocaine was sufficient to show
    a shared intent and an implicit agreement between the Crooked
    Hill residents, as well as establish overt acts perpetrated in
    furtherance of the conspiracy . . . to possess with intent to deliver
    cocaine.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 13-14.
    Considering the totality of the circumstances, and viewing the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree
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    with the trial court’s conclusion that the Commonwealth proffered sufficient
    evidence from which the jury could draw a reasonable inference that Appellant
    Conspired to Commit Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
    Deliver conviction. Appellant is not, therefore, entitled to relief on this claim.
    In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying
    his Motion for a Mistrial. Appellant’s Br. at 24. Appellant argues he was
    prejudiced by co-defendant, Dennison Ortiz-Gomez’s absence at trial, after
    Ortiz-Gomez had pleaded guilty. 
    Id. at 25.
    Appellant asserts that the jury
    improperly inferred that he was “as guilty [Ortiz-Gomez] who entered a guilty
    plea.” 
    Id. We review
    a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of
    discretion. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 
    67 A.3d 716
    , 728 (Pa. 2013).
    A mistrial is appropriate “only where the incident upon which the motion is
    based is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant
    of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true
    verdict.” 
    Id. at 728
    (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Additionally, “[i]t is well-settled that guilty pleas of co-defendants
    cannot be considered as evidence against those who are on trial, because the
    defendant has a right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the
    evidence presented against him, not by what has happened with regard to a
    criminal prosecution against someone else.” Commonwealth v. Geho, 
    302 A.2d 463
    , 465-66 (Pa. Super. 1973) (citations, brackets and quotations
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    omitted). “It is incumbent, therefore, upon the trial judge to give adequate
    and clear cautionary instructions to the jury to avoid guilt by association as to
    the defendant being tried.” 
    Id. at 466
    (quotations omitted).
    Following our review of the record, we find that the trial court properly
    exercised its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion. After Dennison Ortiz-
    Gomez pleaded guilty outside the presence of the jury, the jury was not
    informed that Oritz-Gomez had pleaded guilty and the court gave the jury
    adequate and clear cautionary instructions to avoid guilt by association.
    
    Geho, 302 A.2d at 465-66
    . This claim, therefore, does not garner Appellant
    relief.
    In his third issue, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by allowing the
    improper Rule 404(b) evidence through the testimony of cooperating co-
    conspirators. Appellant’s Br. at 25. In support of this claim, Appellant simply
    states that “[Patrick McKenna]’s testimony was unfairly prejudicial because it
    pertained to prior bad acts that had no relevance.” 
    Id. at 25-26.
    He does not
    support this assertion with any citations to the certified record to clarify what
    testimony he is challenging and likewise fails to cite where, in fact, he
    preserved these challenges for appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (requiring that
    if reference is made to the record, it must be accompanied by a citation to the
    record); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d) (requiring citation to where the issue was raised
    or preserved in the lower court). Without citation to the record, this Court is
    unable to analyze whether the trial court erred in admitting specific testimony
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    and   whether    Appellant    preserved      these   challenges   for   appeal.
    See Commonwealth v. Harris, 
    979 A.2d 387
    , 393 (Pa. Super. 2009)
    (“When an allegation is unsupported [by] any citation to the record, such that
    this Court is prevented from assessing this issue and determining whether
    error exists, the allegation is waived for purposes of appeal.”). Accordingly,
    we find this issue to be waived.
    Judgement of Sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/23/2019
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