Com. v. Shirey, J. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S80014-16
    NON -PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   1   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JOSHUA PAUL SHIREY
    Appellant                   No. 186 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 12, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP- 06 -CR- 0001751 -2015
    BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and RANSOM, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED JANUARY 17, 2017
    Joshua Paul Shirey appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in
    the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, following his conviction for
    making terroristic threats.' Upon review, we affirm.
    Shirey was charged with making terroristic threats after he sent         a
    series of letters to Angela Shirey, his estranged wife, beginning in January
    2015. Shirey wrote the letters from the Berks County Jail; they were made
    to appear as if they were sent by other individuals. One letter threatened to
    kill Glenn Cooper, Angela's new boyfriend, with whom she was           residing.2
    '   18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).
    2   The letter addressed Cooper directly, and included the following language:
    Be ready to move because when you hear my         footsteps, it[']s
    to[o] late.   You wanna fuck   wit[h] wifey[,] I'm gonna murder
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    J-S80014-16
    Following   a   jury trial   on January 11 and 12, 2016, Shirey was convicted on
    the sole count of making terroristic threats.
    Shirey was sentenced to 19 months' to                5   years' incarceration on
    January 12, 2016.        Shirey filed   a   timely notice of appeal and court -ordered
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b).3       On appeal, Shirey raises the following issue           for our review: "Did
    not the trial court err and abuse its discretion by restricting counsel's cross -
    examination of Commonwealth witnesses Angela Shirey and Glenn Cooper ?"
    Brief for Appellant, at 4.
    We note that
    [t]he determination of the scope and limits of cross -examination
    are within the discretion of the trial court, and we cannot reverse
    those findings absent a clear abuse of discretion or an error of
    (Footnote Continued)
    [you] and smear your fuckin[g] brain matter on da fuckin[g]
    concrete. You gonna get yourself killed over her[,] cuzz. I
    fuckin[g] warned you and I'm already gonna break your face and
    legs from the first time[,] [regardless,] faggot. Now I[']m gonna
    take the wind out [of] your fuckin[g] lungs.            I'm gonna
    .   .    .
    murder you wherever[,] I'm gonna walk straight in your
    fuckin[g] house. If you got guns[,] load [']em [']cause you['re]
    gonna need [']em.
    Commonwealth Exhibit 1, Letter Postmarked 1/28/15.
    3 We note that Shirey filed a pro se Rule 1925(b) statement. However, he
    was and continues to be represented by counsel, who filed a Rule 1925(b)
    statement several days later. The trial court accepted and considered the
    counseled statement. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 
    626 A.2d 1137
    , 1139
    (Pa. 1993) (no constitutional right to hybrid representation on appeal).
    -2
    J-S80014-16
    law.   [A]n abuse of discretion is not a mere error in judgment,
    but, rather, involves bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest
    unreasonableness, or misapplication of law. Furthermore, when
    a trial court indicate[s] the reason for its decision our scope of
    review is limited to an examination of the stated reason.
    Commonwealth v. Davis,              
    17 A.3d 390
    , 395 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
    and quotation marks omitted).
    Instantly, Shirey "sought to cross -examine Angela Shirey and Glenn
    Cooper with       information,      namely pending        criminal   charges    and   the
    circumstances surrounding those charges[,] which would have signaled to
    the   jury    a   bias   in   the       manner    of their    testimony towards       the
    Commonwealth."           Brief for Appellant, at 9.             Shirey alleged that      a
    methamphetamine lab was set up in Angela Shirey's house; Shirey sought
    information regarding the nature, grading, and penalties of Cooper's pending
    charges      after Cooper testified        to    being   on   accelerated   rehabilitative
    disposition (ARD) for fleeing and eluding the police, having          a   pending charge
    of theft, and recently having       a   preliminary hearing on charges of possession
    with intent to distribute methamphetamine.4               See N.T. Trial, 1/11/16, at
    128 -29.
    4 At trial, Shirey also attempted to insinuate bias based upon his belief that
    Cooper was a confidential informant for the Commonwealth. See N.T. Trial,
    1/11/16, at 140 (Shirey sent letter to Cooper accusing him of being an
    informant). This belief was based upon conjecture. The trial court limited
    cross -examination in this area, and Shirey raised this as an error in his
    counseled Rule 1925(b) statement. However, Shirey has failed to include
    any argument on this point in his brief, and, accordingly, this issue is
    waived.
    -3
    J-S80014-16
    While
    [t]he Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment confers             a
    constitutional right upon the defendant to conduct cross -
    examination that reveals any motive that a witness may have to
    testify falsely ..., that right is not unlimited:
    [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the
    Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable
    limits on such cross -examination based on concerns about,
    among other things, harassment, and prejudice, confusion
    of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is
    repetitive or only marginally relevant. And as we observed
    earlier this Term, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an
    opportunity for effective cross -examination, not cross -
    examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
    whatever extent, the defense might wish.
    Commonwealth v. Bozyk, 
    987 A.2d 753
    , 756             (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting
    Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 678 -79, (1986) (emphasis in
    original)) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Here, Shirey was given an opportunity to cross -examine Cooper, and
    the jury was made aware of Cooper's pending charges.              However, Cooper
    also testified that he did    not receive payment or promises from the
    Commonwealth in exchange for his testimony.               Furthermore, as the trial
    court noted,
    [t]he nature, grading and penalties of pending charges against
    Mr. Cooper were irrelevant to whether he exhibited motive and
    bias to be a Commonwealth witness.          .    . Any additional
    .
    testimony regarding Mr. Cooper's pending criminal charges
    would have only served to confuse the issues and require the
    jury to consider the facts, penalties and gradings of charges not
    properly within the purview of the jury.
    -4
    J-S80014-16
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/16, at 6 -7.    Accordingly, the court acted within its
    discretion in limiting cross -examination in this matter. 
    Bozyk, supra
    .      We
    discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
    Davis, supra
    .
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    J: seph   Seletyn,
    D.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/17/2017
    -5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 186 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 1/17/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/17/2017