Com. v. Fink, III, O. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
OSCAR EARL FINK III
Appellant No. 1598 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 7, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Civil Division at No(s): CI-12-05815
BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2014
Oscar Earl Fink, III, appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
on August 7, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, upon
the revocation of his probation, and made final by the denial of post-
sentence motions on August 19, 2013. On October 3, 2012, Fink pled guilty
to indirect criminal contempt (“ICC”) for violation of a protection from abuse
(“PFA”) order,1 and was sentenced to six months’ probation. On August 7,
2013, the court revoked his probation and sentenced him to a term of six
months’ incarceration.2 On appeal, Fink challenges the discretionary aspects
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1
23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(a).
2
As will be discussed infra, in a related matter, Fink also pled guilty to
robbery on October 3, 2013, at Docket No. 4551-2012, and sentenced to a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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of his sentence. After a thorough review of the submissions by the parties,
the certified record, and relevant law, we affirm.
The facts underlying Fink’s conviction are well known to the parties,
and aptly summarized in the trial court’s opinion. See Trial Court Opinion,
10/23/2013, at 1-8. Therefore, we need only summarize the procedural
history. On June 20, 2012, Fink’s paramour filed a PFA petition against Fink.
A temporary PFA order was issued that same day. Seven days later, a
criminal complaint was filed against Fink, charging him with one count of
ICC, at Reference Number 12-0138, for violating the PFA order by contacting
the victim. On July 2, 2012, after a hearing, where Fink failed to appear,
the court found the victim had been abused by Fink pursuant to the
temporary order, and a final PFA order was entered for a period of three
years.
Subsequently, on July 10, 2012, a second criminal complaint was filed
against Fink, charging him with one count of ICC, at Reference Number 12-
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
term of three to 23 months in county prison, followed by four years’
probation. At the August 7, 2013, probation violation hearing, the probation
related to the robbery conviction was revoked and Fink was sentenced to
serve the unexpired balance of his minimum sentence for the robbery
offense.
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0139,3 for calling and threatening the victim. Thereafter, on August 24,
2012, a third criminal complaint was issued against Fink, again charging him
with one count of ICC, at Reference Number 12-0137, for allegedly
approaching the victim, taking items from her, and pushing her to the
ground. That same day, a separate criminal complaint was filed against
Fink, at Docket Number 4551-2012, charging him with robbery, theft by
unlawful taking, and simple assault domestic violence, based upon the same
conduct that resulted in the filing of the ICC at Reference Number 12-0137.
On October 3, 2012, a hearing on two of the ICC charges was held, to
which Fink did appear.4 After hearing testimony, the court found Fink guilty
of the two ICC charges at Reference Numbers 12-0138 and 12-0139. The
court then sentenced Fink to six months of incarceration with regard to the
ICC conviction at Reference Number 12-0138, and a consecutive term of six
months’ probation with respect to the ICC conviction at Reference Number
12-0139.
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3
ICC Reference Number 12-0139 is at Civil Docket Number CI-12-05815,
and the case on appeal here.
4
Prior to the proceeding, the Commonwealth moved to nol pros the ICC
charge at Reference Number 12-0137, because of the separate criminal
prosecution, at Docket Number 4551-2012, that was pending based upon
the same conduct.
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With respect to the criminal prosecution, on March 5, 2013, Fink pled
guilty to robbery and received a split sentence of three to 23 months in
county prison, followed by four years’ probation. The sentence at Docket
Number 4551-2012 was made concurrent to the ICC sentence. On May 12,
2013, the court signed an order, directing that Fink would be released from
prison on May 21, 2013, for the robbery conviction. Pursuant to his release,
Fink acknowledged he was informed that he needed to report to the
Lancaster County Adult Probation and Parole Services Office on May 31,
2013, for an appointment. However, on June 21, 2013, Fink’s probation
officer filed a petition to issue capias and bench warrants against Fink on the
ICC conviction, at Reference Number 12-0139, and the robbery conviction,5
based upon Fink’s failure to appear for probation appointments on May 31,
2013, June 11, 2013, and June 20, 2013. The court then issued separate
orders directing that capias and bench warrants shall be issued against Fink.
On August 7, 2013, a hearing was held on Fink’s probation violations.
Fink and his probation officer both testified. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court found Fink was in violation of his probation, which was
revoked. Prior to imposing a sentence, the trial court considered Fink’s
extensive criminal history, his prior probation and/or parole violations,
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5
Fink had completed his sentence of six months’ incarceration on ICC
Reference Number 12-0138.
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comments made by Fink during the hearing, testimony provided by the
probation officer, and other information provided to the court. Based on this
evidence, the court concluded probation had not been an effective
rehabilitation tool for Fink, and that incarceration was essential to vindicate
the authority of the court. The court then sentenced Fink to six months’
incarceration on the ICC conviction, at Reference Number 12-0139. The
court also imposed imprisonment for the unexpired balance of his minimum
sentence on the robbery conviction, but he was made eligible for parole after
serving six months in jail. The sentences were made consecutive to one
another, so Fink’s aggregate sentence was 12 months’ incarceration,
followed by probation/parole.
On August 15, 2013, Fink filed a post-sentence motion, arguing that
the six-month sentence imposed by the court on October 3, 2012 (ICC
Reference Number 12-0138), for violating the underlying temporary PFA
order, was illegal based upon this Court’s decision in Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68
A.3d 917 (Pa. Super. 2013). Fink asserted that consequently, when
sentencing him on the probation violation under ICC Reference Number 12-
0139, the Court should have retroactively taken into consideration the illegal
sentence on ICC Reference Number 12-0138, and imposed probation or a
jail sentence concurrent to the robbery sentence. Fink also filed a motion to
modify his sentence, alleging the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
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adequately consider mitigating circumstances and by imposing consecutive
sentences. The trial court denied Fink’s post-sentence motions on August
19, 2013. On September 6, 2013, Fink filed a notice of appeal, seeking to
appeal only the probation violation sentence under ICC Reference Number
12-0139.6, 7
On appeal, Fink claims the trial court’s sentence of the unexpired
balance of the original sentence on Docket Number 4551-2012, which was
imposed consecutively to the sentence at ICC Reference Number 12-0139,
was manifestly excessive, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to the
fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process because the court
failed to adequately consider the fact that the victim was no longer in fear of
him, which was evidenced by the fact that she petitioned the court to
withdraw the PFA order against him, and the probation violation was for
missed appointments with the probation officer, not for engaging in any new
criminal activity. Fink’s Brief at 14. Likewise, Fink asserts the court failed to
consider his “character and rehabilitative needs,” which he states are as
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6
Fink did not appeal the revocation sentence imposed with regard to the
robbery conviction at Docket Number 4551-2012.
7
On September 6, 2013, the trial court ordered Fink to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Fink filed a concise statement on September 27, 2013. The trial court issued
an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on October 23, 2013.
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follows: (1) he was having issues with his family; (2) his girlfriend’s ex-
husband was causing issues for him during his probationary period; (3) his
girlfriend, the victim, was present in the courtroom in support of him during
the hearing and sentencing; and (3) he was employed by the Manheim Auto
Auction as a car detailer. Id. at 14-15. Additionally, Fink argues the court
failed to consider that he had already served an illegal sentence with respect
to his ICC conviction at Reference Number 12-0138 based on Ferko-Fox
when sentencing him on the probation violations as “this was a relevant
factor.”8 Id. at 16.
Initially, we note Fink only appealed his probation revocation sentence
with regard to his ICC conviction at Reference Number 12-0139, and not his
robbery conviction at Docket Number 4551-2012. See Notice of Appeal,
9/6/2013.9 Therefore, we will limit our analysis to the extent that Fink
challenges his ICC sentence. See Pa.R.A.P. 902 (manner of taking appeal).
Fink’s argument on appeal challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 831 A.2d 656, 660 (Pa. Super.
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8
We will address this contention, separately, at the end of our analysis.
9
Moreover, a review of Fink’s post-sentence motion reveals that a majority
of his argument was devoted to challenge the legality of his sentence as to
his ICC conviction at Reference Number 12-0138 and how it should apply to
his ICC conviction at Reference Number 12-0139. See Fink’s Post-Sentence
Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence, 8/15/2013, at unnumbered 2-4. He also
raised discretionary aspects of sentencing claims. Id. at unnumbered 4.
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2003) (“a claim that the sentence imposed by the trial court was manifestly
excessive is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence.”);
Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. Super. 2010) (a
claim that a trial court failed to consider the defendant’s rehabilitative needs
and the protection of society is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing).
The standard of review for a claim challenging a discretionary aspect
of sentencing is well-established:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound
discretion of the judge, and will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An
abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error
in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish,
by reference to the record, that the sentencing court
ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or
ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable
decision.
Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 980 A.2d 607 (Pa. 2009).
“A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be
considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a
claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 518 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). To reach the merits
of a discretionary issue, this Court must determine:
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(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2)
whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a
motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether
appellant's brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(footnotes omitted).
Here, Fink did file a timely notice of appeal, preserved the issue in a
post-sentence motion, and included the requisite statement pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in his appellate brief. Therefore, we may proceed to
determine whether Fink has presented a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 330 (Pa. Super. 2013).10
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10
With respect to whether an issue presents a substantial question, we are
guided by the following:
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See
Commonwealth v. Paul, 2007 PA Super 134, 925 A.2d 825(Pa. Super. 2007). “A substantial question exits only when the
appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing
judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific
provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the
fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 2013 PA Super 70, 65 A.3d 932,
2013 WL 1313089, *2 (Pa. Super. filed 4/2/13) (quotation and
quotation marks omitted).
Edwards, 71 A.3d at 330 (citation omitted).
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To the extent Fink argues his sentence was manifestly excessive, such
a claim does raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Kelly,
33 A.3d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“A claim that a sentence is manifestly
excessive such that it constitutes too severe a punishment raises a
substantial question.”). Moreover, a claim that the trial court failed to
consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs and protection of society also
raises a substantial question. See Downing, 990 A.2d at 793. However,
generally, “an allegation that the sentencing court ‘failed to consider’ or ‘did
not adequately consider’ various factors does not raise a substantial question
that the sentence was inappropriate.” Id., citing Dunphy, 20 A.3d at 1222.
While Fink does raise an excessiveness argument, a review of his brief does
not reveal any claims concerning his rehabilitative needs. Furthermore, his
assertion that the court failed to consider certain mitigating circumstances
does not present a substantial question. Therefore, our review is restricted
to Fink’s claim that his sentence was manifestly excessive.
“In general, the imposition of sentence following the revocation of
probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which,
absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321, 322 (Pa. Super. 2006). “[A]
sentence should not be disturbed where it is evident that the sentencing
court was aware of sentencing considerations and weighed the
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considerations in a meaningful fashion.” Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d
921, 923 (Pa. Super. 2000).
“[I]t is well settled that the sentencing guidelines do not apply to
sentences imposed as a result of probation or parole revocations.”
Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). The general standards for
sentencing are as follows: “the sentence imposed should call for
confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity
of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the
community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9721(b); see also Commonwealth v. Walls, 846 A.2d 152, 157-158 (Pa.
Super. 2004).11
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11
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771, entitled “Modification or revocation of order of
probation”, provides as follows:
(a) General rule.--The court may at any time terminate
continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions upon
which an order of probation has been imposed.
(b) Revocation. --The court may revoke an order of probation
upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the
probation. Upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available
to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of
initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time
spent serving the order of probation.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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“In addition, in all cases where the court resentences an offender
following revocation of probation ... the court shall make as a part of the
record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of
the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed [and] [f]ailure to comply
with these provisions shall be grounds for vacating the sentence or
resentence and resentencing the defendant.” Commonwealth v.
Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1040-1041 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotations
omitted); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). “A trial court need not undertake a lengthy
discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the
statute in question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing
court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.”
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282-1283 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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(Footnote Continued)
(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.--The court
shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon
revocation unless it finds that:
(1) the defendant has been convicted of another
crime; or
(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that
it is likely that he will commit another crime if
he is not imprisoned; or
(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the
authority of the court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(a)-(c) (italics in original; emphasis added).
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Here, while Fink did commit technical violations of his probation, and
not any new criminal activity, the trial court found total confinement
following the revocation of Fink’s probation was necessary because probation
had not been an effective rehabilitation tool for him, and a sentence of
incarceration was necessary to vindicate the authority of the court. See
N.T., 8/7/2013, at 4, 9. Specifically, the court stated:
You were given significant breaks, as far as I’m concerned,
because when I found you guilty, I could have given you 12
months in jail. I only gave you six months. You were given
another break by the judge who sentenced you on the robbery,
and made that sentence concurrent to my sentence on the ICC,
when it could have been consecutive. You won’t get those
breaks today.
Id. at 9.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court further explained its
rationale:
Prior to imposing sentence, the Court considered [Fink]’s
significant criminal record of 13 prior convictions dating back to
1996, [Fink]’s 10 prior probation/parole violations, comments
made by [Fink] and his counsel, testimony from the probation
officer, and all information obtained when [Fink] previously
appeared before this Court for his ICC charges on October 3,
2012, when [Fink] was cautioned that if he violated probation he
faced six additional months in jail. For these reasons, the Court
determined that probation had not been an effective
rehabilitation tool and a sentence of total confinement was
essential to vindicate the authority of the court. See 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 9771(c)(3).
[Fink] suggests an aggregate sentence of 12 months
incarceration in Lancaster County Prison is unreasonable. By
doing so, [Fink] ignores the threatening and violent nature of
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these offenses, his terrible prior record, previous unsuccessful
periods of supervision, the break [Fink] received when he was
initially placed on probation for the ICC, and the additional break
[Fink] received when his sentence on the robbery conviction was
made concurrent to the ICC sentence. [Leonard v. Smith, 684
A.2d 622, 627 (Pa. Super. 1996)] (the trial court’s sentence of
18 months imprisonment for three separate counts of ICC was
not excessive).
As noted in Crump, supra, sentencing on a probation
violation is a matter vested within the discretion of the trial
court, and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. [Crump,] 995 A.2d at 1282. [Fink] has
demonstrated utter contempt for his probation officer, this
Court, and the administration of justice. For these reasons,
there was no abuse of discretion committed by the Court.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/2013, at 13-14. In light of the above-mentioned
considerations, and upon our review of the record, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Fink’s sentence following its
revocation of his probation as it was not manifestly excessive. Therefore,
we will not disturb it herein.
Lastly, as stated above, Fink asserts the court failed to consider that
he had already served an illegal sentence with respect to his ICC conviction
at Reference Number 12-0138 when sentencing him on the present
probation violations. Fink’s Brief at 16. This argument fails for several
reasons.
First, we are guided by the following principle:
[w]hen, on appeal from a sentence imposed following probation
revocation, an appellant collaterally attacks the legality of the
underlying conviction or sentence,
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such an approach is incorrect and inadequate for two
reasons. First any collateral attack of the underlying
conviction [or sentence] must be raised in a petition
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act. Second, such
an evaluation ignores the procedural posture of [the] case,
where the focus is on the probation revocation hearing and
the sentence imposed consequent to the probation
revocation, not the underlying conviction and sentence.
Commonwealth v. Beasley, 391 Pa. Super. 287, 570 A.2d
1336, 1338 (Pa. Super. 1990).
Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 365 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Here, Fink is attempting to attack the legality of his sentence with
respect to his underlying ICC conviction at Reference Number 12-0138 by
claiming that it was illegal pursuant to Ferko-Fox, supra. He is not
permitted to do so with respect to the present appeal.12 See Infante.
Moreover, we emphasize our review of the matter is limited to the probation
revocation hearing and the present sentence imposed consequent to the
probation revocation, not a underlying conviction and sentence. See id.Second, Fink is essentially asking for time served because he believes
the six-month sentence he served for the allegedly illegal sentence at
Reference Number 12-0138 should be applied to his sentence at Reference
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12
The proper time to raise this argument would have been on direct appeal
from either the issuance of the final PFA order or on direct appeal from the
original judgment of sentence imposed on October 3, 2012.
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Number 12-0139. See Fink’s Brief at 15-16; see also Fink’s Post-Sentence
Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence, 8/15/2013, at unnumbered 4.
Credit for time served is governed by statute, in pertinent part, as
follows:
§ 9760. Credit for time served
After reviewing the information submitted under section 9737
(relating to report of outstanding charges and sentences) the
court shall give credit as follows:
…
(3) If the defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of
the sentences is set aside as the result of direct or collateral
attack, credit against the maximum and any minimum term of
the remaining sentences shall be given for all time served in
relation to the sentence set aside since the commission of the
offenses on which the sentences were based.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9730(3). Here, Fink’s sentence at Reference Number 12-0138
was never set aside because he failed to directly or collaterally attack its
legality. He cannot now ask for credit for time served as to a sentence that
was not found to be improper.
Third, we find Ferko-Fox, upon which Fink relies, is not dispositive in
the present matter. In Ferko-Fox, the plaintiff-wife filed a PFA petition
against defendant-husband and was granted a temporary PFA order. On
appeal, Husband challenged the propriety of the temporary PFA order that
the trial court entered. He contended that 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107 “mandates
that a trial court conduct an ex parte hearing before issuing a temporary PFA
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and that ‘a simple review of a verified petition’ is inappropriate.” Ferko-
Fox, 68 A.3d at 920. The local practice for issuing PFA orders was as
follows:
Lancaster County established an informal practice before the trial
courts in PFA matters, as follows. The court initially reviews a
PFA petition in camera to determine if the allegations raised in
the petition establish an immediate and present danger of abuse.
If the trial court determines that the four corners of the PFA
petition are sufficient to support the required finding of an
immediate and present danger, then it will issue a temporary
PFA and schedule a hearing for a final PFA within ten days.
Id. at 923-924. On appeal, a panel of this Court determined:
[T]he stated practice does not comply with § 6107(b) because it
reduces the procedural safeguards established within the section
and increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
respondent's liberty.
…
Indeed, an appreciable difference exists, in terms of ensuring the
truthful allegations of abuse, between a review of the verified
allegations listed in a PFA petition and the conduct of an ex parte
hearing. A person may blithely execute a petition inflating
claims of abuse. On the other hand, the process of appearing in
court before a judge and swearing to testify truthfully would
necessarily give one pause about leveling exaggerated or
specious allegations against another person. Further, in-person
examination of the petitioner during a hearing permits the trial
court to inquire of facts and circumstances beyond the
allegations that the victim delineated in the petition. It is, in
practice, impossible for a trial court to discern from its review of
pre-printed PFA form whether a petitioner has an improper
motive, such as retaliation or to gain an advantage in another
proceeding.
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Id. at 924. Therefore, the panel held that “absent an exigent circumstance
that prevents a petitioner’s appearance, due process mandates that a trial
court convene an ex parte hearing prior to entering a temporary PFA order
pursuant to § 6107(b).” Id. at 925. Nevertheless, the panel indicated that
“since a final PFA order was entered herein following a full adversarial
proceeding, the lack of an ex parte hearing in the present matter is not
grounds for reversal of the final PFA order.” Id.
Here, we apply Ferko-Fox for the limited conclusion that because a
final PFA order was entered following a full adversarial proceeding on July 2,
2012, where Fink failed to appear, the lack of an ex parte hearing prior to
the issuance of the temporary PFA order would not have been grounds for
reversal of the underlying final PFA order.13 Accordingly, we find Fink’s
argument unavailing, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.
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13
We note that the trial court addressed the issue of retroactivity with
respect to Ferko-Fox. Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/2013, at 14-18.
However, we need not address that issue based on our disposition. We
“may affirm the lower court on any basis, even one not considered or
presented in the court below.” Commonwealth v. Burns, 988 A.2d 684,
690 n. 6 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/18/2014
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