Com. v. Conyers, S. ( 2014 )

J-S70021-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SAMUEL CONYERS
Appellant No. 909 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 11, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0712401-1979
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
JUDGMENT ORDER BY MUNDY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2014
Appellant, Samuel Conyers, appeals pro se from the March 11, 2014
order, dismissing as untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful
review, we affirm.
On December 12, 1979, Appellant pled guilty to one count each of
murder and possession of an instrument of a crime.1 On December 13,
1979, Appellant proceeded to a non-jury degree-of-guilt hearing, at the
conclusion of which the trial court found Appellant guilty of first-degree
murder and imposed an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment without
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501 and 907, respectively.
J-S70021-14
parole. On November 15, 1985, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence, and our Supreme Court denied his allocatur petition on August 24,
1994.2 Commonwealth v. Conyers, 505 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Super. 1985),
appeal denied, 648 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1994). Appellant did not file a petition for
a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. As a result, his
judgment of sentence became final on November 22, 1994, when the filing
period for such a petition expired. See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(3); U.S. S. Ct. R. 13(1). Thereafter, Appellant filed unsuccessful
PCRA petitions in 1996 and 2000. Appellant filed the instant petition on May
15, 2012. On March 11, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA
petition. On March 19, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
As noted above, Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition until
May 15, 2012. Therefore, it was patently untimely because it was not filed
within one year of his judgment of sentence becoming final. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Furthermore, Appellant’s brief does not allege that
any of the three exceptions to the PCRA time-bar applies. See
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(stating, “[t]he PCRA specifically provides that a petitioner raising one of the
statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirements must affirmatively plead
and prove the exception[]”) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 951 A.2d
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2
On January 3, 1994, the trial court granted Appellant leave to file his
allocatur petition nunc pro tunc.
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1163 (Pa. 2008). We note that Appellant’s brief cites to the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).3
Appellant’s Brief at 13. To the extent this could be construed as seeking a
time-bar exception, this Court recently held that Lafler does not create such
an exception. Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1277 (Pa.
Super. 2013).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court correctly
dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely. Accordingly, the PCRA
court’s March 11, 2014 order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/18/2014
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3
In his PCRA petition, Appellant couched Lafler as a time-bar exception
under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 5/15/12, at
2. However, Appellant does not cite to the time-bar or any of its
enumerated exceptions in his brief.
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