Com. v. J.V.S ( 2015 )

J-S41022-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
J.V.S.
Appellant No. 943 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 6, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0001031-2012
BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2015
J.V.S. appeals from the judgment of sentence, imposed by the Court of
Common Pleas of Cumberland County, after a jury found him guilty of
corruption of minors1 and indecent assault.2 Upon careful review, we affirm.
The trial court has set forth the facts of this matter as follows:
The victim . . . M.S., [J.V.S.]’s biological daughter, was born in
January 1994 and lived with her mother for most of her life,
having no real relationship with [J.V.S.], until after she moved in
with him, her step-mother, Heather, and her two half-brothers,
Z.S. and B.S., in April of 2011. M.S. had not been enrolled in
school at her mother’s and was enrolled in 9th grade by [J.V.S.].
As with many teens, M.S. was on bad terms with her step-
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1).
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mother, Heather, and her relationship with [J.V.S.] only
progressed from “all right” to “better than before.”
In July of 2011, M.S. testified that [J.V.S.] and Heather began to
fight, which worsened everyone’s relationships and led to the
first allegation of corruption of minors — [J.V.S.]’s inappropriate
sexual discussions with his daughter. In essence, after “Heather
didn’t give him sex anymore,” [J.V.S.] asked his daughter to find
him girls because “he wanted to sleep with them.” Not
surprisingly, she refused because it was “just gross” to set up
her father with 18-26 year old girls; however, [J.V.S.] persisted
in his requests. Following these rebuffs, [J.V.S.] started asking
M.S. to sleep with him. M.S. poignantly related that when she
told him “no [you’re] my dad,” [J.V.S.] responded, “I don’t see
you as my daughter.”
Sadly, [J.V.S.]’s overtures to his daughter persisted until
December 5, 2011, when they culminated in conduct giving rise
to the indecent assault charge. Specifically, after sending M.S.
to her room to talk to her, he renewed his amorous desires,
telling M.S. “he was in love with [her].” This penultimate
advance was interrupted by a text message from M.S.’s cousin,
Amanda, inviting her to go to the Sheetz store, which [J.V.S.]
permitted.
During the Sheetz trip, after Amanda pressed M.S. as to why she
did not want to go home, M.S. tearfully and nervously informed
Amanda of her father’s actions. M.S. called her mother and
another cousin at that time to inform them too. With no plan to
go elsewhere, M.S. returned home, placed a fork under her
pillow for protection and planned to use her phone to record any
interaction with [J.V.S.]. [J.V.S.] did return to her room and, in
defiance of M.S.’s verbal and physical resistance, placed his hand
on her leg and eventually on her vagina over top of her clothing,
returning his hand to her vagina after she would kick it away.
[J.V.S.]’s efforts ceased when he heard Heather speaking to a
friend in the next room, at which time he jumped up and feigned
as if he was talking to M.S. about school.
M.S. informed her school counselor of the sexual advances and
assault the next day and did not return home; instead, Amanda
went to [J.V.S.]’s house and retrieved all of M.S.’s possessions
except her cell phone. The cell phone was eventually obtained
by Corporal Kenneth Tallman of the Pennsylvania State Police on
December 15, 2013; however, it did not have a SIM card, and
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consequently, no data or images could be recovered. [J.V.S.]
admitted to Cpl. Tallman that he had seen texts on the cell
phone that included allegations of his misconduct, all of which he
denied and suggested that M.S. was upset because she was
doing poorly in school and [J.V.S.] was “getting on her about
homework.”
Trial Court Opinion, 9/30/14, at 6-8 (citations omitted).
On March 19, 2014, at the conclusion of a one-day trial, a jury
convicted J.V.S. of corruption of minors and indecent assault. On May 6,
2014, J.V.S. was sentenced to 16 to 60 months’ incarceration. J.V.S. filed a
timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on September 30,
2014. On October 9, 2014, J.V.S. filed a notice of appeal.
On appeal, J.V.S. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his convictions for corruption of minors and indecent assault.
Our standard of review of sufficiency claims is as follows:
As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims
requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable
to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence
will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
establishes each material element of the crime charged and the
commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is
to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact
can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Lynch, 72 A.3d 706, 707-08 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Section 6301 of the Crimes Code defines corruption of minors, in
relevant part, as follows:
§ 6301. Corruption of minors.
(a) Offense defined.—
(1) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever,
being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act
corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less
than 18 years of age[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
J.V.S. claims the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he corrupted the morals of his 17-year-old daughter.
M.S. testified that J.V.S. told her that her stepmother “didn’t give him sex
anymore,” so he asked M.S. to “find him girls. . .to sleep with [him].” N.T.
Trial, 3/19/14, at 39. J.V.S. argues that because it is not illegal to have an
extramarital affair, and that the “girls” J.V.S. was interested in were
between the ages of 18 and 26, that this discussion between father and
daughter does not constitute corruption of minors. Id. at 40; Appellant’s
Brief, at 10. We disagree.
The scope of the corruption of minors statute is very broad in order to
protect the welfare of children. This Court has stated:
In deciding what conduct can be said to corrupt the morals of a
minor, “[t]he common sense of the community, as well as the
sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most people
entertain is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular
case, and to individuate what particular conduct is rendered
criminal by it. Furthermore, corruption of a minor can involve
conduct towards a child in an unlimited number of ways. The
purpose of such statutes is basically protective in nature. These
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statutes are designed to cover a broad range of conduct in order
to safeguard the welfare and security of our children. Because
of the diverse types of conduct that must be proscribed, such
statutes must be drawn broadly. It would be impossible to
enumerate every particular act against which our children need
be protected.
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 278-79 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing
Commwealth v. Decker, 698 A.2d 99, 101 (Pa. Super. 1997) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
Here, J.V.S.’s conversation with M.S. about his sexual relations with
her stepmother, and his proposal for M.S. to find him other sexual partners,
falls within the scope of corrupting the morals of a minor. Further, after
M.S. refused to find other women for J.V.S. to have sex with, J.V.S.
propositioned M.S. for sex. N.T. Trial, 3/19/14, at 40. Therefore, we agree
with the trial court that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, was sufficient to sustain the corruption of minors
conviction. Lynch, supra.
Next, J.V.S. claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction for indecent assault.
Section 3126 of the Crimes Code defines indecent assault as follows:
§ 3126. Indecent assault.
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent
assault if the person has indecent contact with the complainant,
causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person
or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with
seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual
desire in the person or the complainant and:
(1) the person does so without the complainant’s
consent[.]
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18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1).
The sole basis for J.V.S.’s argument is that M.S. returned to J.V.S.’s
house on the night of the assault and did not report the assault to the
authorities immediately.3 M.S. testified that on the night of December 5,
2011, J.V.S. told her that that he was in love with her, touched her vagina
on top of her clothing, and continued to try to touch her when she kicked his
hand away. N.T. Trial, 3/19/14, at 43, 50-51. The trial court found that
M.S. was credible when she testified that J.V.S. touched the clothing
covering her vagina without her consent. Therefore, we agree with the trial
court that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, was sufficient to sustain the indecent assault conviction.
Commonwealth v. McDonough, 96 A.3d 1067, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(finding that the testimony of a sexual assault victim was sufficient to affirm
a conviction for indecent assault when the factfinder believed the victim was
credible).
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3
J.V.S.’s argument essentially attacks the credibility of M.S., and therefore,
his claim challenges the weight of the evidence. However, J.V.S. did not
raise this claim before the trial court, and accordingly it is waived pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/6/2015
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