Com. v. Tuggle, I. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
IZEK TUGGLE
Appellant No. 218 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 16, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-46-CR-0006944-2011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2014
Izek Eugene Tuggle appeals his December 16, 2013 judgment of
sentence, which was imposed following a nonjury trial that resulted in
Tuggle being found guilty of: person not to possess a firearm, attempting to
obtain a controlled substance (Percocet) by fraud, manufacture of a
controlled substance (marijuana), possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver, and possession of Percocet with intent to deliver.1 We affirm.
In 2011, Tuggle was the target of an investigation into the distribution
of controlled substances and usage of fraudulent medical prescriptions in
Montgomery County. The Montgomery County Detective Bureau gathered
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1
See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), and 901 (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(12));
and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
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information about Tuggle through confidential informants, reports from other
police departments, surveillance, and controlled purchases of controlled
substances. Based upon the probable cause established by this information,
police applied for and received a search warrant for Tuggle’s residence on
August 18, 2011. Upon the execution of that warrant and the recovery of
evidence obtained therefrom, Tuggle was arrested and charged with, inter
alia, the above-referenced crimes. Prior to his trial, Tuggle filed a motion to
suppress a statement that he provided after his arrest, and the trial court
held a hearing on Tuggle’s motion on July 15, 2013.
The trial court has summarized the relevant facts and detailed the
testimony provided at Tuggle’s suppression hearing as follows:
During the course of [Tuggle’s] suppression hearing, Detective
[James] Vinter testified that, on August 19, 2011, at
approximately 6:20 a.m., he participated in the execution of a
search warrant at [Tuggle’s] apartment on Corson Street in
Norristown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Various items
were discovered during this search, including: Percocet,
marijuana, blank prescription pads, and a handgun. [Tuggle]
was immediately taken into custody and was transported to the
headquarters of the Montgomery County Detectives, arriving
there at approximately 8:30 a.m., and was taken to a “holding
facility” within the building.
Detective Vinter testified that, at some point—either at the
Corson Street apartment or in the holding facility—he engaged
[Tuggle] in a very brief conversation, during the course of which
he asked [Tuggle] if he wanted to cooperate and give a
statement. The detective testified that [Tuggle] replied that he
did want to make a statement. The detective described [Tuggle]
as being “very cooperative at that time.”
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On cross-examination by [defense counsel], Detective Vinter
readily acknowledged that he had not informed [Tuggle] of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona[2] prior to asking [Tuggle] if he
was willing to cooperate with the police. Detective Vinter further
acknowledged that, if the conversation had taken place in the
holding facility at the Montgomery County Detectives building,
[Tuggle] would have been handcuffed and “secured” at the time
of the conversation.
Asked by [defense counsel] if his conversation with [Tuggle] had
“included your concern” over a handgun that was discovered
during the search of [Tuggle’s] apartment, Detective Vinter
testified that he could not recall having any discussion with
[Tuggle] concerning the handgun. The detective testified:
I don’t know if I ever said anything about a handgun, Your
Honor. I know I didn’t ask him anything about what was
found in his residence, other than asking him if he would
supply a statement and cooperate. He said he would. But
what was found in the house I never asked him.
As the [trial court] stated on the record in denying [Tuggle’s]
motion to suppress, [the] court fully credited Detective Vinter’s
testimony in its entirety.
Detective [Michael] Reynolds testified that he took [Tuggle’s]
statement in an interview room in the Montgomery County
Detectives building. The detective testified that, prior to taking
the statement, he read [Tuggle] his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, and [Tuggle] then executed a written waiver of those
rights. The waiver on its face explicitly advised [Tuggle] that:
he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could
and would be used against him; that he had a right to consult a
lawyer before being questioned and to have a lawyer present
during questioning; that if he could not afford a lawyer, a lawyer
would be provided to him without cost prior to questioning; and
that he had the right to refuse to answer any questions and to
stop talking at any time.
After [Tuggle] executed the waiver, Detective Reynolds
conducted an interview of [Tuggle], beginning at 11:00 a.m. and
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2
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ending at 11:50 a.m. The detective testified that [Tuggle] was
cooperative, and that at no point did the conversation become
contentious or heated, and at no point did [Tuggle] ask to stop
the interview or ask for a lawyer.
Detective Reynolds then typed [Tuggle’s] statement and gave it
to him to review and make any changes he wanted. A copy of
the typed statement was entered into evidence at [Tuggle’s]
suppression hearing. The statement on its face contains
[Tuggle’s] explicit acknowledgment that no threats or promises
had been made to him to induce him to talk to Detective
Reynolds, and [Tuggle’s] explicit acknowledgment that his
decision to provide a statement . . . was a product of his own
free will.
As the [trial court] stated on the record, [the] court fully credited
the testimony of Detective Reynolds in its entirety.
[Tuggle] testified on his own behalf at the suppression hearing.
[Tuggle’s] testimony did not contradict, in any material way, the
testimony of Detective Reynolds. [Tuggle’s] testimony was,
however, at odds with that of Detective Vinter in regard to the
conversation between the two men during which [Tuggle] agreed
to provide a statement to the police.
In contrast to Detective Vinter, [Tuggle] testified:
That conversation was mainly about the firearm that was
recovered in the apartment, more or less. Questioning me
about was anything on it, which would refer to like it being
a dirty gun or I guess a body or so being on it.
[Tuggle] further testified:
I was telling him that I’m not sure if anything’s on it. I
was telling him it’s not my firearm. But I was just mostly
like a little timid because he was like more persistent with
trying to like more or less put it on me or so, or what I
would say would be to try to scare me.
[Tuggle] stated:
I felt intimidated because I wasn’t sure. I had no idea if
anything would come up on the firearm. So I was
intimidated. I was kind of scared.
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[Tuggle] testified that he was concerned that the handgun—
which he denied owning—might have been used in a crime that
the police would try to “pin it on me” because the gun was
discovered during a search of his residence. [Tuggle] testified
that this concern “played a major role” in his decision to waive
his Miranda rights and give a statement, testifying that he
thought that “if I give him a statement then maybe he would
stop asking me about the firearm or so.”
On cross-examination by the attorney for the Commonwealth,
[Tuggle] testified that no threats or promises were made to him
to induce him to make a statement, but he asserted that he
nonetheless felt “intimidated.” Asked to explain exactly what
Detective Vinter said that made him feel intimidated, [Tuggle]
testified:
He said that I better hope nothing came back on the
firearm. He intimidated me by saying that a lot of things
that’s going on in Norristown as far as the unresolved
murders or pertaining to crimes, things of that nature, that
if something’s on that firearm then it will reflect on me.
That’s what was intimidating to me.
Asked directly if Detective Vinter had told him that giving a
statement would help him, [Tuggle] replied: “No.”
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 3/11/2014, at 2-6 (citations to notes of
testimony omitted; some punctuation modified).
In the statement that Tuggle provided to Detective Reynolds, Tuggle
admitted to stealing blank prescription forms, to filling out these prescription
forms and forging doctors’ signatures, to growing marijuana plants, and to
selling marijuana and Percocet. Tuggle denied ownership of the handgun,
however, and stated that it belonged to a woman that left it in his
apartment.
In his motion, Tuggle sought to suppress the statement that he
provided during the interview with Detective Reynolds. The trial court
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denied Tuggle’s suppression motion because the court credited the
Detectives’ testimony over that provided by Tuggle and determined that
Tuggle’s statement had been preceded by a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. T.C.O. at 8, 9. On July 16, 2013,
Tuggle proceeded to a nonjury trial, and he was convicted on the following
day. On December 16, 2013, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing,
after which it imposed an aggregate sentence of not less than seven and one
half years nor more than fifteen years’ incarceration, to be followed by a two
year period of probation.
Tuggle filed a timely notice of appeal on January 15, 2014. On
January 21, 2014, the trial court directed Tuggle to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), to be
served upon the court no later than February 11, 2014. Tuggle filed a timely
concise statement on February 7, 2014. On March 11, 2014, the trial court
issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Tuggle raises the following issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in denying [Tuggle’s] Motion to
Suppress his statements in that such statements were not
preceded by a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of
Miranda rights as the alleged waiver was preceded by coercive
questioning by Detective James Vinter of [Tuggle] relating to the
gun found in the premises and wanting him to cooperate with
law enforcement authorities, which tainted the voluntariness of
the subsequent Miranda waiver?
Brief for Tuggle at 4.
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When reviewing a trial court’s order denying a suppression motion, our
standard of review is well-settled:
In reviewing a suppression ruling, we are bound by the
suppression court’s factual findings, unless they are without
support in the record. We may reverse the legal conclusions
reached by the suppression court, however, if they are in error.
Thus, our standard of review of the legal conclusions reached by
the suppression court is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant
is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we consider only
the evidence of the prosecution, and so much of the evidence for
the defense which remains uncontradicted when fairly read in
the context of the [suppression] record.
Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 795 (Pa. 2009) (citations
omitted). Additionally, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as
fact finder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (citation omitted). With regard to our scope of review in the
context of an order denying a suppression motion, we are limited to
reviewing only the evidence that was presented at the suppression hearing,
and may not consider testimony adduced at trial. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d
1073, 1083–87 (Pa. 2013).
Tuggle argues that, although he executed a waiver of his Miranda
rights prior to the interview with Detective Reynolds, his waiver was not
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because it was influenced by Detective
Vinter’s allegedly coercive questioning. Specifically, Tuggle asserts that
Detective Vinter questioned him about the firearm that was discovered in his
apartment, and that the detective intimidated him by implying that Tuggle
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may be implicated in any crimes in which the firearm was previously used.
Brief for Tuggle at 22. Detective Vinter contradicted Tuggle’s testimony,
asserting that he only asked Tuggle if he was willing to cooperate and
provide a statement, and that he did not question Tuggle about anything
that was found in the apartment. On review of a ruling denying suppression,
we consider only the evidence of the prosecution, and so much of the
evidence for the defense which remains uncontradicted when fairly read in
the context of the entire record. Galvin, 985 A.2d at 795. As Tuggle’s
testimony was contradicted at the suppression hearing, we may not consider
it on appellate review.
The trial court fully credited Detective Vinter’s testimony, and found
Tuggle’s testimony to be incredible and unpersuasive. T.C.O. at 8. “As we
believe that credibility at a suppression hearing is an important
determination best resolved through the court’s personal observations, we
will not reverse a suppression court’s assessment of credibility absent clear
and manifest error.” Commonwealth v. Camacho, 625 A.2d 1242, 1245
(Pa. Super. 1993). The record provides us no reason to believe that the trial
court committed a clear and manifest error in making its credibility
determinations. Thus, even if we are to consider Tuggle’s testimony
concerning his interaction with Detective Vinter, we are bound by the trial
court’s credibility determinations.
While our standard of review is highly deferential with respect to the
suppression court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, we afford
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no deference to the suppression court’s legal conclusions, and review such
conclusions de novo. In re L.J., 79 A.3d at 1080 n.6. With regard to the
validity of a waiver of Miranda rights, our Supreme Court has described the
law of our Commonwealth as follows:
In determining whether a defendant’s waiver of his Miranda
rights is valid, a trial court must consider: (1) whether the
waiver was voluntary, in the sense that the waiver was not the
result of governmental pressure; and (2) whether the waiver
was knowing and intelligent, in the sense that it was made with
full comprehension of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequence of that choice. The
Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
Factors to be considered in determining whether a waiver is valid
and a confession is voluntary include: the duration and means of
interrogation; the defendant’s physical and psychological state;
the conditions attendant to the detention; the attitude exhibited
by the police during the interrogation; and any other facts which
may serve to drain one’s powers of resistance to suggestion and
coercion.
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 76 (Pa. 2014) (citations
omitted).
Tuggle was apprised fully of his Miranda rights before his interview
with Detective Reynolds, and he signed a waiver form, which indicated that
he was aware of his rights and was willing to give a voluntary statement.
Tuggle does not allege that Detective Reynolds coerced him, but rather that
his prior interaction with Detective Vinter “intimidated” him. Notes of
Testimony, Suppression Hearing, (“N.T.”), 7/15/2013, at 66. As to the
duration of this alleged interaction with Detective Vinter, Tuggle testified
that it was approximately five minutes. Id. at 65. Tuggle testified that he
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was interviewed in a room that the detectives called a “holding room.” Id.
at 59. While the record does not provide a detailed description of the
“holding room,” Tuggle did not testify that the room itself was particularly
intimidating or oppressive.
Tuggle noted that he had been consuming marijuana from
approximately 2:30 a.m. until 5:00 a.m. on the morning of his arrest. N.T.
at 67. The interview with Detective Reynolds during which Tuggle executed
the waiver of his Miranda rights began at 11:00 a.m., approximately six
hours after he had stopped smoking marijuana. While the fact that Tuggle
had consumed marijuana prior to executing the waiver is relevant to
Tuggle’s physical and psychological state, Tuggle testified that, at the time
that he gave the statement to Detective Reynolds, he was not impaired to a
degree that would prevent him from giving a statement. Id. at 69.
The most pertinent factor to be considered in determining whether
Tuggle’s waiver is valid is the attitude exhibited by the police during the
interrogation, because Tuggle’s argument is premised upon the alleged
intimidation that he felt after interacting with Detective Vinter. However, as
we discussed above, Tuggle’s testimony about the interaction was
contradicted by Detective Vinter’s testimony. Furthermore, the trial court
appropriately exercised its discretion in crediting Detective Vinter’s
testimony over Tuggle’s—a determination that we will not disturb on appeal.
The trial court summarized the basis for its legal conclusions as
follows:
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Stated directly, this court heard no evidence indicating that any
improper coercive or intimidating tactics were employed to
induce the defendant to waive his Miranda rights and provide
his statement to Detective Reynolds. The evidence this court
heard rather supports the determination that the defendant’s
waiver of Miranda rights and his statement to the detective
were voluntary, and a product of the defendant’s own free will.
N.T. at 101. We have analyzed the relevant factors, and have determined
that Tuggle’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. As such, his waiver was valid, and the trial court’s conclusions of
law were not erroneous.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/21/2014
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