Com. v. Jones, D. ( 2014 )

J-S45012-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAMON JONES
Appellant No. 520 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of December 14, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0907121-1982
BEFORE: BOWES, J., WECHT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 24, 2014
The learned Majority succinctly summarizes the core assertions raised
by Damon Jones in his first issue in this direct appeal as relating “to the
failure to timely conduct capital sentencing and his ultimate resentencing to
life imprisonment.” Maj. Mem. at 5. The Majority then proceeds to set forth
an excellent discussion of the history of the constitutional rights to a trial by
jury and a speedy trial, including the ultimate extension of those rights to
capital resentencing upon the grant of post-conviction relief. Once the
Majority concludes that capital resentencing falls within the ambit of those
constitutional rights, the Majority proceeds, pursuant to Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), to analyze Jones’ claim on the merits, and to conclude
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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that he is not entitled to relief. However, what becomes lost within the
Majority’s analysis is the fact that the Commonwealth elected not to pursue
the death penalty against Jones on resentencing, a decision which resulted
in Jones being sentenced to life imprisonment. Because Jones was not
subjected to a capital resentencing proceeding, a substantial amount of the
Majority’s discussion unfortunately amounts to non-binding dicta. As such, I
can only join in the result reached by the Majority in its resolution of Jones’
first issue.1
The Majority accurately notes that “[n]either the United States
Supreme Court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have held that the right
to a speedy trial applies to sentencing, let alone resentencing following the
award of post-conviction relief.” Maj. Mem. at 11. Although the Majority
points out that, in Commonwealth v. Greer, 554 A.2d 980 (Pa. Super.
1989), this Court held (albeit without meaningful discussion) that a criminal
defendant may have a right to a speedy resentencing upon remand from the
grant of relief on direct appeal, see Maj. Mem. at 11, the Majority endeavors
in this appeal only to resolve the question of whether a defendant’s speedy
trial right extends to capital resentencing after being granted post-conviction
relief. The Majority does not attempt to resolve the question of whether the
constitutional right extends to non-capital cases.
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1
I join the Majority’s resolution of Jones’ second issue. See Maj. Mem.
at 27-28.
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In essence, the Majority answers a question that, regardless of the
outcome, has no bearing upon Jones. The Court ultimately concludes that,
because the Supreme Court held in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
that a capital sentencing proceeding is part and parcel of a jury trial for
constitutional purposes, such a proceeding also is subject to the speedy trial
mandate. Maj. Mem. at 16-17. But, again, Jones was not subjected to a
capital resentencing. He was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence, as if
this case was any other non-capital first-degree murder case. Thus, while
the Majority may be correct that the right to a speedy trial applies to capital
resentencing proceedings held following the grant of post-conviction relief,
that conclusion has no bearing upon the instant case.
Admittedly, the Majority appears to have good reason for focusing its
attention upon capital resentencing. The right to a speedy capital
resentencing was the basis for Jones’ motion before the sentencing court, in
which Jones sought to have the court preclude the Commonwealth from
seeking the death penalty. Further, that motion is the basis upon which this
appeal, and much of Jones’ arguments, rest. However, those issues became
moot the moment that the Commonwealth elected not to pursue a death
sentence. Accordingly, any discussion of issues relating to capital
sentencing, including the Majority’s subsequent Barker analysis based upon
the same, is dicta. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 935 A.2d 865, 867 n.4
(Pa. 2007) (defining dicta as “[a] judicial comment made during the course
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of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in
the case and therefore not precedential.”) (citation omitted).
The Majority next proceeds to consider whether Rule 600 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure applies to capital resentencing,
and whether that rule could provide Jones with an independent basis for
relief. See Maj. Mem. at 21. After considering the language and purposes
underlying the rule, the Majority concludes that Rule 600 does not apply to
capital resentencing. Id. at 27. However, for the same reasons delineated
above, such a discussion amounts to dicta because Jones was not subjected
to a capital resentencing. Thus, we should not consider the issue in the
manner in which it is analyzed by the Majority.
Nonetheless, I am compelled to point out the incongruity that
necessarily results from the Majority’s Rule 600 analysis. Rule 600 was
“adopted . . . to protect defendants’ constitutional rights to a speedy trial
under the Sixth Amendment [to] the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Bradford,
46 A.3d 693, 700 (Pa. 2012). More importantly, the rule “represents [the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s] determination that the ‘balancing test’
announced in Barker provides only the minimum standards guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that such minimum standards
are not adequate to provide Pennsylvania criminal defendants the protection
guaranteed by the constitution of the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v.
Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1976) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). Thus, it is clear that, in Pennsylvania, Rule 600 was adopted to
provide more protections that those provided by the United States
Constitution.
As I understand the Majority’s analysis, pursuant to Ring, capital
resentencing procedures are subject to the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial
mandate. However, pursuant to the Majority’s analysis, a capital defendant
under identical circumstances could not seek similar relief under Rule 600, a
provision undeniably enacted to provide greater protections than the
Federal Constitution. Although the Majority presents a somewhat persuasive
discussion regarding Rule 600’s application in this context, the Majority does
not address this glaring, and problematic, incongruity. For this reason, I
cannot join the Majority’s Rule 600 analysis.
Based upon my reading of Jones’ brief, it is unclear whether his
arguments are limited to capital resentencing cases, or whether he intended
his arguments to extend to all resentencing proceedings. Moreover, it is
unclear whether an argument on the latter point was preserved first before
the trial court. Regardless, what is clear is that the discussion set forth by
the Majority has no bearing upon Jones, who was not subjected to a capital
resentencing proceeding. Ultimately, I join in the result reached by the
Majority because Jones has proffered no basis in his brief, or before the trial
court, that would entitle him to relief in the form of either dismissal of his
duly imposed convictions or his life sentence. However, in doing so, I
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cannot join in the Majority’s analysis of Jones’ first issue in this appeal
because it is almost entirely non-binding dicta.
Justice Fitzgerald Concurs in the Result.
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