Com. v. Stackhouse, J. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JUSTIN T. STACKHOUSE
Appellant No. 52 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 20, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-CR-0000959-2011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2014
Justin T. Stackhouse appeals from the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Butler County, which denied his petition brought pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 After careful review, we affirm.
On direct appeal of Stackhouse’s judgment of sentence, this Court
affirmed the trial court and summarized the facts of this case as follows:
The Pennsylvania State Police had received information that
[Stackhouse] and several other individuals had been purchasing
large amounts of pseudoephedrine at various pharmacies. After
investigating the matter, members of the Pennsylvania State
Police went to [Stackhouse’s] residence at 132 Cherry Valley
Road in Butler County to conduct what they termed a “knock and
talk” on May 20, 2011. They wanted to speak with the
occupants of the residence about suspected manufacturing of
methamphetamine and [Stackhouse’s] outstanding warrants
from Florida.
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42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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The officers proceeded to walk up the driveway to the house
where they observed two fans located in the basement stairwell
pointing outward acting as a form of an exhaust system. As the
troopers continued to the backdoor, they saw a burnt “blister
pack,” which is packaging for pseudoephedrine, and a piece of
surgical tubing near the steps leading to the back porch. The
troopers believed these items were all indicia of a
methamphetamine lab.
When the officers knocked on the door, [Stackhouse’s] girlfriend,
Robyn Tuttle (“Tuttle”), answered. The troopers, who were not
in uniform, identified themselves and asked her to get
[Stackhouse] to come outside. [Stackhouse] “[c]ame out, swore
at us a little bit, ran back in, and eventually we got him out of
the house to talk to him.” Tuttle’s father and Tuttle’s five-year-
old son were also in the residence at the time. [Stackhouse]
was handcuffed and placed on the ground as he was acting very
“unruly” and “wild.” After consulting privately with
[Stackhouse], Tuttle gave the officers permission to search the
residence and signed the consent form. The troopers agreed
that [Stackhouse] was permitted to walk through the residence
during the search.
[Stackhouse] took the officers through the house and while in
his bedroom, pointed out a black box where he kept items he
used for taking drugs. Additionally, several gallon-sized freezer
bags were recovered containing meth oil; essentially a
combination of Coleman fuel and methamphetamine, which was
one step away from being converted into usable
methamphetamine. [Stackhouse] was arrested and charged
with various offenses.
On July 26, 2011, [Stackhouse] filed an omnibus pre-trial motion
challenging the legality of the search. The motion was denied on
September 2, 2011. Following a jury trial, [Stackhouse] was
convicted of unlawful manufacturing of methamphetamine (child
under 18 years of age present), possession of methamphetamine
precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine,
possession with intent to manufacture a controlled substance of
100 grams or more, possession of a controlled substance, and
possession of drug paraphernalia; he was found not guilty of
endangering the welfare of a child.
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[Stackhouse] was sentenced on January 26, 2012; with regard
to his conviction for unlawful manufacturing of
methamphetamine. [Stackhouse] was sentenced to 35 to 70
months’ incarceration to be served concurrently with his
sentence of 96 to 240 months for possession with intent to
manufacture methamphetamine in excess of 100 grams.
Commonwealth v. Stackhouse, No. 338 WDA 2012, unpublished
memorandum at 1-4 (citations omitted).
Stackhouse filed a timely PCRA petition on June 10, 2013, and on
August 9, 2014, he filed a counseled amended petition. The PCRA court held
a hearing on September 19, 2013, and by memorandum and order dated
December 20, 2013, it denied the petition.
On appeal, Stackhouse raises the following issue and sub-issues for
our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that
[Stackhouse] failed to demonstrate the assertions forming the
basis of [his] ineffective assistance of counsel claim were
meritorious.
A. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in
finding that the consent given by Tuttle was [not] the
result of coercion and that the evidence recovered
during the subsequent search would not have been
suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search.
B. Whether the trial court erred in considering evidence
not of record in violation of the procedural due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in
finding that the search conducted by Trooper Walker did
not exceed the scope of consent given by Tuttle and
that the evidence recovered during the search would
not have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal
search.
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Brief of Appellant, at 4.2
In reviewing an appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, “our standard of
review is whether the findings of the court are supported by the record and
free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 182 (Pa.
2010) (citations omitted).
To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, Stackhouse must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that his conviction resulted from “ineffective
assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case so
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
“Counsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of demonstrating
ineffectiveness rests on appellant.” Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d
1238, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2011). To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, the
defendant must show that the underlying claim had arguable merit, counsel
had no reasonable basis for his or her action, and counsel’s action resulted
in prejudice to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Prince, 719 A.2d 1086,
1089 (Pa. Super. 1998).
Stackhouse argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
include in his omnibus pretrial motion a challenge to the validity of Tuttle’s
consent to search the property. At the PCRA hearing on September 19,
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We have changed the order in which the issues are raised to facilitate our
analyisis.
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2013, Stackhouse called his trial counsel, Armand Cingolani, III, Esquire, as
a witness. Attorney Cingolani testified that he believed Tuttle’s consent was
valid:
This was her house. So did I presume that her consent was
valid[?] [Y]es. And Mr. Stackhouse had by that time told me
that he had led the police officer through the house and showed
him stuff especially in the basement. So, I thought I would get
myself into a trap denying consent whenever he was showing
them around and consenting to them searching. So consent was
not a focus of this because of his actions. It put me in the
position of arguing there’s no consent but I’m consenting, which
is just absurd. So that’s why I didn’t do it.
N.T. PCRA Hearing, 9/9/13, at 20-21.
Attorney Cingolani testified that he chose not to address the validity of
Tuttle’s consent to search in the pre-trial motion or at trial. Regarding the
pre-trial motion, he testified, “I did not think that consent, her consent
would work nor did I know enough about it at the time nor could I have
talked to her at the time. They would have all said this is not your client.”
Id. at 27. Rather, Attorney Cingolani’s focus in the pre-trial motion was
Stackhouse’s lack of consent.
When asked whether he challenged Tuttle’s consent at trial, Attorney
Cingolani testified, “I chose not to because in my experience he could not
use her consent or non-consent and I could not raise it. She was the renter
of the property. He was a guest there.” Id. at 28.
Based on Attorney Cingolani’s testimony, it is clear that he had a
reasonable basis not to challenge Tuttle’s consent. See Prince, supra.-5-
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To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Stackhouse
had to prove there was arguable merit to his claim that Tuttle’s consent to
the search of the house was invalid. See Prince, supra. Here, the PCRA
court did not have to speculate whether a court would have sustained a pre-
trial challenge to Tuttle’s consent because Tuttle, in fact, filed her own
omnibus pretrial motion raising that claim, which the trial court denied.
Commonwealth v. Tuttle, CP-10-CR-960-2011. Stackhouse asserts that
the PCRA court’s reliance on the findings of fact issued by the Tuttle court
constitutes a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights because he was not a
party to those proceedings and did not have the opportunity to cross-
examine the troopers who testified at the hearing.
Had the PCRA court relied exclusively on the denial of Tuttle’s pre-trial
motion as a basis for finding a lack of arguable merit, we might have found
some validity to Stackhouse’s position. However, because the PCRA court
had an independent basis on which to reach its conclusion that there was no
arguable merit, we decline to grant relief on this issue.
Stackhouse further asserts that the PCRA court erred in finding that
the search did not exceed the scope of consent given by Tuttle and that the
evidence recovered during the search would not have been suppressed as
the fruits of an illegal search. At the PCRA hearing, Tuttle testified:
The first discussion [the officers] asked me if I would consent to
the search of the home and I said no. The first time. They
asked a second time, and I told them I would have to discuss it
with Mr. Stackhouse before I made any answers for them. So,
at the time I proceeded to speak with Mr. Stackhouse about
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searching the premises, and the condition that we came up with
that we agreed on was that I would sign the consent but Mr.
Stackhouse had to escort the officers into the home.
N.T. PCRA Hearing, 9/19/13, at 76-77.
Based on the record developed at the PCRA hearing, the court
concluded that Stackhouse did, in fact, accompany the officers during their
search of the premises. Accordingly, it determined that the search did not
exceed the scope of Tuttle’s consent. Under these circumstances, there was
no arguable merit to Stackhouse’s claim that Attorney Cingolani’s failure to
raise the issue in a motion to suppress constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/25/2014
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