Com. v. Bell, M. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S59013-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,           :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee         :
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    MONTANA BELL,                           :
    :
    Appellant        :     No. 2836 EDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 15, 2013,
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
    Criminal Division, at No. CP-51-CR-0012776-2011.
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                     FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2014
    Appellant, Montana Bell, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered following his conviction of one count of third degree murder, one
    count of Violating the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”), and one count of
    possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”). We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
    These charges arose out of an incident that occurred on
    July 11, 2011, at approximately 11:45 p.m. Appellant and the
    decedent, Kim Davis (“Davis”), were engaged in an ongoing
    argument over prescription pills and money.         Davis and
    Appellant met up that night and continued their argument at the
    corner of Patton and Allegheny Streets, outside Davis’s home.
    During the argument, Appellant hit Davis, knocking her to the
    ground. Davis got back up to her feet and reached for the
    hammer she carried around the neighborhood for protection but
    before she could get the hammer out, Appellant shot her. Davis
    ______________________________
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S59013-14
    was shot twice in the head and neck area but suffered three (3)
    gunshot wounds. Davis was shot in her right cheek and the
    bullet exited her left cheek, hitting the left upper cervical spine
    causing a spinal cord injury. Davis was shot in her neck, behind
    her right ear, causing injury to her right temporal lobe. Davis’s
    third gunshot wound was to her left forearm and appeared to be
    a reentry from having her forearm near either her cheek or her
    neck at the time she was shot.
    Officer James Russell (“Officer Russell”) and his partner,
    James Somerville (“Officer Somerville”) noticed a job pending at
    Patton & Allegheny Streets and responded over police radio that
    they would handle the job. Upon arrival, they were flagged
    down by a woman on the street who stated that there was a
    woman, later identified as Davis, lying on the ground. Both
    Officers Russell and Somerville got out of the patrol car and
    approached Davis, who was laying on her stomach. The officers
    rolled Davis over on her back and noticed a large amount of
    blood coming from her head. When asked if she knew who shot
    her, Davis was unresponsive. Davis was breathing but was
    having difficulty speaking because blood was coming from her
    mouth. Other officers arrived shortly after and helped Officers
    Russell and Somerville carry Davis to Russell and Somerville’s
    patrol car. Officers Russell and Somerville rushed Davis to
    Temple University Hospital and remained at the hospital with
    Davis. Davis was pronounced dead at 12:01 a.m. on July 12,
    2011. Davis was transported to the Medical Examiner’s Office
    where an autopsy was performed which determined that the
    cause of death was two (2) gunshot wounds to the face and neck
    and the manner of death was homicide.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/14, at 2-3.
    The trial court provided the following procedural history of this case:
    On June 21, 2013, Appellant, Montana Bell, was found
    guilty, [by a jury], of one (1) count of third degree murder, a
    felony of the first degree; one (1) count of Violating the Uniform
    Firearms Act (“VUFA”) § 6108, a misdemeanor of the first
    degree; and, one (1) count of Possession of an Instrument of
    Crime (“PIC”), a misdemeanor of the first degree. On August
    15, 2013, [the trial court] sentenced Appellant to twenty to forty
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    (20-40) years for the 3rd degree murder conviction, two and
    one-half to five (21/2 - 5) years incarceration for the VUFA
    conviction, and two and one-half to five (21/2 - 5) years
    incarceration for PIC. All convictions are to run consecutively,
    for a cumulative sentence of twenty-five to fifty (25-50) years
    incarceration.
    On September 11, 2013, Appellant filed a timely Notice of
    Appeal. On November 12, 2013, after ascertaining that all notes
    of testimony were available, [the trial court] pursuant to
    Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), ordered
    Appellant to file a self-contained and intelligible statement of
    matters complained of on appeal. On December 2, counsel filed
    a 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal to [the
    trial court].
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/14, at 1-2.       The trial court prepared an opinion
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) based on the issues outlined in Appellant’s
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 
    Id. at 1-9.
    Appellant presents the following issues for our review in his appellate
    brief:
    I.    Is [Appellant] entitled to an arrest of judgment on all
    charges, including Murder in the Third Degree and Related
    Weapons Offenses, where the evidence was insufficient to
    sustain the verdict?
    II.   Is [Appellant] entitled to a new trial where the
    verdict was not supported by the greater weight of the evidence,
    and where the verdict was based on speculation, conjecture and
    surmise?
    Appellant’s Brief at 3.
    We begin our analysis by considering whether Appellant’s issues raised
    in his appellate brief are waived. As noted, Appellant was directed to file a
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    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement in this case and he timely complied.        In that
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant outlined the following issues:
    1. It was error to admit certain ballistic evidence, to the
    prejudice of the defendant. Notes of Testimony, June 20, 2013,
    pp 59, 15-54.
    2. It was error to admit testimony about alleged automobile
    theft, assault, and pills, to the prejudice of the defendant. Notes
    of Testimony, June 17, 2013, pp 13-17, Notes of Testimony,
    June 19, 2013, pp 66-100.
    3. It was error to admit hearsay evidence, to the prejudice of the
    defendant, relative to identification of the defendant. Notes of
    Testimony, June 18, 2013, pp 123-124.
    4. It was error to disallow cross-examination relative to a “deal”
    made by a witness to testify against the defendant, to the
    prejudice of the defendant. Notes of Testimony, June 18, 2013,
    pp 131-132.
    5. It was error to allow testimony, to the prejudice of the
    defendant, that “others” knew that the defendant had been
    arrested. Notes of Testimony, June 18, 2013, p 189.
    Appellant’s Statement of Matters Complained of pursuant to Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 1925(b), 12/2/13, at 1-2.          Consequently, in its
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed the above-referenced
    issues outlined in Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
    Issues not included in a Rule 1925(b) statement are deemed waived.
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).   Our Supreme Court has stated the following
    regarding preservation of issues in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement:
    Our jurisprudence is clear and well-settled, and firmly
    establishes that: Rule 1925(b) sets out a simple bright-line rule,
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    which obligates an appellant to file and serve a Rule 1925(b)
    statement, when so ordered; any issues not raised in a Rule
    1925(b) statement will be deemed waived; the courts lack the
    authority to countenance deviations from the Rule’s terms; the
    Rule’s provisions are not subject to ad hoc exceptions or
    selective enforcement; appellants and their counsel are
    responsible for complying with the Rule’s requirements; Rule
    1925 violations may be raised by the appellate court sua sponte,
    and the Rule applies notwithstanding an appellee’s request not
    to enforce it; and, if Rule 1925 is not clear as to what is required
    of an appellant, on-the-record actions taken by the appellant
    aimed at compliance may satisfy the Rule. We yet again repeat
    the principle first stated in [Commonwealth v.] Lord[, 
    719 A.2d 306
    (Pa. 1998)] that must be applied here: “[I]n order to
    preserve their claims for appellate review, [a]ppellants must
    comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a Statement
    of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Any issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be
    deemed waived.”
    Commonwealth v. Hill, 
    16 A.3d 484
    , 494 (Pa. 2011) (internal footnote and
    citations   omitted).     “[W]aiver    under    Rule   1925    is   automatic.”
    Commonwealth v. Butler, 
    812 A.2d 631
    , 633 (Pa. 2002).               Accordingly,
    because Appellant has failed to preserve the issues raised in his appellate
    brief by including them in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, we find these
    issues waived.
    Additionally, to the extent that Appellant claims that the verdict was
    not supported by the weight of the evidence, we conclude that this issue
    also is waived on a second basis.       “[A] challenge to the weight of the
    evidence must be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.”
    Commonwealth v. Gillard, 
    850 A.2d 1273
    , 1277 (Pa. Super. 2004).               In
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    order to preserve a weight of the evidence claim, it must be raised either
    prior to sentencing in front of the trial court or after sentencing in a post
    sentence motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A).
    Instantly, Appellant failed to raise, prior to sentencing or in a post-
    sentence motion, his claim regarding weight of the evidence.              Rather,
    Appellant raised the issue for the first time in his appellate brief. Thus, in
    addition to these claims being waived as a result of not being included in the
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim is also
    waived due to his failure to preserve it by raising it with the trial court.
    Because Appellant has failed to preserve the issues he raised in his
    appellate brief, we conclude that those issues are waived. As such, we are
    precluded from reviewing the merits of those claims and affirm Appellant’s
    judgment of sentence.      See In re K.L.S., 
    934 A.2d 1244
    , 1246 n.3 (Pa.
    2007) (stating where issues are waived on appeal, we should affirm rather
    than quash appeal).
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/26/2014
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2836 EDA 2013

Filed Date: 11/26/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024