Com. v. Bason, D. ( 2014 )

J-S70003-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DARNELL BASON
Appellant No. 344 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 9, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006896-2010,
CP-51-CR-0006898-2010, CP-51-CR-0006947-2010
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 11, 2014
Darnell Bason appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. After our review, we affirm
Bason’s convictions based on the opinion and supplemental opinion filed by
the Honorable Charles J. Cunningham, III, and we vacate the judgment of
sentence and remand for resentencing.
Bason committed two gunpoint robberies on April 29, 2010. Following
trial in absentia on September 14, 2012, a jury convicted Bason of robbery,1
robbery of a motor vehicle,2 possessing an instrument of crime,3 escape,4
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 3702.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S70003-14
and two counts of criminal conspiracy.5 On January 9, 2013, the court
sentenced Bason to consecutive terms of imprisonment of five to ten years
on the robbery conviction, five to ten years on the robbery of a motor
vehicle conviction, and one to five years on each of the conspiracy
convictions, for a total of 13 to 32 years. The court imposed the mandatory
minimum sentence for the robbery conviction and the robbery of a motor
vehicle conviction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.6
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 907.
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 5121.
5
18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
6
Section 9712 provides in relevant part:
(a) Mandatory sentence. – Except as provided under section
9716 (relating to two or more mandatory minimum
sentences applicable), any person who is convicted in any
court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence as
defined in section 9714(g) (relating to sentences for
second and subsequent offenses), shall, if the person
visibly possessed a firearm or replica of a firearm, whether
or not the firearm or replica was loaded or function, that
placed the victim in reasonable fear of death or serious
bodily injury, during the commission of the offense, be
sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of
total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of
this title or other statute to the contrary. Such persons
shall not be eligible for parole, probation, work release or
furlough.
(b) Proof at sentencing. – Provisions of this section shall not
be an element of the crime and notice thereof to the
defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-2-
J-S70003-14
Bason filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court ordered Bason to file
a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. Bason
filed a timely statement on February 21, 2013. Thereafter, Bason filed a
petition for extension of time to file a supplemental statement of errors
complained of on appeal after the notes of testimony were transcribed. The
trial court denied this petition on March 13, 2013. The trial court filed its
opinion on November 20, 2013, and thereafter filed a supplemental opinion
on May 22, 2014.
We incorporate by reference the trial court’s summary of the factual
and procedural history of this case. See Trial Court Opinions, 11/20/13, at
3-6; 5/22/14, at 2-4.
On appeal, Bason raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the lower court err in denying appellant’s motion to
suppress physical evidence where the recovery of the wallet
and the gun occurred after the police initiated a stop of
appellant in the absence of either reasonable suspicion or
probable cause as the description provided of the suspects
was overwhelmingly vague, and the gun recovered by police
was a product of forced abandonment where the illegal stop
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
reasonable notice of the commonwealth’s intention to
proceed under this section shall be provided after
conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this
section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall
consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford
the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to
present any necessary additional evidence and shall
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this
section is applicable.
-3-
J-S70003-14
and detention of appellant unlawfully provoked appellant’s
flight?
2. Did the lower court err in denying appellant’s motion to
suppress complainant Edward Burse’s out-of-court and in-
court identification where the circumstances of Burse’s
identification were unduly suggestive as he was able to hear
information about the perpetrator conveyed over police radio
and he identified appellant only after appellant was joined
with another male previously identified by Burse, and the in-
court identification did not have an independent origin
sufficient to purge the primary taint of the out-of-court
identification?
3. Did the lower court err in denying appellant’s motion to
suppress complainant Steven Evans’ out-of-court and in-court
identifications where his initial identification of appellant from
a photo array was the fruit of the illegal stop and seizure of
appellant in the absence of either reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, and the in-court identification did not have an
independent origin sufficient to purge the primary taint of the
of the out-of-court identification?
4. Should the mandatory minimum sentencing statute, 42
Pa.C.S. § 9712 [Sentencing for offenses committed with
firearms], be declared void and unenforceable, where multiple
procedural provisions within the statute are facially
unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2151 (2013), and cannot properly be severed from the
remaining statute, thereby rendering application in appellant’s
case of the mandatory minimum sentence of 5 to 10 years’
incarceration under this statute unconstitutional?
After our review of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, we
conclude that Judge Cunningham has properly addressed Bason’s first issue
in his trial court opinion, see Trial Court Opinion, 11/20/13, at 13-15, and
has properly addressed Bason’s second issue in its supplemental opinion.
See Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/14, at 6-9. Bason’s third issue,
which is based on his claim that the initial stop/seizure was unlawful, has
-4-
J-S70003-14
also been properly addressed in the trial court’s opinion. See Trial Court
Opinion, 11/20/13, at 13-15. We, therefore, rely on the trial court’s
opinions to affirm Bason’s convictions.
In his fourth issue, Bason argues that his judgment of sentence must
be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing pursuant to Alleyne v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). In Alleyne, the United States
Supreme Court held that any facts leading to an increase in a mandatory
minimum sentence are elements of the crime and must be presented to a
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In reliance on Alleyne, Bason argues that the application of a
mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to section 9712 was illegal as
section 9712 has been held unconstitutional. Bason did not raise this claim
before the trial court, however, in Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d
108, 118 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), this Court, discussing Alleyne,
stated that where “[a]pplication of a mandatory minimum sentence gives
rise to illegal sentence concerns, even where the sentence is within the
statutory limits[,] [such] [l]egality of sentence questions are not waivable.”
Because Bason’s claim here falls within this “narrow class of cases . . .
considered to implicate illegal sentences,” we address its merits. Watley,
81 A.3d at 118.7
____________________________________________
7
We note that on June 13, 2014, our Supreme Court accepted allowance of
appeal on the issue of whether Alleyne relates to the legality of sentence,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-5-
J-S70003-14
After our review of Alleyne and the recent case law on this issue, we
agree with Bason that his judgment of sentence must be vacated and the
case remanded for resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Valentine,
2014 PA Super. 220 --- A.3d ---, --- (Pa. Super. 2014) (mandatory
minimum sentencing statutes unconstitutional in entirety in providing for
factfinding by court rather than jury on factual predicates). See also
Commonwealth v. Newman, –––A.3d ––––, 2014 Pa. Super. 178, 2014 WL
4088805 (filed August 20, 2014) (en banc) (entirety of mandatory minimum
sentencing statute must be stricken as unconstitutional; it is for the
legislature to create new mandatory minimum sentencing procedures in
conformity with Alleyne).
Because Alleyne and Newman render section 9712 unconstitutional,
we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing without
consideration of any mandatory minimum sentence as provided by section
9712.8
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for re-imposition of
sentence consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
stating the issue as follows: Whether a challenge to a sentence pursuant to
Alleyne v. United States, –––U.S. ––––, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314
(2013) implicates the legality of the sentence and is therefore non-waivable.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, ––– Pa. ––––, 93 A.3d 806 (2014).
8
We note that the Commonwealth does not oppose resentencing in light of
Alleyne. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 16.
-6-
J-S70003-14
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/11/2014
-7-