Com. v. Kirnon, J. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S70023-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JAMIE KIRNON
    Appellant                  No. 1028 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order March 5, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0503741-2001
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                           FILED DECEMBER 12, 2014
    Appellant, Jamie Kirnon, appeals pro se from the March 5, 2014 order,
    dismissing his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
    Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
    On November 4, 2003, a jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree
    murder, aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, carrying firearms in public
    in Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of a crime.1 On November
    5, 2003, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without
    parole for first-degree murder.          On December 22, 2003, the trial court
    imposed an aggregate sentence of 114 to 228 months’ imprisonment for the
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 2702, 903, 6108, and 907, respectively.
    J-S70023-14
    remaining charges, to run consecutive to his life sentence.               This Court
    affirmed    Appellant’s     judgment      of    sentence   on   January   13,    2005.
    Commonwealth v. Kirnon, 
    872 A.2d 1272
     (Pa. Super. 2005) (unpublished
    memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with
    our Supreme Court. As a result, his judgment of sentence became final on
    February 14, 2005, when the filing period for such a petition expired. 2 See
    generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a).                   Thereafter,
    Appellant filed an unsuccessful PCRA petition in 2006.            Appellant filed the
    instant petition on June 2, 2011.              On March 5, 2014, the PCRA court
    dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition.            On April 2, 2014, Appellant filed a
    timely notice of appeal.
    As noted above, Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition until
    June 2, 2011. Therefore, it was patently untimely because it was not filed
    within one year of his judgment of sentence becoming final.                     See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Furthermore, Appellant’s brief does not allege that
    any of the       three    exceptions     to    the   PCRA time-bar   applies.     See
    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    933 A.2d 1035
    , 1039 (Pa. Super. 2007)
    (stating, “[t]he PCRA specifically provides that a petitioner raising one of the
    ____________________________________________
    2
    We observe that the 30th day fell on Saturday, February 12, 2005. When
    computing the 30-day filing period “[if] the last day of any such period shall
    fall on Saturday or Sunday … such day shall be omitted from the
    computation.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Therefore, the 30th day for Appellant to
    file a timely allocatur petition was Monday, February 14, 2005.
    -2-
    J-S70023-14
    statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirements must affirmatively plead
    and prove the exception[]”) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    951 A.2d 1163
     (Pa. 2008).         We note Appellant’s brief cites to the United States
    Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 
    132 S. Ct. 1309
     (2012).3
    Appellant’s Brief at 12, 16, 20, 28. To the extent this could be construed as
    seeking a time-bar exception, this Court has held that Martinez does not
    create such an exception. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 
    60 A.3d 162
    , 165
    (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 
    72 A.3d 603
     (Pa. 2013), cert. denied,
    Saunders v. Pennsylvania, 
    134 S. Ct. 944
     (2014).
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court correctly
    dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely.       Accordingly, the PCRA
    court’s March 5, 2013 order is affirmed.
    Order affirmed.
    Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum.
    Judge Strassburger files a concurring statement.
    ____________________________________________
    3
    In the PCRA court, Appellant couched Martinez as a time-bar exception
    under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), but does not do so on appeal.
    Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 5/19/12, at 7-8.
    -3-
    J-S70023-14
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/12/2014
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1028 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 12/12/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/12/2014