Com. v. Bush, D. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DARRIN BUSH
Appellant No. 1305 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 15, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002918-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and STABILE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2014
Appellant, Darrin Bush, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his
bench trial convictions for possession of a controlled substance, possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of drug
paraphernalia, and criminal conspiracy.1 We affirm the convictions, but
vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
The facts of this case arise from a series of narcotic
surveillances conducted by Philadelphia Police Officer
Eugene Kittles in the vicinity of Cumberland and Colorado
Streets in Philadelphia. As part of this surveillance, Officer
Kittles directed various confidential informants (“C.I.’s”) to
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1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30), (32), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, respectively.
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purchase narcotics with pre-recorded United States
currency. Prior to making the purchases, each C.I. was
searched with negative results for additional currency and
illegal contraband. The following is a summary of Officer
Kittles’ observations during his surveillance.
On the afternoon of August 10, 2010, Officer Kittles
provided a C.I. with twenty dollars in pre-recorded
currency and directed him to 2450 North Colorado Street
to purchase narcotics. Outside the given address, the C.I.
came in contact with an individual later identified as
Timare Bush (“Timare”). Following a brief conversation,
Timare told the C.I., “Wait a minute, it’s not here. It will
be here in a minute.” Between one and two minutes later,
[Appellant] walked from the 2500 block of North Bouvier
Street carrying a black plastic bag in his hand and engaged
in a conversation with Timare. [Appellant] and Timare
entered the 2450 North Colorado Street property, while
the C.I. remained outside. A couple of minutes later,
[Appellant] exited the property and walked back toward
North Bouvier Street. Timare exited the property shortly
thereafter, carrying a plastic bag of yellow items in his
hand. He crossed the street to 2453 North Colorado
Street, and the C.I. followed. Timare handed the C.I. the
yellow items from the bag in exchange for the twenty
dollars. Following the transaction, the C.I. turned the four
yellow-tinted packets over to Officer Kittles. The off-white,
chunky substance inside the packets tested positive for the
presence of cocaine.
The following afternoon, August 11, 2010, Officer Kittles
was on surveillance with his partner, Officer McKellar, at
the 2500 block of North Bouvier Street. Officer Kittles
observed [Appellant] exit the property at 2513 North
Bouvier Street, get into a black Buick LaCrosse, and drive
to a variety store located at 2733 Germantown Avenue.
[Appellant] purchased various packets that Officer Kittles
testified were commonly used to package marijuana and
crack cocaine. [Appellant] exited the store with a black
bag, which he put inside the Buick’s trunk. He then
returned to 2513 North Bouvier Street and reentered the
property, carrying the black bag.
Later that same day, Officer Kittles observed Appellant
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seated on the steps at the corner of Colorado and
Cumberland Streets. He observed a second male, later
identified as Wayne Wiggins, at the 2400 block of Colorado
Street. During the course of Officer Kittles’ surveillance,
five different individuals approached Wiggins and handed
him what appeared to be cash. On each occasion,
[Appellant] would then escort the individual eastbound on
Cumberland Street toward 17th Street to the Buick.
[Appellant] would enter the Buick from the driver’s side.
The individuals would enter from the passenger side.
[Appellant] would remain in the Buick with each individual
for “a short while.” After exiting, each individual would
leave the scene. [Appellant] would then return to the
intersection of Cumberland and Colorado Streets. Law
enforcement did not stop any of the individuals.
A short time later, Officer Kittles provided a second C.I.
with twenty dollars of pre-recorded currency and directed
him to attempt to purchase crack cocaine from the area of
2450 Colorado Street. The C.I. encountered Wiggins and
walked with him over to the property at 2453 Colorado
Street. This was the same location where Timare had
delivered narcotics to the first C.I. one day earlier. In
exchange for the twenty dollars, Wiggins handed the C.I.
four yellow packets containing an off-white, chunky
substance, which tested positive for a cocaine base. Both
the packaging and its contents appeared to be the same
type as the first C.I. had purchased the previous day.
On August 17, 2010, Officer Kittles observed [Appellant]
drive the Buick onto the 2500 block of Bouvier Street.
When [Appellant] exited the vehicle, he was carrying what
looked like a black backpack or gym bag. An unidentified
male approached [Appellant] from the 2400 block of North
Colorado Street and handed him what appeared to be a
large amount of cash. [Appellant] placed the cash in the
bag, which looked like it was filled with money.
[Appellant] then made two trips between the Buick and the
interior of the 2513 North Bouvier Street property.
On that same day, Officer Kittles gave a third C.I. twenty
dollars of pre-recorded currency to attempt to purchase
crack cocaine from the area of 2450 North Colorado Street.
The C.I. encountered Timare outside 2453 North Colorado
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Street. In exchange for the twenty dollars, Timare handed
the C.I. yellow packets, containing a substance testing
positive for a cocaine base. The packets were identical in
size, color, and shape to those delivered to the previous
C.I.s.
On August 20, 2010, Officer Kittles gave a fourth C.I. ten
dollars in pre-recorded currency to attempt to purchase
crack cocaine from the area of 2450 North Colorado Street.
The C.I. encountered Timare and handed him the ten
dollars in exchange for two green-tinted packets containing
an off-white, chunky substance. The substance tested
positive for the presence of a cocaine base.
Based upon these observations, police executed a search
warrant at 2513 North Bouvier Street on August 20, 2010.
When Philadelphia Police Officer Leon McKnight entered the
property pursuant to that warrant, [Appellant] was seated
at a table between the living room and dining room.
Another individual, later identified as “Armstead,” was
seated on a couch in the living room, an arm’s length from
[Appellant]. He was facing the front door. Both Armstead
and [Appellant] immediately ran together toward the
kitchen and tried to escape through the back door. Officer
McKnight briefly pinned both men against the door, but
[Appellant] managed to free himself and run upstairs.
Philadelphia Police Officer Barry Charles pursued
[Appellant] up the stairs and cornered him in the second
floor back bedroom. [Appellant] evaded the authorities by
jumping through the bedroom window.
From the dining room table where [Appellant] was seated,
law enforcement recovered twenty-five clear baggies, each
with ten clear jars with red tops containing marijuana;
three loose bags with bulk marijuana; four bags with ten
black-topped jars; three red-topped jars containing
marijuana; eight Ziploc bags containing numerous
multicolored packets; three scales; a key to the property’s
front door; two boxes of sandwich bags; one camera; a
probation card bearing [Appellant’s] name; ten red-topped
jars; and ten unused black-topped jars. Law enforcement
recovered two baggies of loose crack cocaine from the
kitchen table and ten clear baggies containing large chunks
of crack cocaine from the refrigerator. The officers
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recovered a loaded black Kel-Tech P-11 handgun, as well
as 524 green packets of crack cocaine, from under the
living room couch cushion where Armstead was seated and
just feet from where [Appellant] was seated. Finally,
officers executed a search warrant on the Buick and
recovered a black backpack containing $13,360.00 in cash
and ten red-top and black-top jars matching those
recovered from within 2513 North Bouvier Street. The
$13,360.00 was broken down as follows: 2,155 one-dollar
bills; 131 five-dollar bills; 245 ten-dollar bills; 370 twenty-
dollar bills; four fifty-dollar bills; and five one hundred-
dollar bills. Certified records from the Department of
Transportation verified that the Buick was registered to a
Darrin Kadeem Dozier Bush.
[Appellant] continued to evade law enforcement for
sixteen months.[2] A couple of days after officers executed
the search warrant at 2513 North Bouvier Street, Officer
Kittles contacted the probation officer identified on
Appellant’s probation card, which had been found on the
table between the living room and dining room. Officer
Kittles failed to determine whether [Appellant] had any
upcoming court dates. He explained to the probation
officer, however, that [Appellant] was wanted for arrest
following a narcotics investigation and asked her to hold
[Appellant] the next time he reported. During the first
couple of weeks after the arrest warrant was issued,
Officer Kittles also communicated with other Philadelphia
police officers to let them know that [Appellant] was
wanted, in the event they came in contact with him.
Officers Kittles and McKellar looked for [Appellant] on
“numerous” occasions―approximately 100 times―in the
area where they had previously conducted their
surveillance. They would specifically go by 2513 North
Bouvier Street, although Officer Kittles never knocked on
the door to the property. Officer Kittles did not see
anyone whom he recognized as [Appellant’s] acquaintance
and he did not ask anyone on the street as to [Appellant’s]
whereabouts. [Appellant] was ultimately arrested on
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2
The Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint on September 9, 2010.
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December 22, 2011 on Colorado Street, one street over
from the 2513 North Bouvier Street property.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed December 31, 13, at 3-8) (internal footnotes and
citations to the record omitted).
On March 21, 2012, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information
charging Appellant with multiple offenses related to his drug dealing
activities. At a pretrial hearing on October 12, 2012, Appellant made an oral
motion to dismiss the charges, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Defense
counsel argued the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence when
attempting to locate Appellant prior to his arrest. On December 14, 2012,
the court denied Rule 600 relief.
Following a bench trial, the court convicted Appellant of possession of
a controlled substance, PWID, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
conspiracy. On March 15, 2013, the court conducted Appellant’s sentencing
hearing. For the PWID conviction, the court sentenced Appellant to five (5)
to ten (10) years’ imprisonment. The sentence included a mandatory
minimum term, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1. For the conspiracy
conviction, the court imposed a concurrent term of five (5) to ten (10) years’
imprisonment. The court imposed no further penalty for the remaining
convictions. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on March 22,
2013, which the court denied on March 27, 2013.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on April 26, 2013. On April
29, 2013, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
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complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely
filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on May 20, 2013.
Appellant now raises two issues for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING [APPELLANT’S] MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER
PA.R.CRIM.P. 600, WHERE THE POLICE WERE NOT
DILIGENT IN THEIR EFFORTS TO LOCATE AND ARREST
[APPELLANT] AFTER THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED?
DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSE THE MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 42 PA.C.S. § 9712.1
IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S
RECENT DECISION IN ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES[,
___ U.S. ___, 133 S.CT. 2151, 186 L.ED.2D 314 (2013)]?
(Appellant’s Brief at 3).
In his first issue, Appellant acknowledges that Officer Kittles made
some effort to determine Appellant’s whereabouts and make an arrest.
Specifically, Officer Kittles contacted Appellant’s probation officer, repeatedly
drove through Appellant’s neighborhood, and notified uniformed officers in
the area about the arrest warrant. Appellant insists, however, Officer Kittles
could have gone to Appellant’s previous addresses and questioned
Appellant’s neighbors regarding his whereabouts. Moreover, Appellant
maintains Officer Kittles did not follow up with the probation officer, which
would have led Officer Kittles to discover that Appellant was in court for an
unrelated matter in June and July 2011. Appellant concludes Officer Kittles
did not exercise due diligence in his search for Appellant, and the court
abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. We disagree.
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“In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial court’s
decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth
v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied,
583 Pa. 659, 875 A.2d 1073 (2005).
The proper scope of review…is limited to the evidence on
the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the
findings of the trial court. An appellate court must view
the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling,
this Court is not permitted to ignore the dual
purpose behind Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two
equally important functions: (1) the protection of the
accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection
of society. In determining whether an accused’s
right to a speedy trial has been violated,
consideration must be given to society’s right to
effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to
restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those
contemplating it. However, the administrative
mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate
the criminally accused from good faith prosecution
delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.
* * *
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part
of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the
fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule
600 must be construed in a manner consistent with
society’s right to punish and deter crime.
Id. at 1238-39 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Rule 600 sets forth the speedy trial requirements and provides in
pertinent part:
Rule 600. Prompt Trial
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* * *
[(A)](3) Trial in a court case in which a written
complaint is filed against the defendant, when the
defendant is at liberty on bail, shall commence no later
than 365 days from the date on which the complaint is
filed.
* * *
(C) In determining the period for commencement of
trial, there shall be excluded therefrom:
(1) the period of time between the filing of the
written complaint and the defendant’s arrest, provided that
the defendant could not be apprehended because his or
her whereabouts were unknown and could not be
determined by due diligence;
(2) any period of time for which the defendant
expressly waives Rule 600;
(3) such period of delay at any stage of the
proceedings as results from:
(a) the unavailability of the defendant or the
defendant’s attorney;
(b) any continuance granted at the request
of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.
* * *
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(3), (C)(1)-(3).3 “Rule 600 generally requires the
Commonwealth to bring a defendant on bail to trial within 365 days of the
date the complaint was filed.” Hunt, supra at 1240. A defendant on bail
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3
A new version of Rule 600 went into effect on July 1, 2013, after the trial
court disposed of Appellant’s Rule 600 motion.
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after 365 days, but before trial, may apply to the court for an order
dismissing the charges with prejudice. Id. at 1240-41. To obtain relief, a
defendant must have a valid Rule 600 claim at the time he files his motion
for relief. Id. at 1243.
“The mechanical run date is the date by which the trial must
commence under Rule 600.” Commonwealth v. McNear, 852 A.2d 401,
406 (Pa.Super. 2004).
It is calculated by adding 365 days (the time for
commencing trial under Rule 600) to the date on which the
criminal complaint is filed. The mechanical run date can
be modified or extended by adding to the date any periods
of time in which delay is caused by the defendant. Once
the mechanical run date is modified accordingly, it then
becomes an adjusted run date.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Pa.Super.
2003)).
In the context of Rule 600, “excludable time” is differentiated from
“excusable delay” as follows:
“Excludable time” is defined in Rule 600(C) as the period
of time between the filing of the written complaint and the
defendant’s arrest, …any period of time for which the
defendant expressly waives Rule 600; and/or such period
of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:
(a) the unavailability of the defendant or the defendant’s
attorney; (b) any continuance granted at the request of
the defendant or the defendant’s attorney. “Excusable
delay” is not expressly defined in Rule 600, but the legal
construct takes into account delays which occur as a result
of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control and
despite its due diligence.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 875 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal
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denied, 586 Pa. 734, 891 A.2d 729 (2005) (quoting Hunt, supra at 1241).
“In determining whether the police acted with due diligence [in trying
to apprehend a defendant], a balancing process must be employed where
the court, using a common sense approach, examines the activities of the
police and balances [these] against the interest of the accused in receiving a
fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Ingram, 591 A.2d 734, 737 (Pa.Super.
1991), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 631, 606 A.2d 901 (1992). “The actions
must be judged by what was done, not by what was not done. In addition,
the efforts need only be reasonable; lack of due diligence should not be
found simply because other options were available or, in hindsight, would
have been more productive.” Id.Instantly, the Commonwealth filed the criminal complaint on
September 9, 2010. Therefore, the Rule 600 mechanical run date was
September 9, 2011. Law enforcement, however, could not immediately
apprehend Appellant. At the Rule 600 hearing, Officer Kittles testified about
his efforts to locate Appellant. Ultimately, police arrested Appellant on
December 22, 2011.
Significantly, the trial court evaluated Officer Kittles’ testimony as
follows:
Officer Kittles contacted [Appellant’s] probation officer to
notify her of the warrant for [Appellant’s] arrest and asked
that she hold [Appellant] if he reported to her. Familiar
with [Appellant’s] appearance and acquaintances, Officer
Kittles surveyed [Appellant’s] neighborhood approximately
100 times looking for [Appellant] and/or his
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acquaintances. Finally, Officer Kittles alerted other
Philadelphia police officers to the outstanding arrest
warrant. Given that Officer Kittles testified that
[Appellant’s] case was but one in his substantial case load,
these measures demonstrated a reasonable effort on the
Commonwealth’s part to locate and apprehend [Appellant].
Although [Appellant] argues that the Commonwealth could
have researched when [Appellant] may have next been in
court, the test is not a venture into hindsight reasoning as
to whether certain individuals had been contacted, or other
things done, an arrest would probably have been made.
(See Trial Court Opinion at 17-18) (emphasis in original) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Based upon the foregoing, the court found the Commonwealth had
acted with due diligence in attempting to find Appellant. We see no abuse of
discretion in the court’s decision to omit this portion of the pre-arrest time
from the Rule 600 run date calculation. See Hunt, supra. See also
Ingram, supra (holding Commonwealth acted with due diligence in
attempting to apprehend defendant after filing of criminal complaint; officers
tried to serve arrest warrant at defendant’s last known address, information
from defendant’s mother led officers to believe defendant had left town,
police entered “wanted” message into PCIC database, and officers went to
places where they had seen defendant in past). The concept of due
diligence in this context does not require the Commonwealth to undertake
an all-out manhunt for every fugitive from justice; thus, the delay between
September 9, 2010 and December 22, 2011 was excusable. See
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). This delay yielded an adjusted run date of
December 21, 2012.
Significantly, Appellant moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 600 on
October 12, 2012, before the adjusted run date. Therefore, Appellant did
not have a viable Rule 600 claim when he moved for dismissal. See Hunt,
supra. Under these circumstances, the court properly denied Appellant’s
Rule 600 motion. Id.In his second issue, Appellant asserts the court imposed a mandatory
minimum sentence for his PWID conviction due to the presence of a firearm
in close proximity to the controlled substances. Appellant argues the court
expressly determined the applicability of Section 9712.1 at the sentencing
hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellant insists, however,
that any factor increasing a mandatory minimum sentence must be
determined by the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant
concludes the court imposed an illegal sentence, and we must remand the
case for re-sentencing. We agree.
We are mindful of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Alleyne v. United States, in which the Court expressly held that any fact
increasing the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is considered an
element of the crime to be submitted to the fact-finder and found beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. Here, the court imposed the mandatory minimum
sentence under Section 9712.1 (governing sentences for certain drug
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offenses committed with firearms) for Appellant’s PWID conviction. Section
9712.1(a) sets forth a mandatory minimum sentence of five (5) years’
imprisonment where a defendant is convicted of PWID “when at the time of
the offense the person or the person’s accomplice is in physical possession
or control of a firearm, whether visible, concealed about the person or the
person’s accomplice or within the actor’s or accomplice’s reach or in close
proximity to the controlled substance….” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1(a). Section
9712.1(c) states that the statutory provisions shall not be an element of the
crime and applicability of the statute shall be determined by the court at
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1(c).
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa.Super.
2014) (en banc), this Court addressed the constitutionality of Section 9712.1
in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne, supra.4
Relying on Alleyne, Newman held that Section 9712.1 can no longer pass
constitutional muster as it “permits the trial court, as opposed to the jury, to
increase a defendant’s minimum sentence based upon a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant was dealing drugs and possessed a firearm,
or that a firearm was in close proximity to the drugs.” Newman, supra at
98. Thus, this Court vacated Newman’s PWID sentence and remanded for
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4
This Court also made clear that Alleyne is subject to limited retroactivity;
in other words, Alleyne is applicable to all criminal cases still pending on
direct review. Id. at 90. Because Newman’s case was still pending on direct
appeal, the holding in Alleyne applied to Newman’s case.
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re-sentencing without imposition of the mandatory minimum under Section
9712.1. See also Commonwealth v. Valentine, ___ A.3d ___, 2014 PA
Super 220 (filed October 3, 2014) (involving appeal of sentence arising from
jury trial; extending logic of Alleyne and Newman to Sections 9712 and
9713 and holding those sections are likewise unconstitutional insofar as they
permit automatic increase of defendant’s sentence based on preponderance
of evidence standard).
Instantly, the court conducted a bench trial and convicted Appellant of
multiple offenses, including PWID. At the subsequent sentencing hearing,
the Commonwealth presented a police witness, Officer McKnight, to testify
concerning the applicability of Section 9712.1. Officer McKnight explained
that he was one of the officers executing the search warrant at 2513 North
Bouvier Street. Officer McKnight entered the residence and observed
Appellant seated at a table in the dining room. Officer McKnight saw
narcotics on the table. Another individual, Mr. Armstead, was sitting on a
sofa directly in front of the table. A subsequent search of the sofa yielded a
loaded firearm, which was secreted under a cushion. After receiving the
testimony and argument from counsel, the court found by a preponderance
of the evidence that Section 9712.1 applied to Appellant’s PWID conviction.
(See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 3/15/13, at 21-22.) Given this Court’s
decisions in Newman and Valentine, however, we must vacate and
remand for resentencing. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s convictions, but
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we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing without
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence.5
Judgment of sentence vacated; case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/15/2014
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5
The Commonwealth does not oppose a remand for resentencing in light of
Alleyne. (See Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-12.)
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