Lichtman, J. v. Moss, B. ( 2019 )

J. A21042/19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOAN LICHTMAN, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
: No. 365 EDA 2019
BRADLEY K. MOSS AND :
SHEILA WOODS-SKIPPER :
Appeal from the Order Entered November 27, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No. 131203815
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2019
Joan Lichtman appeals, pro se, from the November 27, 2018 order
entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing
appellant’s writ of mandamus, with prejudice, against the Honorable
Bradley K. Moss and the Honorable Sheila Woods-Skipper.1 For the following
reasons, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.
The trial court provided the following synopsis of the factual and
procedural history:
On September 26, 2007, Rittenhouse Plaza, Inc.
[(“Rittenhouse”)] filed a landlord-tenant complaint
against [appellant] in the Philadelphia Municipal
Court. [Rittenhouse] alleged that rent and other fees
1 Judge Moss serves as a judge on the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County.
Judge Woods-Skipper served as the president judge of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County.
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were due and owing, that notice to vacate was given,
but that [appellant] refused to vacate the premises.
[Rittenhouse] asserted that there were, “no
outstanding notices of L&I violations.” That assertion
is at the heart of this and other lawsuits brought by
[appellant.2 Appellant] has, at all times material[,]
asserted that, “there were L&I violations” and thus
she could not be evicted. . . . She further asserts
that [Rittenhouse’s] statement was perjured and,
therefore, both the Municipal Court and the Court of
Common Pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction
rendering their decisions null and void. [Appellant]
cites no authority for this position despite having had
eleven years and numerous opportunities to do so.
On October 19, 2007, judgment was entered in the
Municipal Court in favor of Rittenhouse for money
damages and possession. [Appellant] asserts that the
[Municipal C]ourt was informed of the perjured
statement during that proceeding. She also asserts
that she subsequently informed [then] President
Judge Woods-Skipper of the perjured
statement.[Footnote 2]
[Footnote 2] When [the trial court] use[s]
the phrase “perjured statement,” [it]
do[es] so not as a conclusion of law, but
rather as a statement of [appellant’s]
viewpoint.
On October 29, 2007, [appellant] appealed to the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for a
trial de novo. Rittenhouse timely filed a complaint
and [appellant] filed an answer, new matter and
counterclaim evidencing her understanding of [the
2 See, e.g., Rittenhouse Plaza, Inc. v. Lichtman, No. 745 EDA 2007,
unpublished memorandum (Pa.Super. filed August 22, 2007); Rittenhouse
Plaza, Inc. v. Lichtman, 26 A.3d 1187 (Pa.Super. 2011) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 32 A.3d 1278 (Pa. 2011); Lichtman v.
Chubb Group of Ins. Companies, et al., 107 A.3d 218 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(unpublished memorandum); Lichtman v. Prudential Fox Roach, 107 A.3d
228 (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum); Lichtman v. Bomstein,
134 A.3d 496 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 141 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016).
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trial court’s] pleading and procedural issues. . . .
[Appellant], in her various memorandums of law,
asserts that she raised the “perjured statement” issue
during the trial de novo. Judge Tereshko found in
favor of Rittenhouse and against [appellant] and
awarded money damages and possession.
[Appellant] did not file a post-trial motion raising the
matters she then and now asserts were erroneously
decided or not properly considered by the trial judge.
Instead, she took a direct appeal to the Superior Court
and also filed a motion for stay of execution. [The]
Superior Court ultimately dismissed the appeal and
denied the stay. Her petition for allowance of appeal
to the Supreme Court was denied on November 5,
2008. Thus, all matters related to the trial for money
damages and possession of the real estate were final
and not subject to further review or, as here, collateral
attack.
The real estate was sold and [appellant’s] efforts to
stay and/or set aside the sheriff’s sale were
unsuccessful. . . . [Appellant’s] appeal to [the]
Superior Court was unsuccessful. Thus, all matters
related to the sale are final and not subject to further
review or, as here, collateral attack.
[Appellant] attempts to yet again revisit the issues
she lost on in the Rittenhouse case in the instant
litigation against the judicial officers who have had
anything to do with or had/have knowledge of those
issues. She does so despite the fact that the Superior
Court entered an order on November 30, 2009, noting
that she was improperly seeking appellate review of
the May 9, 2008, non-jury decision from which she
failed to file post-trial motions and which [the]
Superior Court sua sponte dismissed on June 24,
2008. [See Rittenhouse Plaza, Inc. v. Lichtman,
No. 1412 EDA 2008 (Pa.Super. dismissed June 24,
2008).]
Trial court order and opinion, 11/27/18 at 1-4 (extraneous capitalization,
footnotes 1 and 3, some citations, and emphasis omitted).
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Appellant filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus against
President Judge Woods-Skipper and Judge Moss (collectively, “appellees”) on
April 17, 2018. Appellees filed timely preliminary objections on May 9, 2018.
Following a litany of filings not related to this appeal, the trial court sustained
appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissed appellant’s complaint with
prejudice on November 27, 2018. On December 3, 2018, appellant filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on December 11,
2018.
On December 21, 2018, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The
trial court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and appellant timely complied.
The trial court subsequently filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
This case was set for oral argument for August 28, 2019. Appellant filed
an application for continuance of oral argument, which was denied on
August 7, 2019. On August 15, 2019, this court denied appellant’s application
for reconsideration of our August 7, 2019 order. On October 8, 2019,
appellant filed a post-submission communication pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 2501(a), in which appellant avers that she unsuccessfully attempted
to obtain her desired relief from Judge Moss.
As noted by the trial court, appellant’s “concise” statement fails to
comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). This court has long recognized that
“Rule 1925 is a crucial component of the appellate process because it allows
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the trial court to identify and focus on those issues the parties plan to raise
on appeal.” Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal
denied, 880 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092 (2006).
“The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant
intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the
judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). However, the filing of a timely Rule 1925(b)
statement alone “does not automatically equate with issue preservation.”
Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.Super. 2007), affirmed, 977
A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009). In Tucker, we explained that:
this Court has held that when appellants raise an
outrageous number of issues in their
1925(b) statement, the appellants have deliberately
circumvented the meaning and purpose of
Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively
precluded appellate review of the issues [they] now
seek to raise. We have further noted that such
voluminous statements do not identify the issues
appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because
the briefing limitations contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a)
make[] the raising of so many issues impossible.
Further, this type of extravagant 1925(b) statement
makes it all but impossible for the trial court to provide
a comprehensive analysis of the issues.
Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in
original). Thus, “the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently
concise and coherent such that the trial court judge may be able to identify
the issues to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not suggest
the existence of bad faith.” Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210
(Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis added), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1048 (Pa.
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2008); see also Kanter, 866 A.2d at 401 (finding issues in Rule 1925(b)
statements waived where the court determined that “outrageous” number of
issues was deliberate attempt to circumvent purpose of Rule 1925).
Here, we cannot conclude that appellant’s nine-page statement, raising
21 issues and 33 total theoretical questions, was so concise and coherent that
the trial court was able to conduct a meaningful review of all the issues she
sought to raise. Accordingly, appellant waives all issues on appeal for
circumventing the meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b) so as to preclude
meaningful judicial review.
Alternatively, even if appellant had complied with Rule 1925(b), we
could nonetheless dismiss this appeal because her brief fails to adhere to the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is well settled that parties to an
appeal are required to submit briefs in conformity, in all material respects,
with the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, as nearly as the
circumstances of the particular case will admit. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. “Although
this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant,
pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant.” In re Ullman,
995 A.2d 1207, 1211-1212 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 489
(Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). We will not advocate or act as counsel for an
appellant who has not substantially complied with our rules. Bombar v.
W. Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 93 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). “This
Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to conform to the
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requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.”
Ullman, 995 A.2d at 1211 (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
Instantly, appellant’s pro se brief falls well below the standards
delineated in our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, appellant’s brief
is comprised almost entirely of repetitive prose in which she includes
ad hominem attacks against the trial court and opposing counsel from
previous litigation.3
We further note that appellant’s brief lacks the necessary citations to
the record in violation of Rule 2119(b), and fails to provide this court with
references to the record, in violation of Rule 2119(c).
3 Throughout her brief, appellant accuses opposing counsel in the original
eviction proceeding of perjury and the appellees in the instant case of
committing unspecified crimes on the bench. (Appellant’s brief at 25, 33.)
Indeed, appellant levies the following accusation against both the Philadelphia
and Pennsylvania appellate judiciary, as well as opposing counsel:
In short, there is hardly a judge in Philadelphia or in
any of Pennsylvania’s appellate courts, who is immune
from liability, or even from prosecution or disbarment,
with respect to all the legal cases involving
[appellant]. Each and all of those cases is a derivative
of two attorneys’ underlying crimes, including perjury,
subornation of perjury, fraud, extortion, conspiracy,
forgery, theft, et al., and, especially, their attempts
on [appellant’s] life, intended to silence the crime
victim — permanently.
Of course, all of the involved attorneys — public and
private, directly or indirectly — are also subject to
prosecution and disbarment.
Appellant’s brief at 40 (emphasis in original).
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Based on the foregoing, we find all of appellant’s issues waived.
Accordingly, we dismiss appellant’s appeal. Additionally, we bar appellant
from continuing to raise either the same or related claims without leave of
court. Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1(c).
Appeal dismissed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/7/19
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