Com. v. Baideme, D. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S44020-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    DARRYL BAIDEME                             :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 252 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 6, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
    CP-25-CR-0001622-2017
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    DARRYL ANTHONY BAIDEME                     :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 253 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 6, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
    CP-25-CR-0001067-2017
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                       FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2019
    Darryl Anthony Baideme appeals the judgments of sentence entered on
    his guilty pleas to home improvement fraud.1 Baideme claims that the trial
    court erred by not merging the convictions for sentencing purposes and
    challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentences. We affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    1   73 P.S. § 517.8(a)(1).
    J-S44020-19
    At docket number ending in 1067, Baideme pled guilty to the following
    facts: “It’s alleged that on or about July 21st of 2016, . . . you did accept
    payment of $5,000 more or less from Kevin and - - Reynolds to put siding on
    their residence, that you never started the work and/or did not refund the
    money[.]” N.T., Plea Hearing, 10/17/17, at 7. Baideme also pled guilty to the
    following facts for docket number ending in 1622:
    It is alleged on or about June 25, 2015, . . . you accepted
    advance payments in the amount of $4,000 more or less
    promising to perform home improvement services from
    Gary and/or Marsha [Bierley] ages 66 and 62, respectively,
    and then requested and accepted an additional $2,000 more
    or less and never completed the work and/or purchased
    materials and/or returned the monies when requested[.]
    Id. at 8.
    The trial court sentenced Baideme to consecutive terms of nine months
    to 60 months’ incarceration at docket number 1067, and 12 months to 84
    months’ incarceration at docket number 1622. The court also ordered Baideme
    to pay restitution. Baideme did not file a direct appeal.
    Baideme filed a counseled Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition
    alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file a post-sentence motion
    and direct appeal. See Supplement to Motion for Post Conviction Collateral
    Relief, filed 6/28/18, at 1. The PCRA court granted the petition and reinstated
    Baideme’s post-sentence and direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. See Order of
    Court, filed 11/9/18. Baideme filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial
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    J-S44020-19
    court denied. He then filed separate notices of appeal at each trial court
    docket.2
    Baideme raises the following issues:
    I.     Whether the sentencing [c]ourt erred in failing to merge
    both convictions for purposes of sentencing in that
    [Baideme’s] underlying conduct constituted a spree and
    there was a legal predicate otherwise to merge the counts?
    II.    Whether the sentencing [c]ourt committed legal error in
    imposing a consecutive sentencing scheme and in failing to
    render a legally sufficient contemporaneous statement in
    support of that sentencing election?
    Baideme’s Br. at 2.
    Our standard of review for a merger claim is de novo and our scope of
    review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Tanner, 
    61 A.3d 1043
    , 1046
    (Pa.Super. 2013). Convictions merge for sentencing purposes where: “(1) the
    crimes arise from a single criminal act; and (2) all of the statutory elements
    of one of the offenses are included within the statutory elements of the other.”
    Commonwealth v. Kimmel, 
    125 A.3d 1272
    , 1276 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en
    banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Raven, 
    97 A.3d 1244
    , 1249 (Pa.Super.
    2014)). Where separate criminal acts occur, merger is not appropriate. 
    Id. at 1277
     (concluding “merger is not implicated” where fleeing conviction and DUI
    conviction resulted from one incident).
    Baideme claims that both offenses for home improvement fraud should
    have merged because his actions in committing the fraud “constituted a spree
    ____________________________________________
    2 Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
    , 977 (Pa. 2018), is thus not
    applicable to this case.
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    J-S44020-19
    and there was a legal predicate otherwise to merge the counts.” Baideme’s
    Br. at 5. We disagree.
    The merger doctrine does not apply here because Baideme’s convictions
    arise from two separate criminal acts. At docket number 1622, the act of home
    improvement fraud occurred against the Bierleys in June 2015. See N.T.,
    Sentencing, 12/6/17, at 42; see also N.T., Plea Hearing, at 8. At docket
    number 1067, the relevant events occurred approximately a year later, in July
    2016, and related to Baideme’s acceptance of payment for work on the
    Reynolds’ house without ever beginning work or refunding the payment. See
    N.T., Sentencing, at 42; see also N.T., Plea Hearing, at 7. These two
    occurrences were completely separate and cannot fairly be characterized as a
    “spree.” The merger doctrine does not apply. See Commonwealth v.
    Gatling, 
    807 A.2d 890
    , 899 (Pa. 2002) (“If the offenses stem from two
    different criminal acts, merger analysis is not required”).
    Next, Baideme challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We
    review a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence for an abuse of
    discretion. Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    206 A.3d 551
    , 567 (Pa.Super. 2019).
    Before we address the merits of such a challenge we must determine whether:
    1) the appellant preserved the issue; 2) the appeal is timely; 3) the brief
    includes a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement; and 4) the appellant has raised a
    substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Spenny, 
    128 A.3d 234
    , 241
    (Pa.Super. 2015).
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    J-S44020-19
    Here, Baideme failed to preserve his claim, as his post-sentence motion
    did not challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Motion for
    New Trial and/or Arrest of Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, filed 12/7/18 (challenging
    sequestration of jury; jury taint; and victim credibility); Commonwealth v.
    Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1030
    , 1042 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (“[I]ssues
    challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be raised in a post-
    sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court during the
    sentencing proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary
    aspect of a sentence is waived.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kittrell, 
    19 A.3d 532
    , 538 (Pa.Super. 2011)).
    Even if he had preserved his sentencing claims, and assuming he has
    stated a substantial question, we would reject the claims as meritless.
    Baideme argues the court “failed to afford due weight and consideration to
    mitigation factors” and “failed to proffer a legally sufficient statement on the
    record in support of the imposition of a consecutive sentence.” Baideme’s Br.
    at 4. The record belies these claims.
    Counsel informed the court that Baideme’s parents died when he was
    15 and he had been on his own since then. N.T., Sentencing, at 16. Counsel
    also told the court about Baideme’s children and the court heard from
    Baideme’s fiancé, who was pregnant with Baideme’s child. Id. at 17, 30. The
    trial court also considered the presentence investigation report. Id. at 43.
    Additionally, the trial court stated its reasons for imposing a consecutive
    sentence:
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    I’m going to do the following: I’ve considered the
    Pennsylvania Sentencing guidelines. The [c]ourt has also
    considered the statement of defense counsel, [Baideme],
    the attorney from the Commonwealth. I’ve looked at
    [Baideme], his age, his background, his character, his
    rehabilitative needs and the nature and circumstances and
    seriousness of the offense and the protection of the
    community.
    And here’s what I conclude: [Baideme] has a prior record
    score of three. And so while he’s not the worst among us,
    he has a significant prior record and a significant prior record
    for theft.
    . . . [I]t’s clear that [Baideme] got money and he didn’t do
    the work and that he’s been convicted in some cases and
    other cases plead guilty.
    . . . I might have gone less in this case, but Mr. Baideme’s
    attitude and language has seeped through enough into this
    case that it’s affected his sentencing.
    Id. at 43-44. Here, the court simply did not give Baideme’s mitigating factors
    the weight that he wished. Though it did not provide a lengthy explanation for
    imposing a consecutive sentence, it was not required to do so. See
    Commonwealth v. Malovich, 
    903 A.2d 1247
    , 1253 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“[A]
    lengthy discourse on the trial court’s sentencing philosophy is not required”)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. McAfee, 
    849 A.2d 270
    , 275 (Pa.Super. 2004)).
    The court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning Baideme’s sentences.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -6-
    J-S44020-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/26/2019
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