Estate of Cary H. Simpson, Appeal of: Simpson, J. ( 2019 )

J-A03022-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
IN RE: ESTATE OF CARY H. SIMPSON, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
DECEASED : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: JOHN FREDERICK :
SIMPSON : No. 122 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. 2017 OC 11
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:
FILED MAY 31, 2019
I write separately because I am troubled by the Majority’s analysis of
Appellant’s argument as to why the June 1, 2017 consent decree should be
vacated. In essence, Appellant alleges the orphans’ court should have
vacated the June 1, 2017 consent decree because Appellant agreed to the
decree under misleading pretenses created by the Executor. Appellant’s
Brief at 33-24.
“It has long been the law that courts of equity have the power to
reform a written instrument where there has been a showing of fraud,
accident or mistake.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O’Hanlon, 968 A.2d 765,
770 (Pa. Super. 2009). Although Appellant argues the existence of a mutual
mistake, I believe he is really trying to express the existence of a unilateral
mistake. Generally, “[a] unilateral mistake, which is not due to the fault of
the party not mistaken, but to the negligence of the one who acted under
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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the mistake, cannot be a basis for refusing to enforce [an agreement]
according to its terms.” Ford Motor Co. v. Buseman, 954 A.2d 580, 587
(Pa. Super. 2008). However, “a mistake by one party, and knowledge of the
mistake by the other, [may] justify relief as fully as a mutual mistake,” and
can estop the party with the knowledge of the mistake from relying on the
mistake. Line Lexington Lumber & Millwork Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania
Pub. Corp., 301 A.2d 684, 687-88 (Pa. 1973). “The mistake must go to the
basis of the bargain between the parties, must materially affect the parties’
performance, and must not be one as to which the injured party bears the
risk before the party will be entitled to relief.” RegScan, Inc. v. Con-Way
Transp. Servs., Inc., 875 A.2d 332, 340 (Pa. Super. 2005). “If a mistake
is demonstrated, the contract may be reformed, or the injured party may
avoid his or her contractual obligations.” Id.
Under the particular facts of this case, I believe Appellant has proven
that he agreed to the consent decree under the mistaken belief that the
Estate’s dire financial situation remained the same as it was at the May 3,
2017 hearing. The Executor filed a petition averring that the Estate had a
significant shortfall of assets that could not be met unless certain properties
specifically devised to Barbara and Appellant could be sold. The Executor
represented the same during the May 3, 2017 proceeding. N.T., 5/3/2017,
at 29.
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The parties were unable to complete the proceeding during the court’s
allotted timeframe; so the hearing was reconvened on June 1, 2017. The
parties used the delay to negotiate, and were able to come to an agreement
regarding the Executor’s request to sell the property devised to Appellant.
However, according to Appellant, despite representing that a judicially-
ordered sale of the properties was necessary to meet the obligations of the
Estate’s dire financial state, the Executor never informed Appellant or the
orphans’ court that Barbara had already disclaimed her interest in the
properties specifically devised to her, thereby clearing the way for the
Executor to accept pending offers to sell those properties and for the Estate
to receive a cash infusion. Furthermore, the Executor never informed
Appellant or the orphans’ court that it had entered into a sales agreement
for the radio station and property two days before the June 1, 2017
proceeding. Accordingly, Appellant contends that he agreed to sell the
Henderson Township property under the mistaken belief that sale of the
Henderson Township property was necessary to meet the Estate’s
obligations at that time, but in reality, the sale was not necessary.
The Majority affirms the orphans’ court, which reasoned that Appellant
was aware of the Executor’s intent to sell the radio station from the
Executor’s testimony at the May 3, 2017 hearing. The Majority also
emphasizes that Barbara’s disclaimer of the property specifically bequeathed
to her was recorded of public record in the Blair County Records of Deeds
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Office prior to Appellant’s agreement to the June 1, 2017 consent decree. I
find this fact to be irrelevant. Could Appellant have checked the public
record with the Blair County Records of Deeds Office? Sure. But what
reasonable person would do so? Barbara disclaimed her interest prior to the
May 3, 2017 hearing; yet the Executor made no mention of such disclaimer
at the hearing. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable and not
negligent for Appellant to have relied upon the Executor’s representations of
the Estate’s financial state.
Nevertheless, I am not convinced that the sale of the properties
bequeathed to Barbara and the radio station could have saved the estate
from needing to sell the Henderson Township property. As the Majority
discusses, Appellant’s calculations fail to account for all expenses and rely on
assets that may not come into fruition. Majority at 17. Thus, Appellant has
not proven that the pending sales of the properties referenced above could
have provided sufficient residentiary assets to the Estate such that the
Estate could avoid selling the Henderson Township Property.
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