Benarosh, Y. v. Axelrod, M. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S11017-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    YAACOV BENAROSH AND                      :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    BATYA BENAROSH                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    Appellants            :
    :
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :    No. 3583 EDA 2017
    MICHAEL AXELROD AND JOAN                 :
    AXELROD, INDIVIDUALLY, HIS               :
    HEIRS AND ASSIGNS, AND AS                :
    TRUSTEES OF THE MICHAEL                  :
    AXELROD 2012 IRREVOCABLE                 :
    TRUST, TRIAD REALTY, MARLENE             :
    ZARRETT AND BARE FEET SHOES              :
    Appeal from the Order Entered October 5, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
    No(s): 150902664
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                             FILED APRIL 09, 2019
    Yaacov Benarosh and Batya Benarosh (Appellants) appeal from the
    order denying their petition to open the judgment of non pros entered against
    them. We affirm.
    The procedural history of this premises liability case is extensive and,
    as we discuss infra, includes several irregularities. Because the trial court
    and the parties are familiar with the myriad filings in this case, we discuss
    only those filings that are pertinent to our review of Appellant’s claims.
    On September 25, 2015, Appellants filed the underlying complaint
    J-S11017-19
    through their attorney, Blake Berenbaum, Esquire.1        They alleged that on
    December 13, 2013, Appellant Yaacov slipped and fell on snow or ice outside
    a retail store, Bare Feet Shoes, located at 425 South Street, Philadelphia. The
    complaint named ten defendants: (1) Michael Axelrod, “Michael Axelrod,
    individually of the Michael Axelrod 2012 Irrevocable Trust” (Michael Trust),
    “Michael Axelrod, individually, his heirs and assigns of the Michael Axelrod
    2012 Irrevocable Trust,” “Michael Axelrod, Trustee of the Michael Axelrod
    2012 Irrevocable Trust,” Joan Axelrod, “Joan Axelrod, individually of the Joan
    Axelrod 2012 Irrevocable Trust” (Joan Trust), and “Joan Axelrod, trustee of
    the Joan Axelrod 2012 Irrevocable Trust” (collectively, the Axelrods) — who
    allegedly owned the property; (2) Triad Realty, Inc. (Triad); (3) Marlene
    Zarett;2 and (4) Bare Feet Shoes. We refer to the Axelrods and Zarett, who
    have submitted all of their filings jointly, together as “Appellees.”
    On October 14, 2015, an affidavit of non-service was filed, stating that:
    service of the complaint was not made on Bare Feet Shoes; as of one year
    earlier, Bare Feet Shoes no longer occupied the 425 South Street property;
    ____________________________________________
    1  The trial docket reflects no further filings by Attorney Berenbaum in this
    case. We note that in December of 2015, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
    filed a professional misconduct petition against Attorney Berenbaum. On April
    20, 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania placed him on temporary
    suspension and on December 13, 2017, suspended him for one year and one
    day. Supreme Court Order, 174 DB 2015; Supreme Court Order, 28 DB 2017,
    4/20/17.
    2   Marlene’s last name is also spelled as “Zarrett” throughout the record.
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    and furthermore, that another business, Eternity Fashion, was presently at
    the address. Appellees filed a joint answer and new matter. In response to
    the complaint’s allegation that “Joan Axelrod, Trustee of the Joan Axelrod
    2012 Irrevocable Trust is an adult individual and/or trust established and/or
    created under the laws of the state of New York,” Appellees’ answer admitted
    that Joan Axelrod was a citizen of New York, but denied “[t]he remaining
    allegations set forth in [the] paragraph.” See Appellants’ Complaint, 9/25/15,
    at ¶ 7; Appellees’ Answer, 11/17/15, at ¶ 7. Triad filed a separate answer
    and new matter.
    Over the next 12 months, Triad filed approximately seven motions, and
    Appellees filed approximately four motions, averring initially that Appellants
    failed to respond to their discovery requests and appear for depositions, and
    subsequently that Appellants repeatedly failed to comply with the court’s
    orders compelling them to comply with discovery and appear for depositions.
    Appellants did not respond to any of the motions. The trial court granted relief
    on all the motions, issuing approximately eight orders.3      We note that on
    November 23, 2016, the court held a hearing on Appellees’ motion for
    sanctions and preclusion of Appellants’ introduction of any evidence. Attorney
    Berenbaum did not appear at the hearing, but Susan Frank, Esquire, appeared
    “per diem on [his] behalf.” Id. at 8. On November 28th, the court granted
    ____________________________________________
    3 See Order, 11/28/16; Order, 10/12/16; Orders, 9/29/16 (three orders
    issued on this date); Order, 8/24/16; Order, 8/4/16; Order, 2/18/16.
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    Appellees’ motion and precluded Appellants “from introducing any evidence at
    the time of trial/arbitration in this matter.” Order, 11/28/16.
    On November 29, 2016, Appellees filed a motion for summary
    judgment, arguing that because Appellants were precluded from presenting
    evidence in support of their negligence claims, Appellees were entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. This motion named the movants as Michael
    Axelrod and Joan Axelrod, individually and as trustees of the Michael Trust
    and Zarett. The motion, however, did not specifically include Joan as trustee
    of the Joan Trust as a movant.
    On December 6, 2016 — after Appellants not filing anything on the
    docket since their complaint 14 months earlier — present counsel, Alan
    Zibelman, Esquire, entered his appearance as “co-counsel.”        That month,
    Attorney Zibelman filed three motions seeking relief, including reconsideration
    of the order precluding Appellants from introducing any evidence at trial. The
    trial court denied all of Appellants’ motions.4 Appellants also filed an answer
    to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
    On March 6, 2017, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary
    judgment and dismissed all of Appellants’ claims against them with prejudice.
    The order, however, did not mention Joan Axelrod in her capacity as trustee
    ____________________________________________
    4   Order, 3/6/17; Order, 1/23/17; Order, 12/30/16; Order, 12/15/16.
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    of the Joan Trust. Order, 3/6/17. On April 24th, the parties filed a stipulation
    to dismiss Triad from the case.5 On April 26th, Appellants praeciped for default
    judgment against Joan Axelrod in her capacity as trustee of the Joan Trust.
    Appellants’ Praecipe to Enter Default Judgment, 4/26/17.
    On May 16, 2017 — the day before scheduled trial6 — Appellants filed a
    motion to amend their complaint. They sought to correct the designation of
    “Bare Feet Shoes” to “Bare Feet Shoes, Inc.” and “Bare Feet Shoes and
    Accessories, LLC”7 but specified that they did not intend to “bring[ ] any new
    entities into the . . . litigation.”      Appellant’s Motion to Amend Complaint,
    5/16/17, at 8 (unpaginated). The motion averred that Appellees knew that
    the lessee of the property was “Bare Feet Shoes and Accessories, LLC” but
    that the named insured was “Bare Feet Shoes, Inc.” and withheld this
    information; Appellees “never advised Appellants” that Bare Feet Shoes had
    filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy; and Appellees’ answer improperly presented
    general denials (rather than specific denials) in order “to withhold relevant
    ____________________________________________
    5 Meanwhile, we note, on April 5, 2017, the trial court had granted Triad’s
    motion for preclusion and precluded Appellants “from introducing any
    evidence and/or testimony at the time of trial/arbitration in this matter.”
    Order, 4/5/17. Triad had also filed a motion for summary judgment, but
    withdrew it following its dismissal from the case.
    6See N.T. Hearing, 5/17/17, at 15 (trial court: “[This case] was scheduled to
    go to trial today.”).
    7   See N.T., 5/17/17, at 14.
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    information.” Id. at 4--8.
    On the following day, May 17, 2017 — again, the date that trial was
    scheduled to commence — the trial court convened a hearing.8 When the trial
    court questioned Appellants’ entry of default judgment against Joan Axelrod
    as trustee of the Joan Trust, Appellants, represented by Attorney Zibelman,
    argued that Appellees’ summary judgment motion did not specifically request
    any relief on behalf of Joan Axelrod as trustee.      N.T., 5/17/17, at 5, 9.
    Appellees responded that, as indicated in their answer to the complaint as well
    as the trust origination documents, Joan Axelrod was not in fact a trustee of
    the Joan Trust, but instead merely a settlor.     Id. at 6, 9.   The trial court
    accepted Appellees’ argument, concluded that Joan Axelrod — both
    individually and as trustee — was no longer in the case, and orally opened the
    default judgment against Joan Axelrod as trustee of the Joan Trust. Id. at
    11. However, the court did not enter a corresponding written order to open
    the default judgment.9
    ____________________________________________
    8 Until the May 17, 2017 hearing, the Honorable John Younge presided over
    this case. Thereafter, the case was reassigned to the Honorable Sean
    Kennedy.
    9Appellants have not challenged the lack of a written order, and indeed, have
    acknowledged that the default judgment was opened. See Jackson v.
    Hendrick, 
    746 A.2d 574
    , 576 (Pa. 2000) (plurality) (“In some instances, oral
    orders, made on the record, need not be filed or entered on the docket in
    order to be valid.”); Appellants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for
    Relief from Judgment of Non Pros, 6/26/17, at 11 (unpaginated). For the sake
    of clarity, we direct that upon remand of the record, the trial court shall file
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    At the hearing, the trial court also denied Appellants’ motion to amend
    the complaint, noting the “late date” and that over the course of three years,
    Appellants did nothing to identify the proper parties in this case.         N.T.,
    5/17/17, at 15-16, 18-19. Although Attorney Zibelman initially argued that
    Appellees failed to inform Appellants “who the tenant was” or that Bare Feet
    Shoes was in bankruptcy, Attorney Zibelman conceded that neither he nor
    prior counsel served “discovery asking for those things.” Id. at 13-15. The
    trial court pointed out that with “[t]he most preliminary type of discovery,”
    Appellants could have determined who was responsible for snow removal. Id.
    at 19.
    The trial court then concluded that the only remaining defendant in this
    action was Bare Feet Shoes but, as Attorney Zibelman acknowledged,
    Appellants failed to obtain proper service on Bare Feet Shoes, and Bare Feet
    Shoes did not file an answer.10 See id. at 12, 20. Accordingly, the court
    ____________________________________________
    an order documenting its May 17, 2017 opening of the default judgment
    against Joan as trustee of the Joan Trust.
    10 Appellees’ answer was entitled “Answer of Defendants, Michael Axelrod and
    Joan Axelrod, Individually, His Heirs and Assigns, and as Trustees of the
    Michael Axelrod 2012 Irrevocable Trust, Triad Realty, Marlene Zarrett, and
    Bare Feet Shoes, to Plaintiff’s Complaint Together with New Matter.”
    Appellees’ Answer, 11/17/15, at 1 (emphases added). Possibly relying on this
    title, Appellants’ motion to amend the complaint averred that Appellees’
    answer was also filed on behalf of Bare Feet Shoes. Appellants’ Motion to
    Amend Complaint, 5/16/17, at 4. However, as Appellants’ motion also
    acknowledged, Appellees’ attorney had entered his appearance on behalf of
    the Axelrods and Zarett only. Furthermore, the body of Appellees’ answer
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    dismissed Appellants’ complaint. Id. at 24; Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/18, at
    3. On May 23, 2017, the court issued an order entering judgment non pros
    against Appellants. The trial docket indicates that Pa.R.C.P. 236 notice was
    given on May 23rd.11
    Thirty-four days later, on June 26, 2017, Appellants filed a counseled
    50-page petition to strike the judgment non pros. Appellees filed a response,
    arguing that Appellants’ petition was untimely pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 237.3
    and Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 
    477 A.2d 471
     (Pa. 1984).12 On
    October 5th, the court denied Appellant’s petition for relief, finding it was
    untimely filed beyond the 10-day period set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 237.3. Order,
    10/5/17; Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/18, at 11.
    Although Appellants were represented by Attorney Zibelman, they filed
    a pro se notice of appeal on November 2, 2017 and a pro se Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    ____________________________________________
    referred to Triad and Bare Feet Shoes each as “a defendant other than the
    answering defendant.” Appellees’ Answer, 11/17/15, at 3. It thus appears
    that the inclusion of Bare Feet Shoes in the title of Appellees’ answer was a
    typographical error. In any event, as stated above, Appellants conceded that
    Bare Feet Shoes did not file any answer in this case. N.T., 5/17/17, at 12.
    11 See Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2) (“The prothonotary shall immediately give written
    notice of the entry of . . . any . . . order or judgment to each party’s attorney
    of record[.]”)
    12See Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(b)(1), comment (if a defendant files a petition to open
    judgment more than 10 days after entry of judgment, the defendant must
    comply with Schultz, 
    477 A.2d 471
    ).
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    statement on December 7th.13 Subsequently, on December 20th, the trial court
    issued an order directing Appellants to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, but no
    ensuing statement was filed. The trial court filed an opinion on June 25, 2018.
    In this Court, Appellants initially proceeded pro se, until Attorney Zibelman
    entered his appearance on November 18, 2018. He filed an untimely brief
    and Appellees filed a joint brief. See Superior Court Order, 1/24/19 (denying
    Appellees’ motion to quash or dismiss appeal but noting that Appellants’
    amended brief was untimely filed).
    Preliminarily, we consider the trial court’s suggestion that all of
    Appellants’ issues are waived because their pro se Rule 1925(b) statement —
    which spanned 11 pages and raised 12 issues — was lengthy, confusing, and
    redundant. Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/18, at 12, citing Jiricko v. Geico Ins.
    Co., 
    947 A.2d 206
    , 210, 213 (Pa. Super. 2008) (pro se appellant’s issues are
    waived because        his court-ordered Rule     1925(b) statement was      “an
    incoherent, confusing, redundant, defamatory rant” and presented “no
    legitimate appellate issue”). We also review Attorney Zibelman’s failure to file
    a Rule 1925(b) statement after the court directed Appellants to file one.
    In this case, at no time did Attorney Zibelman withdraw from his
    ____________________________________________
    13  Appellants’ pro se notice of appeal was properly docketed.           See
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    151 A.3d 621
    , 624 (Pa. Super. 2016) (this
    Court must docket a pro se notice of appeal even when the appellant is
    represented by counsel), citing Superior Court O.P. § 65.24 (“A pro se notice
    of appeal received from the trial court shall be docketed, even in instances
    where the pro se was represented by counsel in the trial court.”).
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    representation of Appellants as “co-counsel.” Thus, the trial court clerk of
    courts should not have docketed Appellants’ pro se Rule 1925(b) statement,
    which was a legal nullity, and instead should have forwarded it to counsel.
    See Pa.R.A.P. 3304 (when a litigant, who is represented by an attorney,
    submits for filing a petition, motion, brief or any other type of pleading, it shall
    not be docketed but forwarded to counsel of record); Commonwealth v.
    Ellis, 
    626 A.2d 1137
    , 1139 (Pa. 1993) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to
    hybrid representation either at trial or on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Ali,
    
    10 A.3d 282
    , 293 (Pa. 2010) (pro se Rule 1925(b) statement by a represented
    criminal defendant is a legal nullity). The record and trial docket are silent,
    however, as to whether the statement was in fact forwarded to Attorney
    Zibelman.
    In any event, the trial court issued a Rule 1925(b) order, with which, if
    properly served, Appellants were required to comply. The record does not
    include any accompanying certificate of service, and although the trial docket
    includes an entry for “Notice given under Rule 236,” the docket does not
    indicate to whom notice was sent. Thus, we cannot conclude that the Rule
    1925(b) order was properly served on Attorney Zibelman. See In re Estate
    of Boyle, 
    77 A.3d 674
    , 677-678 (to find waiver for failure to file court-ordered
    Rule 1925(b) statement, trial docket must show that notice of 1925(b) order
    was served on the parties). For all of these reasons, we decline to find waiver
    on the basis of a confusing and redundant pro se Rule 1925(b) statement or
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    the lack of a counseled Rule 1925(b) statement. See 
    id.
    Appellants state their three issues for our review verbatim:
    1. Should a judgment of non pros be reversed where the trial
    court’s order granting the judgment was not supported by
    substantial evidence non pros was erroneous [sic] and an abuse
    of discretion because the trial court did not use the proper
    standard of review and was not supported by substantial
    evidence?
    2. Did the lower court abuse its discretion by issuing a preclusion
    order against Appellants by the Appellees when the Appellees’
    counsel served written discovery questions on August 2, 2016
    when Appellant was in the hospital and Appellees’ counsel only
    obtained one compel order prior to portraying Appellant as willfully
    attempting to avoid providing discovery answers or undergo a
    deposition in their Motion for Sanctions, and the lower court
    abused its discretion when it granted the motion without the lower
    court of November 29, 2016 obtained by the Appellees be vacated
    when the Appellees first served their discovery on August 2, 2016
    only obtained one discovery order which compelled Appellants[‘]
    written discovery and deposition testimony, which Appellants
    complied with, and Appellees except he willfully attempted was
    prepared to undergo, but Appellees’ counsel thwarted them from
    taking place and would not make any attempt to reschedule
    Appellants’ deposition prior to filing a Motion for Sanctions and
    failed to show the lower court any substantial evidence that
    Appellants were willfully non-compliant [sic]?
    3. Should Appellants be permitted to amend their complaint when
    the lower court abused its discretion by denying Appellants’
    motion to amend the caption . . . Appellee and Defendant, Bare
    Feet Shoes [sic] violated the clean hands doctrine by withholding
    the principals of Bare Feet Shoes, which was known to the
    Appellees when they answered Appellants’ complaint three
    months prior to the statute of limitation, which they knew and was
    in their exclusive control and Appellants?
    Appellants’ Brief at 5.
    In their first issue, Appellants allege that the trial court erred in applying
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    J-S11017-19
    Pa.R.C.P. 237.314 to determine whether their petition to strike the judgment
    of non pros was timely. Instead, Appellants contend, the court should have
    applied Pa.R.C.P. 3051(c) and Jacobs v. Halloran, 
    710 A.2d 1098
     (Pa.
    1998), the latter of which they aver applies to judgments of non pros
    “rendered as a result of ‘inactivity’ or a long delay in [the p]laintiffs
    prosecuting their . . . claims[.]” Appellants’ Brief at 21-22. Appellants also
    assert that the court abused its discretion in granting Appellees’ motion for
    summary judgment because the motion “was not supported by substantial
    evidence” and because Joan Axelrod, as trustee of the Joan Trust, was neither
    named as a moving party in the motion nor named in the trial court’s order.
    Id. at 23.
    “A trial court’s decision to deny a petition to open or strike a judgment
    of non pros is scrutinized on the abuse of discretion standard of appellate
    review.” Madrid v. Alpine Mt. Corp., 
    24 A.3d 380
    , 382 (Pa. Super. 2011).
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3(b)(1) states:
    If the petition [for relief from a judgment of non pros] is filed
    within ten days after the entry of a judgment of non pros on
    the docket, the court shall open the judgment if the proposed
    complaint states a meritorious cause of action.
    Pa.R.C.P. 237(b)(1) (emphasis added). The explanatory comment provides
    ____________________________________________
    14 Although Appellants’ brief averred that the trial court applied “Rule 236”
    (“Notice by Prothonotary of Entry of Order of Judgment”), the trial court’s
    opinion states that it applied Rule 237.3. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/18,
    at 11; Appellants’ Brief at 21.
    - 12 -
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    that if a petition to open judgment non pros is filed more than 10 days after
    judgment, the petition “is not within the scope of Rule 237.3(b)” and instead,
    the party must proceed pursuant to Schultz, 
    477 A.2d 471
    .             Pa.R.C.P.
    237(b)(1), comment; see also 
    id.
     (these procedures apply equally to default
    judgments and judgments non pros). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held,
    in Schultz:
    A petition to open a judgment is addressed to the equitable
    powers of the court and is a matter of judicial discretion. The
    court will only exercise this discretion when (1) the petition has
    been promptly filed; (2) a meritorious defense can be shown; and
    (3) the failure to appear can be excused.
    Schultz, 477 A.2d at 472.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3051 provides in pertinent part:
    (c) If the relief [from a judgment of non pros] sought includes
    the opening of the judgment of non pros for inactivity, the
    petition shall allege facts showing that [list of factors.]
    Note: The “inactivity” covered by this subdivision is governed
    by and subject to Jacobs v. Halloran, . . . 
    710 A.2d 1098
     ([Pa.]
    1998).
    Pa.R.C.P. 3051(c) (emphasis added). In Jacobs, the trial court terminated
    the plaintiff’s automobile-collision action because, following the complaint and
    discovery, no docket activity had occurred for two years. Jacobs, 710 A.2d
    at 1100. The court thus entered judgment of non pros against the plaintiff.
    Id. On appeal, our Supreme Court held:
    To dismiss a case for inactivity pursuant to a defendant’s motion
    for non pros there must first be a lack of due diligence on the part
    of the plaintiff in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
    Second, the plaintiff must have no compelling reason for the
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    delay. Finally, the delay must cause actual prejudice to the
    defendant. As always, this determination is to be made by the
    trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse
    of discretion.
    Id. at 1103 (emphasis added).
    Finally, we consider Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 401, which
    governs service:
    (a) . . . Original process shall be served within the
    Commonwealth within thirty days after . . . the filing of the
    complaint.
    (b)(1) If service within the Commonwealth is not made within
    the time prescribed by subdivision (a) . . . the prothonotary upon
    praecipe and upon presentation of the original process, shall
    continue its validity by . . . reinstating the complaint, by writing
    thereon . . . “reinstated” in the case of a complaint.
    Pa.R.C.P. 401(a), (b)(1).
    Contrary to Appellants’ argument, Jacobs and Rule 3051(c) are not
    applicable, because Jacobs addressed the prolonged lack of activity on the
    trial docket following the complaint. See Jacobs, 710 A.2d at 1100. Here,
    the trial court did not dismiss Appellants’ complaint for “inactivity” — both
    Appellants and Appellees filed numerous motions and responses in the five
    months leading to the judgment of non pros. Instead, the trial court specified
    that it was dismissing Appellants’ complaint because Appellants failed to serve
    the complaint on the last remaining defendant, Bare Feet Shoes. Trial Court
    Trial Work Sheet, 5/23/17; N.T., 5/17/17, at 24.
    In addition, because Appellants filed their petition 32 days after notice
    of the judgment was sent, the petition was not within the scope of Rule 237.3
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    (which applies to petitions filed within 10 days of judgment non pros), but was
    subject to Schultz.      See Pa.R.C.P. 237(b)(1), comment.        Pursuant to
    Schultz, Appellants had to demonstrate that: (1) their petition was promptly
    filed; (2) a meritorious defense can be shown; and (3) their failure to serve
    the complaint on Bare Feet Shoes can be excused. See Schultz, 477 A.2d at
    472. Appellants failed to establish this third prong.
    Appellants acknowledged that that they failed to serve their complaint
    on Bare Feet Shoes, and they did not seek reinstatement of their complaint
    against Bare Feet Shoes.       See Pa.R.C.P. 401(a), (b)(1).   Appellants’ sole
    attempt to remedy the failure was to file — 19 months after the affidavit of
    non-service and on the day before the scheduled trial — a motion to amend
    the complaint, but the motion admitted that it did not seek to join “any new
    entities” to the litigation.    See Appellants’ Motion to Amend Complaint,
    5/16/17, at 8.    On appeal, Appellants advance the same allegations of
    Appellees’ willful deception and withholding of information that were rejected
    by the trial court. Appellants would have this Court ignore the trial court’s
    reasoning that Appellants could have — but failed to — determine the proper
    parties through appropriate discovery. Upon review, we hold that the court
    did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ petition to strike the
    judgment non pros. See Madrid, 
    24 A.3d at 382
    ; Schultz, 477 A.2d at 472.
    See also Zehner v. Zehner, 
    195 A.3d 574
    , 581 n. 12 (Pa. Super. 2018) (this
    Court may affirm trial court’s ruling on any basis).
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    J-S11017-19
    We also find no merit to Appellant’s challenge to the order granting
    Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Although Appellants correctly point
    out that neither the motion nor the order specifically mentioned Joan Axelrod
    in her capacity as trustee of the Joan Trust, Appellants again would have this
    Court ignore the trial court’s reasoning — here, that Joan Axelrod was never
    a trustee of the Joan Trust and thus that alleged party did not exist. See N.T.,
    5/17/17, at 9-11; see also Appellees’ Answer, 11/17/15, at ¶ 7. Appellants
    have not argued that Joan Axelrod was in fact a trustee of the Joan Trust;
    thus, no relief is due.
    In Appellants’ second issue, they claim that the trial court erred in
    granting Appellees’ motion to preclude them from introducing any evidence at
    trial. Appellants maintain that they did provide written discovery, and deny
    canceling or failing to appear for an October 14, 2016 deposition. Appellants
    assert that it was Appellees who, on the eve of deposition, rescheduled the
    deposition to October 19, 2016. Appellants’ Brief at 25. Appellants contend
    that they agreed to the October 19th date, but Appellees refused their request
    that the deposition start at noon.      Appellants insist that “they never once
    refused to appear.” Id. at 27.
    This Court has explained:
    Generally, imposition of sanctions for a party’s failure to
    comply with discovery is subject to the discretion of the trial court,
    as is the severity of the sanctions imposed. . . .
    *     *      *
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    The trial court is responsible for overseeing “discovery
    between the parties and therefore it is within that court’s
    discretion to determine the appropriate measures necessary to
    insure adequate and prompt discovery of matters allowed by the
    Rules of Civil Procedure.” Discovery rulings are “uniquely within
    the discretion of the trial judge,” and will not be reversed unless
    they are deemed to represent an abuse of discretion.
    Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lin, 
    992 A.2d 132
    , 142 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
    omitted).
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4019(a)(1) states, in pertinent
    part: “The court may, on motion, make an appropriate order if . . . a party
    fails to serve answers [or] sufficient answers . . . to written interrogatories,”
    fails to appear, after proper notice, for a deposition, or “otherwise fails to
    make discovery or to obey an order of court respecting discovery.” Pa.R.C.P.
    4019(a)(1)(i), (iv), (viii). Further, Rule 4019(c)(2) specifies that the court
    may enter “an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support . . .
    designated claims[,] or prohibiting such party from introducing in evidence
    designated documents, things or testimony[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 4019(c)(2).
    In response to Appellants’ claim, the trial court detailed its rationale as
    follows:
    On February 1[8], 2016, this Court entered an Order compelling
    Appellants to provide full, complete, and verified discovery
    requests within thirty (30) days. On August 2, 2016, during the
    discovery period, . . . Appellees served Interrogatories and
    Requests for Production of Documents upon Appellants at
    Appellants’ counsel’s office. Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4006(a)(2)
    [Answers to Written Interrogatories by a Party], “the answering
    party shall serve a copy of the answers, and objections if any,
    within thirty days after the service of the interrogatories.”
    Therefore, Appellants’ answers and objections to the said requests
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    were due on or before September 2, 2016.
    After Appellants failed to serve answers and/or objections to
    . . . Appellees’ Interrogatories, . . . Appellees[ ] sent Appellants’
    counsel a letter on September 13, 2016, requesting delivery of
    Appellants’ full, complete, and verified discovery responses to . .
    . Appellees’ requests within ten (10) days. On September 16,
    2016, . . . Appellees[ ] requested discovery hearings regarding a
    Motion to Compel Deposition, Request for Admissions, and
    Answers and Production of Documents. On September 2[9],
    2016, the Court entered an Order compelling Appellants’
    deposition to be conducted on October 19, 2016. In accordance
    with Pa.R.C.P. 4007.1(a), notice of the Court’s Orders was
    forwarded to Appellants’ counsel via electronic delivery to the
    address of record with the Court. Appellants were notified of the
    deposition in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 4007.1(a) and were
    required to appear (“[a] party noticed to be deposed shall be
    required to appear without subpoena”), yet failed to do so. On
    October 18, 2016, Appellants’ counsel confirmed that his client
    would be present for the Court ordered depositions, but Appellant
    did not appear for the deposition.
    On September 2[9], 2016, the Court entered an Order
    compelling Appellants’ full, complete, and verified answers to
    interrogatories and responses to request for production of
    documents within twenty (20) days. Appellants failed to deliver
    verified answers to . . . Appellees’ discovery requests within
    twenty (20) days. Appellants neither filed for nor were granted a
    protective order with regard to . . . Appellees’ discovery demands.
    Appellants continued to demonstrate a course of conduct
    consistent with a blatant disregard for this Court’s Orders by
    refusing to comply with five (5) previously issued Orders. . . .
    Appellees then requested this Court to enter an Order imposing
    sanctions and precluding Appellants from introducing evidence or
    testimony in this matter at the time for trial/arbitration, which
    Judge Younge granted on November 28, 2016. Such an Order
    was appropriate here, as Appellants continuously disregarded . . .
    Appellees’ discovery requests.         [See Pa.R.C.P. 4019(a)(1)
    (a)(1)(i), (viii), (c)(2).]
    Appellants’ counsel failed to act in good faith with . . .
    Appellees[ ] to comply with this Court’s numerous Orders.
    Appellants’ counsel had a full opportunity to argue all of the facts
    at the discovery hearing before Judge Younge when the entry of
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    J-S11017-19
    the Court’s Preclusion Order occurred. . . . Appellees’ discovery
    demands were related to discoverable information pertaining to
    this case. The scope and number of the requests for information
    contained in the discovery requests were limited and specific and
    fell within the scope of discovery permitted under the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.         Appellants’ counsel
    continued to defy the Court’s repeated Orders and . . . Appellees
    were prejudiced in the preparation of the case because the
    information requested was not received. Pa.R.C.P. 4019(c)[(5)]
    provides that a Court acting under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
    Procedure may enter an Order “with regard to the failure to make
    discovery as is just.” Therefore, the Court did not err by entering
    a Preclusion Order here.
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/18, at 13-15.
    Further, with respect to Appellants’ claim that on October 13, 2016,
    Appellees rescheduled a deposition — that was to be held the following day —
    to October 19th, we note that it was the trial court, in a September 29, 2016,
    order, who ordered Appellants to appear for a deposition on October 19th at
    10:00 a.m. Order, 9/29/16. At the November 23, 2016 hearing, Appellees
    argued that: (1) on October 18th, Appellants’ counsel confirmed via telephone
    that Appellants would appear for the deposition; but (2) Appellants did not
    appear, and instead, 30 minutes after the deposition was scheduled to start,
    Appellants’ counsel called and asked if the deposition could be conducted at
    2:00. N.T., 11/23/16, at 6-7. Attorney Frank, who had appeared on behalf
    of Appellants, argued that she had emails that would explain why Appellants
    did not appear on October 19th. However, the court responded that Attorney
    Frank did not personally know what happened but instead was merely
    representing to the court what someone else had told her. Id. at 10-13.
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    J-S11017-19
    Given the extensive history — spanning more than 14 months — of
    Appellants’ failure to respond to Appellees’ discovery requests and especially
    their failure to comply with the trial court’s numerous orders compelling them
    to provide discovery and appear for depositions, we hold that the court did
    not abuse its discretion in granting Appellees’ motion for sanctions and
    precluding Appellants from introducing any evidence           at trial.   See
    4019(a)(1)(i), (iv), (viii), (c)(2); Rohm & Haas Co., 
    992 A.2d at 142
    .
    We thus turn to Appellants’ third and final issue, in which they argue
    that the trial court should have granted their petitions to amend the complaint
    and to strike the judgment non pros. Appellants claim that both Appellees
    and Bare Feet Shoes acted with “unclean hands” by willfully withholding
    “information which was in their exclusive control and forward[ing] Appellants’
    complaint to an address that they knew Bare Feet existed who was the same
    principal who owned Eternity Fashions [sic].” Appellants’ Brief at 27-28. See
    also Appellants’ Petition for Relief from Judgment of Non Pros, 6/26/17, at ¶¶
    55-56 (alleging that Meir Duke owned both of the Bare Feet Shoes entities
    and Eternity Fashion, and that Bare Feet Shoes “knowingly attempted to evade
    service of process by having another entity, Eternity Fashion, Inc. assume
    [its] lease obligations“).
    Although Appellants insist that Appellees withheld critical information
    from them, Appellants do not acknowledge, let alone refute, the trial court’s
    observation that Appellants could have ascertained this information through
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    J-S11017-19
    discovery. See N.T., 5/17/17, at 16-19. Appellants have not made any claim
    — before the trial court or this Court — that Appellees provided insufficient or
    incorrect responses to any properly-served interrogatories. Based on the trial
    court’s reasoning, we find no merit to Appellants’ claims of Appellees’ “unclean
    hands” and withholding of information.
    In sum, and for the reasons stated above, we affirm the order denying
    Appellants’ petition to strike the judgment non pros.
    Order affirmed.     Upon remand, the trial court shall issue and file a
    written order memorializing its May 17, 2017 opening default judgment
    against “Joan Axelrod, trustee of the Joan Axelrod 2012 Irrevocable Trust.”
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/9/19
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