Com. v. Stine, M. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S56044-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    MAX C. STINE                             :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 1851 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 29, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
    at No(s): CP-46-CR-0005987-2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                      FILED DECEMBER 10, 2019
    Appellant Max C. Stine appeals pro se from the order dismissing his
    untimely first petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.
    §§ 9541-9546.      Appellant claims that the abandonment of prior counsel
    provides an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. We affirm.
    The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as follows:
    [Appellant] was sentenced on September 18, 2014 following his
    conviction for first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated
    assault, two counts of recklessly endangering another person, and
    possessing an instrument of a crime. Those convictions were a
    result of the shooting death of Jesus Mendoza. On July 11, 2011,
    [Norristown Borough Police Officer Michael] Bishop hear[d]
    automatic gunfire while responding to another call. Upon his
    arrival [at] the location of the gunfire, he found [Mendoza]
    unresponsive, bleeding, and clutching a knife in his hand. Mr.
    Mendoza died of multiple gunshot wounds. Twenty-six shell
    casings were recovered from the scene and were [an] “AK type of
    ammunition.” [Appellant] had been at a party at Paul Hernandez’s
    apartment when Hernandez was involved in an altercation with a
    group of men. [Appellant] was informed of the altercation and
    J-S56044-19
    retrieved an AK-47 weapon from his vehicle. When Hernandez
    saw Mendoza later that night, he went to confront him with a
    knife, but before the men could physically engage, shots were
    fired and Mendoza collapsed. [Appellant] was seen with the AK-
    47 before Hernandez helped [Appellant] dispose of the gun. Two
    bystanders, who were witnesses, were injured by stray gunfire.
    Following his conviction, [Appellant] filed a direct appeal and the
    Superior Court affirmed on July 21, 2016. Thereafter, [Appellant]
    failed to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court. On October 3, 2017, [Appellant] sent a letter to
    [the trial judge] asking that a new attorney be appointed “for my
    appeal.” On or about October 18, 2018, [Appellant] wrote another
    letter to the [c]ourt seeking a new attorney for his appeal because
    he claimed his current attorney would not speak to him. On
    November 8, 2018, [Appellant] sent another letter to the [c]ourt
    stating “I’m at my PCRA right now.” No PCRA [petition] had been
    filed at that time. [Appellant] again requested a new attorney.
    Finally, on December 31, 2018, [Appellant] sent [the c]ourt a
    letter stating he had been abandoned by his attorney, that his
    PCRA was time barred, and that he “needed his appeal rights
    back.” The court construed that letter as a request for some form
    of relief possibly cognizable under the PCRA, and appointed
    [PCRA] counsel [on January 17, 2019]. On May 1, 2019, [PCRA]
    counsel . . . filed a Finley[1] Letter and Petition to Withdraw as
    Counsel. On May 2, 2019, [the PCRA c]ourt [granted PCRA
    counsel’s request to withdraw and] filed its Notice of lntent to
    Dismiss, and on May 29, 2019, following a response, [the PCRA
    c]ourt dismissed the Petition.
    PCRA Ct. Op., 7/16/19, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
    Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal, which was postmarked
    on June 10, 2019. On July 11, 2019, Appellant timely filed a court-ordered
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The
    PCRA court filed a responsive opinion on July 16, 2019.          The PCRA court
    ____________________________________________
    1   Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -2-
    J-S56044-19
    concluded that prior counsel did not abandon Appellant, and Appellant’s own
    inaction resulted in his failure to file a timely PCRA petition.
    Appellant now raises one question for our review:
    Was counsel ineffective for failing to file a timely PCRA petition
    after advising Appellant that he would file the same, resulting in
    the loss of Appellant’s appeal rights?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted).
    Appellant contends that he received appointed counsel for his direct
    appeal.2    
    Id. at 6.
        After this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence,
    Appellant insists that direct appeal counsel promised to “file a counseled PCRA
    petition on [Appellant’s] behalf, and that [Appellant] should have his family
    provide [direct appeal counsel] with a list of character witnesses that [direct
    appeal counsel] could use in perfecting the PCRA” petition.          
    Id. at 6-7.
    Although his family provided the list of character witnesses, Appellant claims
    that direct appeal counsel subsequently abandoned him, refusing to respond
    to any correspondence. 
    Id. at 7.
    Appellant asserts that he did not learn about
    direct appeal counsel’s failure to file a PCRA petition until after the PCRA court
    appointed new counsel. 
    Id. Appellant argues
    that “[a]lthough [direct appeal counsel] was not
    appointed or retained to file a PCRA petition, he nonetheless was required to
    do the same after he made the specific promise to Appellant that he would.”
    
    Id. Appellant further
    argues that direct appeal counsel’s “failure to file
    ____________________________________________
    2Specifically, the trial court appointed Francis M. Walsh, Esq. to represent
    Appellant on May 29, 2015.
    -3-
    J-S56044-19
    Appellant’s first PCRA petition constituted ineffectiveness per se, as it
    completely deprived [Appellant] of any consideration of his collateral claims
    under the PCRA.” 
    Id. at 8.
    Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Bennett,
    
    930 A.2d 1264
    (Pa. 2007), for the proposition that counsel’s abandonment
    can constitute a newly discovered “fact” and trigger an exception to the PCRA’s
    time-bar. 
    Id. Based upon
    the foregoing, Appellant maintains that this Court
    must vacate the order dismissing his PCRA petition and remand the matter
    “to permit Appellant the opportunity to file a timely PCRA petition.” 
    Id. at 9.
    Our standard of review for the dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to
    “whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the
    PCRA court’s decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 
    90 A.3d 1
    , 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
    It is well-settled that “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional
    [pre]requisite.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    111 A.3d 171
    , 175 (Pa. Super.
    2015) (citation omitted). “A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent
    petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment
    becomes final.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    “A judgment is deemed final ‘at the
    conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
    Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
    expiration of time for seeking the review.’”         
    Id. (quoting 42
    Pa.C.S. §
    9545(b)(3)).
    -4-
    J-S56044-19
    Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed more than one year after a
    judgment of sentence becomes final only if the petitioner pleads and proves
    one of the following three statutory exceptions:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
    or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
    the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
    of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
    by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
    of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
    has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “Any petition invoking an exception provided
    in paragraph (1) shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have
    been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).3
    In   Bennett,      the   Pennsylvania      Supreme   Court   held   that   the
    abandonment of a client by counsel constitutes a “fact” within the meaning of
    Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). 
    Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1274
    . For purposes of Section
    9545(b)(1)(ii), abandonment means the complete deprivation of the
    petitioner’s right to review by a court. See Commonwealth v. Peterson,
    
    192 A.3d 1123
    , 1131 (Pa. 2018).                Further, Bennett does not relieve a
    ____________________________________________
    3 On October 24, 2018, the General Assembly amended Section 9545(b)(2),
    and extended the time for filing a petition from sixty days to one year from
    the date the claim could have been presented. See 2018 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act
    2018-146 (S.B. 915), effective December 24, 2018. The amendment applies
    only to claims arising one year before the effective date of this section,
    December 24, 2017, or thereafter.
    -5-
    J-S56044-19
    petitioner from exercising due diligence when discovering the fact of counsel’s
    abandonment. See 
    Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1274
    .
    Instantly, the PCRA court determined that Appellant’s December 31,
    2018 pro se letter constituted an untimely first PCRA petition, and Appellant
    could not overcome the PCRA’s time-bar:
    [Appellant] had until August 20, 2017 to file his PCRA petition, or
    one year from the date his judgement of sentence became final.
    [Appellant] sent his first letter to the [PCRA c]ourt on October 3,
    2017. Even if that letter could be construed as a PCRA [petition],
    . . . it would be time barred. [Appellant’s] letter of December 31,
    2018, which contained a request for relief possibly cognizable
    under the PCRA was thus much too late. Consequently, the
    petition was facially untimely.
    *    *    *
    [Appellant] claims in his letters to [the PCRA c]ourt that he was
    abandoned by counsel. . . . Such claims are belied by letters
    attached as Exhibit D and E to PCRA [c]ounsel’s Petition to
    Withdraw as Counsel and Finley Letter. Exhibit D is [a letter from
    Appellant to direct appeal counsel, containing] negotiations over
    the content of what [Appellant] wishes direct appeal counsel to
    include in his PCRA [petition], and the letter also asks counsel to
    amend [Appellant’s] PCRA [petition].         This letter is dated
    November 8, 2018, well outside the [period for filing a timely
    PCRA petition].
    *    *    *
    Further, direct appeal counsel’s [December 7, 2018] response to
    that letter, in Exhibit E, memorializes an agreement that direct
    appeal counsel would file a PCRA [petition] if he received a list of
    character witnesses from [Appellant’s] mother. When [Appellant]
    failed to provide those witnesses until after the PCRA [petition]
    was time barred, direct appeal counsel informed [Appellant’s]
    family that no PCRA [petition] could be filed. Thus, [Appellant’s]
    own failures led to the failure to file a PCRA petition, not those of
    counsel.
    -6-
    J-S56044-19
    PCRA Ct. Op. at 4-5 (citation omitted).
    Our review of the record, including PCRA counsel’s Finley letter,
    confirms the PCRA court’s findings. Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, direct
    appeal counsel did not abandon him.             Rather, Appellant and direct appeal
    counsel exchanged letters in 2018.             Significantly, direct appeal counsel’s
    December 2018 letter informed Appellant that (1) he had requested a list of
    character witnesses from Appellant in June 2017; (2) Appellant’s mother did
    not provide the list until January 2018; and (3) counsel subsequently informed
    Appellant’s father that “we lacked jurisdiction to file a PCRA” petition. 4 See
    Pet. to Withdraw as Counsel, 5/1/19, at Ex. E. Therefore, the record belies
    Appellant’s assertion of abandonment, and Appellant does not have a basis to
    invoke Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See 
    Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1131
    ; 
    Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1274
    .        Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing
    Appellant’s petition as untimely.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/10/19
    ____________________________________________
    4 Direct appeal counsel also advised Appellant to consider filing a habeas
    corpus petition in federal court. See Pet. to Withdraw as Counsel at Ex. E.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1851 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 12/10/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/10/2019