Com. v. Williams, D. ( 2019 )

J-S51011-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DAVON D. WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1961 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 23, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0005056-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2019
Davon D. Williams appeals from the August 23, 2018 judgment of
sentence entered after the trial court, sitting as factfinder, convicted him of
possession of heroin with intent to deliver (“PWID”) and possession of drug
paraphernalia.1 On appeal, he argues the court erred in refusing to suppress
evidence gained during a traffic stop. He contends his right to be free of
unreasonable searches was violated when the police officer searched the
vehicle his girlfriend (“the driver”) was driving based on three circumstances:
(1) a smell of marijuana, (2) conflicting stories from Williams and the driver
regarding their destination, and (3) the driver did not know where her one-
year-old child was. We affirm.
____________________________________________
1
See 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30) and (32) respectively.
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Just before midnight on a late summer night, Pennsylvania State
Trooper David Long was in a stationary position observing traffic on Interstate
81. He initiated a traffic stop of Williams’s girlfriend’s vehicle when he
observed that its taillights were not on. He asked the driver to operate her
headlights and confirmed that the taillights were in fact operational.
Williams concedes, for purposes of this appeal, that Trooper Long’s
decision to stop the vehicle was appropriate under the law. See Appellant’s
Brief, at 19. Therefore, the crux of this appeal concerns what happened after
the initial stop.
While conversing with the driver, Trooper Long noticed a smell of
marijuana emanating from the vehicle. As per his habit, Trooper Long
summoned his partner, Trooper Travis Martin, to confirm the odor of
marijuana.
Trooper Martin agreed that an odor of marijuana was present in the
vehicle, and the troopers informed Williams and the driver that they were
going to search the car based on this observation. While frisking Williams,
Trooper Martin observed marijuana residue on Williams’s shirt. Williams
admitted to having smoked marijuana earlier in the evening, but denied that
he had done it in the vehicle.
Trooper Martin’s systematic search of the passenger compartment of
the vehicle did not reveal any contraband. When he searched the trunk,
however, he discovered a duffel bag underneath a baby stroller. The duffel
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bag contained 10,005 bags of heroin. The Troopers placed Williams under
arrest and discovered a marijuana grinder in his pocket.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant's
motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the vehicle search. Trooper
Long testified and the dashboard camera from his cruiser was admitted into
evidence. After the trial court denied relief, the parties proceeded to a bench
trial. The trial court found Williams guilty and imposed sentence. This
timely appeal followed.
Williams raises a single issue for our review, arguing that the evidence
recovered from the search of the trunk should have been suppressed:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE STATE POLICE
ILLEGALLY EXTENDED THE DETENTION OF THE VEHICLE,
ITS DRIVER AND APPELLANT (THE PASSENGER) AND THEN
SEARCHED THE ENTIRE VEHICLE, INCLUDING THE TRUNK
AND CLOSED BAG INSIDE, WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE
OR SEARCH WARRANT BASED PRIMARILY ON THE ODOR
OF BURNT MARIJUANA, ALL OF WHICH VIOLATED HIS
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
Appellant’s Brief, at 5.
We review a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion to
determine whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. See Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa.
2007). Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court,
we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the
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evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context
of the record as a whole. See id.Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the
record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if
the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. See id. In contrast, the
suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court,
and our duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the suppression court are subject
to plenary review. See Commonwealth v. McClellan, 178 A.3d 874, 880–
81 (Pa. Super. 2018).
Ordinarily, our scope of review is limited to the suppression hearing
transcript. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013). In his brief, counsel for
Williams asks this Court to also consider the evidence adduced at the bench
trial, which included the testimony of Trooper Martin; only Trooper Long
testified at the suppression hearing. Williams is correct that L.J. provides for
an exception when a party explicitly moves to augment the suppression record
with evidence from a subsequent trial. See id., at 1088 n.17. Here, Williams
explicitly moved for reconsideration of the suppression motion in light of
Trooper Martin’s trial testimony. See Post-Sentence Motion, 8/31/18, at ¶ 19.
The court did not address this request when it denied the post-sentence
motion.
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The Commonwealth contends that we may not review Trooper Martin’s
trial testimony. It argues that even under the exception contained in footnote
17 of L.J., the evidence sought to be added to the suppression record must
have been “previously unavailable.” See id., at 1088 n.17. Since defense
counsel explicitly declined to call Trooper Martin at the close of the suppression
hearing, see N.T., 4/18/18, at 63, the Commonwealth believes his trial
testimony was available for the suppression hearing. See Commonwealth’s
Brief, at 9 (unpaginated).
We conclude it is not necessary to confront the issue of availability in
this case. Even if we include Trooper Martin’s trial testimony in our review, we
do not find that the suppression court erred in refusing to suppress the heroin
found in the trunk of the vehicle.
As noted above, Williams concedes the legality of the initial traffic stop.
He presents two separate arguments regarding the subsequent search. First,
he argues that Trooper Long did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to
prolong the traffic stop.
A law enforcement officer may detain an individual, and extend a vehicle
stop, in order to conduct an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects
that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct. See Commonwealth v.
Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004). Our Supreme Court has noted that
“if there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation (based on probable cause),
additional suspicion may arise before the initial stop's purpose has been
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fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to investigate the new
suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 115 n.5 (Pa. 2008)
(citations omitted).
In order to determine whether a law enforcement officer had reasonable
suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In re D.M.,
781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). In making this determination, we must
give due weight to the specific reasonable inferences the law enforcement
officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. See
Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. 1999).
The totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when taken
together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Id. As our
Supreme Court reasoned in Cook, while “certain facts, taken alone, do not
establish reasonable suspicion ... a combination of these facts may establish
reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 677. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court
recognized in In Interest of A.A., 195 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2018), “the odor of
marijuana alone, particularly in a moving vehicle, is sufficient to support at
least reasonable suspicion, if not the more stringent requirement of probable
cause” that an individual is involved in criminal activity. Id. at 904.
Here, Trooper Long testified that while he was talking to the driver, he
“detected an odor of marijuana” from inside the vehicle. N.T., 4/18/18, at 10.
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This observation provided a sufficient basis to allow Trooper Long to conclude
he had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred in the vehicle.
Appellant next argues that the troopers did not have probable cause to
search the trunk of the vehicle. Our Supreme Court has adopted the federal
automobile exception, which permits police to conduct a warrantless search
of a vehicle if police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of criminal activity; no exigency beyond the inherent mobility of a
motor vehicle is required. See Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855,
865 n.11 (Pa. 2018). The level of probable cause necessary for warrantless
searches of automobiles is the same as that required to obtain a search
warrant. Commonwealth v. Lechner, 685 A.2d 1014, 1016 (1996); see
also Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 104 (Pa. 2014).
Probable cause does not demand the certainty we associate with
formal trials. Rather, a determination of probable cause requires
only that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place. [T]he evidence required to establish probable
cause for a warrantless search must be more than a mere
suspicion or a good faith belief on the part of the police officer.
Commonwealth v. Scott, 210 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an odor may be
sufficient to establish probable cause. Commonwealth v. Stoner, 344 A.2d
633, 635 (Pa. Super. 1975) (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 85 S.Ct. 741 (1965)). “In Stoner, we analogized a ‘plain smell’ concept
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with that of plain view and held that where an officer is justified in being where
he is, his detection of the odor of marijuana is sufficient to establish probable
cause.” Commonwealth v. Stainbrook, 471 A.2d 1223, 1225 (Pa. Super.
1984) (citations omitted).
Once again, Trooper Long testified that he detected the odor of
marijuana in the car. N.T. 4/18/18, at 10. The driver told him that she was
driving to Harrisburg to pick up her one-year-old son. See id., at 27-28.
However, the driver did not know exactly where her son was in Harrisburg.
See id. Furthermore, Williams informed the troopers that he and the driver
were on their way to Pittsburgh to pick up their son. See id., at 28. Under
these circumstances, we conclude the troopers had probable cause to search
the vehicle for marijuana.
Williams asserts that none of these circumstances are individually
sufficient to establish probable cause. Williams’s argument contravenes our
standard of review. We do not consider each circumstance in isolation. Rather,
we consider the totality of the circumstances. So, even assuming that Williams
is correct that none of these circumstances are sufficient on their own, we
conclude they are sufficient taken together as a whole.
Williams contends that, even if the troopers had probable cause to
search the passenger compartment of the vehicle for marijuana, they did not
have probable cause to search the trunk. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982), the Supreme Court of the United States held
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that, “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may
conceal the object of the search.” Id. at 825, 102 S.Ct. at 2173. Thus, “[t]he
scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the
nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is
defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable
cause to believe that it may be found.” Id. at 824, 102 S.Ct. at 2172. The
Ross decision has been frequently cited by the courts of this Commonwealth.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Epoca, 668 A.2d 578, 582 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(noting that when police have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime
is located in a lawfully stopped vehicle, they are empowered to search every
part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search).
Therefore, under Ross, once Troopers Long and Martin developed
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, the scope of
the search was not limited to the main compartment, but extended to every
part of the vehicle that could possibly conceal the object of the search. See
id. Since Trooper Long was unable to determine the origin of the marijuana
odor, a search of the entire car, including the trunk, was warranted.
Williams argues that under Commonwealth v. Scott, 210 A.3d 359(Pa. Super. 2019), the troopers did not have probable cause to search the
trunk of the vehicle. To the contrary, this Court in Scott conceded, “that if a
police officer possesses probable cause to search a motor vehicle, he may then
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conduct a search of the trunk compartment without seeking to obtain probable
cause relative to the particularized area.” See id., at 364. However, the Scott
majority affirmed the suppression of a firearm found in the trunk of the vehicle
because the still smoking marijuana blunt found in the passenger
compartment was an obvious cause of the odor of marijuana emanating from
the passenger compartment. See id.
Williams asserts that Trooper Martin’s trial testimony established an
obvious source for the odor of marijuana. Trooper Martin testified that
Williams’s clothes smelled of marijuana, and contained marijuana residue.
See N.T. 4/18/18, at 59. Williams contends that given this obvious source of
marijuana odor, the troopers had no probable cause to continue searching the
car for marijuana.
We disagree. Trooper Martin’s testimony indicates that he only smelled
the marijuana odor on Williams when he was performing a frisk. This is not
equivalent to the still smoking marijuana blunt found in Scott. Trooper Martin
did not testify that he detected the odor in Williams’s clothing before frisking
him. Nor did Trooper Martin testify that the odor emanating from the clothing
was strong or lingering.
Just as significantly, we note that Scott involved review of an order
suppressing evidence. As a result, the Scott panel was required to review the
evidence of record in a light most favorable to the defendant. Here, we are
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reviewing an order denying suppression. As noted previously, we must review
the evidence of record here in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Under these circumstances, we conclude Scott is distinguishable.
Reviewing the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the suppression court was entitled to find that there was no
obvious source found in the passenger compartment for the odor of marijuana.
The troopers were therefore justified in searching the trunk.
In summary, the evidence presented to the trial court justified (1) the
validity of the initial traffic stop, (2) the extension of the stop which was based
on the requisite reasonable suspicion, and (3) the warrantless search of the
vehicle. The investigation into the trunk did not exceed the permissible
bounds of the search. We therefore reject Appellant's claim that the trial court
failed to suppress the evidence of the contents of the duffel bag.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/18/2019
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