Com. v. Spence, R. ( 2019 )

J-S49004-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ROBERT SPENCE,
Appellant No. 2190 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 1, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010155-2009
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2019
Appellant, Robert Spence, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of
sentence of an aggregate term of 17 to 34 years’ incarceration, imposed after
he was convicted, following a non-jury trial, of interference with child custody,
promoting prostitution, corrupting the morals of a minor, trafficking of
persons, and sexual exploitation of children. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the facts of this case, as follows:
The incidents in this case took place from December 2008
through March 2009[,] and a separate incident took place in
January of 2012. In December 2008, N.S. (hereinafter “[N.S.]”)
ran away from home. At their first in[-]person meeting[,] [N.S.]
and a friend entered into the car of Appellant and were asked by
Appellant if they wanted to work for him … [and] they agreed.
Upon arriv[ing at] Appellant[’s] home[,] there was another
discussion in which Appellant described to [N.S.] that she was
going to make money for him as a prostitute and she agreed.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S49004-19
During this time of prostitution, Appellant gave guidelines to
[N.S.] to follow and controlled [N.S.] in various aspects of [her]
life[,] including where [N.S.] lived, [her] attendance (or lack
thereof) [at] school, the money [she] earned, where she went,
etc. For a period of about two (2) months[,] [N.S.] worked for
Appellant[, during which time] he would drive [N.S.] to various
locations in the [c]ity and [N.S.] stood on the corner waiting to
make money. [N.S.] was expected to work as much as possible,
almost every night, and Appellant would threaten [N.S.] with
physical harm if she did not cooperate with [his] demands. Once
done for the night[,] [N.S.] would give the money [she] earned to
Appellant and he would provide [N.S.] with clothes and jewelry.
Additionally, one[]night Appellant had [N.S.] view a movie about
prostitution and gave her the idea of going to Atlantic City to
prostitute for a higher price. Although [N.S.] did leave on a few
occasions, [she] came back and chose to stay because Appellant
had issued many threats of harm to her and her family.
On January 12, 2009, Appellant was pulled over by police
for possession of a stolen car with [N.S.] in the car. After being
taken down to the police station[, N.S.] was released to the care
of her mother. After [N.S.] returned home she told her mother
she had been prostituting for Appellant, the police were notified,
and a statement was made on January 23, 2009. … [N.S.]
positively identified Appellant through a photograph [and stated]
that he was the person she had been working for while
prostituting. A warrant was issued for his arrest[,] and Appellant
was arrested on March 2, 2009.
Upon Appellant’s arrest and incarceration, he attempted to
send a letter to a friend. In the letter[,] Appellant describe[d]
[N.S.] and [made] reference to her age. Further, … Appellant
discusse[d] prostitution [and] trafficking, and ask[ed] the
recipient to keep … [N.S.] away so she d[id] not show up to court.
The mail was labeled “frank” and returned back to the sender. On
January 20, 2012[,] a correction officer found the letter in the
desk of the … unit where Appellant was believed to be housed.
Based upon review of the contents of the letter[,] the correction
officer gave the letter to his sergeant.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/20/18, at 3-4.
On February 10, 2014, Appellant’s non-jury trial began. At the close
thereof, the court convicted him of the above-stated offenses. On July 1,
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2014, Appellant was sentenced to the aggregate term stated supra. He filed
a timely post-sentence motion challenging, inter alia, the weight of the
evidence supporting his convictions and discretionary aspects of his sentence.
Appellant’s motion was denied by operation of law on November 10, 2014. He
did not file an appeal. However, he subsequently filed a timely petition under
the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, seeking the
reinstatement of his appellate rights, which was granted on June 22, 2017.
Appellant filed the present, nunc pro tunc appeal on July 7, 2017, and he
complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court filed its Rule 1925(a)
opinion on November 20, 2018.
Herein, Appellant states four issues for our review:
I. Whether the court erred in failing to grant Appellant’s post-
sentence motion on the grounds that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence and in failing to grant defense counsel’s
oral motion for judgment of acquittal.
II. Whether the guilty verdicts on the charges of interference with
custody of a child, corruption of the morals of a minor, trafficking
of persons and sexual exploitation of children were contrary to
law.
III. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to
reconsider sentence.
IV. Whether the court erred in denying the motion to preclude the
letter in question based on multiple evidentiary issues.
Appellant’s Brief at 9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Appellant first challenges the weight of the evidence to support his
convictions.
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A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an
appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion;
it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. It is well[-]settled that the jury is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight of
the evidence claim is only warranted where the jury’s verdict is so
contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice. In
determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review
is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion was properly
exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and
inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-36 (Pa. 2011) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellant first avers that the court erred by finding N.S.’s testimony
credible where “[d]efense counsel impeached [N.S.] not once, not twice, but
five times.” Appellant’s Brief at 22 (emphasis in original). While Appellant
provides citations to the transcript of where these alleged impeachments
occurred, he offers no discussion about the points on which N.S. was
impeached, or why those moments during her cross-examination cast doubt
on the veracity of her testimony overall. Accordingly, we are unconvinced by
Appellant’s bald assertion that the impeachment of N.S., in and of itself,
“demonstrates the lack of evidentiary support for the court’s verdict.” Id.Additionally, his remaining arguments attack the sufficiency of the evidence,
rather than its weight. See id. at 22 (arguing that the Commonwealth failed
to prove he enticed or took N.S. away from her mother); id. at 24 (claiming
the evidence did not establish that he knew N.S. was a minor); id. at 25
(asserting that the Commonwealth’s evidence did not establish that he forced
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N.S. to prostitute herself). “A challenge to the weight of the evidence, in
contrast to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, concedes that there
is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 853
A.2d 1020, 1027 (Pa. Super. 2004). Because Appellant has offered no
convincing challenge to the weight of the evidence to support his convictions,
his first issue does not warrant relief.
Next, Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions. Initially, we conclude that Appellant waived his sufficiency claim
by failing to specify, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, what element(s) of his
crimes the Commonwealth failed to prove. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement,
1/8/18, at 2 (“The verdicts were contrary to law on the charges of
[i]nterference with [c]ustody of a [c]hild, [corrupting the morals of a minor],
[t]rafficking of [p]ersons[,] and [s]exual [e]xploitation of [c]hildren. The
elements of the offenses were not made out as articulated by trial counsel in
closing arguments.”); Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257
(Pa. Super. 2008) (“If [an a]ppellant wants to preserve a claim that the
evidence was insufficient, then the [Rule] 1925(b) statement needs to specify
the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.”).
Nevertheless, even had Appellant preserved his sufficiency claim, we
would deem it meritless. In Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089 (Pa.
Super. 2003), we explained that:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all evidence admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to
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enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not
weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Id. at 1092 (citations omitted).
First, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove the crime
of interference with custody of a child, which is defined as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he
knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age
of 18 years from the custody of its parent, guardian or other lawful
custodian, when he has no privilege to do so.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2904(a). Notably, a defense to this crime is that “the child, being
at the time not less than 14 years old, was taken away at its own instigation
without enticement and without purpose to commit a criminal offense with or
against the child[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2904(b)(2).
Here, Appellant contends that N.S.’s testimony demonstrated that she
voluntarily left her mother’s home and stayed with Appellant of her own
volition and, therefore, he did not “take or entice[]” her away from her
mother. Appellant’s Brief at 27. However, this Court has held that “it is the
interruption of lawful custody, and not merely the ‘taking[,’] … that constitutes
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the statutory offense.” Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 599 A.2d 1329, 1331
(Pa. Super. 1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 544 A.2d 1384,
1388 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding that, “it is not merely the act of taking or
enticing that constitutes the offense, but rather the continued maintenance
of the child outside of the custodian’s dominion”)) (emphasis added).
In the case sub judice, N.S. testified that during her first encounter with
Appellant, he told her she was going to work as a prostitute for him. N.T.,
2/25/14, at 71. Appellant forced N.S. to live with him, and said that he would
kill her if she tried to leave or broke any of his rules. Id. at 71-72. N.S.
testified that she did not feel free to leave Appellant’s home and return to her
mother because Appellant had threatened to hurt her if she did. Id. at 80.
We would deem this evidence sufficient to demonstrate that Appellant
maintained custody of N.S. for the purpose of committing a criminal offense,
thus interfering with the custody of N.S.’s mother. As such, we would
conclude that his conviction under section 2904 must stand.
Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions of corrupting the morals of a minor and sexual exploitation of
a child, which are defined, respectively, as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--
(1)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever,
being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act
corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less
than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or
encourages any such minor in the commission of any crime,
or who knowingly assists or encourages such minor in
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violating his or her parole or any order of court, commits a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits the offense of sexual
exploitation of children if he procures for another person a child
under 18 years of age for the purpose of sexual exploitation.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6320(a). Section 6320 defines “procure” as “[t]o obtain or make
available for sexual exploitation.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6320(c).
In this case, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth’s evidence was
insufficient to support these offenses because N.S. “admitted to lying to him
about her age. She also verified Appellant did not learn of her true age until
later, after she began working for him.” Appellant’s Brief at 28. Appellant
seems to suggest that because he believed N.S. was 18 when he met her, he
could not be convicted of the above-stated offenses. Notably, Appellant cites
no legal authority to support this theory. Moreover, he admits that the
evidence established that he learned N.S. was a minor during the time that
she was working for him as a prostitute. Id. Therefore, we would deem the
evidence sufficient to prove that he procured a minor for sexual exploitation
and corrupted the morals of a minor.
Finally, Appellant contends, in a three-sentence argument, that his
conviction for trafficking of persons was not supported by sufficient evidence
because N.S. “explicitly stated that she willingly worked for Appellant.” Id.
(citing N.T., 2/25/14, at 103). In support of this argument, Appellant cites a
portion of his cross-examination of N.S., wherein he confronted her with her
out-of-court statement to police that Appellant did not force her into
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prostitution. However, he wholly disregards that at trial, N.S. testified that
Appellant forced her into prostitution by threatening to kill her if she told
anyone or tried to leave. N.T., 2/25/14, at 71-72. The trial court, as the fact-
finder, was free to credit this testimony and disbelieve N.S.’s contrary
statement to police during their investigation of Appellant’s crimes. See Troy,
supra.In Appellant’s fourth issue, he challenges the discretionary aspects of
his sentence, contending that the court imposed an excessive sentence
without considering mitigating factors, his mental health issues, or his
rehabilitative needs. Again, Appellant has waived this claim for our review.
In his post-sentence motion, Appellant stated that he was challenging his
sentence because he “does have remorse for the victim of the crime he
committed” and he “is motivated to use his incarcerated time to better himself
in order to be a productive member of society.” Post-Sentence Motion,
7/11/14, at 4 (unnumbered). Appellant did not mention his mental health
issues, nor claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs.
Additionally, in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, he generally averred that
“[t]he [c]ourt was in error in denying the [m]otion to reconsider [s]entence.
The sentence was unduly harsh and unreasonable.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
Statement at 2 (unnumbered). Again, Appellant made no mention of the
court’s failure to consider his mental health or rehabilitative needs.
Consequently, we deem Appellant’s sentencing issue waived. See
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that
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the right to appeal a discretionary aspect of sentence is not absolute and is
waived if the appellant does not challenge it in post-sentence motions or by
raising the claim during the sentencing proceedings); Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in
accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).1
In Appellant’s fifth and final issue, he contends that the trial court erred
by admitting a letter ostensibly written by him while incarcerated prior to trial,
in which he discussed N.S. and “the alleged trafficking operation.” Appellant’s
Brief at 31. Appellant vaguely claims that the admission of the letter “violated
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 402, 403, 404, 405, 901, 1001, 1002, and
____________________________________________
1 Notwithstanding waiver, we would conclude that Appellant failed to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the court. Notably, he does not
elaborate on his bald assertion that “the sentence was inconsistent with [his]
rehabilitative needs[,]” nor discuss the mitigating factors or “mental health
concerns” that the court failed to consider. Appellant’s Brief at 30. Appellant’s
undeveloped argument would fail to convince us that the trial court erred by
imposing his sentence, the basis for which it explains as follows:
In anticipation of sentencing, this [c]ourt reviewed the Pre-
Sentence Report. The defense attorney recommended thirty (30)
months with credit for time served. The Commonwealth
recommended twenty-four and [one] half (24½) to forty-nine (49)
years of incarceration. In this case, Appellant was sentenced to a
total of seventeen (17) to thirty-four (34) years with credit for
time served. This [c]ourt’s sentence was within the guidelines.
Further, Appellant’s sentence was justified by the physically and
emotionally damaging acts that Appellant was found to have
committed against [N.S.], the need to protect the public from
Appellant, and the potential for continuing criminal behavior to be
exhibited by Appellant.
TCO at 9.
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those pertaining to ‘authenticity and a lack of foundation.’” Id. Appellant also
contends that “the Commonwealth made no attempt to authenticate the letter
as actually written by Appellant[,]” and that “the letter needlessly presented
cumulative evidence of the alleged trafficking activity.” Id. at 31-32.
Appellant claims he was prejudiced by the admission of this evidence because
the letter “spoke of alleged trafficking activity for which Appellant did not stand
trial.” Id. at 31.
Once again, Appellant’s claim is waived. In his Rule 1925(b) statement,
Appellant vaguely stated that “[t]he [c]ourt … was in error in denying the
Motion to Preclude the letter in question based on multiple evidentiary issues.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement at 2 (unnumbered). Clearly, this generic claim
is insufficient to preserve Appellant’s specific arguments.
In any event, even if not waived, we would deem Appellant’s evidentiary
claim meritless. Aside from listing rules of evidence, Appellant offers no
discussion of those rules or how they were violated. He also fails to cite any
legal authority to support his cursory argument that the Commonwealth failed
to properly authenticate the letter, or that he was prejudiced by its admission.
Therefore, we would conclude that Appellant has not demonstrated an abuse
of discretion by the court. Commonwealth v. Young, 989 A.2d 920,
924 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not
reverse the trial court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.”) (citation
omitted).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/18/19
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