Com. v. Smith, A. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • J-S20041-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    AUSTIN SMITH                               :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 1741 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 1, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000463-2016
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.:                            FILED MAY 31, 2019
    Appellant, Austin Smith, appeals from the order entered in the Jefferson
    County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition brought
    pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
    9546. We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
    June 24, 2016, police entered Appellant’s home pursuant to a search warrant
    and found marijuana and thirteen firearms.          On March 1, 2017, Appellant
    entered a negotiated guilty plea to thirteen counts of persons not to possess
    a firearm.1 Appellant signed a written colloquy, and the court conducted an
    oral colloquy on the record. That same day, the court sentenced Appellant as
    ____________________________________________
    1 Appellant had a prior out-of-state conviction equivalent to possession with
    intent to deliver. See 35 P.S. 780-113(a)(30).
    J-S20041-19
    negotiated to 4 to 8 years’ imprisonment on Count 5, and 3½ to 7 years’
    imprisonment on Count 6, to run consecutively for an aggregate term of 7½
    to 15 years’ imprisonment. The court imposed fines on the remaining eleven
    counts. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
    On July 5, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to modify or correct an illegal
    sentence, which claimed his convictions should have merged for sentencing,
    and an application for leave to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc. The
    court denied Appellant’s application to file post-sentence motions nunc pro
    tunc on July 7, 2017, and denied Appellant’s motion to correct an illegal
    sentence on July 26, 2017. On September 14, 2017, Appellant filed a second
    motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence, which the court denied on
    September 18, 2017. Appellant, on October 16, 2017, filed an application to
    withdraw his guilty plea, which the court denied the following day.
    Appellant timely filed pro se a PCRA petition on January 29, 2018. The
    PCRA court appointed counsel on February 2, 2018, who filed a petition to
    withdraw and a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    518 Pa. 491
    , 
    544 A.2d 927
    (1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc), on October 31, 2018. The following day, the
    PCRA court granted counsel’s petition to withdraw and issued notice of intent
    to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On December 3, 2018, Appellant
    filed a premature pro se notice of appeal. The PCRA court, on December 5,
    2018, ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
    -2-
    J-S20041-19
    appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).            On December 7, 2018, the court
    denied PCRA relief.2 On December 26, 2018, Appellant timely filed a pro se
    Rule 1925(b) statement.3
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    IS SECTION 6105(A)(1) OF TITLE 18 STATUTORILY
    AMBIGUOUS IN THAT A “COMMON PERSON” CANNOT
    PREDICATE ON ITS FACE WHETHER, “THE POSSESSION OF
    A FIREARM” CONSTITUTES A SINGLE UNIT OF
    PROSECUTION OR MULTIPLE UNIT(S) OF PROSECUTION IF
    MORE [THAN] ONE FIREARM(S) ARE FOUND IN THE [S]AME
    ____________________________________________
    2 Appellant’s notice of appeal relates forward to December 7, 2018, the date
    the PCRA court denied relief.         Therefore, we have no jurisdictional
    impediments to our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (stating: “A notice of
    appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry
    of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the
    day thereof”).
    3 Our Supreme Court has expressly disapproved of the practice of courts
    making a wholesale adoption of one party’s position.                     See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. (Roy L.) Williams, 
    557 Pa. 207
    , 224-25, 
    732 A.2d 1167
    ,
    1176 (1999) (acknowledging there is no prohibition for court to adopt portions
    of advocate’s arguments in support of judicial disposition; refusing, however,
    to condone wholesale adoption of advocate’s stance in court’s disposition of
    post-conviction case involving review of death sentence).                 See also
    Commonwealth v. Fulton, 
    583 Pa. 65
    , 71, 
    876 A.2d 342
    , 345 (2002)
    (extending Supreme Court’s disapproval beyond capital cases and stressing
    importance of court providing independent judicial analysis). “In cases
    challenging the scope of this rule, the Court has consistently explained that
    the type of case has no bearing on its conclusion: the need for independent
    judicial analysis is defeated by a trial court’s failure to articulate its individual
    reasoning.” See A.V. v. S.T., 
    87 A.3d 818
    , 823 (Pa.Super. 2014).
    Here, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court just refers us to counsel’s
    no-merit letter, which the court essentially adopts wholesale; and we are left
    without the benefit of the court’s independent reasoning. Prevailing precedent
    requires the court to refrain in the future from this kind of wholesale adoption
    of one party’s position. Accordingly, we base our review on the court’s order,
    the certified record, and the applicable law.
    -3-
    J-S20041-19
    LOCATION AT THE SAME TIME. WHICH, IN TURN, IF
    SUBJECTING ONE TO MULTIPLE UNIT(S) OF PROSECUTION
    COULD AND WOULD THEN VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
    CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES FIFTH AMENDMENT?
    WAS APPELLANT’S CRIMINAL INFORMATION GENERALLY
    IMPROPER BEAUSE IT THEN PREJUDICED APPELLANT INTO
    ACCEPTING   A  PLEA   AGREEMENT    FOR   MULTIPLE
    SENTENCE(S) FOR A SINGLE CRIMINAL ACT OR OFFENSE
    WHICH, IS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE
    JEOPARDY WHEN THE SENTENCE(S) WERE THEN IMPOSED
    IN THE CONSECUTIVE NATURE?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 6).
    Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
    examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination
    and whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Conway,
    
    14 A.3d 101
    , 109 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 
    612 Pa. 687
    , 
    29 A.3d 795
    (2011). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if
    the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd,
    
    923 A.2d 513
    , 515 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 
    593 Pa. 754
    , 
    932 A.2d 74
    (2007).     We give no such deference, however, to the court’s legal
    conclusions.   Commonwealth v. Ford, 
    44 A.3d 1190
    , 1194 (Pa.Super.
    2012). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of
    right; the PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue
    concerning any material fact, the petitioner is not entitled to PCRA relief, and
    no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Commonwealth v.
    Wah, 
    42 A.3d 335
    , 338 (Pa.Super. 2012); Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
    In his issues combined, Appellant argues the language of Section
    -4-
    J-S20041-19
    6105(a)(1), which uses the term “a firearm,” is ambiguous and vague because
    a lay person cannot decipher whether this statute punishes each firearm
    possessed if multiple firearms are found in the same location at the same
    time. Appellant submits the General Assembly did not define “a” in Section
    6105, and contends “a firearm” could mean one firearm or some firearms.
    Appellant avers federal courts have interpreted persons-not-to-possess
    statutes to use collective possession at one time as the unit of punishment,
    and not the number of firearms. Appellant admits that federal statutes use
    the term “any firearm” instead of “a firearm,” however, Appellant contends
    the words “any” and “a” are interchangeable. Appellant asserts that Section
    6105 should be interpreted as using “possession” as the unit of punishment
    instead of the number of firearms, and that his conviction for each possessed
    firearm violates the double jeopardy clause. Appellant complains the criminal
    information, which contained thirteen counts of persons not to possess a
    firearm, induced him into an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea, because
    Appellant felt he was “lucky” to receive two consecutive sentences for a total
    of 7½ to 15 years’ imprisonment. Appellant maintains the court should have
    merged the convictions for sentencing. Appellant concludes this Court should
    vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for the trial court to impose
    concurrent sentences. We disagree.
    A petitioner is eligible for relief under the PCRA if he pleads and proves
    by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted
    -5-
    J-S20041-19
    from, inter alia, an unlawfully induced guilty plea or the imposition of a
    sentence greater than the lawful maximum. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii)
    and (vii).   A claim that a defendant’s convictions should have merged for
    purposes     of   sentencing   implicates          the     legality   of   the   sentence.
    Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 
    900 A.2d 368
    , 373 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
    denied, 
    591 Pa. 681
    , 
    917 A.2d 313
    (2007).
    Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act describes in
    pertinent part the offense of persons not to possess firearms:
    § 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture,
    control, sell or transfer firearms
    (a)      Offense defined.—
    (1) A person who has been convicted of an offense
    enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this
    Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or
    whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not
    possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain
    a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or
    manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.
    *        *       *
    (c)     Other persons.—In addition to any person who has
    been convicted of any offense listed under subsection (b),
    the following persons shall be subject to the prohibition of
    subsection (a):
    *        *       *
    (2) A person who has been convicted of an offense under
    the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The
    Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or
    any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any
    other state, that may be punishable by a term of
    -6-
    J-S20041-19
    imprisonment exceeding two years.
    *     *    *
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), (c)(2).        “The Legislature’s use of the indefinite
    article ‘a’ in the definition of the proscribed conduct makes it clear a person
    who is prohibited from possessing a firearm under [S]ection 6105 violates
    [Section] 6105 for each firearm possessed.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    2 A.3d 650
    , 651 (Pa.Super. 2010) (affirming denial of PCRA relief, where
    Appellant    challenged   consecutive      sentences   under   Section       6105   for
    possessing more than one firearm; holding that, under Section 6105,
    prosecution for each individual firearm possessed does not violate double
    jeopardy; separate and consecutive sentences for each possession are legal).
    A defendant is not required to “be pleased with the outcome of his
    decision to enter a plea of guilty[; a]ll that is required is that his decision to
    plead     guilty   be   knowingly,       voluntarily   and   intelligently     made.”
    Commonwealth v. Moser, 
    921 A.2d 526
    , 528-29 (Pa.Super. 2007). A guilty
    plea will be deemed valid if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
    plea shows that the defendant had a full understanding of the nature and
    consequences of his plea such that he knowingly and intelligently entered the
    plea of his own accord. Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 
    632 A.2d 312
    , 314-15
    (Pa.Super. 1993). A defendant is presumed to be aware of what he is doing
    when he enters a guilty plea, and the defendant bears the burden to prove
    otherwise.     Commonwealth v. Pollard, 
    832 A.2d 517
    , 523 (Pa.Super.
    -7-
    J-S20041-19
    2003).     Mere disappointment in the sentence does not constitute the
    necessary “manifest injustice” to render the defendant’s guilty plea
    involuntary. 
    Id. at 522.
    See also Commonwealth v. Kelly, 
    5 A.3d 370
    ,
    377 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 
    613 Pa. 643
    , 
    32 A.3d 1276
    (2011)
    (reiterating principle that courts discourage entry of plea as sentence-testing
    device).
    The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that pleas be
    taken in open court, and require the court to conduct an on-the-record
    colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the
    consequences of his plea. Commonwealth v. Hodges, 
    789 A.2d 764
    , 765
    (Pa.Super. 2002) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 590).       Specifically, the court must
    affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understands: (1) the nature of the
    charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3)
    his right to trial by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible
    ranges of sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the judge is not bound
    by the terms of the agreement unless he accepts the agreement.
    Commonwealth v. Watson, 
    835 A.2d 786
    , 796-97 (Pa.Super. 2003).
    Instantly, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to thirteen counts
    of persons not to possess firearms. Appellant signed a written plea colloquy,
    and the court conducted an oral plea colloquy on the record.          The court
    sentenced Appellant as negotiated to two consecutive sentences, one of 4 to
    8 years’ imprisonment, and one of 3½ to 7 years’ imprisonment, for an
    -8-
    J-S20041-19
    aggregate term of 7½ to 15 years’ imprisonment.
    Here, Appellant was a person not to possess firearms; and police found
    thirteen firearms in his bedroom.     Therefore, the Commonwealth properly
    charged Appellant with thirteen counts under Section 6105. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 6105(a)(1), (c)(2). The court confirmed in both the written and oral plea
    colloquies that Appellant and the Commonwealth had negotiated two,
    consecutive sentences for persons not to possess firearms; and the court
    sentenced Appellant accordingly.     See 
    Watson, supra
    ; 
    Hodges, supra
    .
    Under prevailing law, the court could not merge the sentences on Appellant’s
    multiple firearms convictions, and it had no obligation to run these sentences
    concurrently.   See 
    Jones, supra
    .       Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and
    intelligently entered into his negotiated guilty plea, and he is not entitled to
    withdraw from it merely because he is now dissatisfied with his bargain. See
    
    Moser, supra
    ; 
    Fluharty, supra
    . Therefore, the PCRA court properly denied
    relief. See 
    Conway, supra
    . Accordingly, we affirm.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/31/2019
    -9-