Com. v. Schannauer, R. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RYAN MATTHEW SCHANNAUER
Appellant No. 2190 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered on December 8, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-36-CR-0000957-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and WECHT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED JULY 10, 2015
Ryan Matthew Schannauer appeals his December 8, 2014 judgment of
sentence. Schannauer’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw as counsel,
together with an Anders/Santiago brief.1 We find that Schannauer’s
counsel has satisfied the Anders/Santiago requirements and that
Schannauer has no meritorious issues to pursue on appeal. Consequently,
we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel, and we affirm
Schannauer’s judgment of sentence.
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1
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.
McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), abrogated in part by
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). In
Santiago, our Supreme Court developed certain rules to ensure compliance
with the principles underlying the Anders decision. Thus, it is common
practice in this Court to refer to briefs filed thereunder as
“Anders/Santiago briefs.”
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The trial court set forth the factual and procedural background of the
case as follows:
On January 15, 2014, Schannauer, then [nineteen] years[-]old,
was charged with criminal homicide (F1), arson – danger of
death or bodily injury (F1), abuse of a corpse (M2), [kidnapping]
to inflict injury/terror (F1), and related conspiracy offenses from
an incident involving the brutal death of Ashley Lynn Kline (age
[twenty-three]) on December 30, 2013.1
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(1), 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2901(a)(3), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a),
respectively.
Schannauer and his co-conspirator, Adam Morning Star Lynch,
lured their friend, Kline, from her home in Berks County under
the pretext of taking her to a movie. While in Schannauer’s
vehicle, a violent struggle occurred between Kline and her
[kidnappers]. Ultimately, the vehicle was driven to a remote
wildlife area in northern Lancaster County, and Schannauer
assisted Lynch in forcibly removing Kline from the vehicle.
Schannauer further helped Lynch in forcing Kline to walk into the
woods and assisted Lynch as he repeatedly stabbed Kline.
Schannauer then poured gasoline over Kline’s body, and Lynch
set her on fire while she was still alive. Schannauer and Lynch
returned on January 8, 2014 and poured more gasoline on
Kline’s body in an effort to conceal her identity and destroy
evidence. Kline’s body was eventually discovered by hikers on
January 12, 2014, and her identity confirmed by dental records.
Pursuant to Pa.R.[Crim.]P. 802, the Commonwealth filed a
[notice of intent to seek a sentence of death] against
Schannauer on March 4, 2014. Specifically, the Commonwealth
believed it could prove two statutory aggravating circumstances:
(1) a killing while in the perpetration of a felony, specifically
arson and [kidnapping], 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(6); and (2) the
killing was committed by means of torture. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9711(d)(8).
On November 3, 2014, Schannauer filed a pretrial motion,
seeking to suppress statements made by Schannauer during
police interviews on January 7, 2014, January 8, 2014, January
9, 2014, January 14, 2014, January 15, 2014, and at other
times Schannauer was interviewed by the Pennsylvania State
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Police. Schannauer further sought to suppress evidence seized
pursuant to search warrants dated January 8, 2014, January 9,
2014, and January 15, 2014, for Schannauer’s residence,
vehicle, telephone[,] and computer. Lastly, Schannauer moved
to dismiss the aggravating circumstances serving as the basis for
the Commonwealth’s [notice intent to seek a sentence of death].
In exchange for the Commonwealth dropping the death penalty,
Schannauer agreed to enter a guilty plea to the charges of [first-
degree] murder, arson, abuse of a corpse, conspiracy to abuse
of a corpse, [kidnapping], and conspiracy to [kidnapping]. The
conspiracy to arson charges were nolle prossed as part of the
negotiated plea agreement. Pursuant to the negotiated guilty
plea tendered on December 8, 2014, the [c]ourt imposed a
mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole on
the [first-degree] murder conviction.
The [c]ourt further ordered the following consecutive sentences
as per the negotiated plea agreement: (1) [ten] to [twenty]
years’ incarceration on the arson conviction; (2) [one] to [two]
years’ incarceration on the abuse of corpse conviction; (3) [one]
to [two] years’ incarceration on the conspiracy to abuse of
corpse conviction; (4) [five] to [ten] years’ incarceration on the
[kidnapping] conviction; and (5) [three] to [six] years’
incarceration on the conspiracy to kidnap conviction.
Accordingly, Schannauer received an aggregate sentence of life
without parole plus [twenty] to [forty] years of consecutive
incarceration. Schannauer was further ordered to pay restitution
in the amount of $7,796.15, plus costs. No [post-sentence]
motions were filed.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O”), 2/3/2015, at 1-4 (some footnotes omitted;
references to notes of testimony omitted).
On December 23, 2014, Schannauer filed a timely appeal to this Court.
On January 12, 2015, Schannauer’s counsel furnished the trial court with a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). In that statement, Schannauer raised the following issues:
1. Did the lower court impose illegal sentences where the
sentences run consecutively to a life sentence?
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2. Did penalty phase counsel provide ineffective assistance
where he was working on several death row cases during the
course or representation of the present case?
3. Did counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to provide
[Schannauer] with a copy of discovery documents?
See Appellant’s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal at ¶¶ 1-3.
Counsel for Schannauer noted in the statement of errors complained of
on appeal that it was his conclusion that Schannauer’s issues are frivolous,
that issues two and three are not reviewable on direct appeal, and that there
are no non-frivolous claims to assert. On February 3, 2015, the trial court
filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
As aforementioned, counsel has filed an Anders/Santiago brief, in
which he has identified the same issues as those raised in his concise
statement. Additionally, counsel has filed a petition to withdraw as counsel.
Schannauer has filed no response to the Anders/Santiago brief.
This Court must pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw before
reviewing the merits of the issues presented by Schannauer.
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en
banc). Prior to withdrawing as counsel under Anders, counsel must file a
brief that meets the requirements established by our Supreme Court in
Santiago. Pursuant thereto, the brief must provide the following
information:
(1) a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
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(2) reference to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;
(3) counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his client.
Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the client of his rights to
“(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal;
or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s
attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”
Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Finally, to facilitate our review of counsel’s satisfaction of his obligations, he
must attach to his petition to withdraw the letter he transmitted to his client.
See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Our review of counsel’s petition to withdraw and the accompanying
brief demonstrates that counsel has complied with Santiago’s requirements.
Counsel has provided a procedural history detailing the events relevant to
this appeal with appropriate citations to the record. See Anders Brief for
Schannauer at 5-6. Counsel also has articulated Schannauer’s position and
has analyzed the information presented to the sentencing court in favor of
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his appeal thoroughly and with appropriate citations to the record and case
law. Id. at 7-8.2 Ultimately, counsel has concluded that Schannauer has no
non-frivolous basis for challenging his sentence, because the sentencing
court applied all of the appropriate sentencing guidelines and there was no
evidence of an abuse of discretion. Id. at 11.
Counsel also has sent Schannauer a letter informing him that he has
identified no meritorious issues to pursue on appeal, he has filed an
application to withdraw from Schannauer’s representation, and that
Schannauer may find new counsel or proceed pro se. Letter, 2/25/2015.
Counsel has attached the letter to his petition to withdraw, as is required by
Millisock.
Accordingly, counsel has complied substantially with Santiago’s
technical requirements. See Millisock, 873 A.2d at 751. Having passed
upon the procedural requirements under Anders and Santiago, we now
must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether this
appeal is wholly frivolous. Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354.
Schannauer’s second and third issues are arguments of claims for
ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims. Pursuant to the current
state of our law, the claim is without merit because Schannauer must raise it
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2
Counsel titles his Anders/Santiago brief as “Summary of Argument,”
but this section is simply the Anders/Santiago brief.
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in a subsequent Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. 3 In
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court
considered “the reviewability of claims of IAC on direct appeal.” Id. at 563.
Following a comprehensive review of the language codified in the PCRA and
decisions from our courts, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that
IAC claims must be deferred until collateral review, and, thus are not
reviewable on direct appeal. Id. at 563, 564. The Court crafted two
exceptions to this general proscription. Id. First, the Court held that a trial
court may, in its discretion, entertain IAC claims where extraordinary
circumstances exist such that review of the claim would best serve the
interests of justice. Id. at 564, 579-80. Second, the Court reposed
discretion in trial courts to review IAC claims during post-sentence motions
only if there is good cause shown, and the unitary review so indulged is
preceded by the defendant’s knowing and express waiver of his entitlement
to seek PCRA review from his conviction and sentence, including an express
recognition that the waiver subjects further collateral review to the time and
serial restrictions of the PCRA. Id. at 563, 580.
There is no indication in the record that extraordinary circumstances
exist in this case such that Schannauer’s IAC claims warrant review on direct
appeal or that Schannauer expressly waived his right to PCRA review.
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3
See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46.
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Consequently, in light of Holmes, Schannauer’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal.
We now turn to the lone potential appealable issue identified by
Anders counsel: “Did the lower court impose illegal sentences where the
sentences run consecutively to a life sentence without parole?” Anders
Brief for Schannauer at 4. A challenge to the legality of the sentence can
never be waived and may be raised by this Court sua sponte.
Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 883 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2014). “A
challenge to the legality of a sentence may be entertained as long as the
reviewing court has jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d
1242, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2011). Our standard of review over questions of the
legality of a sentence is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Akbar, 91 A.3d 227, 238 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Schannauer’s claim concerning the legality of his sentence is meritless.
There is no case law to support Schannauer’s claim. In fact, this Court has
consistently held that “there is no statutory provision restricting the length
of possible sentences.” Commonwealth v. Button, 481 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa.
Super. 1984). Furthermore, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a) gives express authority to
the sentencing court to impose consecutive sentences.4 No statutory or
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4
In pertinent part, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a) provides: “In determining the
sentence to be imposed the court shall . . . consider and select one or more
of the [sentencing] alternatives, and may impose them consecutively or
concurrently.”
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decisional authority circumscribes this authority simply because a life
sentence has been imposed.
We have reviewed counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief carefully, and find
that it complies with the technical requirements imposed by those
precedents. We further find that counsel has taken all steps necessary to
ensure that his client’s interests are protected. We also have conducted an
independent review of the record. Pursuant thereto, we have concluded that
counsel’s characterization and analysis of the record is accurate, and that no
non-frivolous challenge to Schannauer’s judgment of sentence will lie.
Moreover, our review has revealed no other non-frivolous issues that merit
consideration on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Schannauer’s judgment of
sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel
granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/10/2015
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