Com. v. Schirmer, A. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S49011-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ARTHUR BURTON SCHIRMER
    Appellant                  No. 2644 EDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 18, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002107-2010
    BEFORE: OLSON, OTT and STABILE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 23, 2014
    Appellant, Arthur Burton Shirmer, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered on March 18, 2013, following his jury trial convictions for
    first-degree murder and tampering with physical evidence.1          After careful
    consideration, we affirm.
    The esteemed trial court set forth the applicable factual and procedural
    history of this case as follows:
    […] Appellant was a pastor whose second wife, Betty
    Schirmer, appeared to have died in a car accident in [July,]
    2008.     Following [the suicide of one of Appellant’s
    parishioners, Joseph Musante, which occurred on or about
    October 29, 2008, more than three months after Betty’s
    death], the car accident was investigated further. The
    police came to believe that [] Appellant critically injured his
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a) and 4910, respectively.
    J-S49011-14
    wife and then staged a car crash to make her impending
    death appear to be an accident. [] Appellant’s first wife,
    Jewel, also pre-deceased him after purportedly falling down
    the stairs in 1999.[fn] The circumstances of Jewel’s death
    were admitted into evidence for limited purposes pursuant
    to Pa.R.E. 404(b).
    *         *          *
    On November 15, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a
    criminal information.
    On May 20, 2011, [] Appellant filed an omnibus
    motion [alleging, inter alia, that suppression was warranted
    based upon purported omissions and misstatements in the
    affidavits of probable cause attached to the search warrants
    that were issued].
    On January 30, 2012, [the trial court] held the first
    omnibus hearing. On February 7, 2012, [the trial court]
    held the second omnibus hearing.
    On March 19, 2012, [] Appellant filed a brief in
    support of his omnibus motion. On April 4, 2012, the
    Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition.
    On May 18, 2012, [the trial court] entered an opinion
    and order denying [] Appellant’s omnibus motion.
    On June 1, 2012, [] Appellant filed four separate
    motions in limine challenging the admissibility of certain
    evidence on the basis of relevance, unfair prejudice, and
    improper character evidence.
    On August 14, 2012, [] Appellant filed a brief in
    support of his motions in limine. On August 24, 2012, the
    Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition.
    On November 16, 2012, [the trial court] entered an
    opinion and order denying [] Appellant’s motions in limine.
    On January 22, 2013, [following a ten-day trial,] the
    jury found [A]ppellant guilty of murder in the first degree
    and tampering with evidence.
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    On March 18, 2013, [the trial court] sentenced []
    Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
    the first[-]degree murder conviction. [The trial court] also
    sentenced [] Appellant to three (3) to twenty-four (24)
    months in prison for the tampering with evidence
    conviction. On March 28, 2013, [] Appellant filed
    post-sentence motions. On April 22, 2013, [] Appellant filed
    a supplemental post-sentence motion and a brief in support.
    On May 3, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a brief in
    opposition.
    On August 23, 2013, [the trial court] denied []
    Appellant’s post-sentence motions.
    [fn] […] Appellant was not on trial for the murder of Jewel
    Schirmer.   That alleged homicide occurred in Lebanon
    County and Lebanon County had charged but not yet
    prosecuted [] Appellant at the time of the instant murder
    trial.
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/2013, at 1-3 (most footnotes and superfluous
    capitalization omitted). This timely appeal resulted.2
    On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
    1. Should the Commonwealth be permitted to introduce
    irrelevant and presumptively prejudicial evidence that a
    defendant might have murdered his first wife ten years
    earlier to try to prove that he had now murdered his
    second wife, where the deaths were separated in time
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 19, 2013. On September
    20, 2013, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant
    complied timely. The trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a) on November 12, 2013, largely incorporating its prior opinions
    dated May 18, 2012 (denying Appellant’s omnibus motion), November 16,
    2012 (denying Appellant’s motions in limine), and August 23, 2013 (denying
    Appellant’s post-sentence motions).
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    J-S49011-14
    and the circumstances surrounding the two deaths were
    different?
    2. Where a man committed suicide after learning that his
    reverend was having an affair with that man’s wife, can
    such evidence be admitted at the trial of that reverend
    for an unrelated murder when the sole basis for its
    admission is that the man’s suicide sparked an
    investigation into the unrelated murder of the reverend’s
    first and second wives?
    3. Did the introduction of altered digital images of luminal
    glowing on a garage floor where the images never
    existed in real life and only tended to confuse and
    mislead the jury violate Pa.R.E. 403 and Pa.R.E. 901 in
    this close circumstantial evidence case?
    4. Are a [d]efendant’s [c]onstitutional [r]ights violated
    when he is denied the ability to present relevant
    testimony from a witness on his own behalf where that
    witness was the hair dresser who saw the alleged victim
    hours before her death and she would have testified that
    she cut the hair of the alleged victim who did not appear
    in distress or upset, and that it seemed to be a usual day
    for her?
    5. Do misstatements and omissions of facts and undisclosed
    sources of expert opinion render a search warrant invalid
    where the statements are necessary to establish that a
    crime occurred and the police officer includes the
    statements    despite    having   evidence    suggesting
    otherwise?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (suggested answers omitted).
    In his first issue presented, Appellant contends that the trial court
    erred by allowing the Commonwealth to present evidence, pursuant to
    Pa.R.E. 404(b), pertaining to the death of Appellant’s first wife, Jewel, in
    1999. Id. at 16. He claims:
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    The death of his first wife [, Jewel,] in 1999, had only been
    ruled a homicide as of 2012. However, the circumstances
    of [Jewel’s] death were very different from the
    circumstances surrounding [, Betty’s,] death.              The
    Commonwealth maintained that the murder of [Jewel] was
    admissible because it went to prove [Appellant’s] intent and
    it also rebutted [Appellant’s] claim that [Betty] died in an
    accidental motor vehicle crash.        The [Commonwealth’s]
    introduction of evidence [relating to Jewel’s] murder was
    not relevant to intent and had little if any probative value in
    rebutting the claim of accident; rather, it simply suggested
    that [Appellant] had killed before and would do it again.
    Id. at 16. Appellant argues this matter is factually distinguishable from our
    Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 
    846 A.2d 75
    (Pa. 2004). Appellant’s Brief at 16-27.
    “On appeals challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court, our
    standard of review is limited.” Commonwealth v. Aikens, 
    990 A.2d 1181
    ,
    1184 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). “A trial court's decision will not
    be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”        
    Id.
        “[An a]buse of
    discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but [occurs only] where the
    judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or
    where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice,
    bias or ill will.” 
    Id. at 1184-1185
    .
    “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
    or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
    consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. “Evidence that is not
    relevant is not admissible.”     Pa.R.E. 402.   Further, even if evidence is
    relevant, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
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    outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
    confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
    needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.
    With regard to Pa.R.E. 404:
    Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal
    activity is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in
    conformity with those past acts or to show criminal
    propensity. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, evidence of prior
    bad acts may be admissible when offered to prove some
    other relevant fact, such as motive, opportunity, intent,
    preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of
    mistake or accident. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). In determining
    whether evidence of other prior bad acts is admissible, the
    trial court is obliged to balance the probative value of such
    evidence against its prejudicial impact.
    Aikens, 
    990 A.2d at 1185
     (citation omitted).
    In Boczkowski:
    Independent trial evidence established that [Boczkowski’s]
    former wife, Elaine Boczkowski, had been found dead in her
    bathtub in Greensboro, North Carolina, on November 4,
    1990. The factual circumstances of that death bore a
    marked similarity to the circumstances surrounding
    Maryann's [1994] death [in Ross Township, Pennsylvania]:
    Elaine died in her bathtub, Maryann in a hot tub. Both
    women were in their thirties and in good health.
    [Boczkowski] reported to the North Carolina police that
    Elaine had been drinking alcoholic beverages before
    entering the bathtub; he told Ross Township police that
    Maryann had been drinking prior to entering the hot tub.
    [Boczkowski] told police in both jurisdictions that he and his
    wife had a minor argument on the evening before the
    death. In each case, police noticed that [Boczkowski] had
    fresh scratch marks on his arms, hands and torso shortly
    after his wife's death. The autopsies of both women
    revealed that they had died from asphyxiation, not
    drowning.
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    Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 
    846 A.2d 75
    , 82 (Pa. 2004).
    The Boczkowski Court determined that evidence regarding Elaine’s
    death was admissible in Maryann’s murder trial, because:
    Given the remarkable similarity between the manner in
    which both of [Boczkowski’s] wives were killed, evidence
    concerning the circumstances of Elaine's death supported a
    reasonable inference that Maryann's death was not
    accidental, but rather, was a result of [Boczkowski’s]
    deliberate act. We agree with the Superior Court that the
    evidence was highly relevant and that its probative value
    outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. As to the last
    point, we note that the trial court repeatedly and clearly
    charged the jury that the evidence was admitted for the
    limited purpose of excluding accident as the manner of
    death, and could not be considered for any other purpose.
    [Commonwealth v.] Spotz, 756 A.2d [1139,] 1153 [(Pa.
    2000)](fact that trial court clearly instructed jury that it
    could only consider other crimes evidence for relevant
    limited purposes and not merely as evidence of appellant's
    propensity to commit crimes weighed against claim of
    error).
    Boczkowski, 846 A.2d at 89.
    We do not believe that the factual discrepancies between the murders
    in the present case, and those which occurred in Boczkowski, were so
    overwhelming as to preclude application of the rule followed by our Supreme
    Court in that case.   Here, the trial court determined that the deaths of Jewel
    and Betty were substantially similar and that the probative value of evidence
    pertaining to Jewel’s death outweighed its prejudicial effect. The trial court
    concluded that “[t]he evidence of the similarities between the cause of death
    in both cases – Jewel and Betty – could support a conclusion that Betty’s
    death was not the result of an accident but was instead the intended
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    J-S49011-14
    consequence of [Appellant’s] behavior.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/2012, at
    5.   The trial court further noted:
    Dr. Wayne Ross, a forensic pathologist reviewing the
    records of both Jewel Schirmer and Betty Schirmer, found
    that the damage to the scalp and skull showed remarkably
    similar patterns on both women. Dr. Ross opined that the
    evidence in both records was suggestive of staging. Both
    women lived for a short time after their respective
    “accidents” and died later at the hospital. [Appellant] was
    allegedly devoid of emotion at both accident scenes. There
    is some evidence of [Appellant] having extramarital affairs
    in both cases. In both instances [Appellant] is the only
    person known to have been with the victims prior to the
    accidents. Thus, if there [were] foul play in the deaths of
    the two women, [Appellant] would be the only logical
    suspect as no others were present. [Appellant] argues that
    Betty’s death was accidental. The Commonwealth must
    prove that this is not true and that [Appellant] caused
    Betty’s death. Evidence of a strikingly similar [prior] death
    is relevant evidence for the Commonwealth that the
    [present] death was not accidental, and was instead the
    intended consequence of [Appellant’s] deliberate actions.
    […]
    [The trial court then] consider[ed] and balance[d] the
    competing interests at stake. The deaths of [Appellant’s]
    two wives do bear many similarities[, h]owever, a
    significant amount of time did elapse between the two
    deaths. Additionally, the evidence of Jewel’s death [is]
    extensive, and there is a definite concern that essentially a
    trial within a trial will result. This carries a danger of
    distracting or confusing the jury, a danger that [the trial
    court] carefully considered. Nevertheless, [the trial court
    found] that evidence of Jewel Schirmer’s death [was]
    directly relevant, both as evidence of [Appellant’s] intent
    and to rebut his claim that the death [of Betty] was
    accidental. The comparison of head injuries – one resulting
    from an alleged fall down the stairs, and the other from a
    car accident – is far more probative than an analysis of the
    head trauma experienced only by Betty Schirmer. While the
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    evidence is certainly prejudicial, [the trial court did] not find
    that the probative value [was] outweighed by the prejudice.
    Id. at 5-6.
    Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence
    of the death of Appellant’s first wife, Jewel.          Appellant claims his second
    wife’s death was an accident.                  Pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), the
    Commonwealth was permitted to rebut that defense with evidence of Jewel
    Schmirer’s death to show an absence of an or accident.                   We reject
    Appellant’s contention that this case is factually distinct from Boczkowski.
    Here, Appellant claimed that both of his wives’ deaths were accidental. 3
    Despite the fact that the alleged accidents appeared to be distinct, both
    women had almost identical head wounds that suggested they had been
    bludgeoned with a long cylindrical object such as a crowbar before the
    staging of the alleged accidents. More specifically, Dr. Wayne Ross at trial
    opined:
    So the comparison is traumatic brain injury for both
    individuals, Jewel Schirmer, Betty Schirmer, multiple
    impacts to multiple sides of the head. Craniotomies are on
    the left side of the head, lacerations times two on the right
    side of the head.        The lacerations look similar.   The
    lacerations have similar orientation, going up and down.
    And the lacerations are compatible with impacts with a long
    cylindrical object, a crowbar, or other things.
    So, the comparison, what we call similarities, are
    extremely similar. And as a forensic pathologist, when
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Appellant claimed that Jewel died as a result of a fall down a set of stairs.
    He claimed that Betty died as a result of a motor vehicle accident.
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    we’re drawing conclusions about reconstructing injuries and
    accidents, we look at the pattern of injuries. We look at the
    similarities. We look at the crime scene, and we try to piece
    it all together so we are able to draw conclusions about the
    cause of death, the manner of death, but also conclusions
    about the scenes.
    N.T., 1/15/2013, at 90-91. The similarities in the manner of both women’s
    deaths were evidence of lack of an accident. Moreover, like in Boczkowski,
    Appellant was the last person who was with the victims in both cases. The
    trial court carefully weighed the probative value of the evidence with the
    potential prejudice.
    Additionally, the trial court issued cautionary instructions, immediately
    after testimony pertaining to Jewel Schirmer’s death and during the official
    jury charge prior to deliberations.            N.T., 1/15/2013, at 100-102; N.T.,
    1/22/2013, at 157-158. Those instructions specified that the jury was only
    to consider evidence of Jewel’s death for the limited purpose of determining
    the absence of an accident, as mandated by Rule 404.                 “The jury is
    presumed to have followed the court's instructions.”          Commonwealth v.
    Akbar, 
    91 A.3d 227
    , 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2014). For all of the foregoing
    reasons, Appellant’s first issue lacks merit.
    In his second issue presented, Appellant claims the trial court erred by
    permitting the Commonwealth to enter evidence at trial regarding the
    suicide of Joseph Musante, one of Appellant’s parishioners.4 Appellant’s Brief
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Mr. Musante was the husband of Appellant’s administrative assistant. N.T.,
    1/11/2013, at 120; N.T., 1/14/2013, at 115. Mr. Musante broke into
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    at 28.   Appellant asserts that “the suicide as presented merely tended to
    establish that [Appellant] was a bad person and had contributed to the death
    of Joseph Musante” and “merely a guise for introducing irrelevant prior acts
    evidence in this case.”        Id. at 31.     Appellant contends that the trial court
    agreed that evidence tending to show that Appellant caused the death of Mr.
    Musante would pose substantial prejudice, but then permitted the admission
    of five witnesses who testified about the suicide, “graphic photographic
    evidence” including a photo of Mr. Mustante’s lifeless body seated behind
    Appellant’s desk, a letter written by Mr. Musante’s sister to church officials
    which “states that [Appellant] shares in responsibility for [Mr.] Mustante’s
    death[.]”    Id. at 33.       Appellant argues “if police needed to describe why
    the investigation was reinitiated four months after the death of [Appellant’s]
    second wife, the Commonwealth could have done so with far less detail then
    was admitted in this case.” Id. at 34.
    The Commonwealth proffered evidence pertaining to Mr. Musante’s
    suicide as an effort to explain to the jury why the investigation into the
    death of Betty was reopened after its initial closure as an accident, and to
    offer the jury a complete story on the factual background of the instant
    offenses.    Again, “[r]ulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Appellant’s office at the church and committed suicide while sitting at
    Appellant’s desk. N.T., 1/11/2013 at 47-56. Mr. Musante believed that his
    wife and Appellant were having an affair. Id. at 120.
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    discretion of the trial judge, and such rulings form no basis for a grant of
    appellate relief absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Green,
    
    76 A.3d 575
    , 583 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “While it is true that
    evidence of prior crimes and bad acts is generally inadmissible if offered for
    the sole purpose of demonstrating the defendant's bad character or criminal
    propensity, the same evidence may be admissible […] where the acts were
    part of a chain or sequence of events that formed the history of the case and
    were part of its natural development.”       
    Id.
       “The ban on prior bad acts
    evidence, and the lion's share of associated exceptions … are set forth in
    Pa.R.E. 404(b)[,] however, [t]he res gestae or ‘history of the case’
    exception, however, does not spring from Pa.R.E. 404.” 
    Id.
     Such exception
    is described as a:
    special circumstance, one where evidence of other crimes
    [or prior acts] may be relevant and admissible ... where
    such evidence was part of the chain or sequence of events
    which became part of the history of the case and formed
    part of the natural development of the facts. This special
    circumstance, sometimes referred to as the “res gestae”
    exception to the general proscription against evidence of
    other crimes [or prior acts], is also known as the “complete
    story” rationale, i.e., evidence of other [] acts is admissible
    “to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its
    immediate context of happenings near in time and
    place.”
    
    Id. at 583-584
     (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original).
    Here, the trial court determined:
    [E]vidence regarding the suicide of Joseph Musante and
    the affair between his wife and [Appellant] was relevant. …
    [The trial court] considered the evidence of the suicide
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    carefully. The suicide was a critical event in triggering the
    police investigation. In fact, due largely to [Appellant’s]
    staging of the [car] accident [that Appellant claimed caused
    Betty’s death], police did not initially conduct a thorough
    investigation of the car accident.        The break-in at the
    church and suicide in [Appellant’s] office were the events
    that caused police to take a second look at [the death of
    Appellant’s] second wife, and ultimately triggered an
    investigation into the death of his first wife as well. Without
    evidence of the suicide, the Commonwealth’s case would
    have been severely disadvantaged as the timeline would
    have been confusing. An unexplained gap in the timeline
    and investigative process would have had potential to
    confuse and distract the jurors. The Commonwealth did not
    indicate that [Appellant] caused the death of Joseph
    Musante nor did they argue that [Appellant’s] “bad act” of
    engaging in an [] affair with Mr. Musante’s wife meant that
    [Appellant] was a bad person and thus guilty of murder.
    The testimony regarding the suicide was instead
    admitted to explain the course of events, particularly the
    course of investigation. The suicide and testimony from
    family members gave context for statements made by
    [Appellant] to church authorities during an investigation by
    church officials. [Appellant’s] statements to Bishop [Peggy]
    Johnson that his wife’s seatbelt had “come undone” at the
    moment of impact was used to explore the various different
    stories [Appellant] provided regarding the actual mechanics
    of the accident that he claimed caused [Betty’s] death.
    Absent any testimony regarding the suicide and related
    affair between [Appellant] and Mrs. Musante the trial would
    have consisted of testimony that was illogical and
    disconnected. Further, as [the trial court] stated in [its]
    November 16[, 2012] opinion:
    Additionally, evidence of the affair and suicide
    are not highly prejudicial. The suicide is temporally
    distinct from the alleged homicide. Evidence of it
    serves as explanation for the resurgence of
    investigation into Betty’s death. It is not likely to
    confuse the jury and it is unlikely that the jury will
    be distracted from the task at hand – determining
    whether [Appellant] killed his wife – by evidence that
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    Joseph [Musante] killed himself. There is no reason
    to conclude that the jury would be so inflamed by
    evidence of the suicide that they would determine
    [Appellant’s] guilt on a basis other than the evidence
    relating to the death of his wife.
    Similarly, while evidence of the affair may
    be prejudicial, this prejudice does not outweigh
    its probative value. Without evidence of the
    affair, the suicide is illogical, and without the
    suicide, the timeline of the investigation would
    appear completely baffling. Such a logical gap
    would in fact be more likely to distract the jury from
    their careful consideration of the evidence of guilt or
    innocence than the evidence of the affair and suicide.
    Without this evidence, there are clear logical gaps in
    the Commonwealth’s “story.”
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/23/2013, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
    Here, the evidence of Mr. Musante’s suicide was close in time and
    place to the criminal investigation surrounding Betty’s death and necessary
    to complete the whole story as to why her death was deemed an accident
    originally,   but    was   subsequently      reopened.     The    investigation    was
    complicated, made difficult by the fact that Betty’s death appeared staged,
    and   involved      multiple   authorities   from   both   the   church   and     police
    departments.        Throughout the investigation, Appellant gave conflicting
    stories to church officials and the police that formed the basis for the natural
    progression of the investigation. Thus, evidence of the suicide was clearly
    relevant to complete the story regarding the charged offenses.             Moreover,
    the suicide was completely distinct from Appellant’s charged crimes and the
    minimal likelihood of the jury convicting him on such evidence was
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    outweighed by the probative value of evidence of the suicide. Furthermore,
    upon independent review, the Commonwealth did not inappropriately argue
    that Appellant caused Mr. Musante’s death or that causing someone to
    commit suicide was consistent with the murder of Appellant’s second wife.
    The evidence was tailored to the investigation and formed part of the chain
    or sequence of events which became part of the history of the case.         As
    such, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court in
    admitting evidence of Mr. Musante’s suicide.5 Thus, Appellant’s second issue
    is meritless.
    ____________________________________________
    5
    We briefly address Appellant’s alternative assertion that the prejudice of
    the cumulative evidence of Mr. Musante’s death outweighed its probative
    value. Appellant claims that it was improper for the trial court to have
    permitted the Commonwealth to admit into evidence a photo of Mr.
    Mustante’s lifeless body seated behind Appellant’s desk, a letter written by
    Mr. Musante’s sister to church officials, and the testimony of five witnesses.
    Appellant’s Brief at 33.
    Initially, we note that the photograph and the letter to church officials are
    not contained in the certified record. The certified record consists of the
    “original papers and exhibits filed in the lower court, the transcript of
    proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by
    the clerk of the lower court.” Pa.R.A.P.1921. “Our law is unequivocal that
    the responsibility rests upon the appellant to ensure that the record certified
    on appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of the materials
    necessary for the reviewing court to perform its duty.” Commonwealth v.
    Preston, 
    904 A.2d 1
    , 7 (Pa. Super. 2006). “[A]ny document which is not
    part of the officially certified record is deemed non-existent—a deficiency
    which cannot be remedied merely by including copies of the missing
    documents in a brief or in the reproduced record.” 
    Id. at 6
    . “Simply put, if
    a document [or photograph] is not in the certified record, the Superior Court
    may not consider it.” 
    Id. at 7
    . Thus, due to the failure to include the
    exhibits in the certified record, we are unable to review them and, therefore,
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    In his third issue presented, Appellant claims that the trial court erred
    by allowing “digitally altered images” depicting luminol testing 6 because the
    admitted photographs7 were “fabricated” and made “the garage floor look
    like it was covered in blood.” Appellant’s Brief at 35. More specifically, he
    argues that “[t]hese digitally altered images were not fair and accurate
    depictions of how the lumin[o]l looked on the garage floor, and the
    alterations to the photographs were never noted by the State Police and
    therefore the process and system used to create them could not even be
    described at trial.” 
    Id. at 36
    . Thus, he contends that “the introduction of
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    may not consider whether evidence of the photograph and letter to church
    officials in relation to Mr. Musante’s death was unduly prejudicial.
    Regarding Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth unnecessarily presented
    five witnesses to testify about the suicide, we conclude that the trial court
    did not abuse its discretion in permitting such testimony. Upon review, no
    one witness was able to explain the affair and subsequent suicide in the
    context of both the church and police investigations. As previously stated,
    this was a complex matter made difficult by staging the death to look like an
    accident. Based upon our standard of review, we conclude that the trial
    court properly weighed the prejudicial nature of the aforementioned
    evidence with its probative value and we discern no abuse of discretion in its
    admission at trial.
    6
    Luminol is a chemical that illuminates when it contacts the iron component
    of blood. Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    854 A.2d 440
    , 443 (Pa. 2004).
    7
    Again, the actual photographs of the luminol testing are not contained in
    the certified record and we may not consider them. See Pa.R.A.P.1921;
    Preston, 
    904 A.2d at 7
    . However, we are able to reach the merits of
    Appellant’s argument based upon our review of the witness testimony
    pertaining to luminol photography as presented at trial.
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    J-S49011-14
    those images only tended to confuse and mislead [the] jury[.]” 
    Id.
     at 35-
    36.
    Our standard of review is as follows:
    Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the
    trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the
    trial court clearly abused its discretion. The requirement of
    authentication or identification is codified at Pennsylvania
    Rule of Evidence 901, 42 Pa.C.S.A.: “(a) General provision.
    The requirement of authentication or identification as a
    condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
    sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
    what its proponent claims.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). Testimony of a
    witness with personal knowledge that a matter is what it is
    claimed to be may be sufficient to authenticate or identify
    the evidence. Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1).
    Abuse of discretion is shown in the record where the court
    does not apply the law in reaching judgment, or exercises
    manifestly unreasonable judgment, or judgment that is the
    result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.
    Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 
    883 A.2d 1096
    , 1109-1110 (Pa. Super. 2005)
    (internal citations omitted).
    On the issue of the photographs depicting luminol testing, the trial
    court herein determined:
    At trial, the Commonwealth submitted various images of the
    blood which luminesced in the garage of [] Appellant’s
    parsonage.      What [] Appellant pervasively phrases as
    “computer generated images” are, in fact, the overlaid
    photographs of the garage when it was lit and the garage
    when it was dark. The photograph overlay process occurs
    thus: A camera is placed in a certain position and takes a
    photograph while the room’s lights are on; without moving
    the camera, the photographer then takes another
    photograph when the room’s lights are off. The photograph
    of the luminescing blood is then overlaid onto the
    photograph of the lit room. Luminol photography must be
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    J-S49011-14
    conducted in almost complete darkness in order to view the
    luminescence. Considering the dark background of the
    luminesced photograph, the photographs were combined
    into a single image in order to show the location of the
    blood in the garage. The blood’s location would, otherwise,
    be very difficult for the jury to determine. Adobe Photoshop
    was employed in order to combine the photographs.
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/2013, at 5.
    Upon review of the record, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled
    to relief. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Pennsylvania State
    Police Trooper John Corrigan, who the trial court accepted as “an expert in
    crime scene processing, evidence collection, enhancement techniques,
    including the use of luminol.”     N.T., 1/9/2013, at 70.    Before admitting
    photographs of the luminol testing, Trooper Corrigan identified them and
    stated that the photographs fairly and accurately depicted the luminol
    testing process. Id. at 94. “Luminol is an enhancement or a detection of
    blood” that is “mostly used at crime scenes for blood that’s not visible to the
    naked eye or from blood that’s already been cleaned up.” Id. at 95. Police
    conduct testing in the dark, because they spray luminol onto an area of the
    search and a chemical reaction creates a blue glow that indicates a reaction
    to blood. Id. at 96. Trooper Corrigan applied luminol to Appellant’s garage
    and took a photograph in complete darkness of areas that were luminescing.
    Id. at 96-98. He then took a flash photograph from the identical location to
    show the affected area in the light.     Id. at 98-99. The photographs were
    properly authenticated and accurately showed the garage in the light and
    dark.
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    J-S49011-14
    Utilizing computer technology, Trooper Corrigan then overlaid the two
    photographs to show the relationship between the glowing luminol and the
    physical layout of the garage. Id. at 99-103.         Trooper Corrigan testified
    that he layers the photographs on top of one another because
    if [he] show[ed] you a true luminol photograph you’re going
    to see little blue specs, and you’re not going to see anything
    else in relationship to those blue specs, so it’s not going to
    be of any value. It could be in the middle of [his] living
    room. It could be in the middle of your living room. You’re
    not going to know where it’s taken.
    Id. at 98-99. Based upon the foregoing, the trial court properly weighed the
    probative value of the photographs with the potential prejudice.         In fact,
    showing the jury the original photographs, but not the single overlaid
    photograph, would be potentially more confusing and misleading to them.
    Thus, Appellant’s third issue lacks merit.
    In his fourth issue presented, Appellant claims that the trial court
    erred in precluding him from calling Jewel Schirmer’s hairdresser as a
    witness at trial.    Appellant’s Brief at 44.     Appellant asserts that the
    hairdresser was prepared to testify that Jewel had an early morning hair
    appointment on the day of her death and there was nothing “out of the
    ordinary that day.” Id. at 45. Appellant argues that the “appointment itself
    was relevant because it would have made it less likely for [Jewel] to have
    showered on the morning of her death.”          Id.    Appellant proffered this
    testimony to refute Commonwealth witness, Dr. Wayne Ross’ opinion “that
    he could not rule out forceful penetration of the rectal area of [Jewel].” Id.
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    J-S49011-14
    Thus, Appellant contends that the hairdresser’s testimony was offered to
    provide the jury with the inference that “the presence of semen near
    [Jewel’s] anus could be explained from sex occurring the night before that
    remained near that portion of her body.” Id.
    The trial court precluded the proffered testimony as irrelevant. Trial
    Court Opinion, 11/12/2013, at 6. Citing Pa.R.E. 401, the trial court noted
    that “Appellant was not on trial for the murder of Jewel” and the proffered
    testimony that there was nothing unusual about Jewel’s behavior on the day
    of the murder “had no tendency to make a material fact in the homicide of
    Betty Schirmer more or less likely.” Id. at 6-7.
    Based upon our standard of review regarding the admissibility of
    evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
    precluding the proffered testimony. Appellant claims that the witness would
    have testified that there was nothing unusual on the day of Jewel’s death.
    The submitted evidence was entirely tangential to the death of Betty
    Schirmer.   Moreover, the inferences to be drawn were speculative, at best,
    because the hairdresser did not have first-hand knowledge of Jewel’s sexual
    activity or hygiene on the day in question. Accordingly, we agree that the
    proffered testimony was irrelevant to the current matter and the trial court
    properly precluded it from trial pursuant to Pa.R.E. 402.       Accordingly,
    Appellant’s fourth issue is without merit.
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    J-S49011-14
    Finally, Appellant argues that the search warrants obtained in this
    case8 were based upon misstatements, omissions of fact, and unsupported
    expert conclusions and, thus, the trial court erred by failing to suppress the
    physical evidence recovered by police upon execution of those warrants.
    Appellant’s Brief at 46-52. Appellant points to three specific statements, as
    set forth in the affidavits of probable cause, which he believes contained
    misstatements or omissions.          First, Appellant contends that the affidavits
    omitted certain circumstances related to the death of his first wife, Jewel.
    Specifically, Appellant argues that the affiant “deliberately omitted from the
    affidavit of probable cause certain circumstances surrounding the death of
    [Jewel] that a reasonable person would want to know.” Id. at 50. Appellant
    goes on to state that at the time the affidavits were signed, the affiant had
    records from Lebanon County “where EMT’s stated that it appeared [Jewel]
    had fallen straight back from the top of the stairs” and “information that
    [Jewel]… died of a heart attack.”              Id. Appellant further claims that the
    affidavits omitted any reference to the findings of Dr. Isadore Mihalakis that
    ____________________________________________
    8
    There were seven search warrants issued in this case, all utilizing
    substantially similar affidavits of probable cause.     Trial Court Opinion,
    5/18/2012, at 13. The warrants were issued for the parsonage and garage
    at the United Methodist Church in Reeders, Pennsylvania, the 2007 PT
    Cruiser involved in the motor vehicle crash, and Appellant’s residence.
    Moreover, the warrants authorized the search and seizure of computers and
    electronic devices found at the United Methodist Church and in the 2007 PT
    Cruiser. Finally, police obtained a search warrant to draw Appellant’s blood
    for DNA purposes. Id.
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    J-S49011-14
    Betty’s death may or may not be consistent with a motor vehicle accident, or
    Dr. Mihalakis’ written report that concluded that Betty’s injuries were, in
    fact, consistent with a motor vehicle accident.         Id. at 50-51.       Finally,
    Appellant argues that because “it was not mentioned in the warrant [that the
    affiant] had any training in blood splatter analysis” and the affidavit of
    probable cause “does not state any source for [the affiant’s] conclusions that
    a low speed accident could not cause the injuries suffered by [Appellant’s]
    second wife, the conclusions he writes are themselves misstatements.” Id.
    at 51.
    Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a
    suppression motion is
    limited to determining whether the suppression court's
    factual findings are supported by the record and whether
    the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
    Because     the   Commonwealth      prevailed   before    the
    suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of
    the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
    defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context
    of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's
    factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound
    by these findings and may reverse only if the court's legal
    conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of
    the determination of the suppression court turns on
    allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal
    conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose
    duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly
    applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of
    the courts below are subject to our plenary review.
    Moreover, it is within the suppression court's sole province
    as fact finder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight to be given their testimony.
    - 22 -
    J-S49011-14
    Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    24 A.3d 1006
    , 1015 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal
    citations, quotations and brackets omitted).
    “Search    warrants    must   be    supported   by   probable     cause.”
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    42 A.3d 1017
    , 1031 (Pa. 2012) (citation
    omitted). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within
    the affiant's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
    information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
    caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.”   
    Id.
     In order to
    secure a valid search warrant,
    an affiant must provide a magistrate with information
    sufficient to persuade a reasonable person that there is
    probable cause for a search. The information must give the
    magistrate the opportunity to know and weigh the facts and
    to determine objectively whether there is a need to invade a
    person's privacy to enforce the law.
    In determining whether a search warrant is based upon
    probable cause, [the United States Supreme Court has
    stated]:
    The Fourth Amendment's commands, like all
    constitutional requirements, are practical and not
    abstract. If the teachings of the Court's cases are to
    be followed and the constitutional policy served,
    affidavits for search warrants, such as the one
    involved here, must be tested and interpreted by
    magistrates and courts in a commonsense and
    realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by the
    nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
    investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate
    specificity once exacted under common law
    pleadings have no proper place in this area. A
    grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts
    toward warrants will tend to discourage police
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    J-S49011-14
    officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial
    officer before acting.
    Baker, 
    24 A.3d at 1017
    (citations and quotations omitted).
    Regarding misstatements in affidavits of probable cause, since 1970
    Pennsylvania courts have consistently found:
    misstatements of fact will invalidate a search warrant and
    require suppression of the fruits of the search only if the
    misstatements of fact are deliberate and material.
    While we have recognized that the veracity of facts
    establishing probable cause recited in an affidavit
    supporting a search warrant may be challenged and
    examined, [our courts] have not suggested that every
    inaccuracy will justify an exclusion of evidence obtained as a
    result of the search.         The question of whether a
    misstatement was deliberately made is to be answered by
    the lower court.
    
    Id. at 1017
     (emphasis in original).   Moreover, this Court has concluded a
    misstatement is immaterial “if an independent basis exists to support a
    finding of probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Antoszyk, 
    985 A.2d 975
    ,
    982 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    Where omissions are the basis for a challenge to an affidavit of
    probable cause supporting a warrant, we apply the following test:
    (1) whether the officer withheld a highly relevant fact within
    his knowledge, where “any reasonable person would have
    known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish
    to know”; and (2) whether the affidavit would have
    provided probable cause if it had contained a disclosure of
    the omitted information.
    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    850 A.2d 684
    , 689 (Pa. Super. 2004).
    - 24 -
    J-S49011-14
    Here, based upon our standard of review, we discern no abuse of
    discretion or error of law in denying suppression. The trial court set forth
    the applicable legal principles, scrutinized the affidavits of probable cause at
    issue, and thoughtfully examined the testimony of the investigating officers
    and affiant to conclude that there were no material misstatements or
    omissions. Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/2012, at 13-23. We agree.
    With regard to Appellant’s first allegation of error that “it was a
    misstatement to discuss the death of [Appellant’s] first wife without
    mentioning a conclusion referenced in a Lebanon County [p]olice report that
    indicated Jewel Schirmer suffered a myocardial infarction[,]” the trial court
    determined:
    Detective [James] Wagner and Trooper [William] Maynard
    both made clear at the time of the omnibus hearing that
    there were no medical records to sustain a conclusion that
    Jewel died of a heart attack. [Trooper] Maynard and
    [Detective] Wagner were clear that they did not rely on
    information contained in the Lebanon County [p]olice
    report; but rather based their information and conclusions
    on the coroner’s report.      They did not have medical
    records in their possession at the time the warrants were
    issued.    The only clear misstatement in the affidavits
    regarding Jewel’s death was the statement that her
    manner of death was determined to be accidental. In
    reality, the manner of death remained “undetermined” at
    the time the affidavits were written and sworn to.
    Once again, probable cause is present where “the facts
    and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of
    which he has reasonable trustworthy information are
    sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
    caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.”
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
    292 A.2d 352
    , 357 (Pa. 1972).
    It is manifestly reasonable to rely on the coroner’s report
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    J-S49011-14
    which was received from Dr. Wayne Ross, rather than
    another county’s police records. At the time the affidavits
    were written, the only indication of a myocardial infarction
    was contained in the Lebanon County police report. This
    resulted from Chief Deputy Coroner Patty Garber indicating
    to the police that Kidney One and Hershey Medical Center
    had indicated to her that the heart was damaged.
    However, Dr. Ross had never received records from Kidney
    One or Hershey Medical Center to support that
    determination.
    An assertion in a police report that someone else had
    heard from yet a third party that there was a problem with
    the heart is unreliable information in comparison to the
    coroner’s report. The affidavit merely characterized the
    death of Jewel Schirmer as “suspicious.” The affidavit did
    mischaracterize the status of her death by relating that the
    manner of death was determined to be accidental.
    Excising the statement that manner of death was
    accidental strengthens the conclusion that the death of
    [Jewel] was suspicious.
    The omission of any mention of a myocardial infarction
    with respect to Jewel’s heart was not a highly relevant
    fact. However, even if this [were] a highly relevant fact,
    probable cause would still exist with the disclosure of the
    omitted information.
    Id. at 22.
    Regarding Appellant’s contention that the affiant omitted an expert
    report prepared by Dr. Mihalakis,9 the trial court found credible the affiant’s
    ____________________________________________
    9
    Specifically, Appellant challenges the statement in the affidavit that “Betty
    Schirmer’s body could not have slammed around inside the car from the
    impact with the guardrail… Betty Schirmers [sic] injuries are consistent with
    an assault or beating with a blunt force object or weapon.” Trial Court
    Opinion, 5/18/2012, at 17. Appellant argues that this is a misstatement
    because it does not reference Dr. Mihalakis’ written report that stated that
    Betty’s injuries were consistent with an automobile accident in which the
    victim was an unrestrained passenger.
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    - 26 -
    J-S49011-14
    testimony that he did not review the report prior to applying for the search
    warrants and that he had only been told that the injuries could have been
    10
    consistent with an automobile accident, but may have been inflicted prior.
    Id. at 19.    Moreover, even though Dr. Mihalakis’ written report was not
    referenced in the affidavit, the trial court found that the omission of any
    reference in the affidavit to Dr. Mihalakis’ report was not relevant as the
    report contained numerous factual inaccuracies. Id. at 18. Finally, the trial
    court concluded that the affidavit had sufficient independent bases to
    establish probable cause that Betty’s injuries were inconsistent with the
    vehicular accident, stating:
    [T]he affidavit would still allege that there was no evidence
    of braking or skid marks, and that the damage to the
    vehicle was very minor. Examination of the blood evidence
    indicated that the victim was bleeding prior to the accident.
    [Appellant] gave contradictory statements to the deputy
    coroner and to the police. The death of [Appellant’s] first
    wife was suspicious.
    Id. at 20.
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    10
    The affiant, James Wagner, a detective with the Pocono Township Police
    department was investigating the case and working in conjunction with Tom
    McAndrew, an officer with the Pennsylvania State Police. N.T., 1/30/2012,
    at 62-68. Trooper McAndrew met with Dr. Mihalakis to examine the blood
    evidence. Id. at 68. Trooper McAndrew relayed Dr. Mihalakis’ initial
    findings to Detective Wagner, but Detective Wagner did not see Dr.
    Mihalakis’ formal report until after the searches were conducted. Id. at 69.
    At the time he submitted applications for the search warrants, Detective
    Wagner testified that, “[a]ll [he] knew at that time was Trooper McAndrew
    told [him] that the injury to Betty’s head was what [Dr. Mihalakis] would
    expect to find or see in a [vehicular] crash.” Id. at 69.
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    J-S49011-14
    Finally, pertaining to Appellant’s claim that the affiant lacked expertise
    in rendering a conclusion that a low speed accident could not cause the
    injuries suffered by the victim, the trial court concluded:     (1) the affiant
    testified previously in the Commonwealth as an expert in blood spatter
    analysis; (2) prior to applying for a search warrant, the affiant consulted
    with another investigating officer who was qualified as an expert in “blood
    stain analysis and crime scene processing[;]” and, (3) an expert from New
    York concurred that the victim was bleeding prior to entering the car before
    the search warrants were issued.      Id. at 21.   Accordingly, the trial court
    found that “the conclusions of a township detective with training in the field
    of blood stain analysis and a state trooper qualified as an expert in blood
    stain analysis, together with the concurrence of another expert in the field is
    enough to support the statement about the victim bleeding prior to the
    accident.” Id. at 21-22.
    We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law with respect to any of
    the conclusions reached by the able trial court in denying Appellant’s motion
    to suppress based on the affidavits of probable cause issued in support of
    the search warrants.       The affidavits of probable cause were accurate
    reflections of the knowledge known to the affiant at the time of the
    applications.   There was no deliberate withholding of information and there
    were no material misstatements in the affidavits of probable cause.
    Moreover, there were sufficient independent bases within the affidavits of
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    J-S49011-14
    probable cause to support the issuance of search warrants in this case.
    Accordingly, Appellant’s final issue does not merit relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/23/2014
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