Com. v. One (1) Jersey Hold' Em Machine ( 2014 )


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  • J-A21028-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    ONE (1) JERSEY HOLD ‘EM MACHINE
    SERIAL NO. DDGPA0003
    ONE (1) RED, WHITE, & BLUE GAMING
    MACHINE
    SERIAL NO. DDGPA0002
    No. 309 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Dated December 18, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-MD-0001060-2011
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:FILED DECEMBER 23, 2014
    I respectfully dissent.
    As our Commonwealth Court recently acknowledged,
    [Section 5513 of the] Crimes Code has been construed to
    mean that a machine is a gambling device per se, if it can be
    used for no purpose other than gambling. This determination is
    made by comparing the characteristics of the machine against
    the elements necessary to gambling: (1) consideration; (2) a
    result determined by chance rather than skill; and (3) reward. If
    these three elements are present, then the machine will be
    considered “so intrinsically connected with gambling” as to
    constitute a gambling device per se. The Commonwealth has the
    burden of proving the per se nature of the machines.
    J-A21028-14
    Commonwealth v. Wintel, Inc., 
    829 A.2d 753
    , 757-58 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2003) (citations and footnotes omitted).1
    I believe the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the
    machines     at    issue   were     predominately   games   of   skill.   As   the
    Commonwealth’s expert witness pointed out on multiple occasions, the
    “skill” required to prevail in the games at issue was nearly impossible for the
    average or casual player to attain. N.T., 10/18/2013, at 41, 43-44, 48-51,
    85.
    The Commonwealth’s expert, Daryl Robert Sertell (Sertell) testified
    that he is the owner of Casino Horizons Corporation, a consulting firm that
    specializes in gambling and slot machines. N.T., 10/18/2013, at 6. Sertell’s
    evaluation of the machines at issue was based on the premise that, in order
    to be a game of skill, more than half of a player’s attempts to control the
    outcome of a game need to be successful. 
    Id. at 86-88.
    He explained that,
    due to his extensive experience with slot machines, his skill was greater with
    than that of the average player. 
    Id. at 98.
    Yet he could not come close to
    controlling the outcome of a game more than half of his attempts.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    “This Court is not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court.
    However, such decisions provide persuasive authority, and we may turn to
    our colleagues on the Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate.”
    Maryland Casualty Co. v. Odyssey Contracting Corp., 
    894 A.2d 750
    ,
    756 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 
    909 A.2d 1290
    (Pa. 2006), cert.
    denied, 
    549 U.S. 1305
    (2007).
    -2-
    J-A21028-14
    Because the reels moved so quickly that the colors blurred together, it
    was impossible to use color as an aide in play. 
    Id. at 44.
    Because the sound
    track of the machine was not always synchronized with the spinning of the
    reels, a player could not rely on the music to time reel stoppage. 
    Id. at 52-
    53.   Based on his testing, Sertell concluded that the Red, White and Blue
    machine was a game of chance. 
    Id. at 53,
    95.
    Similarly, Sertell concluded that the Jersey Hold ‘Em machine was a
    game of chance.    
    Id. at 53,
    95.    Again, despite his expertise, he fell far
    short of obtaining even the least valuable winning combinations.
    The owner of the machines, Martin Caplan (Caplan) testified that the
    modified machines were games of skill based upon the Rules of Play posted
    on each and the necessity of active player participation to win. N.T.,
    12/18/2013, at 13-14, 34, 35. Caplan, who was not proffered as an expert,
    asserted that it was “impossible” to win either game without “predominant
    application of skill.” 
    Id. at 12.
      Caplan, at various times throughout his
    testimony described “skill” as being “memory”, “concentration”, the ability to
    “play for some length of time in order to get the hang of it”, and pressing
    the stop button to play the game. 
    Id. at 16,
    34, 35. However, on cross-
    examination, Caplan agreed that “there’s no skill [to game play on either
    machine] absent hitting the three [stop] buttons in the time frame” but
    maintained that a person of “average eyesight” would be able to memorize
    the order of symbols on each reel and adjust his play based on knowledge of
    -3-
    J-A21028-14
    when the reels stopped after the button was pressed. 
    Id. at 44,
    48-50.
    Finally, defense expert Nick Farley (Farley), owner of a company
    specializing in the regulatory compliance evaluation of gaming devices,
    opined that both machines were games of skill. N.T., 12/18/2013, at 54, 64.
    Like Caplan, Farley testified that the “skill” involved in each game was the
    actions of the player: placing a bet and physically stopping the reels before
    2
    the machine timed out.           Farley opined that a player could memorize the
    spinning wheels, or use other visual cues, to achieve a desired result. 
    Id. at 81-82.
    Farley noted that during the trials certain of his staff were able to
    identify visual cues to assist in game play, although he conceded that
    players may not actually be able to determine or memorize the entire
    sequence of symbols without prior knowledge.            
    Id. at 77-78.
       Farley
    concluded that “as it is not possible to obtain a winning outcome without
    player input, skill clearly plays a predominate [sic] role in game output.” 
    Id. at 81.
    I find the defense witnesses’ attempt to conflate “action” with “skill”
    unavailing. As our Supreme Court recognized in Two Electronic Poker
    Game Machines,
    ____________________________________________
    2
    However, unlike Sertell, Farley did not indicate many times he and his staff
    played each machine, nor did he testify as to how many attempts to catch a
    particular result were successful. The certified record does not include this
    information.
    -4-
    J-A21028-14
    [w]hile skill, in the form of knowledge of probabilities, can
    improve a player’s chances of winning and can maximize the size
    of the winnings, chance ultimately determines the outcome
    because chance determines the cards dealt and the cards from
    which one can draw—in short, a large random element is always
    present. That the skill involved in Electro–Sport is not the same
    skill which can indeed determine the outcome in a game of poker
    between human players can be appreciated when it is realized
    that holding, folding, bluffing and raising have no role to play in
    Electro–Sport poker. Skill can improve the outcome in Electro–
    Sport; it cannot determine it.
    
    Id. at 978
    (internal citations omitted).
    Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Dent, 
    992 A.2d 190
    (Pa. Super.
    2010), a panel of this Court, applying the “predominant-factor test”,
    determined that Texas Hold ‘Em poker is gambling, stating
    while the outcome of poker may be dependent on skill to some
    degree, it is predominantly a game of chance. While, as noted in
    Two Electronic Poker Machines, skill can determine the
    outcome in a poker game, players are still subject to defeat at
    the turn of the cards.
    
    Id. at 196
    (footnote omitted).
    Likewise, blackjack is a game of chance, despite the fact that a skilled
    blackjack player, or card counter (assuming he is not ejected from the
    casino), can turn the cards in his or her favor. In re $13,561.50, 
    456 A.2d 1140
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)(noting that blackjack game was an “illegal
    gambling device” pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 5513(b)). See also People v.
    Turner, 
    165 Misc. 2d 222
    , 
    629 N.Y.S.2d 661
    (N.Y. Crim.Ct. 1995) (holding
    that “[g]ames of chance range from those that require no skill, such as a
    lottery, to those such as poker or blackjack which require considerable skill
    -5-
    J-A21028-14
    in calculating the probability of drawing particular cards. Nonetheless, the
    latter are as much games of chance as the former, since the outcome
    depends to a material degree upon the random distribution of cards. The
    skill of the player may increase the odds in the player’s favor, but cannot
    determine the outcome regardless of the degree of skill employed.”); State
    v. Eisen, 16 N.C.App. 532, 
    192 S.E.2d 613
    , 616 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972)
    (holding that in blackjack the element of chance dominated the elements of
    skill).
    Similarly, with respect to either one of the machines at issue, the
    action of pressing a button is not a skill within the meaning of the statute,
    and chance predominates the outcome.             Accordingly, as I believe the
    Commonwealth met its burden in proving that chance prevails over skill, I
    would reverse the order of the trial court.3
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Unless these proceedings are an effort to protect the state lottery’s
    monopoly on gambling, it is hard to see what purpose is served in
    preventing charitable organizations from running these games of chance.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 309 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 12/23/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024