Com. v. Miranda, E. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
EFRAIN MIRANDA, III
Appellant No. 229 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 10, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0004165-2011
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 23, 2014
Efrain Miranda, III, appeals from the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Lehigh County dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
This case arises from a lengthy investigation of drug sales in
Allentown, Pennsylvania. On July 18, 2012, Miranda entered a negotiated
guilty plea to 10 counts each of possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance (cocaine),2 conspiracy to commit possession with intent to deliver
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
35 Pa.C.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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a controlled substance (cocaine),3 and corrupt organizations.4 The court
sentenced Miranda to an aggregate term of 12 to 29 years’ incarceration,
and denied his post-sentence motion for a modification of sentence on
September 12, 2012. Miranda did not file a direct appeal of his judgment of
sentence.
Miranda filed the instant PCRA petition on July 8, 2013, which he
amended on November 22, 2013. An evidentiary hearing occurred on
December 6, 2013. Following argument, the PCRA court dismissed
Miranda’s requests for relief. Miranda filed a timely pro se notice of appeal
and, as ordered by the court, filed a timely statement of errors complained
of pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court, at Miranda’s request,
appointed the Lehigh County Public Defender’s Office to represent him.
On appeal, Miranda raises the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel,
Angelo Almonti, Esquire.5 Specifically, Miranda claims that Attorney Almonti
was deficient regarding discovery and failed to explain fully and adequately
the plea negotiations.
____________________________________________
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b)(1).
5
We note that Miranda has failed to cite any legal authority in support of his
position. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d
915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived.”). However, this defect is not fatal to Miranda’s claims.
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Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s denial of a petition for
post-conviction relief is well-settled: we must examine whether
the record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and whether
the PCRA court’s determination is free of legal error. The PCRA
court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support
for the findings in the certified record.
Further, considering just the specific claim appellant has raised
in this appeal, a PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when
he proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
conviction or sentence resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance
of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). As our [S]upreme [C]ourt has
stated:
It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have
provided effective representation unless the PCRA
petitioner pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the
underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s
action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis
designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3)
prejudice, to the effect that there was a reasonable
probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s error.
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citations omitted). The PCRA court may deny a claim of ineffectiveness if
the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet a single one of these prongs. Id.
Moreover, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating counsel’s
ineffectiveness. Id.
Initially, we note that the PCRA court found Attorney Almonti’s
testimony credible and Miranda’s testimony not credible. Further, the record
supports the PCRA’s decision to dismiss Miranda’s petition for failure to
prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence resulted
from the ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.
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Miranda’s first argument, that Attorney Almonti was ineffective for
failing to adequately review discovery with his client and contest a protective
order regarding discovery, is meritless. Attorney Almonti received discovery
in the form of five compact discs of wiretapped conversations as well as
some paper documents including, but not limited to, the criminal complaint,
relevant search warrants, affidavits of probable cause and inventory
receipts. On January 6, 2012, Attorney Almonti informed Miranda, by letter,
that he could not give him the discovery materials due to a protective order,
and requested that Miranda make an appointment to review the discovery in
his law offices. Miranda complied and together they reviewed the discovery
over the course of several sessions. At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Almonti
testified that he did not review every wiretap due to Miranda’s decision to
cooperate with the authorities and his desire for a non-trial disposition.
Attorney Almonti further testified that he did not contest the protective order
due to his belief that it would help his client, who was cooperating with the
authorities. In light of these facts, it is clear that the trial court properly
determined that Miranda’s argument that Attorney Almonti was ineffective
for failing to review discovery is meritless. See id.
Miranda also argues that Attorney Almonti was ineffective for failing to
explain fully all of the possible plea offers and why his client should plead
guilty. Again, the facts undermine this contention.
At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Almonti testified that he repeatedly
explained to Miranda the maximum sentence he could receive. In addition,
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Miranda reviewed a chart authored by the Deputy District Attorney, detailing
each of Miranda’s drug deliveries and the accompanying standard sentence.
Attorney Almonti memorialized these conversations in a letter he sent to
Miranda on June 29, 2012, approximately two weeks before the guilty plea.
Additionally, Attorney Almonti testified that he met with Miranda in prison
the two days prior to the plea hearing as well as the day of the plea. During
these meeting, Attorney Almonti explained the different offers from the
Commonwealth. Furthermore, the trial court conducted an extensive guilty
plea colloquy in which it placed the maximum sentences on the record.
Based on these facts, the trial court properly determined that Miranda’s
argument that Attorney Almonti was ineffective for failing to explain all
possible sentences is meritless. See id.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/23/2014
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